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# The Influence of Community Context and Individual Characteristics on Jewish Identity: A 21-Community Study

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**THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT  
AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS  
ON JEWISH IDENTITY:  
A 21-COMMUNITY STUDY**

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Naturally, responsibility for the content presented herein is the sole responsibility of the authors.

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## **THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS ON JEWISH IDENTITY: A 21-COMMUNITY STUDY**

**T**he purpose of this Report is to explore the extent to which community contexts are related to Jewish identity. We employ the Decade 2000 Data Set which contains almost 19,000 randomly selected Jewish households from 21 American Jewish communities interviewed from 2000-2008. Because of the large sample size, this research also is able to examine various influences on Jewish Identity that have not been definitively addressed in previous research.

First, this Report briefly reviews some of the literature on Jewish identity.

Second, the Decade 2000 Data Set used for the analysis is described and some of the methodological considerations involved in its use are presented.

Third, we perform a factor analysis of 17 Jewish identity indicators which yields four Jewish Identity Factors: a Communal Religious Factor, a Private Religious Factor, a Communal Ethnic Factor, and a Local Ethnic Factor.

Fourth, we present 44 hypotheses related to the relationships between the Jewish Identity Factors and, at the community level, to both Jewish community infrastructure and context and to the broader community context; and, at the individual level, to Jewish background/connection, family status, socioeconomic status, and demography/geography variables. We spend considerable time developing these hypotheses, grounded in the available literature as well as our own reasoning. We have laid out the hypotheses in detail, so that we can compare the results to what would be expected based on prior studies, both among American Jews and the broader population. Because we are introducing indicators of community context, we are able to test the extent to which individual-level characteristics retain their previously-found relationship with the various factors of Jewish Identity, even when community context is controlled. And because we control for individual-level indicators, we are able to discern the net effect of community-level characteristics on individual Jewish identity.

Fifth, we test our hypotheses using a multiple regression model.

Sixth, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings and plans and suggestions for future research and data needs.

## BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

**P**revious research has established a strong relationship between religion and geography (Stump, 2008) in that the following have been shown to vary by geographic area:

1. the Jewish infrastructure provided by Jewish communities (for example, communal organizations such as synagogues and Jewish Community Centers; social, cultural, and educational services; and institutions) (e.g., Sheskin, 2001c).
2. the broader religious milieu and infrastructure (for example, societal expectations of religious behavior and the religious infrastructure available to the broader population) (e.g., Silk and Walsh, 2008; Putnam and Campbell, 2010);
3. the *religious* identity of individuals (both Jewish and non-Jewish) (for example, attendance at religious services (or individual prayer); the subjective importance of religion; and religious affiliation (e.g., Kosmin and Keysar, 2006; Silk and Walsh, 2008; Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey, 1998);
4. the *Jewish Identity* of individuals (for example, religious practices; denominational preference; synagogue affiliation; and communal involvement (e.g., Phillips, 1989; Sheskin, 2001c, 2005a);

While all four of these general findings lead to the expectation that a relationship should exist between community contexts and Jewish identity, research has also established that individual religioethnic identity varies by demographic (such as age, gender, household structure, and immigration status) and socioeconomic characteristics (such as education, income, and occupation) generally (e.g., Christiano, Swatos Jr. and Kivisto, 2007; Demerath, 1965; McCloud, 2007) and specifically among Jews (e.g., Ament, 2004, Hartman and Hartman, 2009; Rieger, 2004). Certainly intersections exist between the impact of geography and community context on the one hand and demographics and socioeconomic status on the other. After all, communities vary in their socioeconomic status. But communities are not monolithic and the extent to which religious identity is influenced by community context is not well established. Much of the research on geography and community context has not sufficiently controlled for individual-level characteristics to determine whether effect of the communal infrastructure exists beyond the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of a community's population. At the same time, the research on individual-level characteristics rarely considers the effect of "place." Take, for example, an educated affluent lawyer who is married with children. Will the probability that he or she will be active in the local Jewish community be different if he or she lives in Las Vegas, NV or Washington, DC? Does "place" exert its own effect, and if so, through what mechanisms? The work of the "Religion by Region" project at Trinity College suggests that "place" indeed affects how religion is expressed, how salient it is for public (and conceivably for private) life, and touches on some of the different expressions



of public Jewish life in the various regions of the United States (the project is summarized in Silk and Walsh, 2008), but the comparisons of Jewish communities are broad and not detailed to the level of specific communities.

Horowitz (1999:237) called for a sociology of “Jewishness of place,” including attention to such variables as Jewish population size, Jewish population density, percentage of persons in the broader population who are Jewish, percentage of intermarried, and number of Jewish institutions. This research is able to address this noted void by using community studies for which this information is available.

Previous research also has established the multifaceted nature of Jewish Identity, which encompasses both religious and ethnic dimensions (e.g., E. Cohen, 2009; Glenn and Sokoloff, 2010; Hartman and Hartman, 1996, 2001, 2009a; Phillips, 1991; Rebhun, 2004; Sharot, 2011). The extent to which individuals and communities view their “Jewishness” as either religious or ethnic or some combination thereof fluctuates with geography, historical context, and the ideology of particular Jewish movements (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Zionist, Humanist, etc.) (e.g., Diner, 2004; Dollinger, 2000; Hartman and Hartman, 2001, 2009; Sharot, 2011).

Jewish religious identity itself has at least two dimensions, the first relating more to the celebrations and public rituals at which communal Jewish Identity, at least in the American context, is expressed (such as participation in a Passover Seder); the second relating to stricter, more traditional ritual practices (such as observance of the dietary laws), often reflecting personal and daily commitment to the traditional commandments (Hartman and Hartman, 2009; Rebhun, 2004). Liebman and Cohen (1990), following Alexander (1987:124-125), distinguished these dimensions as “ceremony,” referring to those rituals which appear to be more a matter of “affirming membership in the social and cosmological order,” while “ritual” expresses more a connection “to some transcendental presence.” As will be seen below, we find these two dimensions of religious identity distinguished in our data as well.

Jewish ethnic identity reflects identification with and commitment to the Jewish people and its continuity. Cohen (1983) identified six dimensions of Jewish ethnicity, including: (1) a sense of peoplehood as expressed through feelings of common destiny with other Jews; (2) tribalism, or a sense of special responsibility for taking care of other Jews in need; (3) marginality, or a sense of feeling apart from other Americans; (4) attachment to Israel; (5) attachment to non-synagogue Jewish institutions; and (6) opposition to intermarriage. Some of these express a broad communal, transcendent sense of identification (the entire Jewish people, its historical legacy, and future), while others express a more social sense of attachment on a local level. Ethnic identity is often expressed in more secular attachment to the Jewish people and its culture rather than through religious attachments or practices.



Jewish identity also varies in the extent to which it is expressed in primarily communal settings, such as a synagogue or in more private settings (for example, the home or as a personal practice) (Hartman and Hartman, 2001, 2009).

While these various expressions of Jewish identity are sometimes difficult to disentangle (Herman, 1977: 37), recognizing the multivariate nature of Jewish identity allows us to raise the questions of whether and how the expression of Jewish identity varies by community, and what community characteristics account for this variation.

### **The Decade 2000 Data Set**


**T**he 1971, 1990, and 2000-01 National Jewish Population Surveys (NJPSs) provide the largest national samples of Jews in single surveys (Massarik and Chenkin, 1973; Kosmin et al., 1991; Kotler-Berkowitz, 2003). However, these studies are quite limited for the purpose of studying variations among local Jewish communities (Sheskin, 2005b). None of the three NJPSs were designed to produce data at the local Jewish community level. In fact, NJPS 2000-01, even with a sample size of 4,523, was only designed to produce accurate data for the country as a whole and for the four major Census Regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). With the partial exception of New York and South Florida, the sample design does not yield random samples of sufficient size to facilitate local analysis. Further, the latest NJPS was conducted a decade ago, and while much can still be gleaned from it, Jewish identity in its various expressions may have changed over the past decade.

The North American Jewish Data Bank ([www.jewishdatabank.org](http://www.jewishdatabank.org)) has collected more than 200 local Jewish Federation-sponsored Jewish community studies which offer greater potential for studying the manner in which Jewish identity varies for different types of individuals by community context.

Almost all local Jewish community studies have collected information for three broad purposes. The first purpose is to enable the organized Jewish community to provide services and programs that contribute to the development of a Jewish community that will offer compelling reasons for Jews to maintain their Jewish Identity and be active members of the Jewish community. The second purpose is to assist the organized Jewish community in addressing the complex programmatic and capital decisions involved in the delivery of social and educational services to the Jewish community. The third purpose is to assist Jewish Federations and other Jewish organizations in financial resource development.

Local Jewish communities have engaged various researchers to conduct these studies, although of the 36 studies completed from 2000-2010, all but six were completed by one of two researchers (Ira M. Sheskin; Jacob B. Ukeles/Ron Miller). This Report uses the 21 data sets created by Ira M. Sheskin from 2000-2008 which comprise the Decade 2000 Data Set (**Map 1**). Despite this, the comparisons of Jewish communities on different

MAP 1: GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS OF SILK AND WALSH  
SHOWING LOCATIONS OF THE 21 COMMUNITIES



measures and our ability to combine the 21 separate studies into one Data Set should be treated with caution for the following major reasons:

1. **Different Dates of the Studies.** The local Jewish community studies included in our analysis were completed over an eight-year period. Differences between Place A in 2000 and Place B in 2008 may be due to the temporal differences in the community studies. For example, the intermarriage rate in Place A may be lower than in Place B simply because the community study in Place A was completed eight years earlier, when intermarriage rates generally were lower.
2. **Different Sampling Methods.** Three different sampling methods were used in the 21 Jewish community studies: Four communities (Bergen, Miami, South Palm Beach, and West Palm Beach) used a random digit dialing (RDD)<sup>1</sup> only sample (drawn from randomly generated telephone numbers). Sixteen communities employed an RDD sample combined with a Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) sample (drawn from a computerized telephone directory).<sup>2</sup> One community (Jacksonville) also sampled from

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<sup>1</sup> The RDD methodology is necessary for a study to obtain results that accurately represent a population. The major advantage of this methodology is that it produces a random sample of Jewish households. When done well, the RDD methodology will yield a high survey cooperation rate (the percentage of households who identify themselves as containing one or more Jewish persons who agree to be interviewed). The RDD methodology also guarantees anonymity to respondents.

An important aspect of the RDD methodology is that it results in an appropriate share of interviews from households who are not listed in the telephone directory. The RDD methodology also facilitates calling households who have recently migrated into the study area and other households whose telephone numbers are not yet published in the local area telephone directory. Perhaps more importantly, the RDD methodology does not rely upon Jewish households making themselves known to the Jewish community by joining a synagogue, the Jewish Community Center, or other Jewish organizations, or by donating money to a Jewish fund raising campaign, which would result in a sample that is inherently biased toward more Jewishly-connected households. Thus, a more accurate representation of the Jewish community should be obtained with the RDD methodology than with telephone directory methods or methods that rely upon randomly selecting households from Jewish organization mailing lists.

An RDD telephone survey proceeds as follows. For all three-digit telephone exchange codes in a study area, four-digit random numbers are generated by a computer to produce seven-digit telephone numbers. For all surveys in the Decade 2000 Data Set, these numbers were purchased from Survey Sampling International of Fairfield, Connecticut. When a number was dialed, there was no guarantee that a household, let alone a Jewish household, would be reached. In fact, for Middlesex County, for example, 30,000 different numbers were dialed more than 52,000 times to obtain the 297 RDD interviews in that study. This is a yield rate of 1.0% (297 divided by 30,000). The remainder of the numbers dialed were either disconnected, not in service, changed to unlisted or other listed numbers, business numbers, government numbers, fax machines, non-Jewish households, ineligible Jewish households (such as a senile person), not answered by a person after multiple attempts, or answered by persons who refused to respond to the screener (the introduction to the survey which determined if we were speaking with a Jewish household) or who refused to cooperate with the survey.

<sup>2</sup> After the completion of the RDD telephone survey, additional telephone interviews were conducted in 17 of the 21 communities with households with a Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) (Sheskin, 1998) listed in the most recent computerized local telephone directory. Lists of more than 200 DJNs were used. In Minneapolis and St. Paul (Sheskin, 2005c), Russian Jewish first names were also used. This greatly facilitated each study as

the Jewish Federation mailing list. Different sampling methods may lead to differences in survey results. Thus, the intermarriage rate in Place A may be higher than in Place B because the community study in Place A used an RDD-only sample, while the community study in Place B used an RDD/DJN sample. Note, however, that weighting factors were employed to adjust much of the bias introduced by DJN sampling. Thus, the intermarriage rate reported in communities with RDD/DJN sampling is within the confidence interval of the percentage that would be derived from the RDD sample alone. **Table 1** shows the sampling methods and sample sizes for each of the 21 community studies included in the Decade 2000 Data Set.

3. **Different Questionnaires.** A variety of questionnaires have been used in Jewish community studies. The survey research literature indicates that even small changes in question wording or in the sequence in which questions are asked on a telephone survey can have a significant impact upon survey results (Bradburn, Sudman, and Wansink, 2004).

In summary, while problems do exist in comparing the results among the comparison Jewish communities and in combining the 21 separate studies into one, we have every confidence that despite these problems, Decade 2000 represents a significant resource for the social scientific study of American Jews. The lack of such a data set for comparative analysis has meant that, until now, only a very limited number of studies have utilized local Jewish community studies for the types of analysis undertaken in this Report (e.g., Phillips, 1993; Rebhun, 1995; Sheskin, 2001c; 2010a, 2010b).

There are two methods that may be used to facilitate comparisons of community studies. One is to analyze each community separately and to compile the results in an aggregated “meta-analysis” (Cooper and Patall, 2009), an approach that allows for determining whether the same results (for example, the relationship between age and Jewish identity or the relationship between education and Jewish identity) are found in different communal contexts. It works best when relatively simple findings are compared and the data (for

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one RDD interview generally was completed every 2-5 hours, depending on the incidence rate for Jewish households in each community; one DJN interview was generally completed every 50 minutes in every community.

Because two sampling methods generally were utilized—RDD and DJN, weighting factors were needed so that the DJN surveys did not introduce bias. For example, surveys completed via DJN sampling invariably find fewer intermarried couples than RDD surveys. Thus, the DJN sample was compared to the RDD sample on a number of key variables: geographic area, age of the head of the household, household size, household structure, length of residence, household income, denominational identification (Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, Reform, Just Jewish), type of marriage (in-married, conversionary in-married, intermarried), synagogue membership, Jewish Community Center membership, familiarity with the Jewish Federation, visits to Israel, and donated to the Jewish Federation in the past year. Chi-square tests were used to see where the RDD and DJN samples differed significantly. Since the RDD sample is the more representative one, appropriate weighting factors were applied to the DJN sample to adjust for the demographic bias introduced by the DJN sample. With these weighting factors applied, no statistically significant differences are seen between the RDD and DJN samples on any of the key variables.

example, question wording, response categories, indicators, sampling methods, and data collection methodology) have been standardized for comparability. Meta-analysis of this type in relation to Jewish studies has been conducted most recently at the Steinhardt Social Research Center, Brandeis University (Saxe, 2010; Tighe et al., 2010), in an effort to estimate the size of the US Jewish population. Saxe and colleagues only included studies of a national US sample in their meta-analysis, and did not include any local Jewish community studies as they do not represent all of the US geographically. One disadvantage of meta-analysis of this type is that it does not enable analysis of population subgroups for which the sample size in any given community sample is too small.

An alternative and often preferable approach, when the data and resources allow, is to aggregate the individual data sets into a single data set, a technique variously termed “individual participant data” (Cooper and Patall, 2009; Riley et al., 2010) or “integrative data analysis” (Curran and Hussong, 2009), and conduct analyses on the individual level, while controlling for multiple levels of variation (for example, community level, individual level, and survey level). Curran et al. (2008: 365) suggest that:

The strategy of pooling data drawn from separate investigations holds many benefits, including increased statistical power, greater sample heterogeneity in important subject demographics, the broader psychometric assessment of constructs, and the ability to estimate a variety of models that would not be possible within any single data set.

However, integrative data analysis also has drawbacks, including the challenge of standardizing measurement for construct development and the effort needed to standardize the questions asked and the response categories. For reasons elaborated below, we were able to use this as the primary approach for the current study.

For the present analysis, we limited the community studies to those conducted by Ira M. Sheskin as the principal investigator since the completion of NJPS 2000-01. This limitation had a number of significant advantages. **First**, the questionnaire used in each of these local Jewish community studies was basically the same, with minimal variation from community to community in almost all basic measures of Jewish identity.<sup>3</sup> **Second**, and of major import, Sheskin had already compiled all 21 studies into a single *mega-data* file, having performed the preliminary comparisons of the questionnaires and eliminating (for the most part) variation by standardizing response categories. It should be noted that this preparation is extremely time-consuming and is mentioned as a major drawback for doing this kind of integrative data analysis (Curran, et al., 2008; Cooper and Patall, 2009). **Third**, numerous comparisons of community contexts were already available. In the latest community study (Middlesex) included in the Decade 2000 Data Set, comparison tables

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<sup>3</sup> Differences do exist from questionnaire to questionnaire as deemed necessary in each community by that community's demographic study committee, Jewish Federation, community rabbis, Jewish agency executives, and lay leadership.

for almost 200 questions were included in the study report (Sheskin, 2009) which is available on the North American Jewish Data Bank website. This greatly facilitated an understanding of the range of variation involved and types of communal comparisons possible with the Decade 2000 Data Set. **Fourth**, Sheskin used the same basic methodology for determining the survey sample [usually a combination of RDD (random digital dialing) and DJN (Distinctive Jewish Names) techniques] for each study. **Fifth**, the same procedure was used to select a respondent from the household to interview (any cooperative adult, Jewish or not, who answered the telephone in a Jewish household). In each study a respondent was pursued intensively<sup>4</sup> until a high cooperation rate was achieved. **Sixth**, all 21 community studies used the same definition of a Jewish person: A Jewish person is any person who currently considers himself/herself Jewish (or who is identified as such by the respondent) or who was born Jewish or raised Jewish and has not formally converted to another religion and does not regularly attend religious services of another religion (irrespective of formal conversion). A Jewish household is defined as any household containing a Jewish person.

Nevertheless, variability exists among the studies. Some questions had to be eliminated from our analysis because they were not asked in all communities or had been altered significantly from study to study. In terms of the samples, while most of the samples were derived from a combination of RDD and DJN techniques, they varied in the percentage of the sample that each sampling technique provided, and in Jacksonville, in addition to RDD and DJN samples, a sample was drawn from the Jewish Federation mailing list. Further, the studies varied in their cooperation rates, ranging from 49%-97% for the screener<sup>5</sup> and from 64%-99% for the survey itself.

**Table 1** presents the communities included in the Decade 2000 Data Set, the year of each study, the sample size, the percentage of the sample contributed by RDD and DJN techniques, and the screener and survey cooperation rates. Some of the variables in **Table 1** were added as a final level of analysis (as survey-level characteristics) in the multiple regression analyses below, to see to what extent, if any, they contribute to the variation in Jewish Identity once other sources of variation have been eliminated. (Because of multicollinearity issues, only a selection of these variables could be included in the multiple regressions.)

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<sup>4</sup> With the exception of Detroit, Las Vegas, and Washington, each candidate telephone number was dialed at least four times to determine eligibility for the sample and then to participate in the survey itself. Again, with the exception of Detroit, Las Vegas, and Washington, an interviewing staff that was primarily or entirely Jewish was used to facilitate cooperation and questionnaires were completed using paper and pencil. For Detroit, Las Vegas, and Washington, Social Science Research Solutions (SSRS, formerly ICR) in Media, Pennsylvania executed the field work. While this meant that most interviewers were not Jewish for these studies, SSRS used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing and 8-10 call backs instead of four.

<sup>5</sup> The screener is the introduction to a survey that determines if a Jewish household has been reached.



**TABLE 1: ATTRIBUTES OF COMMUNITY STUDIES  
IN THE DECADE 2000 DATA SET**

					Percent of Sample		Cooperation Rate for RDD Sample	
Community	Year of Field Work (D2)	Sample Size (D1)	Number of Jewish Households (D1)	Sampling Fraction <sup>1</sup> (D1)	RDD (D1)	DJN (D1)	Screener (D1)	Survey (D1)
Atlantic County	2004	624	10,000	6.2%	32%	68%	90%	96%
Bergen	2001	1,003	28,400	3.5%	100%	0%	90%	84%
Detroit	2005	1,274	30,000	4.2%	32%	68%	64%	67%
Hartford	2000	763	14,800	5.2%	28%	72%	95%	95%
Jacksonville <sup>2</sup>	2002	601	6,700	9.0%	35%	38%	94%	98%
Las Vegas	2005	1,197	42,000	2.9%	33%	67%	49%	64%
Lehigh Valley	2007	537	4,000	13.4%	40%	60%	89%	96%
Miami	2004	1,808	54,000	3.3%	100%	0%	90%	86%
Middlesex	2008	1,076	24,000	4.5%	44%	56%	88%	90%
Minneapolis	2004	746	13,850	5.4%	28%	72%	89%	94%
Portland	2007	421	4,300	9.8%	36%	64%	85%	95%
Rhode Island	2002	829	9,550	8.7%	37%	63%	93%	91%
San Antonio	2007	675	4,500	15.0%	43%	57%	87%	92%
St. Paul	2004	494	5,150	9.6%	41%	59%	89%	94%
Sarasota	2005	616	8,800	7.0%	31%	69%	95%	93%
South Palm Beach	2005	1,511	73,000	2.1%	100%	0%	87%	92%
Tidewater	2001	628	5,400	11.6%	29%	71%	97%	99%
Tucson	2002	805	13,400	6.0%	37%	63%	95%	93%
Washington	2003	1,201	110,000	1.1%	33%	67%	80%	91%
West Palm Beach	2005	1,534	69,000	2.2%	100%	0%	87%	92%
Westport	2000	624	5,000	12.5%	32%	68%	94%	80%
<b>Total</b>		18,967	535,850	3.5%	55%	44%	85%	88%

<sup>1</sup> The percentage of households in the community completing the survey.

<sup>2</sup> 27% of surveys were completed with households on the Federation mailing list.

Note: Labels in parentheses correspond to hypothesis numbers in text.



Finally, note that while the 21 community studies included do not form a national probability sample, the 18,967 interviews do randomly represent almost 536,000 Jewish households containing 1,219,000 persons, of whom about 1,059,000 are Jewish.

For more detail on the methodology of each local Jewish community study included in the Decade 2000 Data Set, see Chapter 2 of the Main Report for each study. All Main Reports are available at [www.jewishdatabank.org](http://www.jewishdatabank.org).

## ANALYSIS PLAN

**W**e chose to use multivariate analysis for most of this study because of the large number of variables (17) to be analyzed and their multiple intercorrelations (for example, between education and income and between number of synagogues in a community and Jewish population size). The large sample size ( $n=18,967$ ) also made this possible and desirable.

**First**, we begin with a factor analysis of Jewish identity indicators. Factor analysis allows us to combine multiple indicators of Jewish identity that are highly intercorrelated with one another into a smaller number (in this case four) of factors (or composite variables). Factor analysis does not presuppose a structure for the dimensions of Jewish identity (that is, it does not “expect” a religious or an ethnic dimension and select variables for them accordingly), but rather allows the user to interpret the structure that the relationships between the variables themselves present. That the results correspond to dimensions found in prior studies, using different samples (as seen below), validates both prior theoretical assumptions and the factor analysis itself.

**Second**, we employ four multiple regression models to explain variations in the four Jewish Identity Factors resulting from the factor analysis. Three levels of independent variables are used in the multiple regressions. First, **community-level** characteristics of the Jewish community in which each household resides include indicators of the Jewish infrastructure of the community (for example, the number of synagogues and the size of the Jewish Federation campaign) as well as indicators of the broader religious context of the general community. Second, **individual-level** variables include Jewish background/connection variables and family status, socioeconomic status, and demographic/geographic variables. Third, **survey-level** characteristics are introduced and are used to determine whether differences in survey methodology and the year of the survey can explain differences in the findings. The use of survey-level characteristics also allows us to determine the net effect of each of the other levels of variables when survey characteristics are controlled.

## DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH IDENTITY FACTORS

**T**he first part of this section presents the results of the Total Factor Analysis (TFA) of all 19,967 cases in the 21 communities. The second part of this section briefly reviews some of the 21 factor analyses performed for each community separately.

### The Total Factor Analysis

Starting from the premise that Jewish identity is multi-dimensional, and desiring to determine what dimensions of Jewish identity were present in this population (rather than *a priori* assuming what the construct of Jewish identity is and selecting indicators to reflect that construct), we performed a factor analysis of the 17 Jewish identity variables common to all 21 communities.

Four factors emerged from the factor analysis of the 17 Jewish identity variables for all 21 communities combined (**Table 2**). Note that factor loadings of .31 or higher were considered when naming each factor. The four factors combined account for 57% of the variance in the original 17 variables. In the following description of **Table 2**, the numbers in parentheses are factor loadings.

**Factor 1 (Communal Religious Factor or “Ceremony”)** reflects the more common religious practices observed by many American Jews: light Chanukah candles (.828), participate in a Passover Seder (.782), Mezuzah on the front door (.615), attend synagogue services (.523), synagogue membership (.496), and light Friday night candles (.437). This factor accounts for 15 percent of the variance in the original 17 variables.

For the most part, the variables loading highly on Factor 1 are those which Alexander (1987, 124) referred to as “ceremony,” and “affirming membership in the social and cosmological order.” Sklare noted that these practices are generally compatible with American society in that they can be redefined in modern non-supra-mundane terms, do not demand social isolation or a unique life-style, provide a “Jewish” alternative when such is needed in the broader American religious scene, and are performed annually or infrequently (Sklare, 1971). Hartman and Hartman (2009) found a similar factor in their analysis of the 2000-01 National Jewish Population Survey.

This factor represents Jewish religious capital. Putnam (2000) distinguishes between *bonding* social capital, which is an investment in social networks of homogeneous groups of people; and *bridging* social capital, which is an investment in social networks of heterogeneous groups. This Communal Religious Factor, because some of the variables which load highly on it may represent participation in activities with heterogeneous groups of Jews and even non-Jews (for example, participate in a Passover Seder, attend synagogue services), may represent some degree of bridging capital as opposed to the more inward directed bonding capital which characterizes the Private Religious Factor (“Ritual”) (Factor 4 below). See Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) on the bridging effects of congregational involvement.

**TABLE 2: JEWISH IDENTITY FACTORS: LOADINGS  
FROM PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION**

Jewish Identity Indicator	Jewish Identity Factors			
	Religious Identity	Ethnic Identity		Religious Identity
	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Communal Ethnic Factor	Local Ethnic Factor	Private Religious Factor (Ritual)
Light Chanukah candles *	.828			
Participate in a Passover Seder *	.782			
Mezuzah on front door of home	.615			
Attend synagogue services **	.523			.450
Synagogue member	.496	.352		
Visit to Israel		.683		
Jewish Organization member		.657		
Donated to local Jewish federation in the past year		.587	.313	
Emotional attachment to Israel		.583		
Donated to a Jewish charity other than Jewish federation in the past year		.572		
Familiar with the local Jewish Federation ****			.780	
Familiar with Jewish Family Service ****			.772	
At least somewhat familiar with at least one local Jewish agency			.754	
Participated in or attended a program at, or sponsored by, the local Jewish Community Center in the past year			.489	
Keep kosher outside the home				.879
Keep kosher in the home				.865
Light Friday night candles*	.437			.584
% of variance explained	15.2%	14.4%	14.1%	13.3%

\*always, usually, sometimes, never.

\*\*several times per week, weekly, a few times per month, about once per month, a few times per year, High Holidays only, never except special occasions, never.

\*\*\*extremely, very, somewhat, not at all emotionally attached.

\*\*\*\*very familiar, somewhat familiar, not at all familiar.

Notes: 1) All variables, except as noted with asterisks, are yes/no responses. 2) Attended synagogue services, Emotional attachment to Israel, Familiar with local Jewish federation, Familiar with Jewish Family Service, At least somewhat familiar with at least one local Jewish agency, and Keep kosher outside home are respondent only questions. All other questions are "anyone in the household."

3) Loadings of less than .31 not reported.

**Factor 2 (Communal Ethnic Factor)** reflects the Ethnic Identity of American Jews: visits to Israel (.683), Jewish organization membership (.657), donated to the local Jewish Federation in the past year (.587), emotional attachment to Israel (.583), donated to a Jewish charity other than the local Jewish Federation in the past year (.572), and synagogue membership (.352). This factor accounts for 14 percent of the variance in the original 17 variables.

These variables do indicate more of an ethnic than religious Jewish Identity and include some of the variables more commonly associated with Ethnic Identity identified by Steven M. Cohen (2001), as described above. Only two of the dimensions mentioned by Cohen (attachment to Israel and to non-synagogue Jewish institutions) were among the common variables in the 21 local Jewish community studies. An additional variable, donations to Jewish charities other than the Jewish Federation in the past year, that Cohen did not include in his ethnic dimension, loaded highly on this factor. Such donations do indicate an investment in Jewish social and cultural capital and, thus, can be viewed as part of the ethnic dimension.

**Factor 3 (Local Ethnic Factor)** reflects integration into the local community in terms of non-religious or non-synagogue Jewish institutions: familiar with the local Jewish Federation (.780), familiar with the local Jewish Family Service (.772), being at least somewhat familiar with at least one local Jewish agency (.754), participated in or attended any program at, or sponsored by, the local Jewish Community Center in the past year (.489), and donated to the local Jewish Federation in the past year (.313). Note that only Jewish institutions common to all communities could be included in this factor. This factor accounts for 14 percent of the variance in the original 17 variables.

**Factor 4 (Private Religious Factor or “Ritual”)** reflects variables related to “personal rituals” that reveal stricter, daily, and personal commitment to ritual: keep kosher outside the home (.879), keep kosher inside the home (.865), light Friday night candles (.584), and attend synagogue services (.450). Hartman and Hartman (2009) found a similar factor in their analysis of the 2000-01 National Jewish Population Survey. Note that it represents religious capital that would bond together similarly observant Jews (“bonding” religious capital).

### **Separate Factor Analyses of Each Community**

Next, factor analyses were run separately for each of the 21 communities to validate for each community the structure of Jewish Identity found in the Total Factor Analysis. The same 17 variables were used and a four-factor solution requested. The percentage of variation explained by the four-factor solution ranges from 52%-60%, meaning this factor analysis is acceptable in each community and the percentage of variance explained quite similar to the total. The factor analysis presented above is referenced as the Total Factor Analysis (TFA) in the discussion below.

Interesting variations in the results by community include:

1. While the order of the four factors varies by community, the same structure was generally found as in the TFA. That the order differs implies that certain types of Jewish Identity are more central in some communities than others. For example, in Bergen County, Detroit, Miami, and Middlesex, the most prominent factor (i.e., the factor explaining the most variation in these variables) was the Private Religious Factor rather than Communal Religious Factor, reflecting the higher percentage of Orthodox in these communities. In St. Paul, the most prominent factor was the Communal Ethnic Factor while in neighboring Minneapolis; the Communal Religious Factor was the most prominent. However, since the four factors in the TFA contribute roughly equal portions to the 57% total variance explained, these variations in order are of interest but do not invalidate the use of the TFA.
2. In the TFA, synagogue membership (which can function both religiously and ethnically) loads more highly on the Communal Religious Factor (.496) than on the Communal Ethnic Factor (.352). The same pattern is found in most of the communities. However, in a few, synagogue membership loads more highly on the Communal Ethnic Factor; in some instances, it also loads highly on the Private Religious Factor or the Local Ethnic Factor. Likewise, in the TFA, attend synagogue services (which is important for ritual observance) loads more highly on the Communal Religious Factor (.523) than the Private Religious Factor (.450). These variations reflect, of course, the multifaceted functions of synagogues (Wertheimer, 2005), as well as how much synagogues can vary across communities. In communities in which the Communal Religious Factor is dominant, synagogue service attendance loads higher on this factor, while in communities where the Private Religious Factor is dominant, synagogue service attendance loads more highly on that factor.
3. In the TFA, light Friday night candles loads more highly on the Private Religious Factor (.584) than on the Communal Religious Factor (.437). However, in some communities, it loads more highly on the Communal Religious Factor than on the Private Religious Factor. We think it shows that light Friday night candles may be more normative in some communities and less of a private ritual than in other communities. The communities in which the loading is different from the TFA tend to have smaller Orthodox populations, but this is not a complete explanation, as not all communities with smaller Orthodox populations have light Friday night candles loading most highly on the Communal Religious Factor.
4. In the TFA, donated to the local Jewish Federation in the past year loads more highly on the Communal Ethnic Factor (.587) than on the Local Ethnic Factor (.313). In some communities (for example, Lehigh Valley, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and San Antonio), it loads more highly on the Local Ethnic Factor than on the Communal Ethnic Factor. In these communities, donations may be directed more to the local community than nationally and to Israel, or may reflect more about integration into the local community than commitment to the broader Jewish peoplehood.

Further analyses of these geographic variations are reserved for future research. We concluded that the similarities in the structure between the individual communities and the total sample were strong enough to warrant using the TFA for the total sample.

## **HYPOTHESES**

**T**he factor scores from the four factors identified above (Communal Religious or “Ceremony,” Private Religious or “Ritual,” Communal Ethnic, and Local Ethnic) are the dependent variables employed in the four multiple regression models developed below. This section discusses the independent variables employed in these multiple regression models. First, we forward 11 hypotheses related to Jewish community-level characteristics followed by 7 hypotheses related to the broader community. Second, we examine 24 hypotheses related to individual-level characteristics (including Jewish background and connectivity hypotheses, family status hypotheses, socioeconomic hypotheses, and demographic/geographic hypotheses). Finally, we forward 2 hypotheses related to survey-level characteristics.

### **Hypotheses Related to Community-Level Characteristics**

#### **Hypotheses Related to Jewish Community Infrastructure/Context**

Cohen (1983:108) suggests that Jewish communities can be characterized by: (1) residents’ aggregate characteristics (such as age, social class, family life cycle); (2) maturity of their Jewish institutions; (3) density of their Jewish populations; and (4) proximity to major Jewish communities and central institutions. Communities with high percentages of recent migrants are likely to have a youthful population in early stages of family development, implying a ritually less observant population, for these are characteristics associated with migration (Goldstein and Goldstein, 1996). Such communities may be deficient in well-established Jewish communal institutions because a critical mass (or threshold population) (Christaller, 1933) of Jews is required to establish a Jewish communal structure, such as synagogues, Jewish Community Centers, Jewish schools, Jewish shopping facilities, and community-wide organizations. While small communities may exhibit a certain intimacy, solidarity, visibility, and coherence (Weissbach, 2005), they are unlikely to have many major Jewish institutions or provide a large enough local marriage market so as to preclude significant intermarriage (Cohen, 1983: 108-9). However, the rise of online dating services (for example, [www.jdate.com](http://www.jdate.com) and [www.frumster.com](http://www.frumster.com)), and the overwhelming phenomena of Jewish youth attending college away from home (Kadushin and Tighe, 2008) may somewhat mitigate the need for a local Jewish marriage market. Nevertheless, the expectation is that smaller, newer Jewish communities may erect fewer barriers to “assimilation” than larger Jewish communities. Cohen found weaker communal affiliation in communities with a high turnover of Jewish population (Cohen, 1983: Ch. 5). However, Cohen’s ability to measure additional



communal characteristics and relate them to Jewish identity was restricted because his research was limited to the Boston community. At the time he suggested that “only a prodigious research effort with detailed historical and contemporary data on dozens of Jewish communities across the United States could even hope to tackle the task properly” (Cohen, 1983: 109). Our data set enables us to approach Cohen’s vision as well as Horowitz’s aforementioned vision of a sociology of “Jewishness of place” (1999:237). Indicators of a Jewish community’s infrastructure included in this analysis derive from both the telephone survey and the Jewish Institutions Survey conducted in each community and are reported in the *Main Report* for each community (available at [www.jewishdatabank.org](http://www.jewishdatabank.org)).<sup>6</sup> In addition, Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz of the Research Department of the Jewish Federations of North America provided recent Annual Campaign data for each community (also reproduced in Sheskin, 2011).

The general expectation is that the more developed a community’s Jewish infrastructure; the stronger is the Jewish Identity of its population in all its various manifestations (as represented by the four Jewish Identity Factors in **Table 2**). Thus, the multiple regression models will examine the manner in which Jewish infrastructure variables are related to the four Jewish Identity Factors. For example, are a greater number of synagogues in a community related to stronger Religious and Ethnic Identity? Is the number of synagogues only related to the Communal Religious Factor or is it also related to the Private Religious Factor? When the size of the Jewish population of a community is larger, is Jewish Identity stronger? In the most general way, our overall hypothesis is that the strength of individual Jewish Identity is related to the characteristics of the Jewish community in which that individual resides.

The following eleven specific hypotheses will be examined, relating Jewish Identity to the characteristics of the Jewish communal infrastructure presented in **Table 3**:

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<sup>6</sup> In each community, brief surveys, comprising the Jewish Institutions Survey, were administered to the synagogues, the Jewish Community Center(s), the Jewish day schools(s), and the Jewish Federation. The Synagogue Survey was completed by the executive director, rabbi, synagogue president, or another member of the synagogue staff of each synagogue and queried the current number of member households as well as the number of member households five years prior to the survey. Also collected were preschool/child care, supplemental school, and day camp enrollments, and the number of participants in Jewish teenage youth groups.

The Jewish Community Center (JCC) Survey was completed by the executive director of each JCC and queried the current number of Jewish member households as well as the number of member households five years prior to the study. Also collected were preschool/child care and day camp enrollments.

The Jewish Day School Survey was completed by the principal or executive director or headmaster of each Jewish day school and queried current Jewish day school enrollments by grade.

The Jewish Federation Survey was completed by Federation Staff and queried the current number of Jewish households on the Jewish Federation mailing list by zip code as well as the number of Jewish donors to the Annual Campaign, number of Jewish households who donated to the Annual Campaign, and amount raised by the Annual Campaign each year for the past decade.



**TABLE 3**  
**JEWISH COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE BY COMMUNITY OF STUDY**

Community	Number of				2009 Jewish Federation Annual Campaign		Number of Synagogues	
	Jews (A1)	Jewish Households (A1)	Percent Jewish (A2)	Percent of Jewish Households in Top 3 Zip Codes (A3)	Amount (A4)	Per Household (A4)	All (A5)	Orthodox (A6)
Atlantic County	20,400	10,000	5.3%	55%	\$790,000	\$79	8	2
Bergen	71,700	28,400	8.1%	34%	\$10,345,000	\$364	54	24
Detroit	72,000	30,000	1.8%	36%	\$31,671,000	\$1,056	48	25
Hartford	32,800	14,800	3.8%	37%	\$4,976,000	\$335	30	8
Jacksonville	13,000	6,700	1.1%	37%	\$2,439,000	\$364	8	2
Las Vegas	67,500	42,000	3.8%	19%	\$1,900,000	\$45	18	2
Lehigh Valley	8,050	4,000	1.3%	50%	\$2,288,000	\$572	9	3
Miami	113,300	54,000	4.7%	43%	\$21,744,000	\$403	68	39
Middlesex	52,040	24,000	6.8%	66%	\$2,287,000	\$95	26	11
Minneapolis	29,300	13,850	2.6%	35%	\$13,257,000	\$957	14	4
Portland	8,350	4,300	1.7%	33%	\$436,000	\$101	13	5
Rhode Island	18,750	9,550	1.8%	39%	\$3,405,000	\$357	16	6
San Antonio	9,170	4,500	0.6%	36%	\$1,917,000	\$426	8	2
St. Paul	10,940	5,150	1.2%	52%	\$2,416,000	\$514	6	2
Sarasota	15,500	8,800	2.6%	35%	\$2,394,000	\$272	10	1
S Palm Beach	131,300	73,000	39.8%	54%	\$16,400,000	\$225	36	13
Tidewater	10,950	5,400	1.1%	33%	\$4,456,000	\$825	12	2
Tucson	22,400	13,400	2.6%	33%	\$3,450,000	\$257	11	3
Washington	215,600	110,000	5.1%	13%	\$23,200,000	\$211	91	21
W Palm Beach	124,250	69,000	12.2%	57%	\$19,027,000	\$276	39	11
Westport	11,140	5,000	8.5%	66%	\$871,000	\$174	8	2
Average	68,393	34,837	7.3%	41%	\$10,891,000	\$371	32	12
<b>Total</b>	1,058,440	535,850			\$169,669,000	\$316		

Note: Labels in parentheses correspond to hypothesis numbers in text.

**TABLE 3: JEWISH COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE BY COMMUNITY OF STUDY--  
CONTINUED**

Community	Number of Jewish Schools		Number of Jewish Agencies (A9)	Length of Residence in Community		20% Increase or decrease in synagogue membership <sup>1</sup> (A10)	% of married couples who are intermarried (A11)
	Day (A7)	Day and supplemental (A8)		0-4 years (A10)	20 or more years (A10)		
Atlantic County	2	10	5	12%	50%	No	26%
Bergen	12	43	4	12%	56%	Increase	17%
Detroit	6	25	9	3%	88%	Increase	16%
Hartford	3	26	4	9%	67%	Decrease	23%
Jacksonville	1	9	4	14%	53%	Decrease	44%
Las Vegas	3	14	3	29%	21%	Decrease	48%
Lehigh Valley	1	8	3	13%	63%	Increase	36%
Miami	16	37	7	12%	62%	No	16%
Middlesex	4	30	5	11%	47%	No	14%
Minneapolis	6	15	5	10%	66%	Increase	33%
Portland	1	7	3	10%	45%	Increase	61%
Rhode Island	2	16	5	10%	69%	Increase	34%
San Antonio	1	6	3	13%	62%	Increase	37%
St. Paul	5	9	5	13%	60%	Increase	39%
Sarasota	1	7	4	18%	26%	No	20%
S Palm Beach	6	19	10	19%	23%	No	9%
Tidewater	1	9	4	10%	59%	Decrease	43%
Tucson	1	10	5	18%	41%	Decrease	46%
Washington	12	67	8	17%	54%	No	41%
W Palm Beach	7	20	5	21%	23%	Decrease	16%
Westport	3	11	2	17%	44%	Decrease	33%
Average	6	23	5	14%	50%		27%

<sup>1</sup> In the past 5-10 years, depending on the community (available in Chapter 7 in each community study)  
Main Report available at [www.jewishdatabank.org](http://www.jewishdatabank.org).  
Note: Labels in parentheses correspond to hypothesis numbers in text.

### **Hypothesis A1: Larger Jewish communities will act to strengthen Jewish Identity.**

The *number of Jews* and the *number of Jewish households* in a community can both be used to measure Jewish community size. The number of Jews for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis ranges from about 8,000 Jews in the Lehigh Valley to over 215,000 Jews in Washington DC. The number of Jewish households varies from 4,000 households in the Lehigh Valley to 110,000 households in Washington. Note that, because of the high correlation between these two variables, both cannot be entered into the multiple regression models. Based on tolerance levels, number of Jewish households was selected for use in the four multiple regression models.

Because larger Jewish populations can support more Jewish infrastructure and more Jewish programming (for example, synagogues, kosher food outlets, Jewish agencies, and Jewish educational and cultural programs) and can allow more of a “community feeling” to develop, we expect that in larger Jewish communities, more interaction exists among Jews, more opportunities exist to express communal Jewish Identity, and stronger Jewish identification is manifested. This is both because the broader community sees a larger number of Jews and identifies them as such and because internally more Jews exist with whom to interact.

A counter argument could be proffered that smaller, “threatened” Jewish populations might band together and form an even stronger identity. Smith (2003) suggests that social marginalization (as would happen with a “threatened” minority) results in greater separation from the dominant (non-Jewish) establishment, thus strengthening individual Jewish Identity. A further possibility is that in large Jewish communities, many people see that Jewish institutions are operating without their help. In smaller Jewish communities, those same individuals might come to the fore, believing that if they do not step forward, no one else will. Such an argument has been validated with regarding to smaller congregational groups in religious congregations more generally (Dougherty and Whitehead, 2011). Sheskin (1991) found, using data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, that Jewish Identity was strongest in medium-size Jewish communities.

### **Hypothesis A2: A higher percentage Jewish in a community will act to strengthen Jewish Identity.**

The *percentage Jewish* for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from less than 1% in San Antonio to nearly 40% in South Palm Beach, although most communities have values below 10%. As with *number of Jews*, it is expected that a higher percentage of Jews in a community results in greater visibility and more identification as such by others, and hence strengthens Jewish Identity. Note that the influence of this variable may interact with the religious or ethnic character of the broader community (discussed below).

**Hypothesis A3: Jewish communities that are clustered in one part of a metropolitan area, rather than being geographically dispersed throughout that metropolitan area, will exhibit stronger Jewish Identity.**

Because the anonymity of a random digit dialing telephone survey means that the exact street addresses of the 18,967 survey respondents are unknown, traditional measures of geographic clustering of a phenomenon, such as nearest neighbor analysis (Burt, Barber, and Rigby, 2009:541-544), cannot be employed. Each telephone survey respondent was asked their zip code. In each community, the total percentage of Jewish households who live in the three zip code areas containing the greatest percentage of Jewish households was calculated. *The percent of households in the top 3 zip codes* for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from 13% in Washington to 66% in Middlesex and Westport. In addition to the reasoning presented under Hypothesis A2 as to why stronger levels of Jewish Identity exist in areas of greater Jewish population density, geographic clustering also results in a Jewish community that is more easily served by Jewish institutions. When a high percentage of a Jewish community resides in a small number of zip code areas, on average they live closer to synagogues, the Jewish Community Center, kosher food establishments, etc. Households who live closer to a synagogue or a Jewish Community Center are more likely to participate in activities at those facilities. In addition, when the population is clustered, it becomes easier for Jewish Family Services, for example, to provide kosher home-delivered meals. Thus, a clustered population encourages use of Jewish agencies (see Hypothesis A9).

**Hypothesis A4: A larger Jewish Federation Annual Campaign will act to strengthen Jewish Identity, especially the Local Ethnic Factor.**

The *size of the Jewish Federation Annual Campaign* is reflective of the existence of a significant local Jewish infrastructure, even though in most communities a substantial portion (30%-40%) of the Jewish Federation Annual Campaign is used for needs nationally, in Israel,<sup>7</sup> and around the world rather than for local programming and infrastructure. The size of the 2009 Jewish Federation Annual Campaign for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from \$436,000 in Portland (ME) to \$31,671,000 in Detroit.

The success of the Annual Campaign is indicative of the sophistication and organization of a Jewish community as well as its level of affluence. In addition, a more successful Annual Campaign generally implies the existence of stronger Jewish agencies that can provide more services and programs to the Jewish community which themselves act to enhance Jewish Identity. We have employed the latest (2009) Jewish Federation Annual Campaign data rather than use the amount from the year of each community study to minimize fluctuations due to variations in the general economic climate over the decade.

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<sup>7</sup> Personal communication from Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Director-Research and Analysis, Jewish Federations of North America, March 4, 2011.

A second variable was used to explore this hypothesis: *Size of Annual Campaign per Jewish household*. Per Jewish household donations for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis vary from \$45 in Las Vegas to \$1,056 in Detroit. By dividing by the number of Jewish households, we have in effect standardized the comparison, so that the size of the Annual Campaign is not simply reflective of the size of the community but rather the mobilization of resources from each Jewish household (on average).

To some extent, this second variable may be a better indicator of communal involvement than the absolute value of the size of the Annual Campaign, which is very much determined by the number of Jewish households in a community. A *caveat* on this statement is that in some communities, a very small number of donors contribute a very high percentage of the campaign, artificially inflating the per Jewish household donation. The value of the tolerance levels of colinearity reinforced our choice to use the annual campaign per Jewish household in the multiple regression models.

**Hypothesis A5: A greater number of synagogues in a community will act to strengthen Jewish Identity.**

The total *number of synagogues* in a community indicates that a variety of worship and congregational options (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, Sephardic, minyon, Humanist, egalitarian/non-egalitarian, etc.) exist in that community. The number of synagogues for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from eight in Atlantic County, Jacksonville, San Antonio, and Westport to 36 in South Palm Beach.

More synagogues means that households should, on average, live geographically closer to a synagogue. Because most non-Orthodox synagogues and some Orthodox synagogues often provide both religious and secular communal activities in addition to religious services, a greater number of synagogues provides more opportunities to participate in Jewish-sponsored events.

Having more than one synagogue of a type, say Reform, also will encourage synagogue membership. If a particular individual who will be comfortable only at a Reform synagogue happens not to like the only Reform synagogue in a community, his or her Jewish Identity (as reflected in the Communal and Private Religious Factors) will be less strong. With more than one Reform synagogue in a community, a greater likelihood exists that he or she will be satisfied with at least one Reform congregation. Note that, because of the high correlation between number of synagogues and number of Orthodox synagogues (Hypothesis A6), this variable does not enter the multiple regression models (based on tolerance levels).

**Hypothesis A6: The greater the number of Orthodox synagogues in a community, the stronger the Private Religious Factor (“Ritual”).**

In addition to offering a wider variety of places of worship, particularly for the Orthodox, the *number of Orthodox synagogues* is likely to be indicative of the existence of other institutions catering to the Orthodox lifestyle, such as kosher food establishments, mikva’ot, and eruvim. The number of Orthodox for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from one in Sarasota to 25 in Detroit.

Orthodox synagogues are investments in social and cultural “bonding” capital which bond the Orthodox community. A strong Orthodox infrastructure supports the lifestyle necessary for the Private Religious Factor (Ritual) (kosher outside the home, kosher inside the home, light Friday night candles, attend synagogue services). Note that no ready data source exists on the number of kosher food establishments, mikva’ot, and eruvim in American Jewish communities.<sup>8</sup>

**Hypothesis A7: A greater number of Jewish day schools will act to strengthen Jewish Identity.**

*The number of Jewish day schools* for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from one in several communities to 16 in Miami. As with synagogues, a greater number of Jewish day schools imply more options (modern Orthodox school, community school, etc.). Again, as with synagogues, a community with more than one Jewish day school of a particular type means a greater probability that parents will find one to their liking. Note that, because of the high correlation of the number of Jewish day schools with the number of Jewish day and supplemental schools (Hypothesis A8), this variable does not enter the multiple regression models (based on tolerance levels). We do, however, include an individual-level indicator of whether the respondent attended a Jewish day school as a child (see Hypothesis C4).

**Hypothesis A8: A greater number of Jewish day and supplemental schools will act to strengthen Jewish Identity.**

The reasoning presented for Hypothesis A7 applies as well to this hypothesis. The *number of Jewish day and supplemental schools* for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from 6 in San Antonio to 67 in Washington. Note that supplemental schools are often called Sunday schools, Hebrew schools, religious schools, and Judaica High schools. The majority of children in almost all American Jewish communities are educated in supplemental schools. They are operated at or by synagogues and Jewish Community Centers. In a few cases, they are operated independently of other Jewish organizations.

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<sup>8</sup> Some websites offer information about kosher restaurants (for example, [www.shamash.org/kosher](http://www.shamash.org/kosher) and [www.kosherrestaurantsGPS.com](http://www.kosherrestaurantsGPS.com)); however, the information is supplied voluntarily and not systematically checked for accuracy (it depends on consumer comments as well as restaurant owners to verify the validity of the information).



**Hypothesis A9: A greater number of Jewish agencies will act to strengthen Jewish Identity, especially the Communal Religious Factor (“Ceremony”), Communal Ethnic Factor, and Local Ethnic Factor.**

In addition to synagogues, all 21 Jewish communities have a variety of Jewish agencies that tend not to cater to the religious needs of the population, but to social, recreational, cultural, educational, housing, and social service needs. Such agencies include Jewish Federations, Jewish Foundations, Jewish Community Centers, Jewish Family Services, Jewish Vocational Services, Jewish homes for the mentally and physically challenged, Jewish elderly services agencies, Jewish Community Relations Councils, senior centers, senior housing, Jewish nursing homes, college Hillels, Hebrew Free Loan Associations, Jewish camps, central agencies for Jewish education, and Jewish youth groups. The *number of Jewish agencies* for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from 2 in Westport to 10 in South Palm Beach.

The existence of many of these agencies implies that less need exists to depend on non-Jewish sources for social, recreational, cultural, educational, housing, and social service needs. Joining the health club at the Jewish Community Center, living in a Jewish assisted living facility, and receiving counseling through Jewish Family Services leads to a greater sense that the organized Jewish community cares about the needs of the community. People will want to be part of such a caring community and will maintain a Jewish Identity for that purpose, leading to stronger Jewish Identity.

**Hypothesis A10: Stable Jewish communities will be characterized by stronger Jewish Identity.**

We used four variables as indicators of the stability of a Jewish community: 1) the *percent of Jewish households in the community for 0-4 years*; 2) the *percent of Jewish households in the community for 20 or more years*; and *whether synagogue membership had 3) increased or 4) decreased more than 20% over the past 5-10 years*. (In most communities, the data were available over the past ten years, but in some communities a five- or seven-year change was available.)

For the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis the percent of households in the community for 0-4 years varies from 3% in Detroit to 29% in Las Vegas. The percent of households in the community for 20 or more years varies from 21% in Las Vegas to 88% in Detroit. Detroit is a good example of a stable community in the sense that very few households are in residence in Detroit for 0-4 years (4%) and a very high percentage are in residence in Detroit for 20 or more years (88%). The opposite is the case in Las Vegas where 29% are in residence for 0-4 years and only 21% in residence for 20 or more years.

Of the 21 communities, nine show increased synagogue membership, six show decreased membership, and six show no significant change.



That stability is related to Jewish Identity is supported by the work of Goldstein and Goldstein (1996) on the migration patterns of American Jews. They found what they termed “traditional holding power”: more stable communities tended to be more traditional and more observant (or it could be that more observant communities tended to be more stable). Earlier work by Goldstein (1981, 1990, 1991) found that (1) high levels of geographic mobility may act to break the ties of individuals to a community and its local institutions, thus acting to reduce Jewish identification; and (2) participation of immigrants may never reach the level of the locally born population. Cohen’s (1983) work also found that communities with a high turnover of Jewish population tended to have fewer Jewish communal affiliations. Goldscheider (1986) contradicted Goldstein and Cohen, suggesting that new migrants may expand existing networks and even create new ones in a relatively short time and may create networks that substitute for formal Jewish community. We phrase our hypothesis along the expectations from Goldstein’s research. More recently, Rebhun (forthcoming) suggests that the effect of Jews’ migration patterns on Jewish Identity and group commitment is greatly weakened, as the extent and scope of their mobility has dispersed Jews throughout the United States, and the Internet affords quicker anticipatory socialization and adaptation to the new environment.

Note that, because of the high correlation among these four variables, neither length of residence variables (percent of households in the community for 0-4 years or for 20 or more years) enter the multiple regression models (based on tolerance levels).

**Hypothesis A11: Jewish communities with a higher percentage of married couples who are intermarried will be characterized by individuals with weaker Jewish Identity.**

*The percentage of married couples who are intermarried* for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from 9% in South Palm Beach to 61% in Portland (ME). Intermarried Jews typically have weaker Jewish identities (Cohen, 2006), either as precedent to their intermarriage or as a result of investment in social capital bridging between Jews and non-Jews, rather than social capital bonding within the Jewish group. We expect this to have an impact on the interpersonal climate in the community, especially where the percentage intermarried is higher.

## Hypotheses Related to the Broader Community Context

We expect that the religiosity of the broader community (**Table 4**) will be related to the strength of Jewish Identity of individuals in the Jewish community. More specifically:

**Hypothesis B1: The greater the percentage of non-religious in the broader community, the weaker the Religious Identity of Jews.**

The percentage of non-religious in the broader community is measured based on the percentage of persons indicating they have no religion (the “nones”) in the 2000-01 American Religious Identification Survey (**Table 4**). We match the *percentage “nones”* in the same Designated Market Area (DMA)<sup>9</sup>, as the local Jewish community study. The percentage “nones” for the 21 Jewish communities included in this analysis varies from 12% in Tidewater to 24% in Las Vegas.

In a sense, if the broader community has a high percentage of persons claiming no religion, there will be more activities geared to non-religious individuals, norms of dress and media use may be geared to non-religious individuals, and non-religious Jews seeking such milieu will be able to reinforce their lack of religious observance. Therefore, we expect a higher percentage of persons claiming no religion to be associated with a higher percentage of Jews who claim they have no religion and thus have a weaker Religious Identity.

**Hypothesis B2: The greater the religiosity of the broader community, the stronger the Religious Identity of Jews.**

The percentage of religious persons in the broader community is measured by four questions from the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (**Table 4**): *percentage believes in God with certainty*, *percentage prays at least once per day*, *percentage religion is important in life*, and *percentage attend religious services once per week*. The PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life has made these data available by state, and the data were matched to each community's state.

The percentage in the state who believes in God with certainty varies from only 57% in three New England communities to 77% in San Antonio (TX). The percentage who prays every day varies from 40% in Portland (ME) to 66% in San Antonio. The percentage who believes religion is important in life varies from 42% in Portland to 67% in San Antonio. The percentage who attends religious services one time per week or more varies from 29% in Tucson (AZ) to 47% in San Antonio.

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<sup>9</sup> DMA stands for Designated Market Area, a Nielsen term that reflects US market areas by the number of television households within the market borders. There are some 210 DMA's in the US. Each community study has only one DMA (although some communities are in the same DMA). The percentage professing no religion was matched by DMA rather than by county, as there are multiple counties in some of the community studies, which made the matching more difficult.

**TABLE 4**  
**COMMUNITY BY REGION BY BROADER COMMUNITY CONTEXT**

Community	% "Nones" (B1)	% Believe in God with Certainty (B2)	% Pray at Least Once Per Day (B2)	% Religion Importan t in Life (B2)	% Attend Religious Services 1+ Per Week (B2)
Hartford	17	57	47	44	30
Portland	15	59	40	42	23
Rhode Island	18	57	47	44	30
Westport	17	57	47	44	30
<b>Total New England *</b> (B3)	17	57	46	44	29
Atlantic County	15	66	51	52	36
Bergen	14	66	51	52	36
Lehigh Valley	15	72	56	54	39
Middlesex	15	66	51	52	36
Washington	16	71	58	56	37
<b>Total Middle Atlantic *</b> (B4)	15	68	54	53	37
Detroit	13	71	56	54	38
Minneapolis	15	70	52	52	38
St. Paul	15	70	52	52	38
<b>Total Midwest *</b>	14	71	54	53	38
Jacksonville	10	72	59	57	37
Miami	18	72	59	57	37
Sarasota	18	72	59	57	37
Tidewater	12	72	59	59	41
South Palm Beach	14	72	59	57	37
West Palm Beach	14	72	59	57	37

**TABLE 4**  
**COMMUNITY BY REGION BY BROADER COMMUNITY CONTEXT**

Community	% "Nones" (B1)	% Believe in God with Certainty (B2)	% Pray at Least Once Per Day (B2)	% Religion Importan t in Life (B2)	% Attend Religious Services 1+ Per Week (B2)
<b>Total South *</b> (B5)	15	72	59	57	38
San Antonio (Southern Crossroads)	14	77	66	67	47
Tucson (Mountain West) (B6)	23	69	53	51	29
Las Vegas (Pacific) (B6)	24	63	58	50	30
<b>Total *</b>	16	68	54	53	36

Source: Calculated from U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, <http://pewforum.org/How-Religious-Is-Your-State-.aspx> (by state) except for "% None" which is from ARIS 2001, <http://prog.trincoll.edu/ISSSC/DataArchive> (by Designated Market Area).

\* See Map 1 for definitions of regions. The Totals are an average for the general population in the communities in *our* sample.

Note: Labels in parentheses correspond to hypothesis numbers in text.

In a sense, if the broader community has a high percentage of persons with deep religious beliefs, public discourse and local news will be geared to a more religious clientele, more religious films may be offered at cultural events, and more people will expect Jews to be religious. We therefore expect this to reinforce strong Religious Identity among Jews.

Note that, because of the high correlation among these four measures as well as with percentage "nones" (Hypothesis B1) and region of the country (Hypotheses B3-6), none of these four broader community variables enter the multiple regression models (based on tolerance levels).

**Hypothesis B3: Jewish Identity will be weaker in New England, especially the Communal Religious Factor, the Communal Ethnic Factor, and the Local Ethnic Factor.**

**Hypothesis B4: Jewish Identity will be stronger in the Middle Atlantic.**

**Hypothesis B5: Jewish Religious Identity will be stronger in the South.**

### **Hypothesis B6: Jewish Identity will be weaker in the West.**

We expect that region of the country will have an independent relationship with Jewish Identity, beyond the nature of the Jewish community itself, because of the varied nature of the regions.

As mentioned above, the Leonard E. Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life at Trinity College has developed a Religion by Region project, describing and analyzing the role of religion in various geographic regions across the United States, culminating in a comprehensive volume in 2008: *One Nation, Divisible: How Regional Religious Differences Shape American Politics* (Silk and Walsh, 2008). The geographic divisions they employ are shown on **Map 1** and are somewhat modified from the Census Divisions and Census Regions employed by the US Census. Based on an analysis of the *North American Religious Atlas* (NARA) ([www.religionatlas.org](http://www.religionatlas.org)), the *American Religious Identification Survey* (ARIS) (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006), and various national polls, each Silk and Walsh region is characterized by differing manners in which religion is integrated with public life. These differences are influenced by the nature of the predominant religions in each area, characteristic patterns of religiosity, and the historical and contemporary overlap of ethnicity and religion/religiosity. This regionalization builds upon and extends previous research on regional differences in religious context (Hoge and Roozen, 1979; Stump, 1986; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993) and parallels work by Kosmin and Keysar (2006), which focuses primarily on ARIS. The role of the Jewish population in each of these regions varies and may well be influenced by the broader religious context in which it is found. In our study, at least one of the 21 communities is located in each region, with the exception of the Pacific Northwest (**Map 1** and **Table 4**).

According to Silk and Walsh (2008), **New England** is disproportionately Catholic and the least Protestant region of the country. While religion is historically entrenched in this region, it has also been quite divisive, so it has retreated from the public arena (Silk and Walsh, 2008). In terms of religiosity, New England is one of the least religious regions (Putnam and Campbell, 2010), with some New England states having high percentages of “no faith” (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006). Jews constitute 3.1% of the population in this region, second only to the Middle Atlantic (Sheskin and Dashefsky, 2010), with Boston being a major Jewish population center.

In the **Middle Atlantic** region, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims are over represented. This “is... the second most heavily ‘churched’ region of the country, exceeded only by the Southern Crossroads” (Silk and Walsh, 2008: 2). In the Middle Atlantic, Jews constitute 5.6% of the population, well above the national average of 2.2%, with major Jewish population centers in the New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington metropolitan areas. The long history of Jews in this region, reinforced both by continuing immigration and economic opportunities, led to the establishment and maintenance of many national Jewish institutions in the region (centers of religious, philanthropic, denominational, cultural, social, and political Jewish arenas). “Of those [organizations] dealing with what is

known as “community relations’ (the non-Jewish world), 27 out of 29 have Middle Atlantic headquarters. Of Israel-related organizations...85 out of 88 are Middle Atlantic. And of the Jewish religious and educational bodies, 52 out of 61 are located there” (Silk and Walsh, 2008: 33). With a pluralistic history, this region is a vibrant ethnic and religious crossroads.

The **Midwest** religious composition is most similar to the national population, with a balance of mainline Protestants, evangelicals, and Catholics. Jews, however, are only 1.0% of the population, with major Jewish population centers in Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland.

Evangelical Protestantism is particularly strong in the **South**, as are the historic African American denominations (Silk and Walsh, 2008). “Nones” (those with no religion) are underrepresented in the South. Religion is more important in the South than in the other regions as demonstrated by higher frequencies of church attendance (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). Silk and Walsh (2008) show this is true for both the South and the Southern Crossroads. Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey (1998) suggest that the strong religiosity of the South developed because the South was relatively isolated from the modernization that occurred elsewhere. Jews are one of the South’s largest religious minorities, but are only 1.3% of the overall population. Major Jewish population centers include South Florida (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties) and Atlanta.

The **Southern Crossroads** is also characterized by a high percentage of evangelicals, plus a high percentage of Roman Catholics. Like the South, it has a high percentage of church affiliates, and a low percentage of “nones.” Jews, however, are less represented in the Southern Crossroads than in the South. In fact, the 0.5% Jewish is the lowest of the eight regions. Only Dallas and Houston may be considered important centers for Jewish population in this geographic area.

The **Pacific, Mountain West, and Pacific Northwest** show less impact of mainline religion (Wuthnow, 1978; Silk and Walsh, 2008). There is a higher percentage of “nones” than in most other areas of the country. According to Graham (1983:8 as quoted in Rebhun, 1995), the social and cultural profile of Sunbelt cities in the Southwest is one of greater religious and cultural pluralism—a “majestic openness”, which may reinforce self-selected identity and weaken the ethnic identity of Jews in these areas. Religiosity is lower in the West (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). Jews constitute 3.2% of the overall population in the Pacific with the Los Angeles and San Francisco-Oakland areas being of particular import. Jews constitute 1.1% of the overall population in the Mountain West, with Phoenix and Denver being important Jewish population centers. Jews are only 0.9% of the overall population in the Pacific Northwest, with Seattle and Portland being the only important communities.

As we note above, the Pew Forum on Religious & Public Life has published several indicators of religiosity by state at [pewforum.org/How-Religious-Is-Your-State-.aspx](http://pewforum.org/How-Religious-Is-Your-State-.aspx), based on their 2007 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. We show four such indicators in **Table 4**,



each of which provides an indication of the broader religious context in the state of each of our 21 communities. For each religiosity indicator, higher levels of religiosity are found in the South and in the Southern Crossroads and lower levels in the Pacific and New England. The New England states in our sample have lower levels of religiosity than the Middle Atlantic and Midwest. Levels of religiosity in the Middle Atlantic are between New England and the Midwest.

Obviously, these are only rough indicators of religiosity since intraregional and intrastate variations are most likely considerable. In addition, the four indicators exhibit high degrees of multicollinearity with one another and with the variable “region.” In the multiple regression models, we use only indicators of the major regions represented in the sample (New England, Middle Atlantic, and South (combining the South and the Southern Crossroads)).

At a more local level (DMA) we were able to integrate the percentage professing no religion (percentage “nones”) from the ARIS 2001 study.<sup>10</sup> The main variation in the percentage professing no religion is between the West (Pacific and Mountain West), with higher percentages professing no religion, and the rest of the country.

Stump (1986) found regional variations in the determinants of religiosity, including (1) a negative relationship between geographic mobility and religiosity in New England; (2), a positive relationship between attendance at religious services and strength of belief in New England; and, (3) a negative relationship between size of place and Catholic service attendance in the West and South Central (because of the presence of rural Cajun and Hispanic folk cultures). In addition, Stump found that strength of belief has the greatest influence on religious participation in the Pacific and New England, and the least effect in the East, South Central, and Mountain regions. He found fewer regional differences for the influence of socioeconomic status and demographic variables on religious service attendance. He did, however, find a significant effect of socioeconomic status and demographic variables on Protestant attendance in the South, reflecting the general importance of religion in that region, and possibly supporting the expectation that higher-status individuals actively support and participate in religious institutions at higher rates. More recently, Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that income did not have an independent effect on religiosity, once gender, race, ethnicity, size of place, and region were controlled. Stump also shows that the influence of various variables on religiosity varies by religion. Controlling for region, therefore, may also clarify the relationship between the individual-level variables (described below) and Jewish identity.

Region may also affect the incidence of anti-Semitism, which may affect Jews’ willingness to publicly identify as Jews (or, conversely, strengthen the communal identification); Smith (1999) found anti-Semitism higher in rural areas, among African Americans, the Religious Right, and those with less income and education. Sheskin (2009: Ch. 11) shows that

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<sup>10</sup> At a later stage of the research, we hope to integrate more indicators of the broader religious context at the county level from the ARIS data. At present, such data are not publically available.



significant differences exist in both the experience with and perception of anti-Semitism in the 21 communities.

Note that multiple regression models do not permit the entry of all four nominal variables due to the problem of singularity. Thus, based on tolerance levels, the West is omitted from the analysis (Hypothesis B6).

**Hypothesis B7: The larger the general population of the broader community, the stronger the Jewish Identity.**

Putnam and Campbell (2010) found that rural communities displayed more religiosity than urban and suburban communities. Most Jews, however, live in urban areas, and the distinction is more between whether they live in metropolitan or non-metropolitan areas (Rebhun, forthcoming). All 21 communities in this study are situated in urban or suburban areas. We do differentiate between communities in areas with approximately one million residents or more compared to communities in smaller metropolitan areas. This variable is called *size of urban area* in **Table 6**.

Goldstein and Goldstein (1996) found that, according to the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, “peripheral Jews” were less likely to live in metropolitan areas. Using the 2000-01 National Jewish Population Survey, Rebhun (forthcoming) found that Jews living in non-metropolitan areas were disproportionately likely to lack a denominational preference, had a weaker sense of belonging to the Jewish people, were less likely to observe Shabbat and other major Jewish holidays, and had lower synagogue attendance than their metropolitan counterparts. Hence, we expected Jews in communities with a larger general population to have stronger Jewish Identity.

### **Hypotheses Related to Individual-Level Characteristics**

Hypotheses related to the individual are examined in four different groups: hypotheses related to (1) Jewish background and connections; (2) family status; (3) socioeconomic status; and (4) demographic/geographic variables.

#### **Jewish Background and Connections Hypotheses**

**Hypothesis C1: Orthodox Jews will have the strongest Private Religious Identity (“Ritual”).**

**Hypothesis C2: Orthodox and Conservative Jews will have the strongest Communal Religious Identity (“Ceremony”).**

**Hypothesis C3: Jews who identify with a denomination will have stronger Communal Ethnic and Local Ethnic Identities.**

In general, we expect that Jewish denominational self-identification will be related to Jewish Identity. *Jewish denominational self-identification* is measured by responses to the question “Do you consider yourself Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, Reform, or Just Jewish?”<sup>11</sup> In our sample, about 5% self-identified as Orthodox, 31% as Conservative, 33% as Reform or Reconstructionist, and 32% as Just Jewish. In contrast, in the 2000-01 National Jewish Population Survey, 8% self-identified as Orthodox, 25% as Conservative, 37% as Reform or Reconstructionist, and 30% as Just Jewish, (Sheskin, 2011: Ch. 6). Although our sample somewhat underrepresents the Orthodox, the sample size of Orthodox Jews is still about 1,000.

Note that Jewish denominational self-identification is by no means monolithic, as shown, for example, by Klaff (2006). Responses to this question mainly reflect a respondent's orientation and their answer may or may not reflect actual religious behavior or synagogue membership. Thus, respondents may describe themselves as Orthodox and not keep kosher or may describe themselves as Reform and belong to a Conservative synagogue or to no synagogue at all. Indeed, only about 61% of the respondents who self-identified with some denominational group actually are members of a synagogue. Using data from the 2000-01 National Jewish Population Survey, Klaff (2006) found that of those self-identifying as Orthodox, about 80% were members of an Orthodox synagogue; of those self-identifying as Conservative, about half were members of a Conservative synagogue; and of those self-identifying as Reform, less than half were members of a Reform synagogue. In all only about one-third of those self-identifying with one of these three denominations were actually synagogue members of the same denomination.

Because of the small number of Reconstructionist (about 1% of the sample), they were combined with Reform for the purposes of the analysis. Grouping them with Reform was a result of previous research which showed that their responses on questions of Jewish identity tended to be more similar to the Reform than the Conservative (Hartman and Hartman, 1996; 2009a).

Denominational groups (whether self-identified or affiliated) do differ in the extent to which adherents see religion as a dominant influence on daily behaviors, in their emphasis on ethnic and/or religious identity, and in the extent to which they value exposure and involvement in the broader (non-exclusively) Jewish world or universalism (Hartman and Hartman, 2001). Because of their adherence to daily ritual and the centrality of religion as a framework for their lives, we expected the Orthodox to have the strongest Private Religious Identity (Ritual). Because of the centrality of the more communal rituals in both Orthodox and Conservative traditions, we expected both of these groups to have stronger Communal Religious Identity than the Reform/Reconstructionist or Just Jewish. Finally, we expected respondents who self-identified as one of the three main American Jewish denominations to be more integrated into the ethnic community, whether local or more broadly conceived, when compared to Jews who considered themselves “Just Jewish.”

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<sup>11</sup> Just Jewish includes some who self-identify with smaller Jewish movements (for example, Jewish Renewal, Jewish Humanist), but over 99% in this group consider themselves “Just Jewish.”

Introducing denominational self-identification into the multiple regression models also controls for this source of considerable variation in Jewish Identity, so that findings related to other variables are net of this effect.

We had several indicators of Jewish experiences as a child, and in general, we expected the stronger the Jewish background as a child, the stronger will be the Jewish Identity of an individual in all senses. The relationships between Jewish education, both formal and informal, and adult Jewish behaviors such as ritual observance, synagogue membership, involvement in Jewish organizations, in-marriage, and opposition to children's intermarriage are well established. Sheskin, using simple one-way correlations, has also shown that relationships exist between various forms of formal and informal Jewish education and adult Jewish behaviors. For an example of these results, see Sheskin (2009, Table 7-1).

**Hypothesis C4: Attendance at a Jewish day school as a child will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult.**

This expectation was based on previous research in many studies. See, for example, Bock 1977; Cohen 1995 2007; Dashefsky and Lebson 2002; Fishman and Goldstein 1993; Goldstein, 1993; Himmelfarb 1974; Schiff and Schneider 1994; and Waxman, 2003.

**Hypothesis C5: Attendance at a Jewish supplemental school as a child will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult.**

We expected that any attendance at formal Jewish education would augment both religious and ethnic awareness and commitment in all its expressions.

**Hypothesis C6: Attendance at a Jewish overnight camp as a child will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult.**

This expectation was also based on numerous findings in previous studies (e.g., Bubis and Marks (1975); Cohen (2000); Cohen and Kotler-Berkowitz (2004); Cohen, Miller, Sheskin, and Torr (2011); Keysar and Kosmin (2001, 2005); and Sheskin (1997, 2010c).

**Hypothesis C7: Regular participation in a Jewish youth group as a teenager will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult.**

**Hypothesis C8: Regular participation in Hillel while in college will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult.**

Youth group participation has also been related to stronger ritual observance, in-marriage as adults, synagogue membership and involvement in Jewish organizational life, greater philanthropy to Jewish causes, and more commitment to the Jewish people (Cohen and Ganapol, 1998; Hartman and Hartman, 2003; Horowitz, 2001), as has Hillel involvement (Baker and Ukeles, 1994; Cnaan 1993; Horowitz, 2001).

**Hypothesis C9: Households with Jewish children will have stronger Communal Religious Identity, Communal Ethnic Identity, and Local Ethnic Identity.**

The high percentage of intermarried couples (about 30%) and respondents who identify as “Just Jewish” (about 30%) (not necessarily the same 30%) raises the question of whether their children are being raised as Jews. Respondents were therefore explicitly asked whether the children in their household were being raised as Jews. Including this variable allows us to determine whether raising children as Jews has an effect on Jewish Identity (or reflects Jewish Identity) over and above whether the respondent is intermarried or identifies with a particular denomination. Because having Jewish children often brings families into contact with other Jewish families, whether for Jewish education or participation in synagogues or the Jewish Community Center, we expect that having Jewish children will be associated with stronger Jewish Identity. (Of course, it could also be that those with stronger Jewish Identity are more likely to raise their children as Jews. With the current data set, this cannot be deconstructed.)

**Hypothesis C10: Residence in areas of a community with higher concentrations of Jews will be related to stronger Jewish Identity.**

As mentioned above (Hypotheses A2 and A3), denser concentrations of Jews are usually associated with a more developed Jewish infrastructure. However, not everyone in a community lives in the areas of densest Jewish concentration. We therefore coded each respondent as to whether they live in one of the three zip codes with the greatest number of Jewish households in the community. We expect that because this reflects a potential for higher interaction with the Jewish community, it would reinforce commitment to the community and reflect stronger Jewish Identity.

**Hypothesis C11: Intermarriage will be associated with weaker Jewish Identity.**

As mentioned above (Hypothesis A11), intermarriage (to a non-Jew) presupposes at least some investment of time and energy in *bridging* social and ethnic capital between Jews and non-Jews (as opposed to *bonding* capital within the Jewish community). Cohen (2006) has shown the divergence in Jewish identity and practice between the intermarried and the in-married. As a result, we expect intermarriage to be associated with weaker Jewish Identity in all respects, especially when other factors are held constant.

**Family Status Hypotheses**

In general, we believe that marital status, household structure, age, and gender will be related to the strength of Jewish Identity. While this has been demonstrated in earlier research (as noted below), including these variables also controls for the variation in Jewish Identity that they introduce. Conversely, support for the following hypotheses, after controlling for community-level characteristics, reinforces the validity of their influences.

**Hypothesis C12: Being married will enhance Communal Jewish Identity (both the Communal Religious Factor and the Communal Ethnic Factor), as well as the Local Ethnic Factor.**

**Hypothesis C13: Being single, never married will detract from Communal Religious Identity and the Local Ethnic Factor.**

In general, in a household with two Jewish adults, if one of the two adults desires to affiliate with the Jewish community and follow Jewish rituals then the household will exhibit Jewish behaviors. Also, the Jewish religion is constructed around family ritual, and Jewish communal events are often organized around family participation, especially inclusive of school-age (or younger) children (Cohen and Ritterband, 1988). This is both to reinforce Jewish Identity among children and to tie families into the communal institutions' educational offerings. Marriage is thus expected to reinforce Jewish Identity, especially in its communal expressions. Previous research has found that married couples often are more affiliated with Jewish organizations and synagogues, especially for activities related to children. They tend to be more active if they have children in classes at Hebrew or Sunday school (or Jewish day school) (Cohen and Ritterband, 1988 as cited in Leibman and Cohen, 1990).

On the other hand, singles (especially if they are older) sometimes feel alienated by the Jewish community because of this familial orientation. See Diamant (1989), Fishman (1993), and Schneider (1984) for a discussion of the manner in which non-married Jewish women experience Jewish life; and Hartman and Hartman (2009) for a discussion of marital status and Jewish Identity.

**Hypothesis C14: Being ever divorced will be associated with weaker Ethnic Identity, particularly with the Local Ethnic Factor.**

Divorce is not generally a stigma in the Jewish community. However, it may broaden the "bridging" social capital of the individual, and in that sense weaken the "bonding" Jewish capital, and with it, Jewish Identity. Divorcees may have more difficulty finding their place in the Jewish community and may also have broadened social contacts because of their search for second (or higher) mates. Remarried individuals are more likely to be intermarried than individuals in first marriages (Hartman and Hartman, 2009), but as our model controls for intermarriage, remarriage was able to be considered as a net effect. (However, remarriage, it will be seen has no significance for any of the Jewish Identity factors and was eliminated at an early stage of the analysis).

**Hypothesis C15: Having more children age 12 and under at home will lead to a stronger Communal Religious Identity and to a stronger Local Ethnic Identity.**

As mentioned in Hypothesis C9, the presence of school-age and especially Bar/Bat Mitzvah-age children is often associated with greater participation in Communal Religious

and Local Ethnic events, often because children are enrolled in religious education which draws the family into participation in community-wide events (Cohen and Ritterband, 1988 as cited in Leibman and Cohen, 1990). At the same time, we recognize that young children may increase the family roles of adults as well as financial burdens, which might, on the other hand, hinder communal participation.

**Hypothesis C16: A larger household size will be associated with weaker participation in the Communal Religious and Ethnic Jewish Identity Factors, particularly the Local Ethnic Factor.**

It is expected that larger household size results in increased domestic roles, which may hinder participation in Communal Religious and Communal Ethnic activities, particularly Local Ethnic Activities. This would be in addition to greater financial burden, which would be controlled by the income variable (discussed below).

### **Socioeconomic Status Hypotheses**

Higher socioeconomic status (as measured by education, labor force participation household income, and housing value) will be related to stronger Jewish Identity, especially in the communal sense. Many sociological studies of religion find that higher levels of secular education are associated with lower levels of religiosity (Darnell and Sherkatt, 1997; Beyerlein, 2004; Massengill, 2008), because secular education often results in a critical response to theological teachings and exposes higher education students to diverse cultures and beliefs. Secular education is considered an investment in “bridging” capital which may weaken ties to particularistic affiliations. Past studies of American Jews, however, have shown an overall positive relationship between secular education and Jewish Identity, which has been extensively studied (e.g., Lehrer, 2009; Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, 2009). This positive relationship has been attributed to the Jewish value placed on education, which was originally focused on religious education, but was broadened to include secular education when such became available to Jews in the modern world (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, 1996b). Higher education, of course, generally leads to higher income and given the high cost of being Jewish, one would expect stronger Jewish Identity among respondents with higher levels of education and income. Sheskin shows a strong relationship between household income and synagogue membership, for example, in almost all 21 communities in our sample. See, for example, Sheskin (2004: Table 7-1). This relationship is driven at least in part by the high cost of Jewish living (Chiswick and Chiswick, 2000; Wertheimer, 2010).

Schieman (2010) finds that socioeconomic status is negatively related to beliefs in divine involvement and control, following Weber’s ([1922] 1963) treatise on the inverse relationship between certain types of religious beliefs and socioeconomic status. However, Schieman also finds that the negative association between socioeconomic status and beliefs in divine involvement or control are attenuated at higher levels of religious involvement. While none of our factors measure belief *per se*, the Private Religious Factor



(Ritual) is comprised of rituals which usually reflect a belief in an active divine involvement; hence, the rationale for daily performance of these rituals. We might, therefore, expect a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and the Private Religious Factor (Ritual).

**Hypothesis C17: Higher education will be associated positively with Communal Religious and Communal Ethnic Identity. Higher education will be associated negatively with the Private Religious Factor.**

Education is measured in this study by highest degree attained. Two demographic characteristics of Jewish households--smaller household size and lower rates of married women in the labor force—imply greater investment in child “quality” than is true in the general community, which in turn leads to high levels of educational success (Lehrer, 2009). Jewish peers and Jewish norms of college education reinforce this academic orientation. As Massengill (2008: 559) has suggested: the relationship between religion and education may have “less to do with religious worldviews and orientations toward secular culture and more to do with networks and associations with significant others.” Hence, we expect that education will be related positively to Communal Religious and Communal Ethnic Identity. However, too much investment in particularistic Jewish cultural and social capital appears to have a negative impact on secular achievement (Chiswick and Huang, 2008; Hurst and Mott, 2006), resulting in the Orthodox having somewhat lower education than the other denominational groups. Hence, we expect an inverse relationship between higher education and the Private Religious Factor. This would also be consistent with the work of Schieman (2010).

**Hypothesis C18: Labor force participation will be related positively to Communal Religious and Communal Ethnic Identity and Local Ethnic Identity; however, it may be related negatively to the Private Religious Factor.**

Structural location theory (de Vaus and McAllister, 1987) hypothesizes that the greater the investment in the secular infrastructure (for example, participating in the labor force), the lower the investment in the religious infrastructure and hence lower levels of religiosity should be evident. This theory has been proposed to explain at least partially why women are more religious than men (because they tend to be less invested in the labor force and occupational attainment). Investment in the labor force may also be seen as an investment in “bridging” social capital, which may be opposed to particularistic religious or ethnic identity. However, among Jewish women, Religious and Ethnic Identity have been found to be related positively to labor force involvement, especially once family status and number of children have been controlled (Hartman and Hartman, 2011). We posit a negative relationship to the Private Religious Factor (Ritual) because of the extra time commitments involved in a more observant lifestyle; this most likely applies more to women than to men.

**Hypothesis C19: Higher income and higher housing value will be associated positively with Communal Religious and Communal and Local Ethnic Identity, and negatively with Private Religious Identity.**

The relationship between socioeconomic status and Jewish Identity is very similar to that between secular education and Jewish Identity. In addition, higher socioeconomic status facilitates greater philanthropy to Jewish causes (an indicator of Ethnic Identity), the ability to pay synagogue dues (synagogue membership is an indicator of Communal Religious Identity) and membership dues in other Jewish organizations (an indicator of Communal Ethnic Identity). We have two indicators of socioeconomic status: household income and housing value. While neither is necessarily reflective of the individual's occupational achievement, they are indicative of social class. For the same reasoning as above, too much particularistic investment in religious capital (Chiswick and Huang, 2008; Hurst and Mott, 2006), and previous findings of a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and belief in divine involvement or control (Schieman, 2010), we expect a negative relationship between higher income and higher housing value and Private Religious Identity.

#### Demographic/Geographic Hypotheses

**Hypothesis C20: Women will have stronger Jewish Identity than men for all aspects of Jewish Identity.**

Women have been found to be more religiously and ethnically identified, both among Jews (Hartman and Hartman, 2009) and more generally (Collett and Lizardo, 2009; Hertel, 1995; Mueller and Johnson, 1975; Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Rayburn, 2004; Stark, 2002; Walter and Davie, 1998; Weber, 1963 [1922]; Woolever et al., 2006). The reasons for this have been explained in some detail in the literature cited. For our purposes, we include the variable to reinforce previous findings as well as to control for any variation in Jewish Identity that gender may introduce.

**Hypothesis C21: The relationship between age and Jewish Identity will vary according to the type of Jewish Identity being considered. Older Jews may be more involved in Communal Religious Identity and in Local Ethnic Identity, while younger Jews may be more involved in Private Religious Identity.**

Putnam and Campbell (2010) find a clear positive relationship between age and religiosity. However, the relationship between age and Jewish Identity has been found to be more complex. While older Jews tend to be more involved in Communal Religious Identity and Communal Ethnic "tribalistic" Identity, younger age cohorts tend to be more involved in private expressions of identity (Hartman and Hartman, 2009a). On the other hand, Sered (1992) found personal religiosity among Jews to increase with age (at least among women). In other respects, the Baby Boomer generation is less (or more) Jewishly identified than younger or older cohorts (Hartman and Hartman, 2009a: 138-40; Waxman,

2001). Age is therefore introduced both as a control variable and as an independent variable, and it reflects both cohort (year of birth) as well as life cycle stage.

**Hypothesis C22: International immigrants will exhibit a stronger Local Ethnic Identity.**

While one might expect international immigrants to be less integrated into the local community, Goldstein and Goldstein (1996) found that international immigrants often were more integrated into the local community because of their heightened need for local services. The latter might be true of more recent immigrants, and may have characterized the initial encounter with the community for immigrants who have been in the country longer.

Many Jews from the former Soviet Union who migrated to the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s were provided significant help by the Jewish Federation, Jewish Family Services, Jewish day schools, and synagogues. Even a decade or so later, this familiarity with these Jewish institutions may mean a strong Local Ethnic Identity.

**Hypothesis C23: The longer the length of residence in a community, the stronger the Communal Religious Identity, Communal Ethnic Identity, and Local Ethnic Identity.**

Rebhun (forthcoming) tests three theories relating migration between communities to Jewish Identity: (1) the “selection” perspective suggests that individuals who move from their communities are less Jewishly identified than those who remain in their communities; (2) the “disruption” perspective posits that migration disrupts social and communal ties and thus weakens Jewish Identity; and (3) the “heightening” perspective posits that religioethnic affiliation becomes a vehicle for integrating into the new community and hence strengthens Jewish Identity. In an earlier work, Rebhun (1995) examined whether in-migrants to a community had stronger or weaker Jewish Identity and found that mobility had a small negative effect on Jewish Identity after controlling for major sociodemographic variables. This supported the hypothesis that migration disrupts, rather than enhances, Jewish Identity. However, Rebhun’s indicator of Jewish Identity did not distinguish the different dimensions of Jewish Identity (rather, it conflated them into one indicator). Further, Rebhun’s analysis only reflected the three large communities of Boston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia; whether this holds true for other communities needs empirical testing.

Goldstein and Goldstein [1996: 206], analyzing the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, found a “holding power of traditionalism,” that is, the most traditional Jews (including Orthodox) were less likely to be mobile. The Goldsteins also found that those new to a community may be less affiliated with Jewish institutions (unless they are international immigrants in need of services the institutions offer—see Hypothesis C22). Sheskin shows a positive relationship between length of residence and affiliation with Jewish institutions (e.g., Sheskin, 2009: Table 7-1). In his latest analysis, using the 1990 and 2000-01 National Jewish Population Surveys, Rebhun (forthcoming) found that

migration had little net effect on Jewish Identity, and he predicted that the effect of migration would continue to weaken.

**Hypothesis C24: Intending to move will be associated with a weaker Local Ethnic Identity.**

Respondents with plans to leave a community are expected to be pulling up roots, and therefore will exhibit lower levels of Local Ethnic Identity (this refers to Rebhun's [forthcoming] "selection" perspective described above). However, it is not clear that intending to move will be related to the other Jewish Identity factors (Communal Religious, Private Religious, and Communal Ethnic Identity), as these seem to be related more to the individual's Jewish Identity and less to their ties to the local community.

**Hypotheses Related to Survey-Level Characteristics**

**Hypothesis D1: The findings will not be influenced by the characteristics of the survey itself.**

Two survey-level indicators were selected to examine whether the manner in which the data were collected had a significant effect on the findings. Because of colinearity, only three of the survey variables shown in **Table 1** could be included: the extent of cooperation with the survey once it was determined that a household was Jewish (the *survey cooperation rate*), the sample size, and the year of the field work (Hypothesis D2). The *screener cooperation rate* (the percentage of households reached who were willing to answer enough questions to determine the households status as Jewish or not) correlated very highly with the survey cooperation rate, so only one of these two variables could be included.

We expected the relative proportions of the sample generated by RDD and DJN sampling techniques to be related to Jewish Identity (a higher percent of DJN being associated with stronger Jewish Identity, per the rationale presented in footnote 2, pp. 10). Since the variation among the communities is relatively small: most of the communities have over 60% DJN. Also four of the communities have 100% RDD samples (**Table 1**), three of which are in Florida. We mention this as a source of variation in case additional community studies are added in the future when the influence of this variable can be tested more adequately. Both the percentage of the sample from random digit dialing (RDD) sampling and from Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) sampling could not be included, as they correlated highly with each other and with the number of Jewish households and the sampling fraction.

## **Hypothesis D2: Year of the survey will not be related to the strength of Jewish Identity.**

Some recent literature suggests that some aspects of Jewish Identity, such as informal social ties, have been weakening over time (Rebhun, forthcoming) although, in other respects, Jewish identity, such as Jews' ties to communal institutions and activities, may be strengthening (Rebhun, forthcoming). Thus, we have controlled for year of the survey, although we did not expect that the nine-year span would make a significant difference in Jewish Identity.

We were hopeful that none of the survey characteristics would have strong effects on the findings on variations in Jewish Identity. This would validate the aggregation of the survey data into one mega-data file.

## **CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION**

**M**ultiple regression is the primary tool used to examine the hypotheses developed above. After analyzing the colinearity statistics, we chose variables for the multivariate analysis that represented Jewish community infrastructure without violating the assumptions of a multiple regression model concerning colinearity.<sup>12</sup> For example, we had to choose between number of Jews (and the log of the number of Jews) and number of Jewish households, selecting the number of Jewish households to test Hypothesis A1. The percentage of Jews in the broader population (of the counties covered in each study) was included to test Hypothesis A2, as well as the density of the Jewish population (as measured by the percent of Jewish households in the top 3 zip codes) to test Hypothesis A3.

The Jewish Federation Annual Campaign per Jewish household was selected to test Hypothesis A4 over the amount of the annual campaign in part because the latter was too highly correlated with number of Jewish households. The high correlation between number of synagogues and number of Orthodox synagogues led to the selection of number of Orthodox synagogues (which is a proxy for the existence of other Jewish institutions such as Jewish day schools, which could not be included due to colinearity and the number of kosher facilities, for which data are not available, to test Hypothesis A6 and meaning that Hypothesis A5 could not be tested within the context of the multiple regression models. It also became impossible to test Hypotheses A7 (number of Jewish day schools), Hypothesis A8 (number of Jewish day and supplemental schools) and Hypothesis A9 (number of Jewish agencies) within the context of multiple regression because of their colinearity with number of Orthodox synagogues and other variables.

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<sup>12</sup> Using roughly the criteria that the tolerance level should exceed .1 and the VIF not exceed 10.

As indicators of community stability, we included whether synagogue membership was increasing or decreasing to test Hypothesis A10, but could not then include the two length of residence variables: the percentage of households who lived in the community twenty years or more, or four years or less. Finally, we included the percentage of the Jewish community who are intermarried as an indicator of the Jewish community to test Hypothesis A11.

For the broader community context hypotheses, we included percentage “nones” to test Hypothesis B1, but then could not include any of the variables to test Hypothesis B2 (**Table 4**). We included dummy variables for New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the South to test Hypotheses B3, B4, and B5, but could not test Hypothesis B6.

Note that the colinearity issues were not an important issue for the individual-level variables and all 24 C-Hypotheses could be tested within the multiple regression models. For the survey-level variables, however, D1 could only be tested with sample size and survey cooperation rate.

## **MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS**

**F**our multiple regression models were developed, one for each Jewish Identity factor. The dependent variables were the factor scores for each of the almost 19,000 cases on each of the four factors defined in **Table 2**. The variables were entered in groups to identify their respective contributions. First, we entered the Jewish community-level variables to discern the extent to which various aspects of Jewish Identity are related to the broader Jewish infrastructure. Second, we entered the indicators of the broader community context to see if these variables would modify the effect of the Jewish infrastructure and contribute independent explanation. In other words, we explored whether Jewish Identity is affected by the broader community context beyond the Jewish infrastructure in that community. Third, we entered the various individual-level variables, including Jewish background/connection, family status, socioeconomic status, and demographic/geographic variables both as control variables and to see whether the expected hypotheses persisted after community-level characteristics were controlled. Fourth, we entered survey-level variables, both to control for variation in how the survey was administered and to validate the idea of aggregating the various surveys into a single mega-data file. **Table 5** presents the  $R^2$  at each stage of analysis. Because  $R^2$  represents the percent of the total variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables at each stage of a multiple regression, we present it as a percentage. That is, an  $R^2$  of .323 is presented as 32.3%. Note that, because of the very large number of cases used in these four multiple regression models, achieving statistical significance is relatively easy.

**Table 6** presents the regression coefficients for the final stage of the multiple regression. Because all variables have been entered into the multiple regression at that stage, the regression coefficients reflect the *net* effects of each of the variables once all other



variables have been controlled. When considering the relative importance of a variable's relationship with a particular factor, we look at the standardized regression coefficients ( $\beta$ ); when comparing the strength of the relationship of a particular variable across factors, we

**TABLE 5**  
**CUMULATIVE R<sup>2</sup> AS GROUPS OF VARIABLES ENTERED**  
**INTO THE FOUR MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODELS**

		Jewish Identity Factors			
		Religious Identity		Ethnic Identity	
Model	Variable Groupings	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Private Religious Factor (Ritual)	Communal Ethnic Factor	Local Ethnic Factor
<b>Community-level characteristics</b>					
1	Jewish community infrastructure/context	1.2%	2.1%	2.6%	13.0%
2	Broader community context	2.2%	2.7%	3.1%	13.5%
<b>Individual-level characteristics</b>					
3	Jewish background/connection	30.0%	33.4%	20.4%	17.8%
4	Family status	31.5%	33.8%	22.4%	18.1%
5	Socioeconomic status	31.8%	34.2%	25.9%	19.2%
6	Demographic/geographic	33.2%	34.9%	29.0%	25.9%
<b>Survey-level characteristics</b>					
7	Survey variables	33.3%	35.0%	29.0%	26.6%

**TABLE 6: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF JEWISH IDENTITY FACTORS**

Independent Variables	Jewish Identity Factors											
	Religious Identity						Ethnic Identity					
	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)			Private Religious Factor (Ritual)			Communal Ethnic Factor			Local Ethnic Factor		
(Labels in parentheses correspond to hypothesis numbers in text)	B	â	Prob	B	â	Prob	B	â	Prob	B	â	Prob
Constant	-26.52	0	.034	10.89	0	.894	21.97	0	.088	14.81	0	.259
Community Level - Jewish community infrastructure/context												
Number of Jewish households (A1)	-1.2E-7	.004	.852	-1.5E-6	-.047	.016	1.5E-7	.005	.819	-2.6E-6	-.081	.000
Percent Jewish (A2)	.204	.021	.268	-.088	-.009	.623	-.347	-.035	.067	-.094	-.009	.625
% Jewish households in top 3 zips (A3)	.214	.030	.087	-.079	-.011	.514	-.118	-.017	.360	-.910	-.128	.000
Annual campaign per Jewish household (A4)	.000	-.035	.056	.000	-.047	.011	-2.6E-5	-.007	.703	.000	.134	.000
Number of Orthodox synagogues (A6)	.002	.025	.238	.003	.037	.083	-.008	-.098	.000	.000	.003	.883
Increasing synagogue membership (A10)	-.009	-.004	.816	-.004	-.002	.920	.016	.008	.696	.042	.020	.298
Decreasing synagogue membership (A10)	.083	.037	.067	-.048	-.022	.280	-.116	-.052	.013	.018	.008	.708
% of married couples intermarried (A11)	-.003	-.041	.072	-.002	-.033	.138	-.001	-.019	.421	.000	.005	.828
Community Level - Broader community context												
Percentage "Nones" (B1)	-1.642	-.053	.034	-1.867	-.061	.013	.321	.010	.687	1.191	.038	.141
New England (B3)	.178	.061	.000	.123	.043	.005	-.199	-.069	.000	-.135	-.047	.004
Middle Atlantic (B4)	.096	.041	.000	.184	.079	.000	-.129	-.055	.000	-.113	-.048	.002
South (B5)	.070	.065	.018	.108	.103	.000	-.081	-.076	.008	.001	.001	.970
Size of urban area (B7)	.054	.027	.105	.099	.050	.002	-.052	-.026	.130	.166	.083	.000
Individual level - Jewish background/connection												
Orthodox (C1-C2-C3)	.472	.102	.000	2.135	.470	.000	.370	.080	.000	.103	.022	.022
Conservative (C2-C3)	.686	.317	.000	.315	.148	.000	.347	.161	.000	.181	.084	.000
Reform/Reconstructionist (C3)	.578	.273	.000	-.149	-.072	.000	.094	.044	.000	.154	.073	.000
Jewish day school (C4)	.153	.045	.000	.247	.073	.000	.188	.055	.000	.035	.010	.322
Supplemental Jewish school (C5)	.194	.092	.000	-.038	-.018	.059	.067	.032	.002	.056	.027	.010
Jewish overnight camp (C6)	-.013	-.010	.257	.009	.007	.412	.044	.034	.000	.022	.017	.062
Jewish youth group (C7)	.054	.047	.000	.008	.007	.396	.004	.003	.705	.023	.020	.028
Hillel (C8)	.006	.006	.515	.025	.025	.003	.014	.014	.120	.012	.011	.203
Household with Jewish children (C9)	.218	.088	.000	.028	.012	.360	-.063	-.026	.051	.117	.047	.000
Resides in densest Jewish area (C10)	.042	.021	.017	-.022	-.011	.195	.126	.062	.000	.039	.019	.037
Intermarried (C11)	-.676	-.281	.000	-.058	-.024	.013	-.533	-.222	.000	-.284	-.119	.000
Individual level - Family status												
Currently married (C12)	.097	.046	.000	-.086	-.041	.002	.047	.022	.062	-.029	-.014	.248
Single, never married (C13)	-.383	-.113	.000	.001	.000	.986	.045	.018	.265	-.126	-.037	.002
Ever divorced (C14)	-.023	-.009	.302	-.001	-.000	.970	-.065	-.026	.005	.025	.010	.292
Number of children age 0-12 (C15)	-.040	-.030	.014	.024	.018	.127	.038	.028	.026	.013	.010	.433
Household size (C16)	.053	.069	.000	.056	.074	.000	.029	.012	.013	-.006	-.007	.644
Individual level - Socioeconomic status												
Highest degree attained (C17)	-.028	-.033	.001	.019	.023	.013	.089	.105	.000	.083	.098	.000
Current employment (C18)	.036	.018	.079	.000	.000	.984	-.116	-.058	.000	.104	.052	.000
Household income (C19)	.001	.000	.976	-.104	-.052	.000	.224	.110	.000	-.012	-.006	.590
Housing value (C19)	.001	.001	.917	-.020	-.030	.003	.055	.079	.000	.026	.037	.000
Individual level - Demography/geography												
Gender (C20)	.095	.047	.000	-.025	-.013	.156	.033	.016	.083	.093	.046	.000
Age (C21)	-.010	-.169	.000	-.002	-.036	.011	.017	.283	.000	-.001	-.014	.347
Foreign born (C22)	.049	.015	.080	.214	.068	.000	.185	.058	.000	-.078	-.024	.007
Length of residence (C23)	-.005	-.005	.605	-.033	-.035	.000	-.001	-.001	.923	.257	.270	.000
Intent to move (C24)	.005	.001	.884	-.074	-.017	.042	.054	.012	.163	.069	.016	.078
Survey level												
Survey cooperation rate (D1)	.006	.055	.001	.004	.035	.027	.002	.021	.202	.014	.136	.000
Sample size (D1)	-8.2E-6	-.004	.860	.000	.052	.025	.000	.060	.012	-7.7E-5	-.039	.110
Year of study (D2)	.013	.028	.037	-.004	-.010	.467	-.015	-.032	.021	-.010	-.022	.120
R-squared	33.3%			35.0%			29.0%			26.6%		
Notes: 1) Probability values less than â =.05 are shown in red; Probability values of â=.05 to .10 are shown in blue. 2) Sample size=18,967												

**TABLE 7**  
**SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL HYPOTHESES**  
**TESTED IN THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION**

Hypotheses	Jewish Identity Factors			
	Religious Identity		Ethnic Identity	
	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Private Religious Factor (Ritual)	Communal Ethnic Factor	Local Ethnic Factor
<b>Community Level - Jewish community infrastructure/context</b>				
A1: Larger Jewish communities will act to strengthen Jewish Identity		.05		.05
A2: A higher percentage Jewish in a community will act to strengthen Jewish Identity			.10	
A3: Jewish communities that are clustered in one part of a metropolitan area, rather than being geographically dispersed throughout that metropolitan area, will exhibit stronger Jewish Identity	.10			.05
A4: A larger Jewish Federation Annual Campaign will act to strengthen Jewish Identity, especially the Local Ethnic Factor	.10	.05		.05
A6: The greater the number of Orthodox synagogues in a community, the stronger the Private Religious Factor	NA	.10	NA	NA
A10: Stable Jewish communities will be characterized by stronger Jewish Identity	.10		.05	
A11: Jewish communities with a higher percentage of married couples who are intermarried will be characterized by individuals with weaker Jewish Identity	.10			
<b>Community Level - Broader community context</b>				
B1: The greater the percentage of non-religious in the broader community, the weaker the Religious Identity of Jews	.05	.05	NA	NA
B3: Jewish Identity will be weaker in New England, especially the Communal Religious Factor, the Communal Ethnic Factor, and the Local Ethnic Factor.	.05	.05	.05	.05
B4: Jewish Identity will be stronger in the Middle Atlantic	.05	.05	.05	.05
B5: : Jewish Religious Identity will be stronger in the South	.05	.05	.05	
B7: The larger the general population of the broader community, the stronger the Jewish Identity		.05		.05
<b>Key to Significance Levels</b>				
Not significant	Reverse significant	Significant	NA=Not Applicable	

**TABLE 8**  
**SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL HYPOTHESES**  
**TESTED IN THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION**

Hypotheses	Jewish Identity Factors			
	Religious Identity		Ethnic Identity	
	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Private Religious Factor (Ritual)	Communal Ethnic Factor	Local Ethnic Factor
<b>Individual level - Jewish background/connection</b>				
C1: Orthodox Jews will have the strongest Private Religious Identity	.05	.05	.05	.05
C2: Orthodox and Conservative Jews will have the strongest Communal Religious Identity	.05	NA	NA	NA
C3: Jews who identify with a denomination will have stronger Communal Ethnic and Local Ethnic Identities	.05		.05	.05
C4: Attendance at a Jewish day school as a child will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult	.05	.05	.05	.05
C5: Attendance at a Jewish supplemental school as a child will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult	.05	.10	.05	.05
C6: Attendance at a Jewish overnight camp as a child will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult			.05	.10
C7: Regular participation in a Jewish youth group as a teenager will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult	.05			.05
C8: Regular participation in Hillel while in college will be positively related to Jewish Identity as an adult		.05		
C9: Households with Jewish children will have stronger Communal Religious Identity, Communal Ethnic Identity, and Local Ethnic Identity	.05		.05	.05
C10: Residence in areas of a community with higher concentrations of Jews will be related to stronger Jewish Identity	.05		.05	.05
C11: Inter-marriage will be associated with weaker Jewish Identity	.05	.05	.05	.05
<b>Individual level - Family status</b>				
C12: Being married will enhance Communal Jewish Identity (both the Communal Religious Factor and the Communal Ethnic Factor), as well as the Local Ethnic Factor	.05	NA	.05	
C13: Being single, never married will detract from Communal Jewish Identity	.10	NA		.05
C14: Being ever divorced will be associated with weaker Ethnic Identity, particularly with the Local Ethnic Factor	NA	NA	.05	

**TABLE 8**  
**SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL HYPOTHESES**  
**TESTED IN THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION**

Hypotheses	Jewish Identity Factors			
	Religious Identity		Ethnic Identity	
	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Private Religious Factor (Ritual)	Communal Ethnic Factor	Local Ethnic Factor
C15: Having more children age 12 and under at home will lead to a stronger Communal Religious Identity and to a stronger Local Ethnic Identity	.05	NA	NA	
C16: A larger household size will be associated with weaker participation in Communal Religious and Ethnic, particularly Local Ethnic activities	.05	NA	.05	
<b>Individual level - Socioeconomic status</b>				
C17: Higher education will be associated positively with Communal Religious and Ethnic Identity. Higher education will be associated negatively with the Private Religious Factor	.05	.05	.05	.05
C18: Labor force participation (especially of women) will be related positively to Communal Religious and Communal Ethnic Identity and Local Ethnic Identity; however, it may be related negatively to the Private Religious Factor	.10		.05	.05
C19: Higher income and higher housing value will be associated positively with Communal Religious and Communal and Local Ethnic Identity, and negatively with Private Religious Identity		NA	.05	.05
<b>Individual level - Demography/geography</b>				
C20: Women will have stronger Jewish Identity than men for all aspects of Jewish Identity	.05		.10	.05
C21: The relationship between age and Jewish Identity will vary according to the type of Jewish Identity being considered. Older Jews may be more involved in Communal Religious Identity and in Local Ethnic Identity, while younger Jews may be more involved in Private Religious Identity	.05	.05	.05	
C22: International immigrants will exhibit a stronger Local Ethnic Identity	NA	NA	NA	.05
C23: The longer the length of residence in a community, the stronger the Local Ethnic Identity, Communal Religious Identity, and Communal Ethnic Identity		NA		.05
C24: Intending to move will be associated with a weaker Local Ethnic Identity.				.10
<b>Key to Significance Levels</b>				
Not significant	Reverse significant	Significant	NA=Not Applicable	

**TABLE 9**  
**SUMMARY OF SURVEY-LEVEL HYPOTHESES**  
**TESTED IN THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION**

Hypotheses	Jewish Identity Factors			
	Religious Identity		Ethnic Identity	
	Communal Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Private Religious Factor (Ritual)	Communal Ethnic Factor	Local Ethnic Factor
D1: The findings will not be influenced by the characteristics of the survey itself (survey cooperation rate)	.05	.05		.05
D1: The findings will not be influenced by the characteristics of the survey itself (sample size)		.05	.05	
D2: Year of the survey will not be related to the strength of Jewish Identity	.05		.05	
Key to Significance Levels				
Not significant	Reverse significant	Significant	NA=Not Applicable	

examine the unstandardized coefficients (B). Also note that the column for each multiple regression model shows the exact probability of committing an alpha error when concluding that a regression coefficient is significant. The SPSS outputs for the multiple regressions are available from the authors.

Finally, **Tables 7-9** summarize the findings for each hypothesis.

### Community-Level Variables

#### Jewish Community Infrastructure/Context Variables

We start with the question of the extent to which the Jewish **community infrastructure/context** contributes to an individual's strength of Jewish Identity (**Table 5**). For Religious Identity (the Communal Religious Factor and the Private Religious Factor) and the Communal Ethnic Factor, less than 3% of the variance in Jewish Identity is explained by Jewish community infrastructure ( $R^2=1.2\%$ ,  $2.1\%$ , and  $2.6\%$ , respectively, when only the Jewish community infrastructure/context variables are entered into the multiple regression models). However, Jewish community infrastructure explains 13% of the variation in the Local Ethnic Factor.

Although Jewish community variables may not contribute much to the explanation of three of the four Jewish Identity factors, **Table 6** shows that individual Jewish community variables do have significant relationships with all four Jewish Identity Factors.



**Jewish population size** (*Hypothesis A1*) (as measured by the number of Jewish households in a community) has a negative relationship with the strength of the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.016$ ) and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). That is, individuals in smaller Jewish communities tend to be more observant of the rituals indicated in the Private Religious Factor and are more integrated into the local Jewish community than are individuals in larger Jewish communities. Number of Jewish households is not related significantly to the other Jewish Identity Factors. As the unstandardized regression coefficient ( $B$ ) is larger for the Local Ethnic Factor ( $-2.6E-6$ ) than for the Private Religious Factor ( $-1.5E-6$ ), we can conclude that Jewish community size has a stronger relationship to the Local Ethnic Factor than to the Private Religious Factor.

Before controlling for the individual-level variables, Jewish population size is significantly related to the Communal Ethnic Factor as well (larger communities exhibit stronger Communal Ethnic Identity). Once all of the individual-level variables have been controlled, this relationship disappears. Larger communities may attract certain types of individual who have stronger Communal Ethnic Identity, but apparently it is not the size of the community itself that creates this relationship.

The **percentage Jewish** in a community's area (*Hypothesis A2*) has only a weak significant negative relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.067$ ). That is, Communal Ethnic Identity is stronger in communities in which Jews are a smaller percentage of the broader population. This may be because minority status helps to bring the community together which strengthens the feeling that Jews are a people connected by a common ethnicity.

In terms of attachment to the local community, the percentage Jewish has an initially significant negative relationship with Local Ethnic Identity. However, once socioeconomic status has been controlled (model 5 of the multiple regression), the significance disappears.

The **density of the Jewish community** (*Hypothesis A3*) (as measured by the percentage of Jewish households in the top three zip code areas) is weakly related to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.087$ ). The density of the Jewish community is also related negatively to the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). In fact, the latter relationship ( $\beta=-.128$ ) is stronger than the (negative) relationship between Jewish population size and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $\beta=-.081$ ).

The density of the Jewish community has a significant negative correlation with the Private Religious Factor before the individual-level variables have been controlled, the significance of which disappears once family variables have entered the multiple regression analysis (model 4 of the multiple regression analysis).

The size of the Federation campaign (*Hypothesis A4*) (as measured by **annual campaign per Jewish household**) is related negatively to the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.011$ ) and positively to the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). We had hypothesized a positive relationship,

expecting that communities with stronger local integration could mobilize a stronger Federation campaign. We have no explanation for the negative relationship with the Private Religious Factor.

**Number of Orthodox synagogues** (*Hypothesis A6*), as expected, shows a weak positive relationship to the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.083$ ) and a negative relationship to the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). We suggest that the communal solidarity fostered by the Orthodox community may be one of bonding among the Orthodox, rather than integrating with the broader local community or even the broader Jewish peoplehood, transcending denominational lines.

**Increasing synagogue membership** (*Hypothesis A10*) has no significant relationships with any of the Jewish Identity factors. **Decreasing synagogue membership** (*Hypothesis A10*) (which may be a proxy for a decrease in the Jewish population) has a weak positive relationship to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.067$ ) and a negative relationship to the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.013$ ). That is, the Communal Religious Factor may be strengthened when the synagogue seems to be vulnerable or threatened by declining membership. Individuals seem to have stronger Ethnic Jewish Identity in stable or growing communities.

The final community characteristic included was the **percentage of intermarried couples** in the community (*Hypothesis A11*). Surprisingly, it has little relationship to the individual's Jewish Identity. Of much more importance is whether the individual is intermarried, as will be seen below (*Hypothesis C11*).

In sum, we were able to test seven of our original eleven hypotheses in the multiple regression analysis. Most of our hypotheses were not confirmed, and in five cases were reverse significant (**Table 7**). In fact, not for even one Jewish community-level variable are our hypotheses supported across all four factors. In some cases, controlling for the individual-level variables eliminated the significance of the community-level variable, suggesting that certain types of communities may attract households with characteristics that are related to different types of Jewish Identity, and this may influence the nature of Jewish Identity in that community, but it is not the community-level characteristics themselves, that do so. What we conclude from this will be examined in the Conclusions section below.

### Broader Community Context Variables

Independent of the Jewish community infrastructure/context, the broader community context has little overall relationship to the strength of individual Jewish Identity, adding from 0.5%-1.0% to the explanation of the variance in each factor (**Table 5**). That is, the change in  $R^2$  varies from 0.5% to 1.0%. Despite this, most broader community context variables are significantly related to the strength of an individual's Jewish Identity.

The **percentage “nones”** (*Hypothesis B1*) in the broader population has a negative relationship with the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.013$ ), as might be expected. Since the Private Religious Factor reflects stronger observance, it is more likely to flourish when the broader population is more rather than less religious. It is also related significantly to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.034$ ).

The relationships between the region variables and individual Jewish Identity hint at the effect of the broader religious context on individual Jewish identity. The dummy variables for New England (*Hypothesis B3*), Middle Atlantic (*Hypothesis B4*), and South (*Hypothesis B5*) are juxtaposed to the missing Midwest, Pacific, and Mountain West regions.

The **New England** (*Hypothesis B3*) and **Middle Atlantic** (*Hypothesis B4*) regions show positive relationships with the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ,  $p=.007$ ) and Private Religious Factor ( $p=.005$ ,  $p=.000$ ), but negative relationships with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ,  $p=.008$ ) and Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.004$ ,  $p=.001$ ). This suggests that the New England and Middle Atlantic Jewish communities are more religious in nature than ethnic. This is not exactly what we hypothesized. We had expected the Communal Religious Factor and the Communal Ethnic Factor to be lower in the Northeast, because of the general retreat of religion from the public arena in that area, but the Communal Religious Factor appears to be strong in the Northeast. It is the Communal Ethnic and Local Ethnic Factors which are weaker, reflecting the retreat of religion from the broader public arena. We had expected strong Jewish Identity in all respects in the Middle Atlantic, but here, too, it appears to be centered on Religious Identity.

The **South** (*Hypothesis B5*) is, as we had hypothesized, reflecting the religiosity of the region, with positive relationships for the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.018$ ) and the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ), but a negative relationship for the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.004$ ). At a later stage of the analysis, we will compare the influences on the various aspects of Jewish Identity in the different regions, to get a better understanding of these patterns.

The **size of the urban area** (*Hypothesis B7*) is related positively to the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.002$ ) and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ), as hypothesized. However, the size of the urban area is not related to the Communal Religious or Communal Ethnic Factors.

In sum (**Table 7**), the percentage of persons in the broader population who profess no religion (percentage “nones”); the dummy variables for New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the South; and the size of urban area all have significant relationships with Jewish Identity. The impact of the broader community context was only fully supported with regard to the Private Religious Factor, which had significant relationships with all of the broader community context variables; similarly, only the Private Religious Factor is associated with having a lower percentage “nones” in the broader population. Hypotheses regarding region were supported in 6 of the possible 12 tests and the reverse hypothesis was significant in another 5 cases. Thus, significant relationships were found in 11 of the 12 cases, but not all in the directions we expected.

## Individual-Level Variables

**Individual-level variables** explain the majority of variation in the Communal Religious, Private Religious, and Communal Ethnic Factors, adding 31%, 32%, and 26%, respectively to the explanation of their variance (**Table 5**). They add only 12% to the explanation of the Local Ethnic Factor (less than the Jewish community-level infrastructure/context variables).

### Jewish Background/Connections Variables

Of the individual-level variables, **Jewish background and connections** explain the most about Jewish Identity for three of the factors (Communal Religious, Private Religious, and Communal Ethnic) (**Table 5**). For the Local Ethnic Factor, more variance in identity is explained by Jewish community-level characteristics than by the individual-level Jewish background/connections variables. However, the majority of the Jewish background/connections variables have significant relationships with the Local Ethnic Factor, although the strength of the relationship is often (but not always) weaker than for the other factors (as shown by comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients [B's]). Thus, the relationship between identifying as **Orthodox** and the Local Ethnic Factor is weaker ( $B=.103$ ) than for the other factors ( $B=.472$  for the Communal Religious Factor;  $B=2.135$  for the Private Religious Factor; and  $B=.370$  for the Communal Ethnic Factor).

Whether the individual identifies as Orthodox explains the highest percentage of variation in the Private Religious Factor (*Hypothesis C1*): although Orthodox has a significant positive relationship with all four factors ( $p=.000$ ,  $p=.000$ ,  $p=.000$ ,  $p=.022$ ), the B for the Private Religious Factor of 2.135 is far higher than the B's for the other three factors. Note as well that  $\beta$  for Orthodox on the Private Religious Factor (.470) is higher than for any of the other variables in **Table 6**. The mean scores on each of the Jewish Identity factors by denominational identification are presented in **Figure 1**. The extreme difference between the Orthodox and the other denominational groups on the Private Religious Factor is clear. Identifying as Conservative also has a significant positive relationship with expressing Private Religious Identity,<sup>13</sup> while identifying as Reform/Reconstructionist is negatively related to the Private Ritual Factor ( $p=.000$ ) because Reform has historically not ascribed to kashrut.

The relationship between the strength of the Private Religious Factor and being Orthodox is stronger than the relationship to the number of Orthodox synagogues (which itself is highly correlated with the proportion Orthodox in the Jewish community,  $r=.734$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Thus it is the individual-level identification rather than the community context which is more strongly related to the expression of Private Religious Identity.

<sup>13</sup> Hartman and Hartman (1999) have shown that individuals who switch to another denomination, particularly a less strict denomination, often retain practices and orientations characteristic of their previous denominational affiliation. Since previously Orthodox are more likely to switch to Conservative than another denominational group, the relationship between identifying as Conservative and the Ritual Factor may be heightened by such switchers. According to the NJPS 2000-01, 29% of Jewish adults who identify as Conservative today were raised Orthodox. (Ament, 2005: Table 4).

# Mean Factor Scores on Jewish Identity Factors by Denomination




Figure 1

Hypothesis C2 suggests that **Orthodox and Conservative** Jews will have stronger Communal Religious Identity than will Reform/Reconstructionist Jews. In fact, the  $\beta$  for Reform/Reconstructionist (.273) is between the  $\beta$ s for Orthodox (.102) and Conservative (.317) Jews. (This does not mean that the Orthodox have weaker Communal Religious Identity than the Conservative or Reform, as **Figure 1** clarifies, but it means that net of other variables included in the multiple regression analysis, being Orthodox has less of a *net* effect on this type of identity than do the Conservative or Reform/Reconstructionist denominational identifications.)

*Hypothesis C3* posits that **Jews who identify with a denomination** will have stronger Communal Ethnic and Local Ethnic Identities and **Table 6** shows that all  $\beta$  for these two factors are significant for all three denominational groups. Identifying as Conservative ( $\beta=.161$ ) is more important than identifying as Orthodox ( $\beta=.080$ ) or Reform ( $\beta=.044$ ) for the Communal Ethnic Factor.

*Hypotheses C4 through C8* state that Jewish background will be related to stronger Jewish Identity: attendance at a Jewish day school as a child (C4), attendance at a Jewish supplemental school as a child (C5), attendance at a Jewish overnight camp as a child (C6), regular participation in a Jewish youth group as a teenager (C7), and regular participation in Hillel while in college (C8) should all be related to all four Jewish Identity Factors.

Such is the case for **Jewish day school** (*Hypothesis C4*), although **supplemental school** (*Hypothesis C5*) and the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.059$ ) show a weak negative relationship since few, if any, Orthodox attend supplemental school. Note that Jewish supplemental school has a higher  $\beta$  (.092) for the Communal Religious Factor than does Jewish day school (.045). Such is also the case for the Local Ethnic Factor (.027 vs. .010). That Jewish supplemental school appears to have more of an impact on certain types of Jewish Identity than Jewish day school is a significant finding as many studies indicate that Jewish day school is more effective at fostering Jewish Identity. These results are especially significant, given our large sample size and the ability to control for many different confounding influences.

**Jewish overnight camp** (*Hypothesis C6*) has a significant positive relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ) and a weak positive relationship with the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.062$ ), but not with either Religious Factor. **Jewish youth group** (*Hypothesis C7*) shows a significant positive relationship with the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ) and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.028$ ). **Hillel** (*Hypothesis C8*) shows a significant positive relationship only with the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.003$ ). Since the majority of the sample (63%) participated in at least one of these activities prior to adulthood, it is probable that at least one expression of Jewish Identity was strengthened by this participation. Interestingly, less than 10% participated in all three kinds of youth activities. The idea that each kind of activity is associated with a different kind of expression of Jewish Identity might be explored in future research.



**Having Jewish children in the household** (*Hypothesis C9*) is related positively to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ), reflecting a tendency to be synagogue members and to participate in communal rituals with other families. It is also related positively to the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.002$ ), presumably because activities with children increase ties to the local community. It is, however, related negatively to the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.051$ ), perhaps because the expense of raising children may lower donations to Jewish causes and curtail travel to Israel, both of which load highly on this factor.

**Residing in the densest Jewish area** of the community (*Hypothesis C10*) is related positively to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.017$ ), the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ), and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.037$ ) but, surprisingly, is not related to the Private Religious Factor. This is surprising because one would normally think that the largest number of Orthodox Jews would reside in the densest area of Jewish settlement.

**Intermarriage** (*Hypothesis C11*), as expected, is related to weaker Jewish Identity for all four factors. It has a strong negative relationship to the Communal Religious Factor ( $B = -.676$ ) and the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $B = -.533$ ). The relationship to the Private Religious Factor ( $B = -.058$ ) is relatively weak, perhaps because intermarriage is minimal in the Orthodox community and the Private Religious Factor reflects that community. Only 3.1% of the Orthodox couples in our sample are intermarried. Among the Conservative, 8.8% are intermarried; among the Reform/Reconstructionist, 19.8% are intermarried, and among those "Just Jewish," 45.8%. Thus, because Communal Religious Identity and Ethnic Jewish Identity reflect the type of Jewish Identity most characteristic of the Conservative and Reform/Reconstructionist, intermarriage has a stronger negative effect on those three factors than on the more Orthodox-related Private Religious Factor.

The Jewish background/connection variables contribute more than any other variable group to explaining all but the Local Ethnic Factor. Is their relationship with Jewish Identity modified by the communal context in which they live? To answer this question, we entered the Jewish background/connection variables into the equation first, then the other individual-level variables, then the communal context variables, and then the survey-level variables (This SPSS output is available from the authors). Comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients from the first multiple regression model to those in the last multiple regression model indicates which Jewish background/connection variables are modified by controlling for communal context. We find surprisingly little difference in the regression coefficients of this group of variables when we make this comparison. The biggest differences are found for the Local Ethnic Factor. Before the communal context variables have entered the multiple regression equation, the strength of most of the Jewish background/connection variables is almost double the values after the communal context variables are controlled. For example, the unstandardized regression coefficient ( $B$ ) for attending Jewish overnight camp as a child changes from .040 to .022; for attending supplemental school changes from .125 to .060. The effect of being intermarried actually increases from the first to the last multiple regression model, from  $B = -.208$  to  $B = -.301$ . So the communal context sometimes clarifies and sometimes explains part of the effect of the individual-level variables on Local Ethnic Identity, but does not change the direction of

influence or, for the most part, whether it is statistically significant. Similar results are seen for the other factors, although the difference between the first and last models may be smaller on the average than for the Local Ethnic Factor.

### Family Status Variables

While the Jewish background/connection variables contribute more than any other variable group to explaining all but the Local Ethnic Factor, Jewish Identity is also related in good measure to individual-level variables that are not specifically “Jewish” in nature—**family status, socioeconomic status, and demographic/geographic characteristics**. These results appear to reinforce Goldscheider’s (1986) thesis of the transformation of Jewishness to social characteristics and networks. At least in terms of the Communal Ethnic Factor, this seems to be true.

**Currently being married** (*Hypothesis C12*) shows a significant positive relationship with the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ) and the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.062$ ), as expected. Similarly, as expected, **being single, never married** (*Hypothesis C13*) is negatively related to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ) and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.002$ ).

**Being ever divorced** (currently divorced plus divorced and remarried) (*Hypothesis C14*) is negatively related to the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.005$ ) (perhaps related to lower financial resources, although this result controls for income and housing value) although no relationship exists (as was hypothesized) with the Local Ethnic Factor.

Unexpectedly, being not currently married is related to the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.002$ ). The Private Religious Factor is also related to being younger (*Hypothesis C21*), and apparently reflects a resurgence in observance that has been found in other studies. For these 21 communities, 10% of households under age 50 keep a kosher home, compared to 7% of households age 50-64 and 6% of households age 65 and over. Future studies will show whether this is a cohort trend which will stay with this group throughout their life cycle, or is something that will become weaker as they age.

**Having more young (age 12 and under) children** at home (*Hypothesis C15*) shows a negative relationship with the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.014$ ) and a positive relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.026$ ). *Hypothesis C9* showed that having Jewish children in the household connects the parents to communal religious activities and the local community. Having more young children, which this variable measures, may increase domestic roles leading to less participation in communal religious activities. It does, however, show that there is some pull into the community ethnically, perhaps to use Jewish communal facilities.

Strong positive relationships exist between **household size** (*Hypothesis C16*) and both the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ) and the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.013$ ). While no hypothesis was forwarded with regard to the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ), a strong

positive relationship is found. As expected no relationship is seen with the Local Ethnic Factor.

Interestingly, there apparently is some interaction between the effects on Jewish Identity of the individual's family status and the communal context. When we contrast the unstandardized regression coefficients of the family status variables before the communal context variables have been controlled, to the unstandardized regression coefficients of the family status variables after the communal context variables have been controlled, we do see differences. (The SPSS outputs are available from the authors.) The relationship between being single (never married) and Private Religious Identity changes from  $B=.092$  ( $p=.005$ ) to  $B=.000$  ( $p=.999$ ); the relationship between being single and the Communal Ethnic Factor changes from  $B=-.449$  ( $p=.000$ ) to  $B=.049$  ( $p=.226$ ). Apparently communal characteristics mitigate the negative effect of being single on Jewish Identity, as they do for being ever divorced. This may reflect the different ways in which Jewish facilities and institutions in the different communities are organized to accommodate these different family status groups.

### *Socioeconomic Status Variables*

**Highest degree attained** is related to stronger Jewish Identity (*Hypothesis C17*) as expressed by all four factors ( $p=.001$ ,  $p=.013$ ,  $p=.000$ ,  $p=.000$ ). The Communal Religious Factor has a negative relationship with education. A negative relationship was expected with the Private Religious Factor. We know of no explanation for this.

Being **currently employed** (*Hypothesis C18*) has a significant negative relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ) and a significant positive relationship with the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.079$ ) and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). The expected negative relationship with the Private Religious Factor is not found.

Note that, for the Communal Ethnic Factor and the Local Ethnic Factor, the relationship between labor force participation is stronger for women than for men: in multiple regressions run separately by gender (not shown here), the unstandardized regression coefficients between labor force participation and Communal Ethnic Identity are  $-.069$  for men ( $p=.033$ ) and  $-.144$  for women ( $p=.000$ ); unstandardized regression coefficients between labor force participation and Local Ethnic Identity are  $.081$  for men ( $p=.018$ ) and  $.129$  for women ( $p=.000$ ). As expected, the relationships are stronger for women than for men, though not in the direction hypothesized for Communal Ethnic Identity.

**Household income** and **housing value** (*Hypothesis C19*) have negative relationships with the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ,  $p=.003$ ), but a positive relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ,  $p=.000$ ). Housing value has a positive relationship with the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). Because Orthodox households tend to have lower household incomes, the negative relationship with the Private Religious Factor is expected; it may also be related to the positive relationship between age and the Private Religious Factor (*Hypothesis C21*). The positive relationship between income and the Communal

Ethnic Factor is also expected, as high secular achievement tends to be normative among American Jews (Hartman and Hartman, 2009b).<sup>14</sup>

### *Demography/Geography Variables*

As expected, **gender** (*Hypothesis C20*) is an important determinant of Jewish Identity. Women exhibit stronger Jewish Identity on all factors ( $p=.000$ ,  $p=.083$ ,  $p=.000$ ) except the Private Religious Factor. Because many of the commandments are not incumbent upon women, persons exhibiting strong Private Religious Identity do not usually show the gender difference in religiosity found for the other Jewish Identity Factors (Hartman and Hartman, 2009a). The findings that women have stronger Jewish Identity for three of the four factors, even when family status, number of young children, secular education achievement, and socioeconomic status are controlled, reinforces previous findings both among Jews and non-Jews (as detailed above).

Much controversy exists among researchers and Jewish community professionals over the manner in which **age** (*Hypothesis C21*) is related to Jewish Identity. Some research suggests that Jewish Identity increases with age; other research suggests that younger persons have stronger Jewish identities, at least in some geographic areas and in some aspects of Jewish Identity. Cohen and Gerstenfeld (2010) suggest that young American Jews may be more highly engaged than their older counterparts, but not in traditional ways of affiliation, joining existing organizations, or even friendships. Even in-marriage and support of Israel may be seen as “optional, tentative, and, at best, a means to expressing higher Jewish purpose.” Baby Boomers, because of the era in which they came of age are seen as a special age cohort by some (e.g., Waxman, 2001)

Our analysis sheds additional light on these controversial and contradictory findings: The relationship between age and Jewish Identity is different for each of the four Jewish Identity Factors and also varies by Jewish denomination (**Figures 2-5**). Each figure shows standardized factor scores on the Y-axis and age of the respondent on the X-axis.

**Figure 2** shows that the *Communal Religious Factor* is strongest among persons identifying with the mainstream denominations, compared to the Just Jewish, and is slightly stronger among persons age 25-34 (especially among the Reform/Reconstructionist). Overall, the pattern is that younger age groups show stronger Jewish Identity in this respect. Also note that the decrease in Jewish Identity with age is much less for the Orthodox and Conservative than for the Reform/Reconstructionist and Just Jewish.

**Figure 3** shows that the *Private Religious Factor* is higher for younger Jews regardless of denomination. The decrease by age is, by far, strongest among the Orthodox. Many older persons identify philosophically as Orthodox as a result of the manner in which they were

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<sup>14</sup> The Hartmans (2009b) also show that the intermarried tend to have lower socioeconomic achievement, reinforcing the perception that it is normative in the American Jewish community to have high socio-economic achievement.

Mean Factor Scores by Denomination by Age




Figure 2




Figure 3





Figure 4




Figure 5

raised. They may or may not still keep a kosher home or attend services regularly, but the synagogue services they feel guilty about missing are Orthodox. Thus, many older persons are philosophically Orthodox, but not behaviorally Orthodox. Younger Orthodox generally are both philosophically and behaviorally Orthodox.

**Figure 4** shows that the *Communal Ethnic Factor*, in contrast to the two Religious Identity Factors, increases significantly with age and does so for all three denominations and the Just Jewish. This supports the argument that attachment to Israel and attachment to Jewish peoplehood is lower among younger Jews,<sup>15</sup> as is the tendency to join organizations (Jewish or not) (Cohen and Gerstenfeld, 2010).

Note as well the slight decrease that seems to occur between age 18-24 and age 25-34, perhaps showing that as young Jews attend college they may tend to experiment with ideas differing from the manner in which they were raised. The data indicate that this dip rebounds by the time this group ages and starts to raise their own children.

**Figure 5** shows that the *Local Ethnic Factor* is strongest for persons age 35-64, peaking, for the most part, at age 45-54 for all denominational groups. The Local Ethnic Factor seems highest during the years in which families have children at home.

So the relationship between Jewish Identity and age is different for each of the Jewish Identity Factors, which may explain the controversial and conflicting findings in previous studies.

**Foreign born** (*Hypothesis C22*) has a weak positive relationship to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.080$ ) and a strong positive relationship with the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ). They also have a strong positive relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ), but a negative relationship with the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.008$ ). The foreign born in this sample derive from about 75 different countries: 22% are from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 10% are from each of Israel and Canada, and 7% are from Poland. A study by Sheskin (2010d) of Jews from the Former Soviet Union, using the same Decade 2000 data set employed in this report, showed that Jews from the FSU exhibited comparable levels of home religious practice as other American Jews, were less likely to be involved in the local Jewish community, and were more likely to identify as Jews in an ethnic sense, than American Jews not from the FSU. A study of Israelis in New York by Cohen (2009) and a study by Sheskin (2010e), again using the Decade 2000 data set, showed that Israelis in the United States, on almost every measure of Jewish connectivity, are more Jewishly connected than non-Israeli Jews in the United States. Thus, the results of the current study are consistent with previous more detailed analysis of this factor.

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<sup>15</sup> See, in particular, *Contemporary Jewry*, Vol. 30, No. 2-3, October 2010, Special Issue on the Distancing Hypothesis.



**Length of residence** (*Hypothesis C23*) in the current community has, not surprisingly, the strongest relationship with the Local Ethnic Factor. Length of residence has the strongest relationship of any variable with the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ), with a  $\beta$  of .257 (more than double any of the other 40 variables). The Communal Ethnic Factor is not related to length of residence or **intent to move** (*Hypothesis C24*) out of the community; the Communal Religious Factor is related to the intent to move, but not to length of residence in the community. Apparently communal religious practices and the communal ethnic feeling are part of Jewish Identity that is part of the “Jew within” that does not diminish with migratory behavior. These results are consistent with an analysis by Sheskin (2005f) who shows that when Jews migrate to Florida retirement communities from the Northeast they are much less likely to connect with their new Florida Jewish community by joining a synagogue or Jewish Community Center or donating to a Florida Jewish Federation, but they are quite likely to continue home religious practices, such as participating in a Passover Seder or lighting Chanukah candles. The negative relationship between length of residence and the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.000$ ) probably reflects the youth of Jews who are strongest in the Private Religious Factor and the fact that younger persons are more likely to migrate than older persons. Perhaps the strong community offered by an Orthodox affiliation is particularly attractive to the young who have moved away from their families. Again, it will be interesting to follow whether this is a cohort or life cycle effect.

### **Survey-Level Variables**

As a group, the **survey-level variables** contribute little explanation to the four Jewish Identity Factors (**Table 5**). This reinforces the validity of using a mega-data file for this type of analysis. However, each of the survey-level variables is related significantly to some of the Jewish Identity Factors.

The **survey cooperation rate** (*Hypothesis D1*) has positive relationships to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.001$ ), the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.027$ ) and the Local Ethnic Factor ( $p=.000$ ). The reason for this may be that the survey cooperation rate is higher in communities that have stronger Jewish Identity, and hence the positive relationship is reflecting a community characteristic more than survey dynamics. Each of the 21 surveys was accompanied by a marketing campaign to encourage the Jewish community to cooperate with the survey. Articles about the study appeared in the local Jewish newspaper. Post cards about the study were sent to all Jewish households and e-mails were sent to all known Jewish households. Advertisements were placed in the local Jewish newspaper and synagogue bulletins. Flyers were distributed around the community. Pulpit announcements were distributed to all local synagogues. While in some communities, the local secular newspaper published a small story about the upcoming survey and the Jewish Federation placed an advertisement in the secular newspaper, most of the publicity is more likely to be seen by “involved” Jews. Thus, it is not surprising that the cooperation rate is higher in communities with higher levels of Jewish Identity.

The **sample size** (*Hypothesis D1*) is related positively to the Private Religious Factor ( $p=.025$ ) and the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.012$ ), although we can posit no reason why this might be the case.

The **year of the study** (*Hypothesis D2*) has a positive relationship to the Communal Religious Factor ( $p=.037$ ), suggesting that later studies reflect greater religious communal commitment. It has a negative relationship with the Communal Ethnic Factor ( $p=.021$ ), suggesting that later studies reflect a weakening Ethnic Identity both broadly and locally. Whether this reflects the particular communities studied, or indicates a trend awaits further study. These results suggest the importance of controlling for survey differences in a meta-analysis, whether the significant relationships reflect community characteristics or characteristics of the survey procedure.

Given the idiosyncratic nature of some of the community studies, some of the variation in survey methodology is intricately related to particular communities and therefore may be less indicative of the survey methodology than of community characteristics. For example, the fieldwork of the Las Vegas study<sup>16</sup> was accomplished using a professional market research firm whereas 18 of the other studies were completed using (paid) members of the Jewish community itself. Could the Las Vegas results be different because of this methodological difference? Perhaps. But, the Las Vegas results are probably different from the other communities because Las Vegas is simply a very different place, Jewishly and otherwise. Thus, it is not clear when we control for survey-level variables what, exactly, we are controlling.

But the fact that the survey-level variables add little to the overall explanation is the more important result because it validates the concept of combining and analyzing the 21 community studies together.

## CONCLUSIONS

**W**hile the importance of place in both Religious and Ethnic Identity has long been recognized by geographers (Stump, 2008; Frazier and Tettey-Fio, 2010), it has not been researched systematically regarding Jewish Identity. This Report may be viewed as the beginning of a “sociology of Jewish place” (using Horowitz’s terminology). Like most studies of Jewish phenomena, Jewish Identity is complex, or, as Egon Mayer opined: full of “messy nuances” (Mayer, 2001) if we want to truly reflect the social phenomena. The 21 community studies in the Decade 2000 Data Set represent a wide range of Jewish community settings, but are not a “representative” sample of American Jewish communities. We lack representation of the “Pacific Northwest” (using Silk and Walsh’s [2008] regional divisions) and only sparse representation of the “Pacific,” “Mountain West,” and “Southern Crossroads.” The indicators of Jewish Identity are plentiful, but, having been collected for local Jewish community agencies, lack some of the more familiar attitudinal

<sup>16</sup> Detroit and Washington, DC were also completed using a professional market research firm, Social Science Research Systems in Media, Pennsylvania.

indicators (such as “How important is being Jewish in your life?” and “Jews in the United States and Jews elsewhere around the world share a common destiny”) and social—but impractical—indicators (such as “How many of the people you consider to be your closest friends are Jewish?” and “I have a special responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world”). Although the 21 local Jewish community studies are methodologically very similar, research on survey research shows that subtle differences in methodology can result in differences in results and such subtle differences do exist among the 21 community studies.

Nevertheless, our efforts represent a good beginning to a “sociology of Jewish place” and suggest clear directions for continuing this research. In this Conclusion section, we summarize the key findings of our research. The next Section discusses key research directions for the future.

We presented a four-factor factor analysis of 17 commonly employed measures of Jewish Identity. These factors reinforce previous multi-dimensional studies of Jewish Identity. The expression of Religious Identity is shown to be separate from the expression of Ethnic Identity. Religious Identity, in turn, can be divided into a Communal Religious Factor, which includes the more commonly-observed ritual expressions of Jewish Identity and the Private Religious Factor, which includes the less-commonly observed and private commitment to daily ritual. Likewise, Ethnic Identity can be divided into a Communal Ethnic Factor which reflects Jewish “secular” culture and peoplehood and a Local Ethnic Factor which includes familiarity with and participation in the local Jewish Federation and its agencies. By replicating the four-factor structure of Jewish Identity for each of the 21 communities individually, we reinforced the validity of the meta-analysis. Our analysis highlights variation in this structure across communities, as well as the (predominant) similarities.

Previous studies of Jewish Identity have identified public and private dimensions of both Religious and Ethnic Identity. Because there were few if any indicators in the 21 questionnaires concerning private ethnic identity, no separate factor of private ethnicity emerged. This finding reinforces the desirability of standardizing local Jewish community study questionnaires and including some questions based upon this theoretical framework, even if it is not in the immediate interest of a given community. Only by some centralized subsidization of the cost of adding such “non-practical” questions, could individual communities perhaps be enticed to cooperate with such a venture. It certainly is worth exploring, although most local community studies already have lengthy questionnaires and adding such material might mean deleting questions that local Jewish Federations would consider more important. These 21 local Jewish community studies benefitted from the fact that all 21 questionnaires were designed by the same researcher and only minor wording changes occurred on a few questions, but more standardization between researchers would make analyses such as the one presented here much more likely and worthwhile.

Besides increasing sample size (in this case, to almost 19,000) and achieving significant representation across various Jewish settings, an important innovation in using these 21 community studies in the Decade 2000 Data Set is that we have much more detail about the Jewish infrastructure in the community of each respondent than has been the case in

any analysis of local or national Jewish population surveys in the past. All of the infrastructure variables in **Table 3** (for Hypotheses A4 to A10) were collected as part of the original studies and were included in the study reports. This facilitated addressing the question of the extent to which Jewish community infrastructure is related to an individual's expressions of Jewish Identity. The answer is that Jewish community infrastructure is positively related to Jewish Identity primarily in terms of the Local Ethnic Factor; its contributions to the other three factors of Jewish Identity (Communal Religious Factor, Private Religious Factor, and Communal Ethnic Factor) are minor, once we control for individual-level characteristics. This should probably not be a surprise. In *The Jew Within: Self, Family, and Community in America*, Cohen and Eisen (2000: 183-4) conclude:

“More and more, the meaning of Judaism in America transpires within the self. American Jews have drawn the activity and significance of their group identity into the subjectivity of the individual, the activities of the family, and the few institutions (primarily the synagogue) which are seen as extensions of this intimate sphere.”

They suggest that American Jews see themselves as autonomous individual choosers from a vast array of Jewish expressions of identity, few of which are dictated by their community of residence, as was the case for generations in Europe. Highly educated as a population, their virtual community has undoubtedly expanded even more since Cohen and Eisen's 2000 study, increasing the options ever more beyond the scope of the individual community. More recently, Rebhun (forthcoming) found that the Jewish identity of individuals who moved from one place to another was minimally impacted. He suggests that this reflects both the greater dispersion of American Jews across the country, as well as an increasing role of the virtual community in promoting integration of Jews into their Jewish communities.

### Community-Level Variables

And yet, some features of Jewish infrastructure are significantly related to integration into the local Jewish community (the Local Ethnic Factor), and some are significantly related to the other three Jewish Identity factors. We do not necessarily posit causality—people with certain types of Jewish Identity may seek communities with certain infrastructures, and/or a community's infrastructure may influence certain aspects of Jewish Identity. But the relationships themselves are notable. Individuals with a strong Communal Religious Identity do not seem to be characterized strongly by living in a particular type of Jewish community, although there is a weak tendency to live in areas more densely populated by Jews and to strengthen communal ties when there is a decrease in synagogue membership (hence, perhaps a decrease in Jewish community size as well).

Individuals with a strong Private Religious Identity are more likely to live in smaller Jewish communities with a low per capita Jewish Federation Annual Campaign per capita that are characterized by a higher number of Orthodox synagogues than other communities.

Individuals with a strong Communal Ethnic Identity tend to live in more stable communities, which are not strongly Orthodox (have fewer Orthodox synagogues).

Integration into the local community (the Local Ethnic Factor) is more likely in smaller Jewish communities, which are not particularly dense (in terms of the percentage of the general population that is Jewish). Where there is stronger integration into the local community, individuals in the community are more likely to be mobilized to contribute to the Jewish Federation Annual Campaign.

So rather than providing definitive results for Jewish community type that results in strong Jewish Identity, we find “messy nuances.” One Jewish Identity type is positively related to a particular community feature, while another is negatively related. Some community features are not related to most expressions of Jewish Identity, but are positively related to another. Clearly, a Jewish community being larger and more developed is not a clear recipe for strong Jewish Identity, nor is density of the Jewish population or mobilizing a strong Jewish Federation campaign. Strong Jewish Identity can be found in stable Jewish communities and not-so-stable Jewish communities. The options seem to be limitless (or perhaps this study does not measure the most important features of Jewish communities for this purpose). As Goldscheider (1986) once suggested, Jews will find a way to create the social and institutional networks that work for them, if they do not already exist; they are not limited to a particular recipe for communal structure.

One *caveat* concerning this conclusion might be that perhaps certain types of individuals are attracted to certain types of communities. Thus, when we examine the characteristics of the individuals in a community, holding constant the types of communities, we are camouflaging some of the relationship. Perhaps. We showed above a few instances where the control of community-level variables does reduce the magnitude and significance of the individual-level variables. But remember that our initial multiple regression models do not control for the types of individuals in the communities, and still, community-level variables contribute less than 3% to the variance in the Communal Religious Factor, the Private Religious Factor, and the Communal Ethnic Factor (**Table 5**). It would seem that a “lack of recipe” is a more valid conclusion.

We control for region of the country (New England, Middle Atlantic, and South) as a proxy for the religiosity of the broader area in which a Jewish community is situated. At the same time, region controls for the region of Jewish life. We find that region is related to the strength of individual Jewish Identity in different ways. Thus, New England and Middle Atlantic communities seem to be characterized by stronger Religious Identity but weaker Ethnic Identity. The religiosity of the South is expressed in individuals with stronger Religious Identities, but weaker Communal Ethnic Identity. Finally, note that of the 12 possible relationships between the three regions and four factors, eleven are significant.



## Individual-Level Variables

Our analysis allows us to test the persistence, when community context is controlled, of the more commonly-researched relationships between individual-level variables and Jewish Identity. Generally, the expectations for the individual-level relationships with Jewish Identity are validated. We find, for example, that the strength of Private Religious Identity is related less to the number of Orthodox synagogues in an area (and hence the number of Orthodox) than to whether an individual self-identifies as Orthodox. Indeed, Jewish background/connection explains more of Communal and Private Religious Identities as well as Communal Ethnic Identity than any other variable group. All three Jewish denomination variables are related significantly to all four forms of Jewish Identity. Strong relationships are found as well for the Jewish connection variables (Jewish day school, supplemental Jewish school, Jewish overnight camp, Jewish youth group, and Hillel) with all four forms of Jewish Identity. Finally, having Jewish children, residing in the densest Jewish area and being intermarried are shown to be significant variables impacting Jewish Identity even after controlling for community context.

Family status contributes to the understanding mainly of the Communal Religious and Communal Ethnic Factors, reflecting the tendency for Jewish communal activities to be organized around families and particularly families with children at home. The significance and importance of the family status variables is modified considerably when the Jewish community characteristics are controlled, suggesting that different types of communities may accommodate different types of families. Phillips (1993) hinted that this might be the case, when he compared Milwaukee, Denver, Chicago, Phoenix, and Los Angeles. Whether this is something that varies by region or specific community is an avenue of future research.

Socioeconomic status (secular education, employment, income, and housing value) has the clearest relationship with Ethnic Identity. Of the eight possible relationships between the four variables and the two ethnic factors, seven are significant (although the relationship between current employment and the Communal Ethnic Factor is reverse significant). For Religious Identity, however, the relationships are less likely to be significant. Higher levels of secular education correspond to lower levels of Religious Identity. Of particular import is that lower income and housing value is related to higher Private Ritual Identity, no doubt due to the lower incomes of many Orthodox Jews. While inverse relationships with religiosity are common in the broader population, previous research has not found such among American Jews, who have less variation in education and income than the broader population. By analyzing the different Jewish Identity factors separately, we see that differences exist in the manner in which socioeconomic status is related to Religious and Ethnic Identity among Jews, especially when community-level characteristics are controlled.

Our expectations about the relationship between demographic/geographic characteristics and Jewish Identity were for the most part supported, particularly for gender, age, and foreign born. However, we note different relationships between age and Jewish Identity depending on the type of Jewish Identity we examine. We find an inverse relationship



between foreign born and Local Ethnic Identity compared to the other Jewish Identity Factors and different magnitudes of relationship between length of residence in the community and the different expressions of Jewish identity (strongest when we consider Private Religious Identity and Local Ethnic Identity).


### **Survey-Level Variables**

To our surprise, each survey variable had significant relationships with various Jewish Identity factors. The survey cooperation rate was positively related to all but Communal Ethnic Identity; the sample size was positively related to Private Religious Identity and Communal Ethnic Identity; and the year of study was positively related to Communal Religious Identity and negatively related to Communal Ethnic Identity. The latter reinforces some of the earlier research which finds that younger cohorts are less likely to join Jewish organizations and participate in Jewish communal life (e.g., Rebhun, forthcoming) and our own findings regarding age and Communal Ethnic Identity. It suggests that even a ten-year span may be significant in terms of change in Jewish identity. Thus, controlling for survey year was important.

With regard to survey cooperation rate, it does not surprise us that in communities with stronger Jewish Religious Identity and Local Ethnic Identity, the Jewish population is more ready to volunteer their time to participate in a survey about their Jewish community. It also reinforces the need to control for the variable to make certain it does not affect the other findings. Sample size may also reflect the readiness of the community to participate (where the sample size is statistically significant in its relation to Jewish Identity, the survey cooperation rate is not, and vice versa). We do not think these findings invalidate the results of the meta-analysis; they do, however, speak to the need to control for variance at the survey level, and in the future we hope to find procedures to include more about the survey variance in our analyses.

Thus, our analysis begins to deconstruct some of the “messy nuances” of Jewish Identity even as it complicates the generalities social scientists have come to assume about the American Jewish community. Being able to separate the different components of Jewish Identity, and control for the net effects of each of these variables, shows that the relationships are complex and in some cases need further study.

### **FURTHER RESEARCH**

learly we are at the beginning of understanding the relationships between geographical context and Jewish Identity. Here we delineate a few of the directions for future research:

Following the approach of Stump (1984), who analyzed regional variations in the determinants of religiosity, in further research we will examine the hypothesis that in different regions of the country, different types of Jewish Identity are related to different

features of the Jewish community and perhaps the broader community characteristics as well, and these may in turn affect how individual-level characteristics are related to Jewish identity.

- We hope to expand the specificity of the broader community characteristics by integrating more results from ARIS 2001 (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006), from which religiosity of the broader population at the county (or DMA) level can be matched to the 21 local community studies. A particular question of interest is whether secularism in the broader community affects (1) the strength of Jewish Identity in any of its expressions; and (2) the relationship between secular achievement (for example, secular education and income) and expressions of Jewish Identity. While we are limited by the indicators of secular achievement available, this research provides some basis for beginning to understand the variations of secularism and its impact on Jewish Identity.
- Another question we hope to consider is whether identifying as Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform implies different expressions of Jewish Identity in different parts of the country. Our findings reinforce previous findings of the important relationships between denominational preference and strength of different kinds of Jewish Identity. However, the interaction of denomination and place has seen little systematic study.
- Some of our hypotheses specified differences in gender, which we have not yet been fully explored. Does the relationship of gender and Jewish Identity vary by community context? Here the broader communal context as well as the Jewish communal context may be relevant.
- As noted above, the Decade 2000 Data Set lacks representation in parts of the West, and is relatively over-represented in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic and South. We hope to incorporate community studies of other researchers and later studies completed by Ira M. Sheskin to make the meta-data file more representative geographically and to keep the data current.
- Again, we emphasize the desirability of standardizing a portion of the community studies' questionnaires to facilitate comparability between researchers and include more communities in a meta-data file such as Decade 2000. Particularly when national studies of American Jews are not being funded, the ability to aggregate local Jewish community studies is imperative, and subsidizing a common core of questions for community studies would be far less costly than developing a new national Jewish population study.

In conclusion, we are just at the beginning of this "sociology of Jewish place," but one that we hope will allow us to address questions of interest about the construction of Jewish Identity in contemporary American life.

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The Jewish Federations  
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