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The American Jewish Year Book 2013, The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities

This Report derives from Chapter 6 of the *American Jewish Year Book, 2013*.

The *American Jewish Year Book* is "The Annual Record of Jewish Civilization." This volume is a very important and prestigious annual publication because it has acted as a major resource for academic researchers, researchers at Jewish institutions and organizations, practitioners at Jewish institutions and organizations, the media, both Jewish and secular, educated leaders and lay persons, and libraries, particularly University and Jewish libraries, for up-to-date information about the American and Canadian Jewish communities. For decades, the *American Jewish Year Book* has been the premiere place for leading academics to publish long review chapters on topics of interest to the American Jewish community.

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Table of Contents from the *American Jewish Year Book, 2013*

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World Jewish Population, 2013

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2013

At the beginning of 2013, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 13,854,800—an increase of 101,500 (0.74%) over the 2012 revised estimate (DellaPergola 2010, 2012). The world's total population increased by 1.16% in 2012 (Population Reference Bureau 2012). World Jewry hence increased at less than two thirds the general population growth rate.

Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and, in the aggregate, in the rest of the world—commonly referred to as the Diaspora—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2013. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core* Jewish population concept assumes mutually exclusive sub-populations even though multiple cultural identities are an increasingly frequent feature in contemporary societies (see more under definitions below). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews after the tragic human losses of World War II and the Shoah, 47 more years were needed to add another million (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 2000).

Since the 1970s, world Jewry stagnated at *zero population growth* for nearly 20 years, with some recovery during the first decade of the 21st century. This was the result of the combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 to over 6 million in 2013. The Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing to the current 7.8 million. The world's total population increased more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.080 billion in 2012 and 7.162 billion in 2013. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.96-1.93 per 1,000 currently.

Two countries, Israel and the US, accounted for over 82% of the 2013 total, another 16 countries, each with more than 18,000 Jews, accounted for another 16%, and another 77 countries, each with Jewish populations below 18,000, accounted for the remaining 2%. **Figure 2** shows the largest *core* Jewish populations.

Israel's Jewish population (*not* including over 318,000 persons not recorded as Jews in the Population Register and belonging to families initially admitted to the country within the framework of the *Law of Return*) surpassed six million in 2013 (43.4% of world Jewry). This represented a population increase of 113,200 (1.92%) in 2012. In 2012, the Jewish population of the Diaspora decreased by 11,700 (-0.15%). The *core* Jewish population in the US was assessed at 5,425,000 (39.2% of world Jewry) and was estimated to have slightly increased over the past 10 years, after probably reaching its peak after 1980, followed by several subsequent years of moderate decline. Jews in the rest of the world were assessed at 2,415,500 (17.4% of world Jewry).

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel now hosts the largest Jewish community worldwide, although some researchers—including in this volume—



Fig. 1 World total population and Jewish population core definition, 1945-2013



Fig. 2 Largest core Jewish populations, 2013

may disagree (Saxe and Tighe, 2013; Sheskin and Dashefsky, 2010, 2013). Demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and destiny—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, minor, slow and diverse changes affecting human birth and death, geographical mobility, and the willingness of millions of persons to identify with a Jewish collective concept—no matter how specified in its details. At the same time, Israel's Jewish population faces a challenging demographic balance with its gradually diminishing majority status vis-à-vis the Palestinian Arab population that lives in the same territory.

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility (3.0 children per Jewish woman on average in 2010) and a young age composition (26% under age 15 and only 12% age 65 and over as of 2011). These two drivers of demographic growth—above-replacement fertility and a balanced age composition—do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example, Canada, Australia, and until recently, Germany), the number of Jews in Diaspora countries has tended to diminish at varying rates. The causes for these decreases are low Jewish birth rates, an increasingly elderly age composition, and a dubious balance between persons who join Judaism (*accessions*) and those who drop or lose their Jewish identity (*secessions*).

All this holds true regarding the *core* Jewish population, which does *not* include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews connected with Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters. If an *enlarged* Jewish population definition is considered, including non-Jews who have Jewish parents, a global aggregate population estimate of 15,773,000 is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, the enlarged estimate grows to 18,197,000. Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and lateral provisions of Israel's Law of Return, the total Jewish and non-Jewish eligible population can be roughly estimated at 21,650,000. The US holds a significantly larger *enlarged* Jewish population aggregate than Israel—8.3 million compared to 6.3 million, respectively. (See **Appendix A** and further discussion of definitions below.)

Fundamentals of Jewish Population Change

Jewish population size and composition reflect the continuous interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community.

Regarding **external factors**, since the end of the 1980s, major geopolitical and socioeconomic changes in the world significantly affected Jewish population trends. Leading factors included the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Germany's reunification, the EU's gradual expansion to 27 states (28 with the inclusion of Croatia as of June 2013), South Africa's transition away from the apartheid regime, political and economic instability but also democratization and growth in several Central and South American countries, and a highly volatile situation in Israel and the Middle East. Large-

scale emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and also from Ethiopia, and rapid population growth in Israel were the most visible effects, accompanied by other significant Jewish population transfers, such as the movement of Jews from Central and South America to the US, particularly South Florida and Southern California. Shifts in group allegiances, reflecting broader trends in religious and national identities, as well as intermarriage patterns also played a role in shaping Jewish population size and composition.

Reflecting these global trends, more than 82% of world Jews currently live in two countries, the US and Israel, and over 95% are concentrated in the ten largest communities. In 2013, the G8 countries—the world's eight leading economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, UK, and US)—comprised over 88% of the total Diaspora Jewish population. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 2005).

Regarding **internal factors**, the defining prerogative of demography is that populations do not surge from a vacuum but rather reflect an uninterrupted chain of events that relay the same population from an earlier to a later point in time. Of the three major determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths); and (b) the balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). Both factors affect increases or decreases in the physical presence of persons in a given place. The third determinant consists of identification changes or *passages* (accessions and secessions), and applies only to populations—often referred to as sub-populations—that are defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific peculiarity, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group. One cannot undervalue the quantitative impact of passages that occur in either direction regarding individual perceptions and emotional attachments to group identities. Some of these passages are sanctioned through a normative ceremony under a given religious denomination, and some are not.

The 2013 Jewish population data were updated from 2012 and previous years in accordance with the known or estimated quantity of vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. In the updating procedure, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new Census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be on target.

The research findings reported here tend to confirm the estimates reported in previous years and, perhaps more importantly, a coherent interpretation of the trends now prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi

1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011). Concisely stated, a strongly positive balance of Jewish vital events (births and deaths) is seen in Israel versus a negative balance in nearly all other countries. A positive migration balance is seen in Israel, the US, Canada, Australia, and in a few other Western countries, while a negative migration balance prevails in Central and South America, South Africa, Eastern Europe, Muslim countries, and several countries in Western Europe. Israel sees a positive balance of accessions to Judaism over secessions, while an often negative, or, in any event, rather uncertain, balance of formal and especially informal passages prevails elsewhere.

While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2013 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes implying bi-local residences and, thus, a double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally mobile and multi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to another. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities, hence Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage. Consequently, analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

Definitions

A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population is addressed at all. The problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework to Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural and socioeconomic environments. The study of a Jewish population (or of any other population subgroup) requires solving three main problems:

1) *defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;
2) *identifying* the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting the target group from the rest of the population—through membership lists, surnames, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
3) *covering* the target group through appropriate field work—in person, by telephone, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on *operational*, not *normative*, definitional criteria. Its conceptual aspects, far from pure theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as cooperation rates have decreased in social surveys, the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. These declining cooperation rates reflect the identification outlook of the persons who are part of the target population—that outlook which is itself an integral part of the investigation. No method exists to break this vicious cycle. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible to uncover. Anything that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be estimated through various imperfect techniques. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of myths, hopes, fears, and corporate interests. No methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these claims—at least not within the limits of a non-fictional work such as this.

Keeping this in mind, four major definitional concepts should be considered to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography (**Figure 3**).

In most Diaspora countries, the concept of ***core Jewish population*** (initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews; *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not have another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps but does not necessarily coincide with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who are not interested in religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or by other cultural criteria. Some others do not even recognize themselves as Jews when asked, but they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without conversion. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons of Jewish origin who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted out. The *core* concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic approach reflecting the nature of many available demographic data sources.

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to the rulings of the Ministry of the Interior, which relies on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects



Fig. 3 Configuring contemporary Jewish populations

definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

A major research issue of growing impact is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the 2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000-01)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included under certain circumstances in the standard *core* Jewish population definition. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. In the NJPS 2000-01 version initially processed and circulated by United Jewish Communities (now The Jewish Federations of North America), a Jew was defined as *a person whose religion is Judaism, OR whose religion is Judaism and something else, OR who has no religion and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing, OR who has a non-monotheistic religion and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing* (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). A category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).

The recent research experience indicates that numerous people tend to shift their identities over time across the different layers of the *core* Jewish definition, and between *core* and *non-core* status. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary between being Jewish and being something else, as illustrated in **Figure 3**.

Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in total Jewish population counts for Canada. The adoption of such increasingly extended criteria by individual researchers tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on Jewish population size beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core* definition. These procedures may respond to local needs and sensitivities but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time.

The concept of an ***enlarged Jewish population*** (initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) includes the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) all other persons of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish (non-Jews with Jewish background); and (c) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may claim to be *also* Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most PJBs who are not part of the US *core* Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of multiple ethnicities naturally should be included under the *enlarged* definition.

The ***Law of Return,*** Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants, awards Jewish new

immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return* (Gavison 2009) a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform), who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews of Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law as such does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior and rabbinic authorities—but only for the specific benefits available under the *Law of Return*. This law extends its provisions to all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren, as well as to their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence the rules of research, rendering them increasingly more complex and flexible. Organizations are motivated by their mission toward their respective constituencies rather than by pure scientific criteria. In turn, the understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources tends to influence them to cover Jewish populations increasingly similar to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions rather than to the *core* definition.

Some past socio-demographic surveys, by investigating people who were born or were raised or are currently Jewish, may have reached a population whose ancestors *ever* were Jewish, regardless of present identification. It is indeed customary in socio-demographic surveys to consider the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some censuses, however, *do* ask about more distant ancestry. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households. Historians might wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived and how many persons today are the descendants of those Jews—for example, *Conversos* who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages. The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.

The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, individual country, and major metropolitan area consistently aim at the concept of *core* Jewish population (**Tables 1 - 6** and **Appendix A**). The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point

for any admittedly relevant elaboration about the *enlarged* definition, or even broader definitions such as the *Law of Return* which will be estimated in **Appendix A.**

Data Sources

Data on population size, characteristics, and trends are a primary tool in the evaluation of Jewish community needs and prospects at the local level, nationally, and internationally. The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported herein reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband, Kosmin, and Scheckner 1988; DellaPergola 2002). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, users of Jewish population estimates should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of our estimates.

The more recent data presented here on Israel, the US, and the rest of world Jewry reflect updated information on Jewish population that became available following the major rounds of national censuses and socio-demographic surveys in countries with large but also smaller Jewish populations from 1999-2012. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. Some of this ongoing research is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research. For example, initiated by the late Roberto Bachi of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an International Scientific Advisory Committee was established under the chairmanship of Sidney Goldstein from Brown University. An Initiative on Jewish Demography, sponsored by the Jewish Agency, facilitated data collection and analysis from 2003-2005, while between 2003 and 2009, the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute (JPPPI) provided a framework for Jewish population policy analysis and suggestions (DellaPergola and Cohen 1992; DellaPergola 2003, 2011; The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute 2005, 2007, 2008). While the quantity and quality of documentation on Jewish population size and characteristics are still far from satisfactory, over the past twenty years important new data and estimates were released for several countries through official population censuses and Jewish-sponsored socio-demographic surveys.

Since 1991, one or more national censuses have yielded results on Jewish populations in European countries like Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine; countries in Asia like Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan;

countries in Africa like South Africa; countries in the Americas like Canada, Brazil, Chile and Mexico; and countries in Oceania like Australia and New Zealand. Population Censuses in the US do not provide information on religion, but have furnished relevant data on countries of birth, spoken languages, and ancestry. Permanent national population registers, including information on Jews as one of several documented religious, ethnic, or national groups, exist in several European countries (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Switzerland) and in Israel.

In addition, independent socio-demographic studies have provided valuable information on Jewish demography and socioeconomic stratification, as well as on Jewish identification. Several socio-demographic surveys were conducted over the past several years in South Africa (1991 and 1998); Mexico (1991, 2000, and 2006); Lithuania (1993); Chile and the UK (1995, 2001, and 2011); Venezuela (1998–99); Guatemala, Hungary, and the Netherlands (1999); Moldova and Sweden (2000); France and Turkey (2002); Argentina (2003, 2004, and 2005); Australia (2008), New Zealand (2008), and Israel (1990, 1999, and 2011, besides the annual National Social Survey). In the US, important new insights were provided by several large surveys: the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000–01, following NJPS 1971 and NJPS 1990), the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS 2001 and 2008), and the Heritage, Ancestry, and Religious Identity Survey (HARI 2001-02). Smaller Jewish samples can be obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS) and similar national studies, and have been compiled and analyzed at the Steinhardt Social Research Institute at Brandeis University—SSRI (Saxe et al. 2013). Two major national studies including fairly large Jewish samples are the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008) and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008). Moreover, numerous Jewish population studies were separately conducted in major cities in the US (notably in Chicago in 2001 and 2010, New York City in 2002 and 2011, Washington, DC in 2003, Miami in 2004, Palm Beach County (FL) in 2005, Boston in 2005—the fifth decennial study in that metropolitan area, and Philadelphia in 2009), as well as in other countries. (For a synopsis of the main findings, see Sheskin 2011, 2012).

Additional evidence on Jewish population trends comes from the systematic monitoring of membership registers, vital statistics, and migration records available from Jewish communities and other Jewish organizations in many countries or cities, notably in Buenos Aires, Germany, Italy, São Paulo, and the UK. Detailed data on Jewish immigration routinely collected in Israel help to assess Jewish population changes in other countries. A new round of population projections undertaken by the author in the light of the latest data also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data.

Presentation and Quality of Data

Jewish population estimates in this study refer to January 1, 2013. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence a somewhat greater margin of

inaccuracy. Indeed, where appropriate, we revised our previous estimates in light of newly acquired information (**Tables 1 - 2**). Corrections were also applied retroactively to the 2012 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2013 estimates. Corrections of the 2013 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident *core* Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in **Appendix A** an estimate of mid-year 2012 total (both Jewish and non-Jewish) country population (Population Reference Bureau 2012), the estimated January 1, 2013 *core* Jewish population, the number of Jews per 1,000 total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The last three columns provide rough estimates of the population with *Jewish parentage*, the *enlarged* Jewish population, and the *Law of Return* Jewish population. These figures were derived from available information and assessments on the generational depth and recent extent of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective *core* Jewish populations, and the figures must be taken as indicative only.

A wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be best to indicate a range (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate for the number of Jews. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective *core* Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counts. Wherever possible we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents.

The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the detailed tables below. The code in **Appendix A** indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates:

(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period.

(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period.

(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.

(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

In categories (A), (B), and (C), the year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2013 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

As noted, one additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola, Rebhun and Tolts 2000; and author's updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first decade of the 21st century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments bound to occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used indications from these projections to refine the 2013 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are clearly shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

World Jewish Population Size and Distribution

The size of world Jewry at the beginning of 2013 was assessed at 13,854,800. World Jewry constituted 1.93 per 1,000 of the world's total population of 7.162 billion by mid-year 2013 (United Nations 2013). One in about 518 people in the world is a Jew (**Table 1**).

According to the revised estimates, between January 1, 2012 and January 1, 2013, the Jewish population increased by an estimated 101,500 persons, or about 0.74%. This compares with a total world population growth rate of 1.16% (basically nil in more developed countries, 1.5-2.0% in less developed countries). World Jewry continued to increase slowly exclusively due to the population increase in Israel (1.92%) overcoming the decrease in the Diaspora (–0.15%).

Table 1 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population at the beginning of 2013 as compared to 2012. For 2012, the originally published estimates from the 2012 *American Jewish Year* Book are presented as are somewhat revised estimates that reflect retroactive corrections made in certain country estimates, given improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of 7,200 persons in the 2012 world Jewry estimate. Most of the correction concerns Canada. Explanations are given below for these corrections.

The number of Jews in Israel increased from 5,901,100 in 2012 to 6,014,300 at the beginning of 2013, an annual increase of 113,200, or 1.92%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora *decreased* from 7,852,200 to 7,840,500—an annual decrease of 11,700, or –0.15%. These

Table 1 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographical regions, 2012 and 2013[a]

Region	2012			2013		Percentage change 2012-2013	Jews per 1,000 total population in 2013[a]
	Original	Revised[b]					
	Number	Number	Percent[c]	Number	Percent[c]		
World total	**13,746,100**	**13,753,300**	**100.0**	**13,854,800**	**100.0**	**0.74**	**1.96**
Diaspora	7,845,000	7,852,200	57.1	7,840,500	56.6	-0.15	1.11
Israel	5,901,100	5,901,100	42.9	6,014,300	43.4	1.92	753.53
America, total	**6,183,200**	**6,190,000**	**45.0**	**6,189,900**	**44.7**	**0.00**	**6.53**
North[d]	5,800,000	5,804,000	42.2	5,805,000	41.9	0.02	16.64
Central, Caribbean	54,200	57,000	0.4	56,900	0.4	-0.18	0.28
South	329,000	329,000	2.4	328,000	2.4	-0.30	0.83
Europe, total	**1,426,900**	**1,427,400**	**10.4**	**1,416,400**	**10.2**	**-0.77**	**1.74**
European Union[e]	1,109,400	1,109,900	8.1	1,105,700	8.0	-0.38	2.20
FSU[f]	276,900	276,900	2.0	270,300	2.0	-2.38	1.34
Other West	19,400	19,400	0.1	19,300	0.1	-0.52	1.43
Balkans[f]	21,200	21,200	0.2	21,100	0.2	-0.47	0.22
Asia, total	**5,941,100**	**5,941,100**	**43.2**	**6,053,700**	**43.7**	**1.90**	**1.45**
Israel	5,901,100	5,901,100	42.9	6,014,300	43.4	1.92	753.53
FSU[f]	20,000	20,000	0.1	19,600	0.1	-2.00	0.24
Other	20,000	20,000	0.1	19,800	0.1	-1.00	0.00
Africa, total	**75,300**	**75,200**	**0.5**	**74,700**	**0.5**	**-0.66**	**0.07**
Northern[g]	3,600	3,600	0.0	3,500	0.0	-2.78	0.01
Sub-Saharan[h]	71,700	71,600	0.5	71,200	0.5	-0.56	0.09
Oceania[i]	**119,600**	**119,600**	**0.9**	**120,100**	**0.9**	**0.42**	**3.25**

a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: Mid-year 2012. Source: Population Reference Bureau 2013. Mid-year 2012 estimates.
b Based on updated or corrected information.
c Minor discrepancies due to rounding.
d US and Canada.
e Including Baltics.
f Asian regions of Russian Federation and Turkey included in Europe. Excluding Baltics.
g Including Ethiopia.
h Including South Africa, Zimbabwe.
i Including Australia, New Zealand.

changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and other countries to Israel, and the internal decrease typical of the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In 2012, out of a total growth of 113,200 core Jews in Israel, 89,500 reflected the balance of births and deaths, 4,300 derived from conversions to Judaism, and 19,400 reflected the estimated Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration) (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2012, 2013; Fisher 2013). This estimate includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants, returning Israelis, and Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time. Therefore, internal demographic change produced nearly 80% of the recorded growth in Israel's Jewish population as well as most of the Diaspora's estimated decrease.

By comparing the Israel-Diaspora net migration balance with the total estimated decrease in the Diaspora's *core* Jewish population, one obtains that the former was larger than the latter. This would imply a slightly positive balance in the combination of Jewish births and deaths, as well as of accessions to and secessions from Judaism across the Diaspora. This is quite certainly underestimating the actually negative balance between these demographic factors, resulting in higher than real population estimates for the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. Such an underestimate should be adjusted in future Jewish population reports.

Recently, however, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, and, to a lesser extent, countries such as Peru and India. To some extent this phenomenon occurs in the Diaspora as well. The return or first-time accession to Judaism of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to some of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel.

As noted, we corrected previously published Jewish population estimates in light of new information. **Table 2** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945–2013, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and as corrected retroactively, incorporating all subsequent revisions.

These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published until 1980 by other authors and since 1981 by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* based on the information that was available on each date. It is likely that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

The time series in **Table 2** clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally from World War II until 2005. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 182,000 in the 1990s. While 13 years were necessary to add one million to world Jewry's postwar size, 47 years were needed to add another million. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 531,400 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total.

Table 2 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2013

Year	World Jewish population			World total population		Jews per 1,000 total population
	Original estimate[a]	Revised estimate[b]	Annual percentage change[c]	Total (millions)[d]	Annual percentage change	
1945, May 1	11,000,000	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,303,400	11,297,000	0.57	2,526	1.74	4.47
1960, Jan. 1	12,792,800	12,079,000	0.67	3,026	1.83	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	13,950,900	12,585,000	0.41	3,691	2.03	3.41
1980, Jan. 1	14,527,100	12,819,000	0.18	4,449	1.85	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,810,300	12,868,000	0.04	5,321	1.74	2.42
2000, Jan. 1	13,191,500	13,050,000	0.14	6,075	1.41	2.15
2005, Jan. 1	13,034,100	13,183,000	0.20	6,487	1.32	2.03
2010, Jan. 1	13,428,300	13,581,400	0.60	6,916	1.24	1.96
2011, Jan. 1	13,657,800	13,658,000	0.56	7,000	1.21	1.95
2012, Jan. 1	13,746,100	13,753,300	0.65	7,080	1.14	1.94
2013, Jan. 1	13,854,800		0.74	7,162	1.16	1.93

a As published in *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some estimates reported here as of January 1 were originally published as of December 31 of previous year.
b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
c Based on revised estimates, besides latest year.
d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations 2013.

Table 3 Jewish population by major regions: core definition and Law of Return definition (rough estimates), 1/1/2013

Region	Core Jewish population[a]	Population with Jewish parents[b]	Enlarged Jewish Population[c]	Law of Return Population[d]	Difference (Law of Return - Core Jewish population)	Percentage distribution of difference
World total	**13,854,800**	**15,772,800**	**18,197,400**	**21,649,500**	**7,794,700**	**100.0**
North America	5,805,000	7,225,000	8,800,000	11,600,000	5,795,000	74.3
Latin America	384,900	498,600	599,100	656,900	272,000	3.5
European Union[e]	1,105,700	1,296,000	1,574,300	1,833,300	727,600	9.3
FSU in Europe[e]	270,300	400,200	540,500	827,400	557,100	7.1
Rest of Europe	40,400	47,100	56,000	61,600	21,200	0.3
Israel	6,014,300	6,047,500	6,332,900	6,332,900	318,600	4.1
FSU in Asia	19,600	26,800	37,500	54,300	34,700	0.4
Rest of Asia	19,800	22,600	25,600	28,600	8,800	0.1
Africa	74,700	80,900	87,300	94,200	19,500	0.3
Oceania	120,100	126,100	144,200	160,300	40,200	0.5

a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; *and* do not have another religion. Also includes persons with Jewish parents who claim no current religious or ethnic identity.
b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) all other not currently Jewish persons with a Jewish parent.
c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) all other not currently Jewish persons with a Jewish parent; and (c) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).
d Sum of Jews, children, and grandchildren of Jews, and the respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identity.
e The Baltic countries are included in the European Union, not in the FSU.

Between 2010 and 2013, world Jewry increased by over 273,000, but Israel's Jewish population grew by 310,000 while the total Diaspora decreased by 37,000. **Table 2** also outlines the slower Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of world population. In 2013, the share of Jews among world population (1.93 per 1,000) was less than half the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

In this study, we have made an entirely new attempt to evaluate the possible extent of various expanded Jewish population definitions in each country of the world: the total of those who have Jewish parents regardless of their current identity; the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of non-Jewish household members; and the population eligible for the Law of Return (**Table 3** and **Appendix A**). The main gist of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate inter-country comparability. In the light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it appears that Jewish communities in different countries increasingly tend to follow local criteria that may differ from the definitional criteria accepted in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US is evaluated quite differently in the present study and in another essay appearing in this same volume (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2013). But in a global study like ours, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently across the board. By showing the consequences for Jewish population evaluation different definitions may have, we believe readers will have an additional tool to better appreciate the ongoing population trends in their countries.

The results are quite tentative but provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of persons who have a Jewish parent, regardless of their own identification, stands at 15,772,800, or 1,918,000 more than the 13,854,800 core Jews. The total number of household members with at least one core Jew is estimated at 18,197,400, or an additional increment of 2,424,600. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return is roughly estimated at 21,649,500, or an additional increment of 3,452,100. All in all, the difference between the Law of Return potential aggregate and the core Jewish population can be evaluated at 7,794,700 self-described non-Jews, holders of a non-Jewish religion and/or a non-Jewish ethnicity. Of these roughly estimated 7.8 million somewhat Jewish-connected non-Jews, 74.3% live in North America, 9.3% in the EU, 7.2% in the FSU, 4.1% in Israel, 3.5% in Latin America, and 1.1% in other countries.

Major Regions and Countries

About 45% of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with about 42% in North America (**Table 1**). Over 43% live in Asia, mostly in Israel. Asia is defined as including the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asian parts of the Russian Federation and Turkey. Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounts for over 10% of the total. Fewer than 2% of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania.

Very significant changes occurred in world Jewish population distribution by major regions between 1948 and 2013. **Figure 4** illustrates these changes by focusing on a threefold division between the US, Israel, and the rest of the world. In particular the rapid growth of Israel's Jewish population is evident, from 650,000 and 5.7% of the total in 1948, to over 6

million and 43.4% in 2013. In contrast, the US changed from over 4.5 million and 39.5% of the total in 1948, to over 5.4 million and 39.2% in 2013, while the total Jewish population in other countries decreased from over 6.3 million and 54.9% of the total in 1948, to over 2.4 million and 17.4% in 2013. The most significant declines occurred in the FSU, in other Eastern European countries, in Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, in Africa south of the Sahara, and in Latin America. Substantial stability prevailed in North America and in Western Europe as a total. Significant increases occurred in Oceania where the Jewish population represents less that 1% of world Jewry. All in all, comparing 1970 with 1948, and 2013 with 1970, the geographical map of world Jewish population dispersion tends to become much more concentrated over time.

Among the major geographical regions shown in **Table 1**, the number of Jews increased between 2012 and 2013 in Israel (and, consequently, in Asia as a whole), in Oceania, and minimally in North America thanks to continuing immigration to Canada. Jewish population size decreased to variable extents in Central and South America, Western Europe, the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and in Africa. These regional changes reflect the trends apparent in the Jewish population in the major countries in each region. We now turn to a review of the largest Jewish populations in individual countries.

Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation along with an increasing concentration in a few countries, 98.3% of world Jewry in 2013 lived in the largest 18 communities, and excluding Israel from the count, 96.9% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 17 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 69.2% who lived in the US (**Table 4**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (the Russian Federation); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances *vis-à-vis* the Jewish presence.

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by a higher share of Jews in a country's total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be related to the country’s level of development (**Table 5**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2013, the share of Jews out of the total population was 753.5 per 1,000 in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza). Israel obviously is a special case, but has become also quite a developed country. Elsewhere Jews represented 17.3 per 1,000 of total population in the US; 3.9 per 1,000 on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.8 per 1,000 on average in the other nine countries with over 18,000 Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority of world population.



Fig. 4 Core Jewish population in the United States, Israel and other countries, thousands, 1948-2013

TABLE 4 Countries with largest core Jewish populations, 1/1/2013

Rank	Country	Jewish population	Percent of total Jewish population			
			In the world		In the diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	Israel[a]	6,014,300	43.4	43.4	[b]	[b]
2	US	5,425,000	39.2	82.6	69.2	69.2
3	France	478,000	3.5	86.0	6.1	75.3
4	Canada	380,000	2.7	88.8	4.8	80.1
5	United Kingdom	290,000	2.1	90.9	3.7	83.8
6	Russian Federation	190,000	1.4	92.2	2.4	86.3
7	Argentina	181,500	1.3	93.5	2.3	88.6
8	Germany	118,000	0.9	94.4	1.5	90.1
9	Australia	112,500	0.8	95.2	1.4	91.5
10	Brazil	95,200	0.7	95.9	1.2	92.7
11	South Africa	70,000	0.5	96.4	0.9	93.6
12	Ukraine	65,000	0.5	96.9	0.8	94.5
13	Hungary	48,000	0.3	97.2	0.6	95.1
14	Mexico	40,000	0.3	97.5	0.5	95.6
15	Belgium	30,000	0.2	97.7	0.4	96.0
16	Netherlands	29,900	0.2	97.9	0.4	96.3
17	Italy	28,100	0.2	98.1	0.4	96.7
18	Chile	18,500	0.1	98.3	0.2	96.9

a Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
b Not applicable.

TABLE 5 Largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 total population and Human Development Indices, 1/1/2013

Rank	Country	Jewish population	Total population	Jews per 1,000 total population	HDI rank[a] 2012
1	Israel[b]	6,014,300	7,981,500	753.5	16
2	US	5,425,000	313,900,000	17.3	3
3	France	478,000	63,640,000	7.5	20
4	Canada	380,000	34,900,000	10.9	11
5	United Kingdom	290,000	63,220,000	4.6	26
6	Russian Federation	190,000	143,200,000	1.3	55
7	Argentina	181,500	40,800,000	4.4	45
8	Germany	118,000	81,800,000	1.4	5
9	Australia	112,500	22,000,000	5.1	2
	Total ranks 3-9	1,750,000	449,560,000	3.9	23.4[c]
10	Brazil	95,200	194,300,000	0.5	85
11	South Africa	70,000	51,100,000	1.4	121
12	Ukraine	65,000	45,600,000	1.4	78
13	Hungary	48,000	9,900,000	4.8	37
14	Mexico	40,000	116,100,000	0.3	61
15	Belgium	30,000	11,100,000	2.7	17
16	Netherlands	29,900	16,700,000	1.8	4
17	Italy	28,100	60,900,000	0.5	25
18	Chile	18,500	17,400,000	1.1	40
	Total ranks 10-18	424,700	523,100,000	0.8	52.0[c]
	Rest of world	240,800	5,762,069,500	0.0	ca. 100[c]

a HDI = The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education and income (in terms of US dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme 2013.
b Jewish population includes the total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights**.** Total population includes all residents of Israel plus Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
c Average HDI rank for group of countries.

To better illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, **Table 5** also reports the Human Development Index (HDI) for each country (United Nations Development Programme 2013). The HDI—a composite measure of a society's education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics of the members of those Jewish communities. The HDI country ranks reported in the table are for 2012. Of the 18 countries listed, four are included among the top ten HDIs among 189 countries ranked (Australia, the US, the Netherlands, and Germany). Another five countries are ranked better than 25th (Canada, Israel, Belgium, France, and Italy), four are better than 50th (UK, Hungary, Chile, and Argentina), four are better than 100th (Russian Federation, Mexico, Ukraine, and Brazil), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (121st) pointing to lesser development in the host society. One should be aware that Jewish communities may display social and economic data significantly better than the average population of their respective countries, but nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of each individual, Jews included.

The increasing overlap of a Jewish presence with higher levels of socioeconomic development in a country, and at the same time the diminution or gradual disappearance of a Jewish presence in less developed areas is a conspicuous feature of the 20th and early 21st centuries. The emerging geographical configuration carries advantages concerning the material and legal conditions of the life of Jews, but it also may generate a lack of recognition of, or estrangement toward, Jews on the part of societies in less developed countries that constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's total population and the overwhelming majority of voting countries in international bodies like the United Nations.

Major Cities

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also within countries, and have resulted in a preference for major metropolitan areas. Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city, definitions varying by country. (For definitions of Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) in the US see: United States Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget 2008). It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jews in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. For example, in the case of a recent Jewish population study in the New York area (Cohen, Ukeles, and Miller 2012) we subtracted about 100,000 individuals of the 1,538,000 (see Chapter 3) that had been included in the Jewish population count because they were neither were born Jewish nor had converted to Judaism and therefore could not be considered part of a core Jewish population definition.

But the unequivocal fact of an overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is shown by the fact that in 2013 more than half (53.9%) of world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2012; see Chapter 5, Sheskin and Dashefsky 2013).

These five areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Los Angeles (**Table 6**). About 67.2% of world Jewry lived in the five previous areas plus the South Florida, Be'er Sheva, San Francisco, Washington/Baltimore, and Boston areas. The 15 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish population encompassed 76.1% of all Jews worldwide.

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and having surpassed 3.1 million Jews by the *core* definition, now exceeds by far that in the New York Combined Metropolitan Statistical Area, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.1 million Jews. Of the 15 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, eight were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, and Canada. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being a national or regional capital, enjoying a high standard of living, with a highly developed infrastructure for higher education, and widespread transnational connections.

Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. The differences in the US may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. Estimates of part-year residents for the two main receiving areas of South Florida and Southern California are reported in the footnotes to **Table 6.** The respective estimates of part-year residents were excluded from the estimates in the table. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, or vice versa (Pupko 2013).

Determinants and Consequences of Jewish Population Change

International Migration

Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, the international migration of Jews is only imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants by country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants (DellaPergola 2009). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2012). Jewish organizations, like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) (2013) in the US or Zentralwohlfhartsstelle (2013) in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on an annual basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.

TABLE 6 15 metropolitan areas (CMSAs) with largest core Jewish populations, 1/1/2013

Rank	Metropolitan area[a]	Country	Jewish population	Percent of world's Jews	
				%	Cumulative %
1	Tel Aviv[b]	Israel	3,120,900	22.5	22.5
2	New York[c]	US	2,100,000	15.2	37.7
3	Jerusalem[d]	Israel	861,400	6.2	43.9
4	Haifa[e]	Israel	692,100	5.0	48.9
5	Los Angeles[f]	US	688,600	5.0	53.9
6	South Florida[g]	US	485,850	3.5	57.4
7	Be'er Sheva[h]	Israel	381,900	2.8	60.1
8	San Francisco[i]	US	345,700	2.5	62.6
9	Washington/Baltimore[j]	US	332,900	2.4	65.0
10	Boston[k]	US	295,700	2.1	67.2
11	Chicago[l]	US	294,700	2.1	69.3
12	Paris[m]	France	283,000	2.0	71.3
13	Philadelphia[n]	US	280,000	2.0	73.4
14	London[o]	United Kingdom	195,000	1.4	74.8
15	Toronto[p]	Canada	185,000	1.3	76.1

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country. Some of the US metropolitan areas are defined differently than in the Sheskin and Dashefsky chapter in this volume. Some of the US estimates may include non-core Jews.

b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, and Ashdod Subdistrict. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000.

c Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 100,000 individuals pertaining to the enlarged Jewish population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Cohen, Ukeles and Miller (2012). New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area. Principal cities: New York, NY; White Plains, NY; Newark, NJ; Edison, NJ; Union, NJ; Wayne, NJ; and New Brunswick, NJ.

d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of Judea and Samaria District.

e Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District.

f Includes Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana area, San Bernardino and Ventura areas.

g Includes Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Not including 69,275 part-year residents.

h Includes Be'er Sheva Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District.

i Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 40,000 individuals pertaining to the enlarged Jewish population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Phillips (2005). Includes the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont area, Napa, San Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma.

j Includes the District of Columbia, northern Virginia, Montgomery County, Prince Georges County , and the Baltimore-Towson area.

k Includes Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, Bristol, Worcester area (MA), Hillsborough, Merrimack, Belknap area (NH), and Rhode Island.

l Includes Chicago-Joliet-Naperville area (IL-IN-WI), Kankakee area (IL), La Porte area (IN).

m Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95.

n Includes Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington area (PA-NJ-DE-MD), Berks area (PA), and Cumberland (NJ) area.

o Greater London and contiguous postcode areas.

p Census Metropolitan Area.

Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the former Soviet Union (FSU) opened its doors at the end of 1989. Of the estimated total 1.66 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2012 by main countries of destination, including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel's share of the total increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years 1990-1991. It then decreased to 41% in 2002-2004 and increased again to 71% in 2010-2012. The decrease of the US as a destination for FSU migrants in the first decade of the 21st century is noticeable, as is the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany in the second half of the same decade. These significant increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU during times of rapid geopolitical and economic change, and real or expected disruptions in the environment affecting Jewish life, namely the relationship between society at large and the Jews. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic opportunities in the main countries of destination.

Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948-1968, and 59% between 1969-2008 (DellaPergola 2009). Clearly migration, or rather a net migration balance to Israel, decreases the Diaspora Jewish population and increases Israel's Jewish population. **Table 7** shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2011 and 2012. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core* Jewish population, definition.

In recent years, Jewish international migration has tended to decrease due to the growing concentration of Jews in more developed countries. Historically, a clearly negative relationship emerged between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate. This logically helps to predict the continuation of rather low levels of migration in the foreseeable future, provided current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions continue to prevail across the global system. Despite this, 16,557 new immigrants arrived in Israel in 2012, compared to 16,892 in 2011, 16,633 in 2010, 14,567 in 2009, and 13,699 in 2008. This represents a fairly stable pattern and a moderate reversal of the decreasing trend that had prevailed for several previous years, although the general immigration level remained quite low compared with other periods in Israel's migration history. The main countries of origin continue to be Russia, Ethiopia, the US, Ukraine, and France, each with more than 1,500 immigrants. In 2012, immigrants slightly diminished from North America, the US, and Latin America, with tiny increases from the EU and the FSU Asian republics. To these figures, significant numbers should be added of immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than in many Western countries, thus making Israel a reasonable option for international migration.

On the other hand, Israel—in part because of the smallness of its market and the limits this imposes upon employment opportunities—is a source of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010). In recent years, some Israelis, mostly former immigrants, have also migrated to the FSU (Cohen 2009; Tolts 2009). Estimates of total emigration from Israel range from 5,000-15,000 annually,

Table 7 New immigrants to Israel[a], by last country of residence, 2011-2012

Country	2011	2012	Country	2011	2012	Country	2011	2012
Grand total[b]	**16,892**	**16,557**	France	1,619	1,653	Armenia	46	25
			Germany	97	100	Azerbaijan	141	154
America - total[b]	**3,468**	**3,310**	Greece	8	10	Georgia	187	231
North America	**2,575**	**2,525**	Hungary	128	110	Kazakhstan	153	145
Canada	212	235	Ireland	-	5	Kyrgyzstan	54	48
United States	2,363	2,290	Italy	94	137	Tadjikistan	10	9
Central Amer., Carib.	**168**	**167**	Luxembourg	-	2	Turkmenistan	10	38
Costa Rica	6	28	Netherlands	40	36	Uzbekistan	270	312
Cuba	54	64	Poland	17	16	**Other Asia**	**126**	**107**
Dominican Republic	3	1	Portugal	6	5	Bahrein	1	-
El Salvador	1	-	Romania	41	51	China	6	8
Guatemala	6	7	Slovakia	2	1	Hong Kong	5	2
Honduras	5	1	Slovenia	-	1	India	35	27
Martinique	1	-	Spain	53	76	Iran	46	37
Mexico	87	61	Sweden	22	15	Japan	1	1
Panama	5	5	United Kingdom	485	569	Lebanon	2	1
South America	**725**	**616**	**FSU in Europe**	**6,354**	**6,272**	Pakistan	6	-
Argentina	220	222	Belarus	304	377	Philippines	3	-
Bolivia	7	4	Estonia	8	10	Singapore	-	6
Brazil	157	162	Latvia	67	57	Thailand	3	-
Chile	40	42	Lithuania	21	19	Vietnam	1	-
Colombia	90	44	Moldova	217	209	Yemen	17	25
Ecuador	6	3	Russian Federation	3,678	3,545	**Africa - total[b]**	**2,934**	**2,642**
Paraguay	-	2	Ukraine	2,051	2,048	**Northern Africa**	**2,756**	**2,517**
Peru	79	37	FSU unspecified	8	7	Algeria	2	-
Suriname	1	-	**Other West Europe**	**64**	**86**	Egypt	2	-
Uruguay	48	67	Gibraltar	1	-	Ethiopia	2,666	2,432
Venezuela	77	33	Monaco	2	2	Morocco	40	45
Europe - total[b]	**9,388**	**9,424**	Norway	2	3	Tunisia	46	40
European Union[c]	**2,858**	**2,993**	Switzerland	59	81	**Sub Saharan Africa**	**178**	**125**
Austria	19	18	**Balkans**	**112**	**73**	Madagascar	1	-
Belgium	175	140	Bosnia-Herzegovina	-	1	South Africa	174	125
Bulgaria	33	17	Croatia	2	1	Zimbabwe	3	-
Cyprus	3	-	Serbia	6	9	**Oceania - total**	**97**	**104**
Czech Republic	5	13	Turkey	104	62	Australia	92	96
Denmark	3	14	**Asia - total[b]**	**997**	**1,075**	New Caledonia	-	4
Finland	8	4	**FSU in Asia**	**871**	**962**	New Zealand	5	4

a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including immigrant citizens.
b Including country unknown.
c Not including Baltics.
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

despite much higher numbers sometimes mentioned in public discourse. In 2011, the number of Israelis obtaining legal permanent resident status in the US was 4,389 versus 5,172 in 2010, and an annual average of 5,408 in 2000-2009 (US Department of Homeland Security 2012), pointing to a declining trend. In Canada, the decade 2001-2011 yielded over 21,000 Jewish immigrants, or an annual average above 2000, mainly from the FSU, Israel, and other European countries (Statistics Canada 2013). The level of emigration from Israel is consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of economic development (DellaPergola 2011). These findings are in contrast with the widespread assumption that the volume and timing of Israeli immigration and emigration are primarily motivated by ideological and security factors, and not by socioeconomic determinants.

Marriages, Births, and Deaths

Another major determinant of demographic change at the global level is family formation and childbearing. The birth rate, in turn, bears crucial consequence for a population's age composition. When international migration stands at moderate levels, as in recent years, the most important determinant of long-term population change becomes the birth rate, which reflects both the average number of children currently born per women age 15-49 (the *fertility rate*) and the size of potential parental cohorts. In contemporary societies, the latter is, in turn, affected by the number of births in previous years, by international migration, and to some extent by the level of mortality. The mutual influence of childbearing and age composition is worthy of special attention and indeed plays an important role in the case of world Jewry. In addition, the question of the Jewish identity of the children of intermarriage now plays a significant role in the overall pattern of Jewish demographic change (Reinharz and DellaPergola 2009).

Low birth rates and relatively high intermarriage rates have prevailed among some European Jewish communities since the late nineteenth century. After World War Two, the US and several Western European countries experienced a prolonged rise in fertility, which did not occur in Eastern Europe. These trends were matched by the respective Jewish communities in each country, though at lower levels. Where the baby boom occurred, it generated large age cohorts born between 1945 and 1965, who in turn reached the age of procreation between the 1970s and the 1990s. An "echo effect" of more births might have been expected, but fertility rates, general and Jewish, decreased sharply since the 1970s and such "echo" was actually quite weak if at all visible. Jews usually anticipated by several years these developments, resulting in lower birth rates across the board. Significant internal differentiation persisted according to religiosity and other social characteristics among Jewish populations, with Orthodox Jews generally maintaining higher fertility rates than other more secular Jewish groups.

Several Jewish communities in different countries have collected data on the balance between Jewish births and deaths over the past two decades. The number of Jewish births was usually exceeded by the number of Jewish deaths according to direct vital registrations in the Russian Federation, the UK, Germany, and according to indirect estimates, in the US. This gap was strikingly high in the Russian Federation and in other European republics of the FSU (Tolts 2004). In the Russian Federation in 2000, there were only 600

recorded Jewish births compared to over 8,200 recorded Jewish deaths—a net loss of 7,600. Such striking deficit reflects extreme population aging (see below), in part the consequence of the intensive emigration of younger Jewish adults and nuclear families with the consequence that large numbers of elderly remained behind in the FSU.

In Western Europe, the negative gap was somewhat smaller, yet consistent. In the UK in 1991, the 3,200 Jewish births were exceeded by 4,500 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 1,300. The most recent UK data available from Jewish community sources indicate a reversal of this trend in 2005, showing an increase in the number of births and a decrease in the number of deaths (Graham and Vulkan 2008). The decrease to fewer than 3,000 Jewish deaths in recent years seems to indicate a significantly reduced Jewish community, or a significant under-reporting of Jewish burials, or both. In Germany, the Jewish community experienced a threefold population increase due to a significant inflow of FSU immigrants since 1989. However, while in 1990 there were 100 Jewish births and 400 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 300, in 2012, 199 Jewish births were recorded compared to 1,282 Jewish deaths—a net loss of nearly 1,100 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle 2013).

In the US, Jewish vital statistics are not directly available. However Jewish population projections based on the available age composition and cautious assumptions about the age-specific frequency of motherhood and deaths suggests that the core Jewish population generates annually about 50,000 births and 58,000 deaths. The likely deficit of about 8,000 is being compensated by a positive Jewish immigration balance.

Israel is the only exception to these recessive demographic trends. Steady immigration produced a doubling of Israel's Jewish population between 1970 and 2004, which was reinforced by a significant Jewish natural increase. In 1990, 73,900 Jewish births and 25,800 Jewish deaths produced a natural increase of 48,100. In 2004, for the first time, more than 100,000 Jewish babies were born in Israel. In 2012, 125,400 Jewish births and 35,900 Jewish deaths produced a net increase of 89,500. Demand for children continues to be strong among both the religious and the secular populations, rooted partly in Jewish communal identity and partly in a broader sense of economic optimism and life satisfaction, and resulting in significantly larger families in Israel than among Jews in other countries (DellaPergola 2009).

Low Jewish birth rates and population aging in the Diaspora are further impacted by high and continually increasing rates of intermarriage. Overall, the rate of intermarriage has been increasing among Jews, but significant differences persist by country. In recent years, in the Russian Federation, about 70% of recently married Jewish women and 80% of recently married Jewish men married non-Jews. In the US, and in several medium-size European Jewish communities, the intermarriage rate was over 50%; in France and the UK, it was over 40%; in Canada and Australia, over 30%; and in South Africa and Venezuela, over 15%. Of the major Jewish communities, probably only Mexico had an intermarriage rate lower than 15%. The incidence of intermarriage is significantly dependent on the ethno-religious composition of parents: most of the total increase in intermarriage occurs among Jewish adults who are themselves the children of intermarried parents (Phillips 2013).

In Israel, the rate of intermarriage is less than 5%, low but not negligible, reflecting the growing size of the non-Jewish population who immigrated under the *Law of Return*, particularly from the FSU. Many of these intermarriages are performed in Cyprus (Dvorin 2006). The absence of civil marriage in Israel raises the intriguing question of the inability of the Israeli legal system to face the family formation needs of an increasing number of citizens whose religion is not Jewish. On average, based on the 2010 Jewish population distribution and recent intermarriage rates in different countries, about 29% of all recently married Jews worldwide, and 48% of all recently married Jews in the Diaspora, started a new family with a non-Jewish partner. Scattered data on cohabitation among young Jewish adults point to much higher rates of intermarried couples.

A further factor in Jewish population change is the Jewish identity of the children of intermarriages. The percentage of the children of intermarriage being raised as Jews during the early 1990s was about 20% in both the US (Phillips 1997) and the Russian Federation (Goskomstat 2004). In 2001, this percentage had increased in the US to more than one-third (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003), but was still far from the 50% that would be required so as not to contribute to a decrease in the number of Jews. The non-identification with Judaism of many children of intermarriages, added to low levels of Jewish fertility, produces an even lower "effective Jewish birth rate."

In addition, non-affiliation with the Jewish community is more frequent among intermarried than among in-married Jewish adults. This often appears to be associated with a propensity to have fewer children. This whole chain of lifecycle factors related to marriage, childbearing, and childrearing potentially leading to Jewish identification and demographic erosion is quite marginal in Israel compared to other countries.

Conversions

Given the increasing number of Jewish households (defined as a household containing one or more self-identified Jews) some of whose members are not Jewish, the number of persons converting to Judaism is highly relevant to Jewish population change.

In Israel, data on converts through the Israel Conversion (*Giyur*) Courts from 1999 to 2012 cover passages to Judaism certified through both the civilian and military (Israel Defense Forces) conversion systems. Most civilian conversions were of new Ethiopian immigrants who, in recent years, almost exclusively included over 3,000 Falash Mura annually. Within the military conversion system, the demand for conversion prevailed among young adults mostly born in the FSU or in Israel to non-Jewish immigrant mothers. About 500-800 young military were converted annually from 2005 to 2012. Only a small number of converts were civilians from countries other than Ethiopia who immigrated to Israel under the *Law of Return*. Only in 2005, and again in 2007 and 2008, did Conversion Courts certify somewhat higher numbers of converts. The 2009 estimate was much lower due to reduced immigration from Ethiopia and ongoing controversies within the Israeli Rabbinate about the general validity of conversion procedures. Some members of the Israeli Rabbinate have indeed requested that thousands of conversions performed in the Israel Defense Forces conversion system be annulled. The matter was eventually settled, but controversy about conversion in Israel remains high.

Overall, from 1999 to 2012, 71,984 persons converted to Judaism through Israeli rabbinical channels. Given the opposition to conversion within some branches of the Israeli Rabbinate, the actual number of *gerim* (Jewish neophytes) was not low and constituted a visible component of Israel's Jewish population growth. However, the total number of "others," i.e., *Law of Return* immigrants and their children not registered as Jews, increased from 171,600 in 1999 to 318,600 in 2013. Most of these "others" were lacking religious status, with a minority of less than 10% Christians and a few Moslems. Only in 2008 and 2011 was the number of converts to Judaism greater than the annual increment in the "others" population.

Data on conversions to and from Judaism in Diaspora countries exist, but have not been compiled systematically. The consistent evidence from socio-demographic surveys, reflecting the net effect of accessions and secessions, is that more people were born Jewish than the number of people who consider themselves currently Jewish. The main evidence for this loss derives from Jewish population surveys undertaken in the US. One recent source, the 2007 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (Pew 2008), compares the percentages of those raised Jewish with those currently Jewish of the US total population. At least in terms of Jews by religion, the lifetime balance is unequivocally negative—about 0.2% of the US total population. Assuming the same effects among children as among adults, this would amount to a net lifetime loss of about 600,000 individuals, or well above 10% of a total Jewish population estimated by different authors at between 5 and 6.5 million (see below). It is true that some of these passages occur from/to the unknown/unreported/agnostic/atheist group, rather than from/to another specific religious group. But such data certainly disprove the assumption of a significant ongoing passage from the outside and the peripheral toward the inside and the central areas of the Jewish identification typology outlined in **Figure 3**, which would otherwise fuel an increase in the US Jewish population.

Another, admittedly small, example illustrative of a more general trend comes from the 2001 Census of Scotland, the data from which are available separately and in greater detail than the data from other parts of the UK. In 2001, 8,233 persons in Scotland declared that either they were raised Jewish or their current religion was Jewish. Of these, 5,661 (69%) were both raised Jewish and Judaism was their current religion; 1,785 (22%) were raised Jewish but were not currently Jewish; and 787 (9%) were not raised Jewish but were currently Jewish. Thus, the total number with Jewish upbringing was 7,446, and the number currently Jewish was 6,448, a difference of 998—a net loss of 13% (Graham 2008).

Age Composition

Age composition plays a crucial role in population change. **Figure 5**, covering 1975-2012, exemplifies the extreme variations that can emerge in age composition following the transition from higher to lower birth rates and death rates. Jewish populations can be classified into five demographic types, gradually moving from traditional, to transitional, moderately aging, advanced aging, and terminal.

Traditional Jewish populations, frequent in the past and characterized by very high percentages of children, have disappeared. Jews in Ethiopia,

here portrayed just before their mass immigration to Israel in 1991, were the last surviving example.

The **transitiona**l type occurs as fertility is controlled and mortality is lowered due to better health care. Such populations feature a relatively high percentage of children, an increasing share of adults, and a median age around 30 or under. Israel in 2012 provided the only persisting example of a Jewish population where the percentages in each major age group tend to decrease regularly from the younger age groups to the older age groups.

In **moderately aging** communities, the center of gravity moves to age 45-64, but children under age 15 are still more numerous than adults age 65 and over. This type, whose median age is about 35 and less than 40, was still evident during the 1970s and through the 1990s in the US, and still later in some communities in Central and South America like Mexico, or even France which in 2002 still was in the moderately aging type with 19% age 65 and over, and possibly a similar percentage of children under age 15 (Cohen 2002).

More recently, Jewish communities in the US–namely in New York (Cohen, Ukeles, and Miller 2012)–and Canada, major Jewish communities in Western and Central European countries, Central and South American communities like Argentina and Brazil, as well as Australia and Turkey, joined the **advanced aging** type. In these populations, persons age 65 and over outnumber children under age 15, and median ages mostly range between 40 and 45 but also tend to approach 50.

The **terminal** age composition pattern is typical of the Russian Federation, the other FSU republics, Germany, and several other Eastern European countries. It comprises percentages of elders that are double or more the percentage of children, with a median age of 50 or higher, eventually tending toward 60 and over.

In the US, because of the lack of a national Jewish population survey in 2010, the ongoing aging process can be portrayed by comparing results of NJPS 1990, with NJPS 2000-01 corrected for under-reporting of young and middle-age adults, and with projections of the same corrected figures for 2011 (DellaPergola 2013). In these projections, death rates were based on Israeli Jews' detailed schedules—Israel being a country with high life expectancies of over 84 years for women and over 80 years for men in 2010. Birth rates were assumed according to varying assumptions about the effective Jewish fertility rate—i.e., estimated average children born, discounted for the non-inclusion of some children of intermarriages. The decline in the younger US Jewish cohorts under age 30 is evident (33.4% in 2011 versus 37.4% in 1990), as against an increase in the population age 60 and over (26.4% in 2011 versus 22.4% in 1990). The whole gamut of Jewish community resources and needs is being significantly reshaped by these demographic changes that portray the aging of Jewish population.



Fig. 5 Jewish populations in selected countries, by main age groups, 1975-2012

Demographic Implications

The corollary of the older age composition among Jews in many countries is that the annual number of deaths must outnumber the annual number of births. Such a skewed age composition also reflects the past non-incorporation within the Jewish collective of many children of intermarriages, which is bound to lead to a continuing Jewish population decrease in future years as in fact has been the case in the Diaspora over the past decades.

Jews in Israel are the notable exception. Their vital rates not only *do* generate Jewish population growth, but the rate of natural increase is high in comparison with other developed societies, and in fact very similar to that of the world's total population (Population Reference Bureau 2012). Contemporary Jewish demography is split between an Israeli component that features consistent increase and a Diaspora component which—though some internal variation exists—is bound to decrease.

Jewish Population by Country

The Americas

The Jewish population in the Americas is predominantly concentrated in the US (5,425,000, or 88% of the continental total), followed by Canada (380,000, 6%), South America (328,000, 5%), and Central America (56,900, 1%) (**Appendix A**).

The United States

Jewish population size in the US constitutes a most important component of any global Jewish population estimate and needs careful assessment in the general context of a lack of official Census documentation and of an abundance of alternative sources of quite diverse quality. In recent years the topic has been at the center of an intriguing debate in the social scientific study of Jewry. Competing narrative and empirical approaches have generated diverging estimates, with a significant high-low gap of about two million, and opposite interpretations of current and expected trends, ranging between rapid growth and slow decline. Two entire volumes comprising the whole gamut of methods and positions have been devoted to the matter (Heilman, 2005, 2013). Here we present reasoning and empirical evidence grounded on demographic research already discussed elsewhere in greater detail (DellaPergola 2005, 2010, 2012, 2013), as well as the main rationale of the competing schools of thought regarding the current number of Jews in the US.

A general prerequisite of population estimates is that they should be coherent with similar estimates from earlier dates, reflecting the intervening changes over the period considered. The same applies to Jewish population estimates with the already noted caveat that comparisons are only possible if population definitions are kept comparable over time. In the US, several major sources of data allow for a detailed reconstruction of Jewish population trends since the end of World War II to date. In 1945, the total US Jewish population was realistically assessed at 4.4 million (Rosenwaike 1980). Between then and 1990, when the estimate was put around 5.5 million, all of the main

surveys undertaken provided agreeing indications on the general direction and speed of change. Relatively rapid growth until the late 1970s was followed by stagnation or incipient decline during the subsequent 20 years.

A highly coherent time sequence was provided by several forward-backward Jewish population projections that tried to ascertain whether the various national surveys could be logically related to each other through a set of assumptions inferred from the findings of the same surveys regarding international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions (DellaPergola 2005). Thus, in light of the then ongoing and expected demographic trends, the over 5 million Jews found in the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969) quite accurately predicted the 5,420,000 Jews found by NJPS 1971 (Massarik 1974), which in turn predicted the 5,515,000 found by NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991). If there had been a NJPS 1980, it would probably have shown a peak-ever around 5.6 million, reflecting a first echo of the enhanced baby-boom cohorts. Yet, Jewish population was aging through the combined effect of postponed marriage, low fertility, more frequent intermarriage, and the non-attribution of Jewish identification to high percentages of the children of one non-Jewish parent. The unavoidable consequence was the stoppage of growth and incipient decline. Both NJPS 1971 and NJPS 1990 findings (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983, 1988) pointed to a predictable Jewish population reduction that was indeed found by two nearly simultaneous and competing studies in 2001. Indeed, both NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001) assessed American Jewry at 5.2-5.3 million and produced fundamentally similar Jewish population profiles (Perlmann 2007). Other Jewish population projections—having perhaps overestimated the US Jewish net migration balance—suggested somewhat higher scenarios, but equally ended up with an expectation of eventual decline after temporary growth (DellaPergola, Rebhun and Tolts 1999, 2000).

In some popular perceptions, NJPS 2000-01 is a study that failed because of a variety of inappropriate procedures during and after the fieldwork. But the truth is that NJPS 2000-01 was submitted to independent professional scrutiny, which concluded that the study—while handicapped by methodological shortcomings such as low response rates, inconsistent survey coverage of relevant population subgroups, and loss of documentation—stood within the range of professionally acceptable research standards and biases and was therefore eminently usable (Schulman 2003). And indeed some of the critics, leaving aside the question of population estimates, have used NJPS 2000-01 (Kadushin, Phillips, and Saxe 2005). By decision of the Jewish Federations of North America—the main sponsor of the 1971, 1990, and 2000-01 National Jewish population surveys—no national survey was undertaken in 2010, thus depriving the public of the opportunity to further compare developments based on substantially similar Jewish databases.

The mentioned survey-to-survey projections aimed at determining the consistency between different Jewish population databases scattered across more than forty years were significantly on target, with reasonable margins of error not only for the total Jewish population but also for each birth cohort. This means that the same people surveyed in a certain year were found alive and older at a later year—give and take a margin of statistical error, and

allowing for the intervening changes occurring within each sex and five-year age group, such as incoming and outgoing international migration, children born to women of relevant ages, deaths, accessions to and secessions from Jewish identity. Significantly, when stable characteristics of a given cohort, such as the number of children born to older women, could be compared at two points in time such as NJPS 1990 and NJPS 2000-01, they appeared to be the same, confirming that basically the same population had been surveyed twice (DellaPergola, 2013). It also should be noted that on most accounts when an NJPS-based estimate could be checked against a similar estimate from another source, the comparison usually held—with the possible exception of Jewish Community Center (JCC) membership. Examples of such good matches are the estimated numbers of children enrolled in Jewish day school compared with actual school enrollment (Schick 2005) and the estimated number of documented immigrants compared with actual institutional data (HIAS annual).

There remained however an important point of contention regarding a supposed undercount in NJPS 2000-01 of many Jewish adults age 35-44 and age 45-54 (Saxe et al. 2006, 2007; Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These adults were born, respectively, between 1957-1966 and 1947-1956. Indeed, a reduction in the reported number of Jews born in those specific years had already been noted when comparing NJPS 2000-01 with NJPS 1990, and perhaps more interestingly, also when comparing NJPS 1990 with NJPS 1971 (DellaPergola 2005). As noted, NJPS 1990 data could be projected ten years forward and compared with the actual findings of NJPS 2000-01. This cohort-wise comparison provided quite crucial evaluative information. The core Jewish population finally adjusted from NJPS 1990 was 5,515,000. For NJPS 2000-01, actual data processing brought about an estimate of 5,035,468. After imputation of people not actually covered in the survey, such as institutionalized persons in homes for the elderly or in prisons, the estimate finally circulated amounted to 5,200,000 (Kotler Berkowitz et al. 2003). Our independent projection from 1990 to 2000 based on the evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality, accession, and secession frequencies, provided a higher estimate of 5,367,244 (DellaPergola 2013).

Interestingly our detailed age-specific projection produced results nearly identical to the actual NJPS 2000-01 regarding two age cohorts, born between 1970-1990 and born in 1950 or earlier. The population actually covered fell short of the one projected by just 1% for those born in 1970-1990, age 0-19 in 1990 and age 10-29 in 2000, and by 1.7% for those born in 1950 or earlier, age 40 and over in 1990 and age 50 and over in 2000. Moreover, the projection estimate of the age group 0-9 in 2000—the births expected to have occurred under observed age-specific fertility rates during the inter-survey period—was 514,095, a figure nearly identical to the 515,146 core Jewish children of the same ages actually found in NJPS 2000-01—a discrepancy of 0.2 percent. So far, then, the expected and actual 2000-01 data were extraordinarily consistent. However, the situation was different for the 1950-1970 birth cohort, age 20-39 in 1990 and age 30-49 in 2000. Here NJPS 2000-01 found 1,338,527 individuals versus an expected figure of 1,624,543—a significant difference of -286,016 or -17.6 percent. In other words, this was a real shortcoming of NJPS 2000-01.

Whether the significant under-coverage of this particular generation of Jewish adults born during and after the baby boom years depended on insufficient efforts or skills at the stage of fieldwork, or on the elusive nature of their Jewish identification cannot be easily adjudicated. Either explanation stands to reason. But unquestionably, a correction was necessary by adding overall a total of 331,776 core Jews to the original NJPS 2000-01 figure not inclusive of those in institutions. The correction affected not only total Jewish population size, but also age composition with visible effects on the subsequent demographic dynamics of US Jewry. In fact, the addition of 286,000 adults at ages typical for family growth, plus about 50,000 older ones, could generate some Jewish population increase over the decade 2000-2010. Projecting the corrected NJPS 2000-01 to 2010 indeed resulted in a total of 5,425,000 Jews—about 60,000 higher than the corrected 2000-01 figure. It is also true that entrance of the children of baby boomers in lifecycle's reproduction stage was quite late and incomplete and therefore the second baby-boom's echo effect, visible in the corrected data for 2010, was quite weak.

Looking more broadly at recent Jewish population patterns in the US, during the 1990s there was an influx of at least 200,000 new Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU), Israel, Central and South America, South Africa, Iran, and Western Europe, which was expected to have boosted the total US Jewish population. But, since the late 1960s, Jewish fertility consistently stood well below replacement level (2.1 children per woman), hence population continued to age producing rising death rates, while intermarriage rates continued to increase (beyond possible differences of opinion regarding the magnitude of these rates), and propensities to identify with Judaism among children of intermarriages continued to remain low and far less than half of all such children and younger adults. The ensuing population decrease was more likely the product of actual demographic trends than an artifact of insufficient data.

The current age composition of US Jewry and other evidence about age-specific birth and death frequencies suggests that about 50,000 Jewish births (by the core definition) occur annually in the US versus about 58,000 Jewish deaths. The number of Jewish immigrants to the US has diminished significantly, especially from the FSU. In 2011 2,363 new immigrants moved from the US to Israel, and 2,290 did so in 2012 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Such US emigration constitutes about one half of the total of Israelis admitted as legal immigrants in the US, 5,172 in 2010 and 4,389 in 2011 (US Department of Homeland Security 2012). Jewish immigrants continued to arrive in the US from other countries, mainly in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. But, at the same time, an increase in Israelis returning to Israel and of immigrant US citizens in Israel was also recorded, reflecting the economic contingencies of the 2008-2009 major recession and the slow subsequent US recovery at a time when Israel's economy was comparatively stable. Consequently, an annual net migration into the US of 5,000 Jews or slightly more can be estimated. In other words net immigration basically balances the losses due to the higher number of Jewish deaths than Jewish births.

Regarding the balance of affiliations and disaffiliations with Judaism the notion that more Jews are now "coming out of the closet" is disproven by

empirical evidence (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). Examining shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society—comparatively more frequent than in other countries—an American Jewish Committee survey found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose, while Evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the "religiously undefined" tended to gain (Smith 2008). All in all, American Jewry neither was gaining nor losing large numbers due to conversions to and from other religions. However, the overall number of secessions from Judaism was double the number of accessions. US Jewry continues its aging trajectory with low fertility rates well below generational replacement and a low percentage of children of intermarriage being raised as Jews. The latter feature might change in the future if the much higher percentages found by the 2005 Boston study (Saxe et al. 2006) and by the Middlesex County, NJ study of 2008 (Sheskin 2009) extend to other US Jewish communities.

Several other independent sources have more or less confirmed the general trends outlined here. The three American Religious Identity Surveys (ARIS) (Kosmin, Mayer, and Keysar 2001; Kosmin and Keysar, 2009), after one incorporates estimates of the child population and a proportional allocation from the steadily growing share of persons with no religion (the "nones,") or who refuse to report a religion, provided comparatively lower Jewish population estimates, but the direction of change over time was the same as other national estimates, pointing to a decline toward 2000.

Among the more recent general surveys, by far the one with the largest national sample was the 2007 Pew Survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). After assessing weighting procedures, response rates, age and religious composition of the households, and a sampling error of ±4.5%, the Jewish population range obtained was 5,343,000-5,847,000, with an average estimate of 5,595,000, including persons without religion who were raised Jewish in their childhood.

As against this basic profile, the literature of the past ten years has yielded widely different population estimates and perceptions of the direction of change. The puzzle of the growing discrepancy between US Jewish population estimates during the more recent period since 1990 reflects several problems. First and foremost is the inconsistent Jewish population definitions adopted by different sources. For example, the 2001-02 Heritage, Ancestry and Religious Identification survey (HARI) (Tobin and Groeneman 2003) used a broader definition of Jewish identity than NJPS and AJIS in the same year. AJIS used the same definition as NJPS 1990, but NJPS 2000-01 itself used a broader definition. In most other general surveys which include a Jewish subsample, many quite crucial Jewish-non-Jewish demographic differentials are often neglected. Examples are when data for a sample of American adults are used to project data for Jews, disregarding existing structural differences between Jews and non-Jews, namely the lower share of children among Jews; or when household variation in personal religious identifications is ignored in projections from household size to population size, thus incorporating non-Jews in Jewish population estimates.

Special national Jewish population surveys, like the various NJPSs, or other national population surveys which include a sizeable subsample of Jews, may claim to constitute a satisfactory basis for nationwide Jewish population estimates. Jewish national surveys, with their detailed information

on individual identification characteristics, offer good opportunities to assess the grey zones around the more clearly declared Jewish core. In Jewish sponsored surveys, along with a generally lower response rate, significantly fewer respondents than in general surveys readily admit their Jewishness when defined in terms of religion. On the other hand, quite a few respondents who in the first place may not seem to belong with the core Jewish population can be recovered and incorporated through detailed reading of personal family and life histories. General social surveys, based on population classification by religion, do not offer the same maneuvering opportunity—hence resolution of the undeclared parts of the Jewish core becomes largely conjectural. A sure mistake would be to attribute in general surveys the same rate of non-response/unknown/agnostic as found in Jewish surveys.

Two alternative methods have been pursued to estimate the US Jewish population: 1) the compilation of a vast array of local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2013), and 2) the meta-analysis of a vast pool of national surveys, each including a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Neither method was designed since the beginning to determine countrywide population estimates. On the other hand, both methods provide excellent ground for serious comparative analytic work and for in-depth multivariate analysis.

Without detracting from the importance of local Jewish community studies—still the most important tool for Jewish community planning—the methodology of summing the local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves fairly recognize (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007; Sheskin 2008). Because of the large and diverse database they use, the lack of synchronization and the very uneven quality of the various sources, local Jewish community summations are at risk of amassing significant amounts of errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006; Groenman and Smith 2009) when it comes to national Jewish population estimates they were not designed to supply in the first place. Based on their compilation of local estimates Sheskin and Dashefsky (2013, Chapter 5) estimate the US Jewish population at 6.2-6.5 million.

The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) meta-analysis of a large set of general social surveys is one of the more interesting and ambitious projects ever undertaken in the social scientific study of American Jews (Saxe et al. 2006; Tighe et al. 2005; Tighe et al. 2009). The SSRI suggestions that US Jewry might comprise 6.0-6.5 million, or perhaps even as many as 7.5 million persons, or that 70,000 Jewish babies are born annually, or that American Jewry grew by 13.5% during the last ten years, as against a US total White non-Hispanic population growth of 1.2% (US Census Bureau 2012) become plausible only if referring to the enlarged concept of total population in Jewish households and not to the core concept of individually-identified Jews (Tighe, Kadushin, and Saxe 2009, 2011). We should point out that the similar estimates reached using very different methods by Saxe and his associates, and by Sheskin and Dashefsky, are quite coincidental and in no way reflect mutual agreement between the respective research teams.

Following these facts and assumptions, our core Jewish population estimate is set at 5,425,000 for 2013. Dutifully taking into account survey

statistical errors, the US core Jewish population could be no less than 5.2 and no more than 5.7 million. Our estimate reflects a well-documented pattern by which US Jewish population size, under consistent definitions, has not changed much since 2001 besides marginal growth, and will probably not change dramatically for several more years. The suggestion of significantly higher *core* Jewish population estimates at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century does not look tenable, as the implicit assumption of these higher estimates is that either: (a) there were one million more Jews in the US in the 1970s than commonly known, or (b) that the US Jewish population has grown during the past decade at a pace higher than that of the US total white population, or similar to that of the Jewish population in Israel, or (c) that Jewish population definitions can be freely updated and stretched following the prevailing mood of American society regardless of common standards in other countries.

If, however, different definitional rules are considered, the picture is quite different. It is beyond dispute that the US has a far larger *enlarged* and *Law of Return* population. The former comprises at least 6.8 million persons who are Jewish, or have been Jewish, or have a Jewish parent and are not Jewish themselves. The *enlarged* population of current Jews, other persons with Jewish ancestry, and all other non-Jewish members of households with at least one Jewish member can be evaluated at 8.3 million. By the rules of the *Law of Return*—which along with Jews also entitles their non-Jewish children, grandchildren, and the respective spouses to Israeli citizenship—there might be in the US as many as 11 million persons eligible.

Canada

In **Canada**, the situation is significantly different than in the US concerning both available databases and substantive population trends. In 2011, a new National Household Survey (previously known as a population census) was undertaken, allowing for comparisons with the Censuses of 2006 which included a question on ethnic ancestry and of 2001 which also provided data on religion (Statistics Canada). Estimates of Jewish ethnicity, released every five years, can be compared with estimates of religion, released every ten years. Both types of information can be used to provide an estimate of Canada's *core* Jewish population. Data on religion and ancestry are collected through open-ended questions, with examples and instructions provided. Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Consequently, people can be ethnically Jewish only, or Jewish and something else, being the descendants of intermarriages or expressing multiple cultural identities. Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are *not* included in the *core* concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion may declare a Jewish ethnicity in the Canadian Census and are included in the *core*. The Jewish Federations of Canada defines this as the *Jewish Standard Definition* (Shahar 2004).

In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were Jewish by religion. The number has remained nearly unchanged compared to 2001, when it reached 329,995. Previously there had been a significant increase from 296,425 in 1981 and 318,070 in 1991. Following Jewish ethnicity throughout

the past decades provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. An initial estimate of 293,000 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 349,000 in 2001, 315,000 in 2006, and 309,650 in 2011—a decrease of 1.7% in five years and 16.3% in twenty years. In other words, the ethnic mode of Jewish identification was stronger than the religious mode until 2001, but now seems to be losing traction among Canadian Jewry. By combining religion and ethnicity, the core Jewish population was evaluated at 312,060 in 1981, 356,315 in 1991, 370,520 in 2001, and 380,000 in 2011. Compared to the core figure, religion tended to lose some ground, constituting 95% of the broader concept in 1981 and 87% in 2011. The main Jewish population growth therefore involved the total of persons with a Jewish religion but another ethnicity, and persons with a Jewish ethnicity but no religion. **Figure 6** provides a synopsis of the number of Jews by various definitions since 1981.

More striking changes affected the distribution of Canadians and of the Jews among them between single and multiple ethnicities. Among Canada's total population in 2011, 57.9% of the total population provided a single ethnicity answer and 42.1% reported multiple ethnicities. 5.8 million (31%) of the 19 million who provided a single ethnic response declared themselves to be Canadian, and 4.7 million (34%) of the 13.8 million who provided a multiple response did so. All in all, 10.6 million of a total population of 32.9 million reported a Canadian ethnicity—which in other epochs was thought to be a nonexistent construct. The growth of a new Canadian ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new American ethnic identity in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). Most likely, the rapid growth of *Canadian* as a primary or additional ethnic category affects identification perceptions among Jews. In 1981, 90% of total ethnic Jews declared a single ethnicity, but this share had decreased to 66% in 1991, 53% in 2001, 43% in 2006, and 37% in 2011. The proportion of Jews (63%) with a multiple ethnicity is today much higher than among the total population (42%). Some minor inconsistencies in the ratio between the number Jews by religion and by ethnicity depend on changes in classification definitions and modes of data processing at Statistics Canada.

The sharp decrease from 1991 to 2011 in Jewish ethnic identification clearly points to a powerful process of acculturation that operates at two levels. One is that intermarriage is on the increase, which generates growing multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews. The share of children of intermarriage reported to be Jewish is also increasing, with significant gender differences in this respect: The likelihood of a child of intermarriage being raised Jewish is four times higher if the mother is Jewish than if the father is (Goldman 2009).

As noted, the number of Canada's Jews according to religion remained stable around 330,000 between 2001 and 2011. It should be stressed, though, that between 2001 and 2011, 21,445 Jews immigrated into Canada were still in Canada in 2011. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decrease of 6.5%) were it not for this immigration. This essentially points to some emigration, to a negative balance between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and to passages from self-definition of Jews by religion to lack of religion. Emigration from Canada is moderate, with 457 persons migrating to Israel in 2011-2012,



Fig. 6 Jewish population in Canada, by different definitions, 1981-2011

and an unknown number of others evidently moving to the US and possibly other countries.

Assuming continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition, we estimate the Jewish population to be at 380,000 in 2013, the world's fourth largest Jewish community. Actually, this estimate is not strictly comparable with the concept of *core* Jewish population as it includes a fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, and some of whom may not readily identify as Jewish if asked. Some of these would probably better be included among the non-Jewish component of the *enlarged* Jewish population. Taking into account all ethnic Jews who profess a non-Jewish religion, and other non-Jewish household members, an *enlarged* Jewish population of 500,000 would probably obtain.

The Jewish population of Canada was greatly concentrated in the major urban areas. In 2001, about half the total lived in Toronto, another fourth lived in Montreal, and the total of the five main urban area including Vancouver, Winnipeg and Ottawa reached 87% (Weinfeld, Schnoor and Koffman 2012).

Mexico

In **Mexico**, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2010 Census reported a Jewish population of 59,161 plus another 8,315 *Neo israelitas* (New Jews), for a grand total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these, 62,913—55,138 Jews and 7,775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (**Table 8**) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica 2002). If we project the number of Jews age 5 and over to an estimate also inclusive of children, the total population obtained for 2000 would be about 49,000. On the face of these data we would have an increase of over 10,000 (+21%) if only counting the Jews, and nearly 18,500 (+38%) if also including the New Jews. These quite surprising findings, at a time when migration if anything is slightly diminishing Mexican Jewish population size, are consistent with erratic estimates in past Censuses which reported 17,574 Jews in 1950, 100,750 in 1960, 49,181 in 1970, 61,790 in 1980, and 57,918 (age 5 and over) in 1990. In other words these figures cannot be accepted at face value.

An in-depth analysis of the 1970 Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) indeed unveiled a significant presence among those defined as Jews of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment, exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and *descalzos* (shoeless). The further inclusion of a category of *Neo israelitas* in 2010 does not seem to convincingly solve the problem of the attribution to Judaism of a population most likely composed of followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah's Witnesses.

Indeed, the 2010 Census compares the age 5 and over population by state. The total Jewish population age 5 and over in the metropolitan area of Mexico City (Federal District and the adjacent portions of the State of Mexico including the northwestern suburbs of the capital city) was 32,464 in 2000 and 39,777 in 2010. Allocation of the 0-4 age group in the 2000 Census suggested

TABLE 8 Jewish population age 5 and over in Mexico, 2000-2010

Federal Division	2000	2010	Difference	Percentage change 2000-2010
Total	**45,260**	**61,991**	**16,731**	**37.0**
Federal District	18,380	18,865	485	2.6
State of Mexico	14,084	19,812	5,728	40.7
Rest of Mexico	12,796	23,314	10,518	82.2

Source: Unadjusted census data, see text.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía y Informatica 2002; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012.

an estimate of about 35,000 Jews in the Mexico City metropolitan area and 40,000 nationwide. Based on the published (and not totally consistent) Census figures, Jews in Mexico age 5 and over (not including *Neo israelitas*) would have increased from 45,260 in 2000 to 61,991 in 2010, an increase of 16,731 (+37.0%). The increase would be only 485 (+2.6%) in the Federal District, 5,728 (+40.7%) in the State of Mexico, and 10,518 (+82.2%) in Mexico's other federal states. Such findings are most implausible. A Jewish population survey undertaken in 2000 provided a national estimate of 39,870 Jews, of whom 37,350 lived in Mexico City (Comité Central Israelita de México 2000), confirming the results of a previous 1991 survey (DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). A new survey in 2006 confirmed the previous results (Comité Central Israelita de México 2006).

Mexican Jewry still displays a relatively young age profile compared to other Jewish populations in Central and South America, but some aging was visible during the past decade and emigration intermittently affected the community. In 2013, allowing for some emigration to the US and Israel (158 persons moved to Israel in 2011-2012) and some new arrivals we upwardly corrected our previous Jewish population estimate to 40,000, the world's fourteenth largest Jewish community (**Table 4**).

Other Central and South American countries

Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in Central and South America, reflecting recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985, 1987, 2008, 2011). However, outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, an increased interest in Judaism appeared among real or putative descendants of *Conversos* whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal. Some of these *Converso* communities have been trying to create a permanent framework for their Jewish identity, in part manifested through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion in the size of some communities, especially smaller ones located in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries.

Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—due to dire economic conditions in Argentina and to special incentives offered by Israel. In 2003, the Argentinean economic situation eased somewhat and Israel restricted its incentives, resulting in much lower levels of emigration. About 1,500 persons left Argentina for Israel in 2003, decreasing steadily to 337 in 2010, 220 in 2011, and 222 in 2012 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Based on the experience of previous years, approximately 20% of these migrants were non-Jewish household members. Partial evidence from different sources indicated that less than half of total Jewish emigration from Argentina was to Israel, with most others going to South Florida, where the Greater Miami Jewish Federation ran a program to assist Argentinian Jews. Permanence in Israel of the new immigrants was high, at least during the first three years after immigration, with only about 10% emigrating (Adler 2004).

Following a 2004 Jewish population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005), an initial claim of a

Jewish population of 244,000 was based on significantly extended definitional criteria. Of the 244,000, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered themselves as totally or partly Jewish—consistent with our own previous estimate of 165,000. This estimate for the major urban concentration appeared consistent with our national *core* estimate. The 244,000 estimate is a good estimate of the *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) in AMBA, while over 300,000 persons were identified in the same survey who were in some way of Jewish origin or attached to a person of Jewish origin. Another survey, limited to the City of Buenos Aires, suggested significant aging of the *core* Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005). The current situation implies an annual loss of about 500-1,000 persons through a negative balance of Jewish births and deaths and emigration. Argentina's Jewish population is assessed at 181,500 in 2013, the world's seventh largest Jewish community.

In **Brazil**, the second largest Central and South American Jewish community, the 2000 Census indicated a rather stable Jewish population of 86,828, up from 86,416 in 1991 (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica; Decol 2002). Considering the possible omission of persons who did not answer the Census question on religion, we assessed Brazil's core Jewish population at 97,000 in 2003 and, allowing for moderate emigration (319 persons went to Israel in 2011-2012), at 95,200 in 2013—the world's tenth largest Jewish community. The Census data were consistent with systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the Jewish Federation of São Paulo that showed 47,286 Jews (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002) and an assumption that about one-half of Brazil's Jews live in that city. According to the Census data, the Jewish population in São Paolo decreased from 41,308 in 1980 to 37,500 in 2000 (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estatistica IBGE 2001; Decol 1999). Brazil's *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) was assessed at 132,191 in 1980 and 117,296 in 1991 and reached 119,430 in 2000 (Decol 2009). The enlarged Jewish population is assessed at 125,000 in 2013.

Chile has the fourth largest Jewish community in Central and South America. This relatively stable core Jewish population is assessed at 18,500 in 2013 on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003) and an earlier Jewish population survey (Berger et al. 1995). **Uruguay** has experienced continuing emigration (Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006), including 115 migrants to Israel in 2011-2012. The Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was reduced to 17,200 in 2013. **Venezuela** experienced significant Jewish emigration in recent years (DellaPergola, Benzaquen, Beker de Weinraub 2000). In 2000, about 20% of the former students of Jewish schools in Uruguay, and over one-third of the adult children of Caracas Jews, lived in a different country. In Venezuela, where the Jewish community has been under pressure due to the demanding local political circumstances, the estimate was reduced to 9,000 Jews, reflecting emigration of 110 persons to Israel, and higher numbers to other countries, particularly South Florida, in 2011-2012.

In Central America**, Panama**'s Jewish population was re-evaluated at 10,000 following Jewish immigration from other Central and South American countries. **Costa Rica**, as well as **Colombia**, with 134 migrants to Israel in 2010-2011, and **Peru**, with 116 migrants (several of whom recently converted to Judaism) had Jewish populations below 3,000.

Europe

The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,416,400 in 2013, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU) (**Appendix A**). The EU, comprising 27 countries, reached an estimated total of 1,105,700 Jews in 2013 (78% of the continent's total). The former Soviet republics in Europe outside the EU comprised 270,300 Jews (19%). All other European countries combined comprised 40,400 Jews (3%).

The momentous European political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the structure of Jewish community organizations, with an expanded presence of Israeli and American bodies in Eastern European countries. The latter have played an important role in strengthening or even creating anew the possibilities of Eastern European Jewish life in the fields of religion, education, culture, social service, and support to the needy. The revitalization of Jewish community life may have some impact on demographic trends, primarily through the revival of submerged Jewish identities and the stimulus of greater social interaction with other Jews, possibly leading to Jewish marriages and children. Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous database. Nevertheless several works have attempted to create and expand such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 2010).

The European Union (EU)

In 2004, the EU expanded from 15 to 25 countries, incorporating the three Baltic FSU republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), another five that had been part of the Soviet area of influence in Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and two southern European insular countries (Cyprus and Malta). In 2007, two more countries that had been part of the Eastern Europe sphere of influence of the Soviet Union were admitted to the EU (Romania and Bulgaria), and in June 2013 Croatia joined as the 28th member. The EU's expanded format symbolized an important historical landmark: the virtual boundary between Western and Eastern Europe was erased. Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey are the next candidates for EU membership. Disagreements about the possible inclusion of an Islamic country like Turkey reflect the ongoing dilemma in the definition of Europe's own cultural and geopolitical boundaries.

United Kingdom

In the **United Kingdom**, the 2011 Census (Office for National Statistics) (**Table 9**), initially available for England and Wales, pointed to a slight Jewish population increase, from 259,927 in 2001 to 263,346 in 2011 (+1.3%). The total Jewish population for the UK (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) in 2001 was 266,741. The 2001 national population

Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century (Kosmin and Waterman 2002). There was general agreement that the 2001 Census had somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sections of UK Jewry. In 2011, indications exist that the response rate significantly increased in those areas, especially when it was realized that government investment tends to be based on reported population figures (Graham and Vulkan 2012). In 2001, about 15% of the UK total population reported no religion and another 8% did not answer the question, for a total of 23%. In 2011, this percentage rose to 32% (25% and 7% respectively). In view of the organized Jewish community's efforts to encourage participation in the Census, it is not plausible that Jewish population estimates should be expanded accounting for the increase in agnostics and atheists to an extent similar to that of the total population. But indeed some upward adjustments are necessary (Graham, Schmool and Waterman 2007; Graham and Waterman 2005; Voas 2005; Graham and Waterman 2007).

Detailed tabulations were obtained by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the Board of Deputies of British Jews from the Office for National Statistics from the 2001 Census. An in-depth profile of the socio-demographics of British Jewry thus emerged, along with a better evaluation of the quality of Jewish population estimates. One interesting finding was that the Jewish population was dispersed over the whole national territory, including all counties but one—the Isles of Scilly. The presence of Jews in areas lacking Jewish infrastructure suggests a lower degree of affiliation with the organized community than previously assumed. Analyses of data for detailed geographical precincts allowed for estimates of non-response in areas with higher and lower Jewish shares of the total population. A significant correlation was found between the known Jewish religiosity, in terms of the local presence of very Orthodox Jews in a ward, and non-response to the religion question. On the other hand, post-Census surveys of Jews in London and Leeds did not reveal high percentages declaring they had not answered "Jewish" to the question on religion (Miller, Schmool and Lerman 1996; Graham and Vulkan 2007).

Table 9 illustrates significant geographical shifts that occurred among UK Jews between 2001 and 2011. The most significant relative increase occurred in the North East, including the Yeshiva center of Gateshead upon Tyne. Increases also occurred in the North West (Manchester) and East Midlands (Nottingham) areas. On the other hand significant losses appeared in the Yorkshire and Humber (Leeds) and West Midlands (Birmingham) areas, as well as throughout the South East (Surrey), the South West (Bournemouth), and Wales. Regarding London, the main portion of the metropolitan area was quite stable (148,602 in 2011 versus 149,789 in 2001) with an increase of over 3,000 in Inner London partly compensating for a decrease of 5,000 in Outer London, while the areas just beyond London's northwestern suburbs (Hertsfordshire) continued to expand steadily. As noted, some of these changes may reflect the higher propensity of Haredi Jews to participate in the 2011 Census.

As already noted, more detailed data for Scotland in 2001 (where some Census questions were asked differently than in other UK areas) showed 6,448 people currently reporting Jewish religion as compared to a total of

TABLE 9 Jewish population in the United Kingdom, 2001-2011

Area and main city or county	Jewish population 2001	Jewish population 2011	Percentage change 2001-2011	Total population 2011	Jews per 1,000 total population 2011
Total United Kingdom	**266,872**	**NA**		**63,182,175**	
England	***257,671***	***261,282***	***1.4***	***53,012,456***	***4.9***
North East (Gateshead)	3,151	4,503	42.9	2,596,886	1.7
North West (Manchester)	27,974	30,417	8.7	7,052,177	4.3
Yorkshire and the Humber (Leeds)	11,554	9,929	-14.1	5,283,733	1.9
East Midlands (Nottingham)	4,075	4,254	4.4	4,533,222	0.9
West Midlands (Birmingham)	4,977	4,621	-7.2	5,601,847	0.8
East (Hertsfordshire)	30,367	34,830	14.7	5,846,965	6.0
London	149,789	148,602	-0.8	8,173,941	18.2
South East (Surrey)	19,037	17,761	-6.7	8,634,750	2.1
South West (Bournemouth)	6,747	6,365	-5.7	5,288,935	1.2
Wales	***2,256***	***2,064***	***-8.5***	***3,063,456***	***0.7***
Northern Ireland	***365***	***NA***		***1,810,863***	
Scotland	***6,580***	***NA***		***5,295,400***	

Source: Office for National Statistics 2012; Graham, Boyd, Vulkan 2012.

TABLE 10 Jewish population in Germany, 1989-2012

Area and main city	Jewish population 1989	Jewish population 2006	Jewish population 2012	Percentage change 1989-2006	Percentage change 2006-2012	Total population 2012	Jews per 1,000 total population 2012
Total	**31,057**	**107,794**	**102,135**	**247.1**	**-5.2**	**81,751,895**	**1.2**
Baden-Wurttemberg (Stuttgart)	1,936	8,157	8,262	321.3	1.3	10,753,880	0.8
Bavaria (Munich)	5,484	18,825	18,352	243.3	-2.5	12,538,696	1.5
Berlin	8,500	11,022	10,237	29.7	-7.1	3,460,725	3.0
Brandenburg	450	1,374	1,450	205.3	5.5	2,503,273	0.6
Bremen	132	1,140	972	763.6	-14.7	660,999	1.5
Hamburg	1,344	3,086	2,527	129.6	-18.1	1,786,448	1.4
Hesse (Frankfurt a.M.)	6,440	12,429	11,652	93.0	-6.3	6,067,021	1.9
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	100	1,750	1,547	1,650.0	-11.6	1,642,327	0.9
Lower Saxony (Hannover)	501	9,197	8,245	1,735.7	-10.4	7,918,293	1.0
North Rhine-Westphalia (Düsseldorf)	4,782	29,652	27,702	520.1	-6.6	17,845,154	1.6
Rhineland-Palatinate (Mainz)	352	3,237	3,294	819.6	1.8	4,003,745	0.8
Saarland	236	1,134	993	380.5	-12.4	1,017,567	1.0
Saxony (Leipzig)	350	2,576	2,655	636.0	3.1	4,149,477	0.6
Saxony-Anhalt	50	1,805	1,481	3,510.0	-18.0	2,335,006	0.6
Schleswig-Holstein	250	1,679	1,970	571.6	17.3	2,834,259	0.7
Thuringia	150	731	796	387.3	8.9	2,235,025	0.4
Total former West Germany + Berlin	***29,957***	***99,558***	***94,206***	***232.3***	***-5.4***	***68,886,787***	***1.4***
Total former East Germany	***1,100***	***8,236***	***7,929***	***648.7***	***-3.7***	***12,865,108***	***0.6***

Source: Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2013.

7,446 who said they were raised as Jews—a net lifetime loss of 13% (United Kingdom, Scotland, General Register Office 2002; JPR 2003).

British Jewry is aging, with 16% of persons being under age 15, compared to 22% age 65 and over in 2001. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit 2005). Comparing the uncorrected Census returns for the age 0-9 group and the recorded number of Jewish births over the past ten years preceding the Census, the discrepancy was only 2.5%. This confirms some undercount, but not on a scale that would significantly impact Jewish population Census estimates. The same vital statistics indicated a continuing excess of Jewish burials over Jewish births until 2004, but since 2005 the trends apparently reversed. The steadily decreasing number of Jewish deaths is an obvious symptom of a shrinking population which loses several hundred people annually through a negative vital balance, and a growing use by Jews of non-Jewish burial societies.

Another indicator of the same trend is the decreasing synagogue membership in the UK (Hart and Kafka 2006; Graham and Vulkan 2010; Vulkan and Graham 2008). Synagogue membership decreased by 17.8% between 1990 and 2000, and by 4.5% (about 1% annually) between 2001 and 2005. This trend, however, seems to have abated, as in 2010 synagogue membership was 82,963 households, compared to 83,567 households in 2005. At the same time, the denominational balance has shifted toward the strictly, often called right-wing, Orthodox (whose membership doubled between 1990 and 2010) and Masorti (tending to American Conservative, with an 85% membership increase), as against a reduction in the Central (mainstream) Orthodox (a 30% membership decrease). This may plausibly explain the apparent increase in the birth rate. But the decreasing number of recorded burials is most likely explained by an increasing number of families who do not choose Jewish burial societies.

We increased the UK Jewish population estimate from the 2001 Census count of 266,741 to 300,000 (about 12%), and to 291,000 in 2011 (about a 9% increase over 2001, pending the receipt of results for Scotland and Northern Ireland) assuming a lower rate of non-response among Jews than in the general population in the 2011 Census. All in all, this seems a fair resolution. The updating must account for the negative balance of births and deaths during most of the intercensal period after correcting for under-reporting, as well as a moderate increase in emigration (485 persons immigrated to Israel in 2011 and 569 in 2012). We estimated the UK's total Jewish population at 290,000 in 2013, the world's 5th largest Jewish community.

Germany

In **Germany**, Jewish immigration mainly from the FSU, brought to the country over 200,000 Jews and non-Jewish household members between 1989 and 2005. This caused a significant boost in the Jewish population of Germany that had previously relied on a few Shoah survivors and several thousand immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. This major immigration wave subsequently diminished to a few hundred annually. The

German government, under pressure because of growing unemployment and a crumbling welfare system, limited Jewish immigration from the FSU in 2005. On January 1, 2005, the previous special quota immigration law (*Kontingentsflüchtlingsgesetz*) was replaced by new more restrictive rules (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*). Jews lost their privileged quota status. The new law elevated integration into German society and good economic prospects above other considerations and required Jews aspiring to immigrate to Germany to first prove that a community would accept them as members. Prior knowledge of the German language was required. Potential Jewish immigrants now also had to prove that they would not be dependent on welfare and were willing to enter the German labor market (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz, Lebok, and Polian 2002; Erlanger 2006).

In 2012, based on German Jewish community sources, 481 Jewish FSU immigrants were recorded as new members of German Jewish communities, as compared to 636 in 2011, 667 in 2010, 704 in 2009, 862 in 2008, 1,296 in 2007, 1,971 in 2006, 3,124 in 2005, 4,757 in 2004, 6,224 in 2003, and 6,597 in 2002 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2013). Between 2002 and 2004, the *enlarged* total of Jews and non-Jewish family members who came to Germany from the FSU was larger than the number of FSU migrants to Israel, but Israel regained primacy as of 2005. Admission criteria to the central Jewish community follow Jewish rabbinical rules. The total number of *core* Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 in 2006, diminished to 107,330 in 2007, 106,435 in 2008, 104,241 in 2009, 104,024 in 2010, 102,797 in 2011, and 102,797 in 2012. Of the current total, only 5,000-6,000 were part of the original community of 28,081 members at the end of 1990. The remainder was mostly recent immigrants and their children. **Table 10** compares the numbers and geographical composition of Jews in Germany at three points in time: 1989 on the eve of the great migration influx, at the peak of growth in 2006, and in 2012.

Total growth between 1989-2006 was 253.9%, or more than three and a half times. However during the past seven years, a contraction of 5% is seen. Most of the growth was in the Länders (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (West Germany) which passed from 29,957 in 1989 to 99,558 in 2006, and diminished to 94,206 in 2013. In the Länders of the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) (East Germany) the number of Jews was assessed at a tiny 1,100 in 1989, increased to 8,236 in 2006, and was slightly reduced to 7,929 in 2012. Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographical absorption of immigrants, no specific area has become really dominant in Jewish population distribution. The main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rein-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin.

The age composition not only of the 5,000-6,000 long-time Jewish residents of Germany, but also of the many more newcomers, is very skewed and very aged. To characterize the prevailing demographic trend, in 2012, 199 Jewish births and 1,282 Jewish deaths were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of over 1,000 Jews. While 563 Jews joined a German Jewish community in 2012, 784 Jews withdrew membership. Moreover, 197 persons emigrated to Israel in 2011-2012. All in all, because of

these and other population movements, the total Jewish community inclusive of orthodox and liberal congregations diminished by 862 persons in 2012. Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and a preference on the part of some Jews not to identify with its official institutions, we assessed Germany's *core* Jewish population at 118,000 in 2013, the world's eighth largest Jewish community. The *enlarged* Jewish population, inclusive of the non-Jewish relatives of immigrants, is closer to 250,000, and creates new opportunities for Jewish religious, social, and cultural life in Germany. It also suggests significant dependence on welfare and a significant need for elderly services (Schoeps, Jasper, and Vogt 1999).

Other EU countries

The largest Jewish community in Europe is **France**, where a 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohen with Ifergan 2003). Jewish population is slowly decreasing, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the US, and other countries. Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually for several years, stood at 1,619 in 2011 and 1,653 in 2012. Jewish emigration was directed as well toward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of anti-Semitism, including physical violence as exemplified by the tragic murder of Jewish school children and an adult in Toulouse in 2012.

A survey of Jewish tourists to Israel from France in 2004 unveiled a remarkable estimate of 125,000 visitors, or more than 30% of all French Jews age 15 and over (Cohen 2005). Much higher percentages have ever been to Israel. Of the 125,000, 23% (about 29,000) affirmed their intention to move to Israel in the near future. The US was a distant second candidate for possible emigration. Migration intentions are not a proxy for actual migration decisions, but in the past such intentions proved quite reliable in the case of French Jews (Cohen 2007). The diminishing feeling of security among French Jewry and the actual movement of thousands of persons is undisputable. Our 2013 estimate for French Jewry, the third largest in the world, was therefore decreased to 478,000.

In **Hungary**, our *core* estimate of 48,000 Jews (the world's thirteenth largest Jewish community) reflects the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population's vital balance has been negative for several years. A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger *enlarged* Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004). The report reconstructed Jewish population changes between the end of World War II and 1995 (based on Stark 1995) but the latter study significantly underestimated emigration from Hungary to countries other than Israel, as well as to Israel outside the major migration periods. However, a demographic extrapolation based on the usually accepted number of post-Holocaust *core* Jewish survivors and accounting for the known or estimated numbers of births, deaths, and emigrants to Israel and other countries since 1945 closely matches our assessment (Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002). In the 2001 Hungarian Census, only 13,000 reported themselves Jewish by religion. In 2011-2012, 238 persons emigrated to Israel. The *enlarged* Jewish population in Hungary was about 95,000 in 2013.

Belgium's Jewish population was estimated at 30,000, the world's fifteenth largest Jewish community. Quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from other countries. However, in 2011-2012, 315 Jews emigrated to Israel, reflecting concerns similar to those of French Jewry. Local Jewish population estimates are quite obsolete and unsubstantiated in comparison with most other EU countries, but the order of magnitude reported here is supported by indirect evidence such as the number of votes collected by Jewish candidates in the 2003 legislative elections (Cohn 2003).

The next two largest Jewish communities in the EU, and globally, are in the Netherlands and Italy. In the **Netherlands**, a 1999 survey estimated a Halakhic Jewish population of 30,072 (which is the basis of our estimate of 29,900 that considers that the intervening changes tend to balance), of which perhaps as many as one-third were immigrants from Israel, and an *enlarged* Jewish population of 43,305 (Solinge and de Vries 2001; Kooyman and Almagor 1996). In **Italy**, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's Jewish population—decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 25,143 in 2001 and 24,462 at the end of 2009 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002, 2010; Lattes 2005). Our estimate of 28,100 allocates for non-members, also considering enhanced migration to Israel of 233 in 2011-2012.

Next in Jewish population size among EU countries are **Sweden**, estimated at 15,000 (Dencik 2003) and **Spain**, estimated at 12,000 (Cytto 2007). Much higher figures occasionally mentioned for Spain lack any real documentary basis, unless one desired to venture into speculations about the number of descendants from the Inquisition (Adams et al. 2008). No other Jewish community in the EU reaches 10,000 by the *core* definition. In some EU countries national censuses offered a rough baseline for Jewish population estimates. In **Austria**, the 2001 Census reported 8,140 Jews, of which 6,988 lived in Vienna (Statistik Austria 2003). We estimated the *core* community at 9,000. In **Romania**, the 2002 Census reported a Jewish population of 6,179, but we assessed the community at 9,400, after accounting for 92 migrants to Israel in 2011-2012. In **Poland**, where the 2002 Census reported a Jewish population of 1,100, we estimated 3,200. For Austria, Romania, and Poland, available data on Jewish community membership helped improve our estimates.

The Former Soviet Union

The FSU is one of the areas where Jews experienced the greatest demographic and socioeconomic transformations (Konstantinov 2007). In the more recent period, Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high rates of intermarriage, low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages, and significant, though decreasing, emigration. Our 2013 assessment of the total *core* Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics is 301,600 core Jews, of whom 282,000 lived in Europe (including the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 19,600 in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members created an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly twice as large as the *core* (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011, 2013). A

similar number of further eligible persons would probably lead to an estimated *Law of Return* population approaching one million. The ongoing process of demographic decrease was alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish cultural and religious activities, including Jewish education, thanks to the investment of American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with 7,134 in 2011 and 7,234 in 2012.

Russian Federation

In the **Russian Federation,** the October 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our *core* Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, derived from a February 1994 Russian Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Tolts 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). After the compulsory item on ethnicity *(natsyonalnost)* on identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question was made optional for the first time, the October 14, 2010 Russia Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another 41,000 undeclared people who most likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600 in 2010 (**Table 11**) (Tolts 2011). Considering the continuing emigration and negative balance of births and deaths, we evaluate the Russian Federation's Jewish population at 190,000 in 2013, the world's sixth largest Jewish community.

Table 11 compares the totals and main geographical distributions of Jews in the Russian Federation in 2002 and 2010. Original Census data and data adjusted for Census underenumeration were compared. According to the adjusted data, the Jewish population in the Russian Federation has diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration, aging and a negative balance of births and deaths. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in the two main cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the basic configuration was not much altered through migration or vital events during the intercensal period.

Jewish population size was clearly more stable in Russia than in the other FSU republics. This partly reflected Jewish migration among the various republics as well as lower emigration from Moscow and other important urban areas in the Russian Federation (Tolts 2003). Nevertheless, the striking imbalance of Jewish births and deaths, and continuing emigration (3,678 persons to Israel in 2011 and 3,545 in 2012, including non-Jewish household members) implies continuing population decrease and an increasingly elderly age composition. The number of births to couples with two Jewish parents decreased from 1,562 in 1988 to 169 in 2000. Births to couples with at least one Jewish parent were estimated at 5,858 in 1988 and 1,057 in 2000. Recorded Jewish deaths were 13,826 in 1988 and 8,218 in 2000. As a result the powerfully negative balance of these vital events was -7,978 in 1988 and -7,161 in 2000 (Tolts 2005). These changes occur in the context of a general net population decrease being experienced by the Russian Federation, as well as by other European republics of the FSU, and it is unlikely that more recent detailed data would unveil a different pattern.

Table 11 Jewish population in Russian Federation, 2002-2010

Area	Census figures		Adjusted figures[a]		Percent of total		Difference	Percentage change
	2002	2010	2002	2010	2002	2010	2002-2010	2002-2010
Total	**233,600**	**156,600**	**255,100**	**200,600**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**-54,500**	**-21.4**
Moscow	80,400	53,100	88,000	68,000	34.5	33.9	-20,000	-22.7
St. Petersburg	36,600	24,000	40,000	31,000	15.7	15.4	-9,000	-22.5
Rest of Russia	116,600	79,500	127,100	101,600	49.8	50.7	-25,500	-20.1

a Estimates based on proportionally adjusted results of the 2002 and 2010 Russian Federation censuses.
Source: Tolts 2004; 2011.

Other FSU countries

In **Ukraine,** the December 5, 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews, not significantly different from our estimate of 100,000 on January 1, 2002. Over 80% of Ukrainian Jews were Russian speakers. Given that our baseline for the latter estimate was the 487,300 Jews counted in the Census of January 1989, the fit between the expected and actual was remarkable (Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). Given the dramatic pace of emigration since 1989 and continuing emigration at the end of 2001, the Census fully confirmed our previous assessment of ongoing demographic trends. A new Census was planned in 2010 but was postponed until 2012. Adding continuing emigration (2,051 persons to Israel in 2011 and 2,048 in 2012) that among other factors reflects the instability of Ukraine's politics, we assess the 2013 *core* Jewish population at 65,000, the world's eleventh largest Jewish community.

Of the other European republics of the FSU, the largest Jewish population is in **Belarus**. The Belarus Census of October 2009 found 12,926 Jews, with 2.4% of the population not reporting an ethnicity/nationality (Belstat 2009). Our estimate, also considering 681 migrants to Israel in 2011-2012, was adjusted to 11,500 in 2013. Following EU membership in 2004 by the three Baltic republics of **Latvia, Lithuania**, and **Estonia,** the Jewish population has been fairly stable. After some adjustments, partly reflecting several minor revisions of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian national population registers, and accounting for 182 migrants to Israel in 2011-2012, we assessed a combined 11,700 for the three Baltic countries in 2013 (Goldstein and Goldstein 1997).

A survey in **Moldova** found an *enlarged* Jewish population of 9,240 in 2000 (Korazim and Katz 2003). The Moldova Census of October 2004 reported 3,628 Jews, although it did not cover the Russian controlled Moldovan territory east of the Dniester River. According to unofficial results of a separate Census of November 2004, about 1,200 Jews lived east of the Dniester River. Considering 426 migrants to Israel in 2011-2012, we assess the *core* Jewish population of Moldova at 3,800 in 2013.

Other European Countries

As a result of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joining the EU, only 40,400 Jews lived in Europe outside of the EU and the FSU in 2013. Of these, 19,300 lived in Western Europe, primarily in **Switzerland**, estimated at 17,400 in 2013 (Bundesamt für Statistik 2005) which in 2010-2012 sent 140 migrants to Israel. Another 21,100 lived in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, primarily in **Turkey** and mostly in Istanbul's European neighborhoods. A 2002 survey in Istanbul suggested widespread aging in a community that has experienced significant emigration (166 persons migrated to Israel in 2011-2012). In Istanbul, 10% of the Jewish population was under age 15, compared to 18% age 65 and over (Filiba 2003; Tuval 1999). Several Censuses in Eastern European countries reported numbers of Jews significantly lower than our assessment, see **Appendix A** (Bulgaria 706 in 2011; Croatia 495 in 2002; Serbia 785 in 2002; Slovakia 631 in 2011; Slovenia 28 in 2002). *Enlarged* Jewish populations are significantly higher in Eastern Europe, reflecting the high levels of intermarriage following the Shoah and massive emigration.

Asia

The Jewish population in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel (**Appendix A**). Israel accounts for more than 99% of the total Jewish population in Asia. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia each account for less than one-half of one percent of the continental total.

Israel

After World War II, **Israel**'s (then still Palestine) Jewish population was just over one-half million (Bachi 1977). This population increased more than tenfold over the next 60 years due to mass immigration and a fairly high and uniquely stable natural increase. Israeli population data are regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Israel also has a permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Annual data derive from CBS periodic censuses and detailed annual accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, immigrants, emigrants, and converts). The most recent Census was in December 2008 and, as is usual, resulted in a correction to the current population estimates extrapolated from the previous 1995 Census. Thus, the original Jewish estimate of 5,569,200 for the end of 2008/beginning of 2009 was raised to 5,608,900—a 39,700 person increase. Two main reasons made this update necessary. The first is the normal discrepancy that may occur between repeated population counts. The second is possible delays in the reclassification of persons following conversion to (or from) Judaism.

At the beginning of 2013, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 6,014,300, and, when combined with 318,600 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,332,900 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2004, for the first time, more than 100,000 Jews were born in Israel. In 2012, 125,409 Jewish births—the highest ever—and 35,919 Jewish deaths—also the highest ever—produced a net natural increase of 89,490 Jewish persons—again, the highest ever. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate slightly rose to nearly 3.0 children per woman, higher than in any other developed country and twice or more the effective Jewish fertility rate in most Diaspora Jewish communities. This reflected not only the large family size of the Jewish population's more religious component, but more significantly a diffused desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially remarkable among the upwardly mobile (DellaPergola 2009).

At the time of this writing, the final data on the components of population growth for 2012 were not yet released. In 2012, 16,557 new immigrants, plus presumably 4,000-5,000 immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time) arrived in Israel, for a total of 21,000-22,000 immigrants, of which 15,000-16,000 were Jewish. In addition there were several thousands of Israelis returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad. Current emigration (estimated at 5,000-6,000) reduced this to a net migration balance of 15,000-16,000, of whom 10,000 were Jewish. In 2011, there were 16,892 new immigrants plus another 4,700 immigrant citizens and others in different programs of family reunion, for a

total of 21,600, of whom 13,800 were Jewish. The net international migration balance was 16,600, of whom 7,700 Jewish, from which a total net Jewish emigration estimate can be obtained of 5,000. The net emigration of Jews was 6,100, indicating that among non-Jews the propensity to emigrate was relatively lower. All in all, these data about Israel's international migration balance point to a relatively low level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to relatively low levels of emigration. The latter observation stands in sharp contrast with the highly spirited debate about an alleged increase of emigration from Israel (Lustick 2011; DellaPergola 2011).

The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants. However, evidence from Israel's Rabbinical Conversion Courts indicates some increase in the number of converts. Overall, between 1999 and 2012, nearly 72,000 were converted to Judaism by Rabbinical Conversion Courts, some of whom are not permanent Israeli residents. Most converts were new immigrants from the Ethiopian Falash Mura community. The highest year was 2007 with 8,608 converts. Since 2010, the annual number of converts has been around or slightly above 5,000. Overall, 6,408 of the converts came through the Rabbinate of the Israeli Defense Forces and 65,576 were civilians (Fisher 2013; Waxman 2013).

To clarify the intricacies of demographic data in Israel and the territories of the Palestinian Authority, **Table 12** reports numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households and Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, and foreign workers, and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *enlarged* definition) in each division is also shown.

Of the 6,014,300 *core* Jews in 2013, 5,454,900 lived within Israel's pre-1967 borders; 205,000 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 20,500 in the Golan Heights; and 333,900 lived in the West Bank. Of the 318,600 non-Jewish household members included in the *enlarged* Jewish population, 302,600 lived within the pre-1967 borders, 8,000 in East Jerusalem, 1,000 in the Golan Heights, and 7,000 in the West Bank. *Core* Jews represented 75.4% of Israel's total legal population of 7,981,500, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, *and* the Israeli population in the West Bank, but not the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza, nor foreign workers and refugees. Israel's *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,332,900 represented 79.3% of Israel's total population of 7,981,500.

As shown in **Table 12**, the *enlarged* Jewish population represented 78.0% of the total within pre-1967 borders, 41.4% in East Jerusalem, 47.3% in the Golan Heights, and 13.0% in the West Bank. If one also considers the Arab population of Gaza, *core* Jews constituted 7.8% (8.0% based on the *enlarged*) of the total population living in the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza). Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, was 1,648,600, or 20.7% of the total population thus territorially defined.

Table 12 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees In Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2013[a]

Area	Core Jewish population	Others	Core Jewish and others[b]	Arab population and others	Foreign workers and refugees[c]	Total	Percent of Jews and others[h]
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Grand total	**6,014,300**	**318,600**	**6,332,900**	**5,576,900**	**300,000**	**12,209,800**	51.9
State of Israel [d]	***6,014,300***	***318,600***	***6,332,900***	***1,648,600***	***300,000***	***8,281,500***	76.5
Thereof:							
Pre-1967 borders	5,454,900	302,600	5,757,500	1,322,600	300,000	**7,380,100**	78.0
East Jerusalem	205,000	8,000	213,000	302,000	-	**515,000**	41.4
Golan Heights	20,500	1,000	21,500	24,000	-	**45,500**	47.3
West Bank	333,900	7,000	340,900	[e]	-	**340,900**	13.0[f]
Palestinian Authority				***3,928,300***		***3,928,300***	-
West Bank	[g]	[g]	[g]	2,290,900	-	**2,290,900**	-
Gaza	-	-	-	1,637,400	-	**1,637,400**	-

a Rounded figures.
b Enlarged Jewish population.
c All foreign workers and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders.
d As defined by Israel's legal system.
e Included under State of Israel.
f Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction.
g Included under State of Israel.
h Column 3 divided by column 6.
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Migration Authority; Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; and author's estimates.

Table 13 Percent of core and enlarged Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2013

	Percentage of Jews[a] by definition	
Area	Core	Enlarged
Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory	**49.3**	**51.9**
Minus foreign workers and refugees	50.5	53.2
Minus Gaza	58.5	61.6
Minus Golan Heights	58.7	61.8
Minus West Bank	75.6	79.6
Minus East Jerusalem	78.6	82.7

a Total Jewish population of Israel including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
Source: Table 6-12.

Table 13 reports the percentage of Jews according to the *core* and *enlarged* definitions out of the total population of the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River from which we gradually and cumulatively subtract from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is a gradually growing Jewish share of a total population which gradually diminishes according to the different territorial and population configurations considered. This allows a better evaluation of the possible share of the Jewish population out of the total population that exists under alternative assumptions.

A total combined Jewish and Arab population of 11,909,800 (excluding foreign workers) lived in Israel and Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza) in 2013. The c*ore* Jewish population represented 50.5% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. If the 318,600 non-Jewish members of Jewish households are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,332,900 represented 53.2% of the total population of Israel and the Palestinian Territory.

If we also add to the permanent population some 240,000 non-Jewish foreign workers—legal or undocumented—who are not permanent residents, and an additional 60,000 refugees, for a total estimate of 300,000, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations represented, respectively, 49.3% and 51.9% of the total population present in Israel and the Palestinian Territory, estimated at 12,209,800 in 2013. The Jewish majority is constantly decreasing—and possibly does not subsist—among the broadest possible aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel (DellaPergola 2003, 2007, 2011; Sofer and Bistrow 2004).

These estimates reflect our own assessment of the total Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. To clarify the issues, it should be noted that until the Oslo agreements statistical operations in the West Bank and Gaza were the responsibility of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In 1967, immediately after the June war, Israel conducted a population Census in the West Bank and Gaza. The count showed a population of 598,637 in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and 356,261 in Gaza, for a combined total of 954,898, plus 65,857 in East Jerusalem (Bachi 1977). The East Jerusalem Arab population was incorporated within Jerusalem's expanded municipal territory when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in November 1967. After 1994 Israel transferred the chore to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). In 1997, the PCBS conducted a Census in the West Bank and Gaza under the guidance of Norwegian experts and reported 1,600,100 inhabitants in the West Bank and 1,001,569 in Gaza, or a combined total population of 2,601,669 (not including Israeli settlers). Another 294,014 persons were recorded but they were not included in data processing because they were abroad at the time of the Census. In addition, the population of East Jerusalem was assessed at 210,000 (Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics 1998). The annual rate of population growth over the 30 years (1967-1997) for the aggregate of the West Bank and Gaza would be 3.4%, and would be 3.9% for East Jerusalem. Such high growth rates are fully consonant and if anything slightly lower than annual growth rates among Moslems who were citizens of Israel assessed at 3.7% during the same

period. Palestinian population growth during the 1967-1997 intercensal period was very high but plausible.

The PCBS subsequently released population projections based on fertility and migration assumptions, reaching an estimate of 4,081,000 for the end of 2007, inclusive of East Jerusalem. Besides first deducting East Jerusalem because it was already accounted for in the Israeli data, we judged the PCBS projected estimate to be too high since it assumed a continuing immigration of Palestinians to the West Bank that did not materialize and was instead replaced by some out-migration (particularly of Christians). The same estimates were also debated by a group of American and Israeli writers who maintained that current population estimates from Palestinian sources were inflated by one and one-half million (Zimmerman et al. 2005; Zimmerman, Seid and Wise 2005; for a rebuttal, see DellaPergola 2007, 2011).

In November 2007, the PCBS undertook a new Census which resulted in a total population of 3,542,000 in the West Bank and Gaza (plus 225,000 in East Jerusalem, clearly an undercount because of the PCBS's limited access in the city). The new Census total not unexpectedly was more than 300,000 lower than the PCBS's own projected estimate. Our own independent assessment, after subtracting East Jerusalem (as noted, already allocated to the Israeli side), accounting for a negative net migration balance of Palestinians, and some further corrections, was about 3,500,000 toward the end of 2007, and 3,928,300 on January 1, 2013. Of these, 2,290,900 were in the West Bank and 1,637,400 in Gaza.

By our estimates, the 1997-2007 intercensal yearly average population increase among Palestinians in the aggregate of the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and Gaza would be 2.91%. This strictly matches a 2.91% yearly growth rate for Arabs in Israel over the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). In subsequent years, the growth rate of Israel's Arab population was slowly declining and in 2012 was 2.21% (2.32% among Moslems only), as against 1.9% for the Jewish population with immigration and 1.5% without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in the aggregate of the West Bank and Gaza was probably decreasing as well to a level very similar to that of Israel's Arabs—still significantly higher than among the Jewish population.

Our adjustments for the beginning of 2013 mostly rely on the rate of population growth observed among Muslims in Israel whose demographic characteristics are quite similar to those in the Palestinian Territory, though probably both fertility and mortality are slightly higher in Palestinian Territory than in Israel. Our estimates of the total Palestinian population are lower than some other independent evaluations (Population Reference Bureau 2012) since we assume that the original PCBS Census figures had been overestimated by counting some persons, students, and others who actually resided abroad for more than one year.

The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 302,000 at the beginning of 2013, and constituted 37% of Jerusalem's total population of 820,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Choshen et al. 2010, 2012; DellaPergola 2008). By adding the 1,648,600 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 3,928,300 Palestinian estimate for the West Bank and Gaza, a total of 5,576,900 obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and

70,000 in 2013, the world's twelfth largest Jewish community.

Our revised estimates for Northern Africa acknowledge the practical end of the Jewish presence in most countries and the ongoing reduction in the small Jewish communities remaining in **Morocco** and **Tunisia**, now assessed with a combined population of 3,300 (and 171 migrants to Israel in 2011-2012).

Virtually the entire Jewish population is estimated to have emigrated from **Ethiopia**. The question that remains open concerns the Falash Mura—a community of Jewish ancestry long ago baptized to Christianity. Upon migration to Israel, all Falash Mura undergo conversion to Judaism. Their quest for family reunification, and the personal chains involved with extended family patterns create a never-ending potential stream of often unskilled non-Jewish immigrants and is the subject of continuing public discussion. The last few thousand members of the enlarged community, which we very tentatively assessed at 2,000, are still waiting in Ethiopia hoping to migrate to Israel. The government of Israel decided to stop any further migration after the current contingent have been transferred, but it is hard to predict whether this will really be the last word in the saga of Ethiopian Jewry. Since 3,589 Falash Mura went to Israel in 2007, the flow decreased to 1,582 in 2008 and only 239 in 2009. It increased again to 1,655 in 2010, 2,666 in 2011, and 2,432 in 2012. In 2013 we allocate a nominal value of 100 to the remaining core Jewish presence in Ethiopia—as distinguished from Falash Mura.

Oceania

Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in Oceania. **Australia**'s 2011 Census reported a Jewish population of 97,336, versus 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2007, 2012; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2013) (**Table 14**). In view of general non-response to the question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000 in 2011, a ten year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2013). Accounting for such factors as continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, moderate but rising rates of intermarriage, and the community's rather old age composition (Eckstein 2009; Markus, Jacobs, and Aronov 2009; Markus et al. 2011), we increased the *core* Jewish population estimate to 112,500 in 2013. Australia has the world's ninth largest Jewish population. The Jewish population is highly concentrated in the two major metropolitan areas of Melbourne and Sydney which in 2011 comprised 85% of the total.

The 2006 Census of **New Zealand** suggested a Jewish population increase to 6,858, mostly following immigration from South Africa, the US, and the UK (Statistics New Zealand 2007; Morris 2011). We assessed the total at 7,500 in 2013. The 2011 population Census was canceled after a severe earthquake damaged the city of Christchurch.

the Jordan River. If only adding East Jerusalem's Arabs to the 3,928,300 who live in the West Bank and Gaza, a total of 4,230,300 would obtain.

In sum, in 2013 Jews (by the *core* definition) constituted 49.3% of the total population present on the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, including foreign workers, estimated at 12,209,800. The percent of Jews was 50.5% after subtracting foreign workers; 58.6% after subtracting the population of Gaza; 58.7% after subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights; 75.6% after subtracting the Arab population of the West Bank; and 78.6% if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem. If the *enlarged* rather than the *core* Jewish population is considered, each of these percentages would increase by 3-4%.

Other Asian Countries

In the rest of Asia, the Jewish population consisted mainly of the rapidly decreasing communities in the eight Asian FSU republics, the largest of which were **Azerbaijan** (8,800 Jews in 2013), **Uzbekistan** (4,000), **Kazakhstan** (3,200), and **Georgia** (2,900) (Tolts 2013). Continuing emigration was the main factor of change. In the 2009 Kazakhstan Census, 5,281 people appeared with "Judaism" as religion, most of them Kazakh (1,929) and Russian (1,452) ethnics. The more reliable total number of ethnic Jews was 3,578.

The largest Jewish population in a single country in Asia besides Israel was Iran. Our estimate of 10,100 Jews in **Iran** in 2013 reflects an effort to monitor intensive emigration to Israel, the US, and Europe since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Large scale emigration, selectively inclusive of younger adults, typically engenders significant aging among the extant remaining communities. The Jewish population in **India** is estimated at 5,000. Another reservoir for possible Jewish population increase is the local tribe known as *Benei Menashe* who claims ancient Jewish origins (Parfitt 2002).

Small Jewish populations, partly formed by temporary sojourners, exist in various South Asian and East Asian countries, namely in **China**. Rapid economic development and increasing relations with Israel render these countries receptive to a small but clearly increasing Jewish presence. We assess the number in China including Hong Kong and Macao, at 2,500, mostly recent arrivals. **Japan** has a more veteran Jewish presence estimated at 1,000.

Africa

The Jewish population in Africa was mostly concentrated in **South Africa** (94% of the continental total, **Appendix A**). According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population was 61,675 (Saks 2003). Factoring in the national white non-response rate of 14% led to a corrected estimate of 72,000. Allowing for a certain proportion of actual Jews among the higher self-reported numbers among South Africa's nonwhites (11,979 blacks, 1,287 coloreds, and 615 Indians, many of whom practice other religions), we assessed the total size of the Jewish community at 75,000 in 2001. After the major wave of departures just before the 1994 internal transferal of power, South African Jewry has been relatively stable (Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006). Following a continuation of moderate emigration to Israel (299 in 2011-2012) and other countries, we estimate South Africa's Jewish population at

Table 14 Jewish population in Australia, 2001-2011

Area	Census figures		Adjusted figures[a]		Percent of total		Difference	Percentage change
	2001	2011	2001	2011	2001	2011	2001-2011	2001-2011
Total	**83,993**	**97,336**	**100,792**	**112,034**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**11,242**	**11.2**
Victoria	39,190	44,540	47,028	51,266	46.7	45.8	4,238	9.0
New South Wales	34,597	38,002	41,516	43,740	41.2	39.0	2,224	5.4
Rest of Australia[b]	10,206	14,794	12,247	17,028	12.2	15.2	4,781	39.0

a Estimates based on proportionally adjusted results of the 2001 and 2011 Australian censuses.
b In 2011, includes portions of Victoria and New South Wales outside the main metropolitan areas of Melbourne and Sydney.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012; Graham 2012.

Table 15 World Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion (per 1,000 total population), 1/1/2013

Number of Jews in country	Jews per 1,000 total population					
	Total	0.0-0.9	1.0-4.9	5.0-9.9	10.0-19.9	20.0+
Number of countries						
Total[a]	**95**	**66**	**22**	**3**	**3**	**1**
100-999	38	35	2	-	1	-
1,000-4,999	23	21	2	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	8	4	4	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	9	3	5	1	-	-
25,000-49,999	5	2	3	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	3	1	2	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	7	-	4	2	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)						
Total[a]	**13,854,800**	**296,200**	**1,130,500**	**607,700**	**5,805,600**	**6,014,300**
100-999	11,700	10,000	1,100	-	600	-
1,000-4,999	56,700	51,300	5,400	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	61,400	32,200	29,200	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	129,000	39,400	72,400	17,200	-	-
25,000-49,999	176,000	68,100	107,900	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	230,200	95,200	135,000	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	1,750,000	-	779,500	590,500	380,000	-
1,000,000 or more	11,439,300	-	-	-	5,425,000	6,014,300
Jewish population distribution (percentage of world's Jews)						
Total[a]	**100.0**	**2.1**	**8.2**	**4.4**	**41.9**	**43.4**
100-999	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	-
1,000-4,999	0.4	0.4	0.0	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	0.4	0.2	0.2	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	0.9	0.3	0.5	0.1	-	-
25,000-49,999	1.3	0.5	0.8	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	1.7	0.7	1.0	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	12.6	-	5.6	4.3	2.7	-
1,000,000 or more	82.6	-	-	-	39.2	43.4

a Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 Jews, for a total of 500 Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding. Israel includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

Dispersion and Concentration

In 2013, 95 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 15**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews, three had 50,000 to 99,999, five had 25,000 to 49,999, nine had 10,000 to 24,999, eight had 5,000 to 9,999, 23 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 38 had less than 1,000. The 69 country communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for less than 1% of world Jewry.

In only five Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1,000 (0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (19.4 Jews per 1,000 inhabitants), the US (17.3), Canada (10.9), France (7.5), Australia (5.1), and Uruguay (5.1). The case of Israel is evidently different, with a *core* Jewish population that represents 75.6% of the total population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 79.6% of the total population (**Table 14**). In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population is decreasing.

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 26 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Four countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 total population: the US, France, Canada, and Australia. Four more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. One country has 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 total population: Uruguay. Ten more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Chile, Switzerland, Sweden, Belarus, and Panama. Six countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, Spain, and Iran.

Outlook

Beyond the many and arguable problems related to Jewish population definitions, and beyond imperfect data availability and accuracy, it is important to recognize that powerful and consistent trends constantly shape and reshape the demographic profile of world Jewry. It is important that we read current data in historical and comparative context and we detect the underlying drivers of Jewish population change within the broader context of global society. The recent momentum of Jewish population change in the US and in most other countries of the world—at best tending to zero growth—contrasts with that of Israel—characterized by the continuation of significant natural increase. While the transition of Israel to the status of largest Jewish population in the world is grounded on solid empirical foundations, the US remains a very large Jewish population—culturally and socioeconomically a powerful, creative, resilient, and influential center of Jewish life.

The US also constitutes a powerful source of new modes of Jewish population attachment—whether exclusive or shared with alternative identifications, whether through direct genealogical linkage or by voluntary association with others who are Jewish. These definition and identification patterns operate along with, and to some extent compete with, the more

conservative and mutually exclusive Jewish family and identification patterns that prevail in Israel. Both modes, however, generate widespread echoes across all other Jewish communities worldwide, including powerful mutual influences among the two major ones. The aggregate demographic weight of other Jewish communities globally—aside from their continuing cultural relevance—is gradually decreasing. The cultural and institutional projection and influence of the two major centers, Israel and the US, tends to become increasingly significant in other geographical areas of Jewish presence in a Jewish world that has become demographically more bi-polar, but also more individualistic and transnational in accordance with the globalization trends of the contemporary world.

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Appendix A. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2013

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b]	Jews per total 1000 population	Accuracy rating[c]		Population with Jewish parents[d]	Enlarged Jewish population[e]	Law of Return population[f]
WORLD	**7,056,611,000**	**13,854,800**	**1.96**			**15,772,800**	**18,197,400**	**21,649,500**
AMERICA TOTAL	**947,950,000**	**6,189,900**	**6.53**			**7,723,600**	**9,399,100**	**12,256,900**
Canada	34,900,000	380,000	10.89	B 2011	X	425,000	500,000	600,000
US	313,900,000	5,425,000	17.28	B 2011		6,800,000	8,300,000	11,000,000
Total North America[g]	**348,950,000**	**5,805,000**	**16.64**			**7,225,000**	**8,800,000**	**11,600,000**
Bahamas	400,000	300	0.75	D 1995		350	400	500
Costa Rica	4,500,000	2,500	0.56	C 1993		2,750	3,000	3,200
Cuba	11,200,000	500	0.04	C 2000		1,000	1,500	1,800
Dominican Republic	10,100,000	100	0.01	D 2000		150	200	300
El Salvador	6,300,000	100	0.02	C 1993		150	200	300
Guatemala	15,000,000	900	0.06	B 1999		1,000	1,200	1,400
Jamaica	2,700,000	200	0.07	C 2010		300	400	500
Mexico	116,100,000	40,000	0.34	B 2010	X	45,000	50,000	65,000
Netherlands Antilles	310,000	200	0.65	C 1998		300	400	600
Panama	3,600,000	10,000	2.78	C 2012	X	10,500	11,000	12,000
Puerto Rico	3,700,000	1,500	0.41	C 2000		1,700	2,000	2,500
Virgin Islands	110,000	500	4.55	C 2006		600	700	800
Other	27,980,000	100	0.00	D		200	300	500
Total Central Amer., Caribbean	**202,000,000**	**56,900**	**0.28**			**64,000**	**71,300**	**89,400**
Argentina	40,800,000	181,500	4.45	B 2003		270,000	330,000	350,000
Bolivia	10,800,000	500	0.05	C 1999		700	900	1,000
Brazil	194,300,000	95,200	0.49	B 2001		105,000	125,000	135,000
Chile	17,400,000	18,500	1.06	B 2002		21,000	26,000	30,000
Colombia	47,400,000	2,500	0.05	C 1996		2,800	3,000	3,500
Ecuador	14,900,000	600	0.04	B 2011		800	1,000	1,200
Paraguay	6,700,000	900	0.13	B 1997		1,200	1,500	1,800
Peru	30,100,000	1,900	0.06	C 1993		2,300	3,000	3,500
Suriname	500,000	200	0.40	D 2000		300	400	500
Uruguay	3,400,000	17,200	5.06	B 2006		20,000	25,000	27,500
Venezuela	29,700,000	9,000	0.30	C 2012		10,500	12,000	13,500
Total South America[g]	**397,000,000**	**328,000**	**0.83**			**434,600**	**527,800**	**567,500**
EUROPE TOTAL	**815,761,000**	**1,416,400**	**1.74**			**1,743,300**	**2,170,800**	**2,722,300**
Austria	8,500,000	9,000	1.06	B 2001		12,000	15,000	18,000
Belgium	11,100,000	30,000	2.70	C 2002		35,000	40,000	45,000
Bulgaria	7,200,000	2,000	0.28	C 2001		4,000	6,000	7,500
Cyprus	1,200,000	100	0.08	D 2012		150	200	250
Czech Republic	10,500,000	3,900	0.37	C 2001		5,000	6,500	8,000
Denmark	5,600,000	6,400	1.14	C 2001		7,500	8,500	9,500
Estonia	1,300,000	2,000	1.54	B 2012		2,600	3,400	5,000
Finland	5,400,000	1,300	0.24	B 2010		1,500	1,800	2,500
France[h]	63,640,000	478,000	7.51	B 2002		528,000	600,000	700,000
Germany	81,800,000	118,000	1.44	B 2017		150,000	250,000	270,000
Greece	10,800,000	4,500	0.42	B 2000		5,700	6,000	7,000
Hungary	9,900,000	48,000	4.85	C 2001		75,000	95,000	150,000
Ireland	4,700,000	1,200	0.26	B 2001		1,400	1,600	1,800
Italy	60,900,000	28,100	0.46	B 2011		33,000	37,000	40,000
Latvia	2,000,000	6,300	3.15	B 2012	X	8,500	12,500	18,000
Lithuania	3,200,000	3,400	1.06	B 2012	X	4,700	6,500	10,000
Luxembourg	500,000	600	1.20	B 2000		750	900	1,000
Malta	400,000	100	0.25	D 2012	X	150	200	250

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b]	Jews per total 1000 population	Accuracy rating[c]	Population with Jewish parents[d]	Enlarged Jewish population[e]	Law of Return population[f]
Netherlands	16,700,000	29,900	1.79	B 2000	43,000	50,000	55,000
Poland	38,200,000	3,200	0.08	C 2001	5,000	7,500	10,000
Portugal	10,600,000	600	0.06	C 2001	800	1,000	1,200
Romania	21,400,000	9,400	0.44	B 2001	13,500	17,000	20,000
Slovakia	5,400,000	2,600	0.48	C 2001	3,600	4,500	6,000
Slovenia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C 2003	150	200	300
Spain	46,200,000	12,000	0.26	D 2007	15,000	18,000	20,000
Sweden	9,500,000	15,000	1.58	C 2007	20,000	25,000	27,000
United Kingdom[i]	63,220,000	290,000	4.59	B 2011	320,000	360,000	400,000
Total European Union 27	**501,960,000**	**1,105,700**	**2.20**		**1,296,000**	**1,574,300**	**1,833,300**
Belarus	9,500,000	11,500	1.21	B 2009	17,500	23,000	36,000
Moldova	4,100,000	3,800	0.93	B 2004	5,700	7,500	11,400
Russian Federation[j]	143,200,000	190,000	1.33	C 2010	280,000	380,000	570,000
Ukraine	45,600,000	65,000	1.43	B 2011	97,000	130,000	210,000
Total FSU Republics	**202,400,000**	**270,300**	**1.34**		**400,200**	**540,500**	**827,400**
[Total FSU in Europe][k]	**208,900,000**	**282,000**	**1.35**		**416,000**	**562,900**	**860,400**
Gibraltar	31,000	600	19.35	B 2001	700	800	900
Norway	5,000,000	1,300	0.26	B 2010	1,500	2,000	2,500
Switzerland	8,000,000	17,400	2.18	B 2000	20,000	25,000	27,000
Total other West Europe[g]	**13,501,000**	**19,300**	**1.43**		**22,200**	**27,800**	**30,400**
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,800,000	500	0.13	C 2001	800	1,000	1,200
Croatia	4,300,000	1,700	0.40	C 2001	2,400	3,000	3,500
Macedonia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C 1996	150	200	250
Serbia	7,100,000	1,400	0.20	C 2001	2,100	2,800	3,000
Turkey[j]	74,900,000	17,300	0.23	B 2002	19,300	21,000	23,000
Other	5,700,000	100	0.02	D	150	200	250
Total Balkans	**97,900,000**	**21,100**	**0.22**		**24,900**	**28,200**	**31,200**
ASIA TOTAL	**4,183,900,000**	**6,053,700**	**1.45**		**6,096,900**	**6,396,000**	**6,415,800**
Israel[l]	7,640,600	5,680,400	743.45	A 2012	5,710,500	5,992,000	5,992,000
West Bank[m]	2,631,800	333,900	126.87	B 2012	337,000	340,900	340,900
Gaza	1,637,400	0	0.00	A 2012	0	0	0
Total Israel and Palestine[n]	**11,909,800**	**6,014,300**	**504.99**		**6,047,500**	**6,332,900**	**6,332,900**
Azerbaijan	9,300,000	8,800	0.95	B 2009	10,500	16,000	24,000
Georgia	4,500,000	2,900	0.64	B 2002	4,500	5,800	8,700
Kazakhstan	16,800,000	3,200	0.19	B 2009	4,800	6,400	9,600
Kyrgyzstan	5,700,000	500	0.09	B 2009	750	1,000	1,500
Turkmenistan	5,200,000	200	0.04	D 1989	250	300	500
Uzbekistan	29,800,000	4,000	0.13	D 1989	6,000	8,000	10,000
Total FSU in Asia[g]	**81,700,000**	**19,600**	**0.24**		**26,800**	**37,500**	**54,300**
China[n]	1,350,400,000	2,500	0.00	D 2010	2,700	3,000	3,300
India	1,259,700,000	5,000	0.00	B 1996	6,000	7,000	8,000
Iran	78,900,000	10,100	0.13	D 1986	11,000	12,000	13,000
Japan	127,600,000	1,000	0.01	D 1993	1,200	1,400	1,600
Korea, South	48,900,000	100	0.00	C 1998	150	200	250
Philippines	96,200,000	100	0.00	D 2000	150	200	250
Singapore	5,300,000	300	0.06	C 1990	400	500	600
Syria	22,500,000	100	0.00	C 1995	150	200	250
Taiwan	23,300,000	100	0.00	D 2000	150	200	250
Thailand	69,900,000	200	0.00	D 1998	250	300	350
Yemen	25,600,000	200	0.01	C 1995	250	300	350
Other	981,990,200	100	0.00	D	200	300	400
Total other Asia	**4,090,290,200**	**19,800**	**0.00**		**22,600**	**25,600**	**28,600**

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b]	Jews per total 1000 population	Accuracy rating[c]	Population with Jewish parents[d]	Enlarged Jewish population[e]	Law of Return population[f]
AFRICA TOTAL	**1,072,000,000**	**74,700**	**0.07**		**80,900**	**87,300**	**94,200**
Egypt	82,300,000	100	0.00	C 2008	150	200	300
Ethiopia	87,000,000	100	0.00	C 2008	500	1,000	2,000
Morocco	32,600,000	2,400	0.07	C 2006	2,500	2,700	2,900
Tunisia	10,800,000	900	0.08	C 2008	950	1,000	1,100
Total Northern Africa[g]	**300,100,000**	**3,500**	**0.01**		**4,100**	**4,900**	**6,300**
Botswana	1,900,000	100	0.05	C 1993	150	200	250
Congo D.R.	69,100,000	100	0.00	C 1993	150	200	250
Kenya	43,000,000	300	0.01	C 1990	500	700	800
Namibia	2,400,000	100	0.04	C 1993	150	200	250
Nigeria	170,100,000	100	0.00	D 2000	150	200	250
South Africa	51,100,000	70,000	1.37	B 2001	75,000	80,000	85,000
Zimbabwe	12,600,000	400	0.03	B 2001	500	600	700
Other	421,700,000	100	0.00	D X	200	300	400
Total Sub-Saharan Africa[p]	**771,900,000**	**71,200**	**0.09**		**76,800**	**82,400**	**87,900**
OCEANIA TOTAL	**37,000,000**	**120,100**	**3.25**		**128,100**	**144,200**	**160,300**
Australia	22,000,000	112,500	5.11	B 2011	120,000	135,000	150,000
New Zealand	4,400,000	7,500	1.70	B 2006	8,000	9,000	10,000
Other	10,600,000	100	0.01	D	100	200	300

a Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2013). Mid-year 2012 estimates.

b Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; *and* do not have another religion. Also includes persons with Jewish parents who claim no current religious or ethnic identity.

c A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends. D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. In categories A), B), and C), the year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2013 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

d Sum of (a) core Jewish population and (b) all other not currently Jewish persons with a Jewish parent.

e Sum of (a) core Jewish population, (b) all other not currently Jewish persons with a Jewish parent, and (c) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).

f Sum of Jews, children, and grandchildren of Jews, and the respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identity.

g Including countries not listed separately.

h Including Monaco.

i Including Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

j Including Asian regions.

k Including Baltic countries already included above in EU.

l The total legal population of the State of Israel on 1/1/2013, including Jews (enlarged definition) in East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, and Arabs and other non-Jews in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but not in the West Bank and Gaza, and excluding foreign workers and refugees, was 7,981,500. Jews constituted 753.5 per 1,000 of this total.

m Total Palestinian population on 1/1/2013 in the West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,290,900; Gaza: 1,637,400; Total: 3,928,300 (our revised estimate). For the West Bank, 333,900 Jews and 7,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households were added, for a total of 340,900 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 2,631,800 includes Palestinian, Jewish and other residents.

n The total legal population on 1/1/2013 of the State of Israel plus the total population of the Palestinian Territory, excluding foreign workers and refugees, was 11,909,800. Jews constituted 504.99 per 1,000 of this total.

o Including Hong Kong and Macao.

p Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa.

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