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Planning for Jewish communities

Jews and Jewry in contemporary Hungary: results of a sociological survey

Edited by András Kovács

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tel +44 (0)20 7935 8266 **fax** +44 (0)20 7935 3252 **e-mail** jpr@jpr.org.uk **website** www.jpr.org.uk
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The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research** (JPR) is an independent think-tank that informs and influences policy, opinion and decision-making on social, political and cultural issues affecting Jewish life.

András Kovács is Professor in the National Studies Program at Central European University, Budapest, and Senior Researcher at the Institute for Ethnic and Minority Studies at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

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Planning for Jewish communities includes surveys and research into the infrastructure of organized Jewish communities, helping them develop policy recommendations and strategies for change in the welfare, educational and social sectors.

Foreword

This report on contemporary Hungarian Jewry, which comes on the sixtieth anniversary of the Holocaust in Hungary, represents both a continuation of and a new phase in the work of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) on diaspora Jewish communities. Although JPR's most recent work in its Planning for Jewish Communities programme has concentrated on the United Kingdom, particularly the Long-term Planning for the British Jewish Community (LTP) project, it has taken, and continues to take, a keen interest in Jewish communities abroad, especially those outside North America. Over the past decade, JPR has published the results of a survey of Jews in the 'new' South Africa, essays on new Jewish identities and the politics of cultural revival among Jews in Europe, a pilot study on European Jewish cultural production and consumption, as well as short works on the development of Jewish museums in Europe.

In addition to its policy reports, JPR produces an academic journal, *Patterns of Prejudice* (published by Routledge), many of whose articles deal with aspects of prejudice and xenophobia in Europe in the present and in the recent past. JPR also maintains a website called *Antisemitism and Xenophobia Today* (www.axt.org.uk) that monitors hatred, xenophobia and prejudice across Europe and provides links to other websites that deal with similar issues. JPR also organizes public lectures, seminars and conferences on related issues and its staff participates in parallel meetings throughout Europe.

In light of all this activity, the current report should not be viewed in isolation; it forms part of a continuing programme of work in which JPR has been engaged since its inception as an international think-tank. Moreover, there has been a rebirth of new European Jewish identities that differ from those in Israel and North America in several important ways, and indeed differ considerably from older European Jewish identities. This and a discernible rise in levels of antisemitism in many European states reinforce JPR's intention in the medium term to lead the way in policy research for Jewish communities in Europe.

The present report discusses the results of a sample survey of contemporary Hungarian Jewry conducted by the Institute for Minority Studies at Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest. The research was initiated and directed by Professor András Kovács and carried out by a research group (Róbert Angelusz, János Ladányi and Róbert Tardos). The study examined a wide variety of demographic, social and cultural issues, including Jewish identity and practices, as well as respondents' ideological, social and economic attitudes.

Understanding generational changes in the social position of Hungarian Jews was among the survey's main research goals, as was determining the current social and economic position of Jews within Hungarian society. Monitoring the attitudes of contemporary Hungarian Jews concerning their own Jewish origins, as well as Jews and Judaism in general, constituted another goal. Yet another objective was to ascertain the extent to which Hungary's Jews involve themselves in organized Jewish community life. Finally, the survey aimed to look at how Hungarian Jewry views antisemitism and its own relations with the non-Jewish population as well as attitudes towards Israel and the impact of the Holocaust.

The results of the survey have already been published in Hungary.[1] The English version published here has been edited, mainly by adding background information to make the findings more comprehensible and relevant to a wider, non-Hungarian, readership.

For some people who take an interest in Jewish communities, there appears to be a fixation with numbers. How many Jews are there? Or how many 'real' Jews are there? These are questions that are at best difficult, and usually impossible, to answer for a multiplicity of reasons. Are people Jewish only on the basis of their religious beliefs or practices? Or are they less Jewish if the extent of their observance of Jewish customs and traditions is minimal and their religious beliefs nil, even though their parents and all

1 The report was published in Hungarian as András Kovács (ed.), *Zsidók és zsidóság a mai Magyarországon. Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei* (Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary. Results of a Sociological Survey) (Budapest: Szombat 2002). In addition, several thematic analyses by five authors were published in András Kovács (ed.), *Zsidók és zsidóság a mai Magyarországon* (Budapest: Múlt és Jövõ 2003).

four grandparents were Jewish? Can people be Jewish today simply because they are married to a Jewish person and follow Jewish custom? Do people cease to be Jewish when they lose contact with Jewish institutions and with other Jewish people? Can people be Jews just because they consider or *feel* themselves to be Jewish? In one form or another, questions such as these concern every Jewish community in the modern world and they are particularly pertinent with regard to the Jews of Hungary.

Even before the Nazis' decimation of Hungarian Jewry outside Budapest and the ghettoization of the Jews of Budapest in 1944, concerns over identity such as these were to the fore. The issues of deviation from religious orthodoxy and assimilation were familiar long before the Nazi invasion and the Communist takeover that succeeded it. The British historical geographer Tim Cole, in his account of the making of the Jewish ghetto in Budapest in the spring and summer of 1944, notes that the issue of exterminating the 'Jew' was preceded by the need to define who was and was not a 'Jew', and that

> the problematic and contested nature of defining the 'Jew' came in particular because such definition involved an attempt to draw (imaginary) boundaries between the 'Jew' and the 'non-Jew' in Hungary.[2]

Cole notes that, while the word 'Jew' was used unambiguously in the so-called First Anti-Jewish Law of 1938, there was no attempt at a systematic definition of who the 'Jew' was, the legislation assuming that the 'Jew' was a member of the 'Israelite faith'. Drawing boundaries between 'Jews' and 'non-Jews' involved the implementation of a series of categories of Jews who were exempt under the legislation: converts to Christianity and those who had distinguished themselves in military service during the Great War. Further legislation in the following year went on to include as 'Jews' people with at least one parent or two grandparents of the 'Israelite faith'. This law also broadened the definition of those exempted from having to be 'Jewish' to include people who had distinguished themselves in the political, academic, religious (Christian) and sporting arenas. Further legislation in 1941 was more explicit in the determination of 'Jewishness' by grandparentage in that it specified the grandparent's status at birth.

All of these laws were of practical significance when, in 1944, decisions were taken to create Jewish areas in Budapest, not in the form of a ghetto that concentrated all the city's 'Jews' geographically into a single area but by designating specific buildings in specific streets in specific parts of the city as being either 'Jewish' or 'non-Jewish'. This was enacted by means of large population exchanges within the city. There are serious and problematic implications of these historical events for Jews in contemporary Hungary. For instance, when some researchers state that there are confused Jewish identities in modern Hungary or that the degree of Jewishness and Jewish identity can be determined on the basis of the origin of parents and grandparents, it is important to realize that these considerations are not latter-day sociological inventions. They are rooted in both past and present realities in which the divide between 'Jew' and 'non-Jew' is not a solid wall but one that is riddled with holes and gaps, if it exists at all.

There are practical implications, too. As Leonard Mars notes, to identify oneself publicly as a Jew in Hungary today may lead, paradoxically, to being granted access to educational resources from abroad, so that people with 'Jewish family connections' now seek admission to Jewish schools because of a perception of better educational opportunities.[3] Being 'Jewish' can offer other benefits as well, such as, for older people, a supplement to the state pension or sheltered accommodation. And what goes for Hungary goes for many other countries in East and Central Europe and that, in turn, is what makes this report so interesting, relevant and timely.

Stanley Waterman
Director of Research
Institute for Jewish Policy Research

2 Tim Cole, *Holocaust City: The Making of a Jewish Ghetto* (New York: Routledge 2003).

3 Leonard Mars, 'Cultural aid and Jewish identity in post-Communist Hungary', *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2000, 85–96 (89). Mars's conclusions are based on a small number of interviews and may be difficult to substantiate. Moreover, state compensation is only one of several schemes directed at members of various minority groups.

Editor's introduction

After the political emancipation of the Jews in Hungary in 1867, they became one of the most flourishing communities in Europe. Most of the estimated 900,000 Jews living in the Hungarian kingdom before the First World War followed the pattern of 'western' Jewry with regard to integration, economic and social mobility, and political orientation. This state of affairs was dramatically shattered by the anti-Jewish legislation of the 1930s and, finally, by the Holocaust.

The Holocaust annihilated the majority of Hungarian Jews. Depending on the method of calculation, it is estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 Hungarian Jews perished in the territory that is present-day Hungary. Scholars agree that, in 1941, when the last census to include religion and ethnic origins was carried out, 400,000 persons of the Jewish religion and 50,000–90,000 Christians of Jewish origin were living in Hungary as defined by its post-Second World War boundaries. The number of survivors is estimated to have been between 190,000 and 260,000.[1]

Due to the almost complete annihilation of provincial Jewry, the majority of the survivors, 144,000 persons, lived in Budapest. The Jewish community in most provincial towns was reduced to a handful of survivors; in 1949, 96,537 Jews lived in Budapest, comprising 9.1 per cent of the city's population. Of these, it is estimated that one-third were not Jewish by religion. There was a subsequent decrease due to emigration, mixed marriages and low birth-rates that reflected not only the disappearance or ageing of spouses, but also the material and psychological consequences of persecution. During two major periods of emigration (1945–8 and 1956–7) between 60,000 and 75,000 Jews left the country, effectively strengthening the trend towards assimilation among those remaining, as did the uneven age and gender distribution that resulted from the selective losses, forcing many Jews, especially women, to marry non-Jews. Consequently, the number of people belonging to the Jewish community declined but the number of those who had Jews in their family grew. According to a sample survey carried out in 1999, 2 per cent of Hungary's adult population of around 8 million people (aged eighteen or older) claimed to have a Jewish parent or grandparent.

The social structure of the surviving Jewry was greatly altered. While the more religious and traditional provincial Jews had been almost wiped out (or soon emigrated), the majority of the Jews of Budapest—especially those of the more urbanized, assimilated middle class—survived and found themselves in a favourable position in post-war Hungary relative to the general population. This was a result of their better education, higher qualifications and traditionally higher propensity for mobility; furthermore, following their years of persecution, they were perceived as being 'reliable' in terms of their political sympathies. For political reasons, opportunities opened up for them to pursue careers for which they were qualified but which had been unavailable to them before the war. Several Jews entered the re-organized administration, public services, political institutions and law-enforcement agencies.

Due to the role of the Soviet army in the liberation of the Budapest ghetto and the concentration camps, and the public commitment to end discrimination, some Jews became loyal Communists, joining the party and assuming middle- and high-ranking positions before the 1956 revolution. Moreover, they rejected their former identities, cultural traditions and community ties. At the same time, the Jewish middle class and *petite bourgeoisie* became victims of the government's anti-religious and anti-bourgeois measures that followed the Communist takeover. Jews were also threatened in anti-Zionist campaigns.

The reconstruction of religious and community life started soon after the war with the re-establishment of 258 communities, most of which were Neolog (Conservative or moderate Reform). However,

1 The territory of Hungary between 1938 and 1945 and in the post-war period was not identical. As a consequence of the revision of the post-First World War peace treaties, between 1938 and 1941 Hungary regained a portion of the territory of the pre-First World War Hungarian kingdom (Southern Slovakia, Northern Transylvania, Carpatho-Ruthenia, Northern Vojvodina) that included a substantial Jewish population. This population almost wholly perished in the Holocaust. If we added the number of victims from these territories to the number of those in pre-war Hungary, then the total number of Hungarian Holocaust victims would be around 500,000.

because of internal migration, emigration and political change, barely more than a quarter of these continued into the 1950s, and they were mostly in larger towns. In 1950 the institutions, organizations and associations of the Orthodox and Neolog branches of the Jewish community were forced to merge under the leadership of the National Office of Hungarian Israelites and the National Representative Organization of the Hungarian Israelites. This brought about the disappearance of an independent Orthodox community. These organizations functioned strictly as religious associations within limits set by the state. They were loyal to the regime to the point of denouncing Zionism and distancing themselves from Israel. Jewish life was restricted to religious observance and even this was increasingly difficult; moreover, all forms of secular community life were suppressed. However, throughout this period, the community was permitted to run a hospital, an orphanage and a care home for older people and to provide kosher food products.

The seventeen Jewish primary schools, seven secondary schools and a teachers' training college that had survived the war were nationalized. A single secondary school and the National Rabbinical Seminary both continued to function under the supervision of the Communist-controlled State Office for Religious Affairs. The Seminary, with a substantial library, was the only institution of its kind in Communist Eastern Europe, and attracted students from neighbouring countries as well, though the numbers of students and teachers were very low. The Jewish secondary school was increasingly poorly attended—there were only ten students in 1976—but this trend changed at the beginning of the 1980s.

Following the fall of the Communist regime in 1989 attempts to develop particularist identities were no longer suppressed and people could choose freely among the emerging identity options. The number of Jews who started to take an interest in Jewish religion, traditions and culture increased, and several cultural, religious and Zionist organizations were either established or revived. Jewish publications also proliferated and Jewish education expanded. Today there are four Jewish primary and secondary schools in Budapest with approximately 1,200 students. Despite this, only a small number of Jews have become more observant. In 1992 community leaders estimated that only around a quarter to a fifth of Hungarian Jewry was associated with communal institutions.

After France, Russia and the Ukraine, present-day Hungary has the largest Jewish population in

Figure 1: Officially organized Jewish religious communities in contemporary Hungary



continental Europe. How will this sizeable community develop in the future? Is it a vanishing diaspora community or could it be the basis of an effective identity revival? Can it enjoy a peaceful and harmonious co-existence with the ambient majority or will the continuing existence of a Jewish subgroup within Hungarian society be a source of permanent conflict? What are the content and forms of expression of Jewish identities in contemporary Hungary? Unfortunately, our knowledge of Hungarian Jews at the time of the fall of the Communist system was not sufficient to answer these and many other substantial questions on the economic and social status of Jews in Hungary as well as on their social and political attitudes and opinions. The most recent reliable demographic data on Hungarian Jews were provided by the 1945–6 registry of survivors compiled by the Statistical Office of the Hungarian branch of the World Jewish Congress and by the 1949 Census, which contained a question on religion. In the fifty years following, no systematic investigations into the Hungarian Jewish population were carried out. Our survey is the first to fill this gap.

Between March and November 1999, a research group at the Institute for Minority Studies of the Institute of Sociology at Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest conducted a questionnaire-based sociological sample survey of contemporary Hungarian Jewry. The study investigated demographic data, social and cultural characteristics, religion and Jewish ancestry as well as the ideological, social and economic attitudes of the interviewees.

This investigation had several concrete goals. The first was to gain insight into the changes in the social position of Hungarian Jewry over several generations, and to determine as closely as possible the social and economic position of Jews within Hungarian society at large. To do this, the survey gathered key demographic and social data spanning four generations: the people we interviewed, their parents and grandparents, and their children.

Another important goal was to monitor the attitudes of today's Hungarian Jews, both towards their own Jewish origins and towards Jews and Judaism in general. In doing so, it was possible to compare the attitudes of today's Jews regarding their Jewishness with those of previous generations. We also examined opinions on assimilation, integration and renewal. The survey also sought to determine the degree to which Jews in Hungary participated in organized Jewish community life, as well as the extent of their knowledge and opinions relating to Hungarian Jewish organizations and cultural institutions.

Separate questions examined respondents' evaluations of the current situation of Jews in Hungarian society, their relations with the non-Jewish population, their opinions regarding antisemitism in Hungary after 1989, and their overall political, economic and social attitudes. Finally, the survey looked at attitudes toward the state of Israel and at personal assessments of the impact of the Holocaust.

A total of 2,015 individuals aged eighteen and over were interviewed. One of the greatest problems of the survey was in generalizing from the data collected, especially because the sample was unlikely to be fully representative. Because of the sampling method used, the sample population tended to be 'closer' or more attached to Judaism than the wider Hungarian Jewish population.[2] Nonetheless, each characteristic subgroup of the Hungarian Jewish community is represented in the sample, though probably not in the proportion that corresponds to their numbers in reality.

I would like to thank Professor Barry Kosmin of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, London, Professor Zvi Gitelman of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Professor Viktor Karády of the Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris, and Dr David Singer of the American Jewish Committee for their invaluable help in bringing the survey to fruition.

Róbert Angelusz, András Kovács, János Ladányi and Róbert Tardos carried out the data analysis; and Tamás Stark made the demographic calculations. Sampling, interviewing and data processing were carried out under the guidance of Gabriella Borsós and Zoltán Szendrö. I am indebted to Professor Stanley Waterman, Szilvia Balassa, Ruth E. Gruber and Antónia Szenthe for their contributions to the English version of this report.

2 The problems of the sampling method are discussed in Appendix 1

Finally, the survey was financed by the American Jewish Committee, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Claims Conference, the Jewish Agency, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary (MAZSIHISZ), the Hungarian Jewish Heritage Public Foundation and the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation.

András Kovács
Budapest

1 Demographic characteristics of Hungarian Jews

Owing to the sampling methods used (see Appendix 1), the survey data on the demographic make-up of the Jewish population need to be analysed with care. Nonetheless, the authors of the survey are confident that the composition of the sample of 2,015 individuals aged eighteen and over adequately reflects the current demographic situation, as evidenced by the general age-profile.

Age distribution

Table 1 shows that the age distribution of the sample was uneven. In particular, there are two points where the age structure of the sample population differed from that of the general Hungarian population. The 56–65 age cohort among the Jewish population was smaller than its adjacent cohorts (46–55 and 66–75). This represents the 'war-time generation', born between 1934 and 1943, which was likely to have been less numerous from the outset, due both to the uncertainty immediately preceding the Second World War and to the situation during the war.[1] This generation was also seriously affected by emigration in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, as people in their twenties constituted the largest number of emigrants.

In addition, the high proportion of Jewish older people, particularly those aged over 75—compared with the Hungarian population in general—is also significant. This is due not only to sampling limitations but also to a relatively high Jewish life expectancy compared with the rest of the population. This finding is reinforced by mortality statistics from Budapest for both males and females. It was estimated that the life expectancy of the capital's Jewish male population in 1999 was 78, compared with 68 for Budapest males in general; the life expectancy of Jewish women was 82, compared with 77 for the whole of the capital's female population. In addition, the low proportion in the 26–35 age cohort is a direct reflection of the diminished 56–65 cohort.

Table 1: Age distribution of the sample population compared with the general Hungarian population, by gender (%)

Age group	Jewish sample (N=2,015)	Hungarian population (1999)	Male Jews (N=956)	Hungarian males (1999)	Female Jews (N=1,059)	Hungarian females (1999)
18–25	13	17	14	18	12	15
26–35	9	17	10	19	8	16
36–45	12	18	13	19	11	17
46–55	19	18	18	18	19	17
56–65	13	13	12	13	14	14
66–75	18	11	18	9	17	13
76 and over	17	6	16	4	19	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source for data on the general Hungarian population (N = 7,953,114): *Demográfiai Évkönyv. Magyarország népesedése, 1999* (The Demographic Yearbook. The Population of Hungary, 1999) (Budapest: KSH 2000), 10–15

1 Between 1931 and 1937 the number of Jewish births in Budapest was 1,687 annually, but in the period between 1939 and 1943 it was only 1,000; see Viktor Karády, *Túlélök és újrakezdök* (Survivors and New Beginnings) (Budapest: Múlt és Jövö 2003), 74.

Gender distribution

Among the survey sample, the ratio of males to females was 47:53, and this gender distribution corresponds to that of the Hungarian population in general. The greater proportion of females in the older age groups is also seen in the Hungarian population.

Marital status

Tables 2a and 2b show that the proportion of married people in the Jewish population was lower than that of the Hungarian population as a whole. There was also a higher proportion of divorced Jews compared with the general population. The proportion of the population widowed was also higher among Jews, due in large part to the relatively high number of elderly Jewish women.

Analysis of marital status by gender indicates that the percentage of divorced women among the Jewish population was much higher than that of divorced men. It was also higher than that of divorced women in the total Hungarian population. However, the data suggest that the growing number of cohabiting Jews corresponds well with the overall trends seen in the younger and better-educated non-Jewish population, with cohabiting couples outnumbering married couples among those under thirty.

Table 2a: Jewish marital status, by gender and age group (%)

Gender and age group	N	Single	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	Widowed	Total
Male	952	20	56	8	7	9	100
Female	1,052	17	37	6	17	23	100
Full sample	2,004	19	45	7	12	16	100
18–25	249	85	4	11	–	–	100
26–35	176	36	37	19	8	–	100
36–45	241	12	58	10	19	1	100
46–55	374	6	63	6	22	3	100
56–65	260	7	64	4	16	9	100
66–75	360	5	50	4	13	28	100
76+	344	2	35	2	6	55	100

Table 2b: Marital status of the Hungarian population, by gender and age group (%)

Gender and age group	Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Total
Male	29	59	8	4	100
Female	18	52	11	19	100
Full sample	23	55	10	12	100
18–25	83	16	1	–	100
26–35	30	60	9	1	100
36–45	11	71	16	2	100
46–55	6	71	16	7	100
56–65	4	68	11	17	100
66–75	3	54	7	36	100
76+	4	29	3	64	100

Source: *Demográfiai Évkönyv. Magyarország népesedése, 1999* (The Demographic Yearbook. The Population of Hungary, 1999) (Budapest: KSH 2000), 36

Children

In general, the data indicate that the average number of children per household among Jews was similar to that of the Hungarian population at large. The mean number of children per sample family was 1.20. Some 29 per cent of households had no children; most of these comprised members of the younger generation. Thirty per cent of respondents had one child, 31 per cent had two children and 7 per cent had three or more children.[2] The low number of children is most likely connected to the practice of marrying relatively late in life and to the high educational status of the sample population (discussed below), as well as to the growth in popularity of cohabitation and the high divorce rate. These Jewish population trends are reflected in trends observed among the better-educated sectors of the general Hungarian population.

However, one observation in particular does seem to differentiate the Jewish population from the general population. The number of children of men aged over forty in the sample was much higher than that of women aged over forty. One possible explanation for this is that men remarry after divorce more frequently than women, and tend to have children from second (or later) marriages.

2 These figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number. The 2001 Census found that the proportion of families without children in the Hungarian population was 23 per cent; families with one child represented 34 per cent of the population, those with two children 34 per cent and those with three or more children just 8 per cent (*Census 2001* (Budapest: KSH 2001), 51).

2 Geographical distribution

One of the most striking features of the Jewish population in Hungary is its high degree of spatial concentration. Nearly 90 per cent were currently living in Budapest (see Figure 2), principally due to the pattern of destruction during the Second World War. Before the Holocaust, most Hungarian Jews lived in the provinces, with only between 25 and 30 per cent in Budapest. The vast majority of Hungary's provincial Jewish population was annihilated, but about two-thirds of the Jews of Budapest survived. Table 3 shows the marked residential concentration of Jews in Budapest over the past fifty years. Whereas some 87 per cent of respondents lived in Budapest, only 69 per cent were born there.

Table 4 shows that the Jews of Budapest were concentrated in certain districts of the city. It also provides a clear indication of the emerging residential patterns and trends, particularly among the younger groups. For example, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of Jews living in district 2, a so-called 'green belt' district on the hilly Buda side of the city, where residence implies higher social status. This district was popular among Jews before 1945 and its popularity is apparently growing again among younger Jews. However, there was no such increase in districts 11 and 12, which historically enjoyed a similar ecological and social status as district 2 but were never as popular among Budapest's Jews. In the rundown, inner-city districts 6, 7 and 8, the proportion of Jews in the population decreased with age. In district 13, which is popular with Jews, the trend was unclear. The proportion of middle-aged people (the 35–55 cohort) was highest there, but it decreased markedly in the younger age groups.

Figure 2: Residential distribution of Jews in Hungary



Table 3: Residential location of the sample, their fathers and their grandfathers (%)

Location	Respondents' place of birth	Respondents' current residence	Father's place of longest residence	Grandfather 's place of longest residence
Budapest	69	87	71	39
Other urban areas	20	11	19	29
Rural areas	7	2	7	15
Abroad*	4	–	3	7
Missing	–	–	–	10
Total	100	100	100	100
N	2,012	2,015	2,003	1,822

* In the case of the parents and grandparents, 'abroad' is generally taken to mean territories that once belonged to Hungary but that are no longer part of it.

It is striking that the proportion of the Jewish population living in the outlying districts of Budapest (districts 16, 19, 20, 22) was much higher among younger people than those born before 1945. This difference was even greater in the case of the children of respondents.[3] Table 4 also shows that the younger generation was significantly overrepresented in suburban areas, both those beyond of the administrative borders of the capital and those within Budapest itself.

Table 4: Residential location of respondents and their children in Budapest (%)

District	Respondents born pre-1945	Respondents born post-1945	Children of all respondents
1	3.2	3.5	3.7
2	11.7	12.7	14.1
3	6.7	6.0	7.6
4	2.4	2.4	5.0
5	9.5	7.6	3.1
6	4.5	4.7	3.5
7	7.9	7.6	6.4
8	4.0	4.0	3.7
9	3.6	3.2	3.9
10	2.1	1.5	1.4
11	7.4	6.6	8.8
12	4.7	5.2	5.2
13	17.3	18.5	13.1
14	8.7	8.3	9.9
15	2.2	2.0	3.2
16	0.8	1.7	2.4
17	0.5	0.5	0.8
18	1.2	1.2	1.0
19	0.4	1.0	1.1
20	0.1	0.4	0.7
21	0.5	0.6	0.5
22	0.4	0.7	0.8
23	0.1	0.1	0.0
Total	100	100	100
N	758	1,565	829
Conurbation (N)	30	47	97
Countryside (N)	117	203	192

Figure 3: Jewish residents of administrative districts of Budapest (% of total Budapest Jewish population)



Surprisingly, among the children's generation, there was an increase in the proportion of those living outside Budapest (as distinct from those living in the greater Budapest conurbation), a feature that was not apparent among the respondents, whether they were born before or after 1945. As the temporary addresses of those living in student residences or on army service have not been included in the data, the higher rate of the children currently living outside Budapest suggests a slight increase in the proportion of the Jewish population in the countryside. However, closer analysis of the data also shows that these people were living in provincial urban or suburban communities rather than in strictly rural areas.

3 'Children' here refers to all the children of the respondents: i.e. this rate was higher among the children of respondents than among the respondents. We asked respondents where their children lived and how old they were. All the statements about 'children' are based on these data.

Another phenomenon should be noted: the number of children of Jewish families who were living permanently outside Hungary was remarkably high. Among all the children of all the respondents, 1 in 9 lived permanently outside Hungary.[4] Furthermore, this proportion was much higher than that of the non-Jewish population in the same age groups, implying that many more of the respondents' children have emigrated from Hungary than have those in the Hungarian population at large.

4 We do not have data on this for previous generations because the sample included only the population living in Hungary permanently.

3 Socio-economic indicators

Education

In terms of educational achievements and professional choices,[5] the survey data show that the profile of Hungarian Jewry differs distinctly from that of the Hungarian population as a whole. Since almost 90 per cent of Hungary's Jews live in Budapest, the city's Jewish population was compared with the population of Budapest as a whole.

Figure 4 shows that Hungarian Jews had a much higher level of educational attainment than the ambient population. The percentage of those with academic (college and university) degrees, especially university diplomas, was much higher than that of the population of the capital in general. Table 5 shows that, in general terms, the younger the age cohort, the higher the level of educational

Figure 4: Highest educational level attained by the Jewish population (N = 1,826) and the population of Budapest (N = 520)



Source for the Budapest data: National surveys of MTA-ELTE Kommunikacioelmeleti Kutatocsoport (Research Group for Communication Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Loránd Eötvös University) in October 1998 and in February 2000

5 In Hungary, primary education lasts for eight years and is divided into two stages of four years each. Secondary education is provided in either academic (*gimnázium*) or vocational secondary schools (*szakközépiskola*). Secondary schools often offer more than one programme (e.g. academic and vocational courses or academic four- or six-year courses). The typical institution offering general education and a Secondary School Leaving Certificate is the *gimnázium*, which may be attended for four, five (in the case of bilingual secondary schools), six or eight years. The *szakközépiskola* and vocational schools (*szakiskola*) train students in the fields of humanities, technical and agricultural sciences and services. The *szakközépiskola* provide a general education during the first four years and award the Secondary School Leaving Certificate; the vocational education generally begins after the fourth year, although some introductory vocational subjects may be taught earlier. The length of vocational courses may vary from one to three years or more. The vocational schools (*szakiskola*) do not award the Secondary School Leaving Certificate and the level of the vocational qualification is lower than that in the *szakközépiskola*. As for higher education, Hungary has a dual system of colleges and universities. Some colleges are associated with universities and operate as faculties of the universities. A university can also offer college-level courses. The duration of training at college level is a minimum of three years and a maximum of four years; at university level it is a minimum of four years and a maximum of five years (with the exception of medical universities where it is six years). Both colleges and universities grant the *Föiskolai Oklevél* (college-level degree) and universities grant the *Egyetemi Oklevél* (university-level degree). Universities organize three-year doctoral programmes, specialized further education courses (with a normal duration of one to three years) and various continuing education courses. See www.unesco.org/iau/cd-data/hu.rtf (viewed 28 January 2004).

Table 5: Highest educational level attained by the Jewish population, by age cohort (%) (N = 2,009)

Educational level	18–34	35–54	55–69	70+
Primary school	4	1	7	28
Vocational school (*szakiskola*)	5	3	5	5
Secondary school (*gimnázium*)	61	24	27	28
College degree	14	25	18	13
University degree	16	47	43	26
Total	100	100	100	100
N	412	610	409	578

achievement, although there has been a tendency among some young entrepreneurs to forego formal higher education.

The education level was also relatively high among respondents who were economically inactive (over two-fifths had at least higher education degrees). Among the economically active Jewish population, this proportion was even higher, at more than two-thirds. At the same time the percentage of those with fewer educational qualifications was correspondingly smaller.

Economic activity and employment

There were marked differences between the economically active and inactive members of the sample.[6] The percentage of actively employed people in the sample was 47 per cent (with a further 9 per cent represented by students). This proportion is relatively high with regard to both the age composition of the Jewish population (with a significant proportion of older people) and the general level of employment in Hungary. The Jewish population tended to become inactive later than the general Hungarian population, and the proportion

Figure 5: Highest educational level attained by economically active and inactive Jewish populations (N = 1,826)



6 The active group contained those who were employed. The great majority of the inactive group were retired (77 per cent). Consequently, the mean age of the inactive group was high (71 years).

of those taking early retirement was relatively low. All told, just 2 per cent of the sample were unemployed. This pattern is probably related to the respondents' occupations and employment patterns.[7]

Table 6 shows the prevalence of high-status professional occupations among Jews in the sample as compared with the total population of Budapest. Though not shown in the table, this was particularly marked among the younger economically active population. Those in managerial positions, professionals and the self-employed comprised over 70 per cent of the whole sample and, in the case of the economically active population, this proportion rose to more than 80 per cent. Among the active group, i.e. the younger generations, the proportion of entrepreneurs was much higher than among the older (currently inactive) generations (25 per cent against 6 per cent). One interpretation of this pattern is that Jews have returned to traditional modes of economic activity. Commerce was the most common form of economic activity among those respondents who were economically inactive, but this was not the case for the younger generations, who tended to choose professions in the service sector or in the cultural sector. Another substantial group among the economically inactive had been employed in traditional production, mainly in industry, but this was no longer the case among the active group.

Standard of living

The survey data demonstrate a high economic and social status for the Jewish population as compared with the population at large. Rather than illustrate this by income levels, which are often inaccurate, material well-being was measured by determining the proportions of households owning specific consumer durables. Table 7 shows the ownership of such goods among the economically active and inactive sections of the survey sample as well as for the better-educated general population. The table also shows another useful indicator of material status: the frequency of holidays abroad.

Table 6: Occupations of Jews, compared with the general population in Budapest (%)

Occupation	Budapest Jewish population	Budapest general population	Jewish population		General population	
			Active	Inactive	Active	Inactive
Managerial	26	12	25	27	9	13
Professional	29	13	32	25	16	9
Self-employed/-entrepreneur	16	12	25	6	19	2
Clerical	21	24	13	29	24	27
Skilled worker	6	23	4	9	23	24
Other manual worker	2	16	1	4	9	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1,713	520	885	817	-	-

Source for the Budapest data: National surveys of MTA-ELTE Kommunikacioelmeleti Kutatocsoport (Research Group for Communication Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Loránd Eötvös University) in October 1998 and in February 2000

7 The national unemployment rate in 1999 was 7.1 per cent; see *Key Indicators of the Labour Market*, 3rd edn (Geneva: International Labor Organization 2003); for a summary, see www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/indicats.htm (viewed 10 March 2004).

The high propensity of Jewish households to own consumer durables was especially striking when it came to hi-tech products and services, including personal computers, mobile phones and, in particular, access at home to the Internet. However, examination of the data indicates that, while living standards were generally high, there were considerable differences within the Jewish population, particularly between the younger, economically active group and the older, inactive sector. Detailed analysis shows that just under one-quarter of the older population owned only three or fewer of the eight items listed in the survey; such a low ownership level was very rare among the economically active group. The ownership rates for the economically inactive group among the non-Jewish population exceeded the parallel age-group in the Jewish sample. The probable explanation for this is that the inactive non-Jewish population was younger than the equivalent Jewish group; as a consequence, the consumer durables present in their households were probably purchased during the household members' economically active period. An alternative reason for the difference could be that older widowed women lived in relatively deprived households due to a single low income; since they constituted a much greater proportion of the Jewish population than the general population, this finding would is not surprising.

Table 7: Socio-economic indicators: Jews compared with the population of Budapest with at least a secondary school education (%)

Indicator	Jewish population			Educated Budapest population		
	Active (N=1,048)	Inactive (N=967)	Total (N=2,015)	Active	Inactive	Total (N=520)
Ownership of a						
Car	72	36	55	67	56	62
Microwave oven	78	56	68	76	56	67
VCR	82	52	68	82	63	71
Mobile phone	59	14	39	42	18	31
Personal computer	67	19	47	55	32	43
Internet access at home	35	6	23	13	10	12
Holiday abroad in previous year	62	28	48	26	19	24
Holiday home	32	23	29	26	23	24

Source for the Budapest data: National surveys of MTA-ELTE Kommunikacioelmeleti Kutatocsoport (Research Group for Communication Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Loránd Eötvös University) in October 1998 and in February 2000

4 Religious and ethnic background

Examining the ancestry and religious backgrounds of the respondents was one of the most challenging aspects of the survey. Even when sufficient information was available, it was difficult to discern a clear-cut pattern, since ethnic lineage and religious lineage do not always coincide.

The survey collected data on the religious backgrounds of respondents' parents and grandparents. This information was 'fine-tuned' by constructing the survey questionnaire in such a way as to approach the subject of the interviewees' religious backgrounds from several possible angles. Separate questions related to each of the respondent's six immediate ancestors (two parents and four grandparents). These asked whether or not they were Jews or of Jewish origin, whether or not they were observant Jews, and whether or not they had converted to another religion.[8]

Analysis of the responses allowed us to trace the extent of religious and ethnic continuity as well as marital homogeneity (Jewish–Jewish marriages) and to chart these tendencies through succeeding generations. These data provide important information on the cohesion and structure of the Jewish population, in general terms as well as over time.

Religious and ethnic composition

An index of religious and ethnic continuity was calculated on the basis of the data that referred to each respondent's four grandparents. Under the heading of 'homogeneous' are those who reported that all four grandparents were Jewish, either on the basis of their religion or their ethnicity.[9] The 'partly homogeneous' group consists of those who had one non-Jewish grandparent, and the group labelled 'mixed origin' includes those who had only one or two Jewish grandparents. Figure 6 shows the results for the entire sample and Table 8 shows them broken down into specific age groups.

Figure 6: Number of respondents' Jewish grandparents



Table 8: Number of respondents' Jewish grandparents, by age group (%)

Age group	4	3	1 or 2	Total	N
18–25	40	10	50	100	254
26–35	39	13	48	100	174
36–45	56	10	34	100	241
46–55	79	6	15	100	376
56–65	84	5	11	100	262
66–75	88	1	11	100	360
76+	89	3	8	100	346
Full sample	72	6	22	100	2,013

As these illustrations show, for nearly three-quarters of the sample population, all four grandparents were Jewish. However, the proportion was much higher among the older generation and markedly lower among those aged 45 and younger. In the under-35 cohorts, the proportion of those with just one or two Jewish grandparents represented practically half of

8 Negative answers to the question about the Jewish origin of forebears as well as the ambiguous cases (such as those of mixed origin) were categorized as 'other'. With regard to the question on Jewish religious affiliation, the questionnaire offered the following options: 'yes', 'other religion', 'not belonging to any denomination', 'other'. For the question about conversion, the category 'other' was introduced among the optional answers, alongside 'yes' and 'no', for ambiguous cases.

9 'Religiously Jewish' refers to those whose grandparents belonged to the Jewish religious community; 'ethnically Jewish' refers to those whose grandparents' parents belonged to the Jewish religious community, but who themselves did not belong to it, either because they converted or because they defined themselves as 'not belonging to any denomination'.

the entire age group, showing the sustained erosion of ethno-religious continuity in recent decades.

Exogamous marriage

The data allowed patterns of endogamy (in-marriage) and exogamy (out-marriage) to be traced among the age groups of the contemporary Jewish sample. Since the experience of men and women can differ, Tables 9a and 9b break down the marriage data by gender as well as by generation and age group.

Comparing the younger groups with the older ones, Table 9b clearly shows that the proportion of people marrying Jews has declined, a feature already hinted at in Table 8. The pattern has obviously been influenced by historical as well as demographic developments. The heavy losses suffered during the Holocaust sharply diminished the possibility of endogamous marriages. In Budapest in 1946, for example, there were an estimated 157 Jewish women for every 100 Jewish men. At the same time, however, the rate of decline of endogamy has not been steady, and in fact seems to have stabilized at about 40–50 per cent. (It should also be noted that there are fewer data on the youngest groups as they are now marrying later.)

Comparison by gender suggests another significant phenomenon: men of the present generation tended to marry non-Jewish women more frequently than Jewish women married non-Jewish men, a widespread finding in contemporary Jewish communities.

Table 9a: Endogamy of respondents and their parents, by gender* (%)

Status	Parents	Married respondents	Married males	Married female
Endogamous	79	51	44	58
Exogamous	21	49	56	42
Total	100	100	100	100
N	1,995	1,631	768	863

Table 9b: Endogamy of respondents, by age group* (%)

Status	18–25	26–35	36–45	46–55	56–65	66–75	76+
Endogamous	48	37	44	48	44	51	70
Exogamous	52	63	56	52	56	49	30
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	40	113	213	349	246	343	337

* Only those respondents who were at the time (or previously) married are included in these tables (i.e. cohabitees are excluded). Marriages are 'endogamous' when both partners qualify as Jewish by religion or ethnic origin. In these tables the respondent was considered Jewish if he or she had at least two Jewish grandparents. The data refer to the most recent marriage.

5 Religious observance and cultural traditions

The survey attempted to chart the transmission of various elements of Jewish religious observance and cultural traditions across generations. The questionnaire listed a series of religious practices and traditions, and asked to what extent they were observed or preserved during the respondents' upbringing and in their current households.

The data shown in Table 10 are revealing and clearly suggest that, for the sample as whole, the observance of Jewish religious and cultural traditions has greatly diminished in Hungary over the past fifty years. Nevertheless, comparing the patterns for different age groups enables us, simultaneously, to draw a more detailed picture. It appears that the process of secularization has manifested itself most strongly during the lifetimes of the older generations. The older groups currently observed fewer Jewish practices than they did during their childhood years. Today's middle-aged group, those between 45 and 65, observed very few Jewish traditions, and the families in which they were brought up had already become secularized. This implies that the middle-aged generation underwent only limited behavioural changes during their own lifetimes. They also appear to have been little affected by the religious and cultural revival that has occurred since the fall of Communism. Significantly, however, the younger generations do show an inclination to return to tradition, with most of the examples of religious-cultural practices listed by the survey being observed more frequently than they were either in the families in which they were brought up or among the older generations.

The discernible increase of traditional Jewish practice among the younger age cohorts is representative of what appears to be a resurgence or renewal of

Table 10: Observance of religious practices and cultural traditions in respondents' upbringing and current households, by age group (% responding 'yes')

Religious practice	18–25		26–35		36–45		46–55		56–65		66–75		76+		Full sample	
	U	C	U	C	U	C	U	C	U	C	U	C	U	C	U	C
Sabbath observance	8	11	6	18	11	14	20	14	38	10	49	14	58	19	30	14
Fasting on Yom Kippur	33	44	14	34	23	33	41	38	60	26	80	27	84	40	52	34
Passover seder	24	37	13	35	20	34	33	35	46	24	61	21	49	24	41	29
Keeping kosher	5	13	6	14	10	9	13	8	19	5	32	3	42	10	20	8
Making cholent	44	50	40	31	50	38	57	43	64	38	73	34	77	35	59	38
Mezuzah	25	31	13	26	17	25	24	26	37	11	59	13	66	22	37	21
Lighting Hanukkah candles	27	39	13	41	22	38	33	36	47	26	67	23	69	28	43	32
Bar mitzvah	20	25	10	12	16	17	21	16	37	11	59	13	69	16	36	15
Jewish burial	58	51	46	41	58	44	59	50	68	34	79	40	80	45	64	44
Circum-cision	21	23	13	18	19	17	29	12	47	13	65	15	72	22	41	17
N	254		174		241		376		262		360		346		2,013	

U = upbringing C = current household

Jewish identity. This pattern has been observed elsewhere and the reasons for it—whether or not it does in fact represent an actual 'return' at all—are highly complex. Nevertheless, the patterns observed in this survey are probably due to a general strengthening of the demand for ethnic and religious identities throughout the Hungarian population after the collapse of the Communist system. This is a natural phenomenon at a time of great social change, which generally sends acquired social identities into crisis. The upsurge in Jewish identity has probably been enhanced by the wider acceptance of a multiculturalist orientation. The identity renaissance has also been facilitated by the opening of Hungary's borders and, especially, by the rapidly developing relations with North American Jews and Israel. However, the main motivation behind the formation of new identities has been the desire of younger people to cast off the stigmatized identities of the older generation. There are many Jews in Hungary, for instance, who only consider themselves Jewish when faced with antisemitism. For younger Jews, who have, since 1989, lived through a period without the political restrictions placed on their parents by the Communist system, such an identification is not only unattractive but one that has been wholly rejected. One result of the quest for a more positive identity could be the slightly diminishing rate of exogamy in the younger generations (see Table 9b) and the rediscovery of some religious-cultural traditions. Table 11b shows that this pattern of 'revival' also applied to synagogue attendance. The rate of those who never attended synagogue, even on important religious festivals, was very high, amounting to nearly

Table 11a: Religious observance of respondents and respondents' parents, by age group (%)

Age group	Religiously observant	Observing High Holy Days	Non-practising believer	Not religious	Atheist	Total	N
Father	15	30	12	28	15	100	1,936
Mother	16	34	13	27	10	100	1,971
Full sample	6	25	17	37	15	100	1,995
18–25	5	34	11	39	11	100	251
26–35	5	28	17	42	8	100	169
36–45	4	26	13	38	19	100	241
46–55	4	26	13	41	16	100	373
56–65	2	21	21	38	18	100	260
66–75	5	23	18	34	20	100	358
76+	12	20	27	29	12	100	343

Table 11b: Synagogue attendance of respondents and respondents' parents, by age group (%)

Age group	Daily	Several times a week	Weekly	Monthly	High Holy Days	Less frequently/ never	Total	N
Father	3	4	10	3	36	44	100	1,900
Mother	1	3	9	3	42	42	100	1,947
Full sample	1	1	5	4	26	63	100	2,006
18–25	1	4	6	7	34	48	100	253
26–35	2	1	8	6	25	58	100	173
36–45	1	1	6	4	29	59	100	241
46–55	1	1	5	4	31	58	100	376
56–65	0	1	2	3	22	72	100	260
66–75	0	0	4	2	26	68	100	359
76+	1	2	5	2	18	72	100	342

two-thirds of the whole sample. However, among the youngest sector of the sample, there has been an apparent reversal of the pattern of secularization, once again suggesting that there has been a revival of interest in Judaism and Jewish traditions among the young.

Importantly, analysis of respondents' levels of religious observance and other key indicators, such as synagogue attendance, demonstrates that the survey sample was much less religiously observant than members of other religious groups in Hungary. While about 50 per cent of the Jewish respondents considered themselves religious (in the broadest sense of the word), other data on religiosity indicate that, among the Christian denominations, the rate is as high as 70 per cent.

Participation in established Jewish communal life

The data presented in Table 12 indicate that most Jews in Hungary have little regular contact with organized Jewish communal structures. More than one-quarter of the entire sample showed a complete lack of interest in existing Jewish communal organizations and cultural institutions. Another quarter was only loosely affiliated with them: from time to time they participated in some kind of cultural event. A little less than half of the sample showed a deeper involvement. Within this group a closer connection to the various Jewish socio-religious organizations was the dominant feature. The percentage of those who maintained multiple ties was just over 10 per cent. Of those who participated in the activities of the various religious-social organizations, most were usually also active in Jewish cultural life, although, interestingly, the converse was not usually the case.

Based on several questions in the survey about participation in various Hungarian Jewish institutions, the following typology gives five types of relationships to organized Jewish activities.

Table 13: Typology of relationships to organized Jewish activity

Type	Cultural	Socio-religious	Definition
1	O	O	No cultural or socio-religious activity
2	×	O	Loose cultural connection (occasional attendance at cultural events)
3	×	O	Active participation in cultural arena (with none in socio-religious life)
4	O	×	Participation in socio-religious life (no attendance at cultural events)
5	×	×	Integrated participation (both socio-religious and cultural)

Table 12 shows the distribution of data according to this typology among the sample as well as by the different categories of ethno-religious origins described in Table 8. As expected, among those classed as 'homogeneous', with four Jewish grandparents, the proportion that demonstrated 'integrated participation' in the established Jewish community through socio-religious organizations was markedly higher than those in the 'partly homogeneous' or 'mixed' categories.

Table 12: Participation in Jewish socio-religious and cultural organizations, by ethno-religious group (%)

Type	Ethno-religious origins			Full sample
	Homogeneous	Partly homogeneous	Mixed	
1	27	32	37	29
2	23	27	35	26
3	7	10	8	7
4	31	19	12	27
5	12	12	8	11
Total	100	100	100	100
N	1,451	118	446	2,015

However, these differences were less well marked when the data were examined by age. The core of the membership of cultural and religious organizations appeared to be people aged around 50 and their children, aged between 18 and 25. Older age in itself appeared to be associated with a decline in participation. It is also possible that members of the older generations who cut all ties to Jewish organizations during the Communist regime are more reluctant to become involved again than younger people.

According to the survey data, most Jews affiliated with the established Jewish community by attending cultural events. More than 60 per cent of respondents said that they occasionally attended some kind of organized event. Ten per cent said they frequently attended concerts organized in the synagogue, Klezmer music programmes and programmes offered by the Bálint Jewish Community Center (operated under the auspices of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee); a further 30 per cent said they attended such events fairly frequently. Events staged at the Goldmark Hall (the auditorium of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary) were less well attended; some 3 per cent said they attended programmes there frequently, and 22 per cent fairly frequently. The Goldmark Hall primarily attracted members of the older age groups, while events at the Bálint Community Center were more popular among young people.

The data show that participation or membership in socio-religious organizations was much less prevalent than attendance at cultural events. Thirty-nine per cent of those asked said they belonged to some kind of Jewish organization or participated in activities put on by a Jewish organization. Twenty-six per cent of these respondents reported membership in the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary (MAZSIHISZ), and 2 per cent said they also performed some sort of function within the organization. A further 20 per cent of respondents mentioned other socio-religious organizations with which they had occasional contact, and most of them referred to the Hungarian Jewish Cultural Association (MAZSIKE). Only 6 per cent said they participated in the activities of the Union of Jewish Students, Habonim Dror, B'nai Brith, Sim Shalom Progressive Reform Community or the Hungarian-Israeli Friendship Society.

Perceptions of the Jewish community

The survey asked several questions aimed at gauging respondents' feelings about what the role of Jewish communal bodies should be. Six areas of activity were identified and respondents were asked to select three to which they felt communal leaders should pay special attention. Table 14 shows the data in order of frequency. As the results illustrate, the social, economic and cultural functions of the Jewish community were much more important for the respondents than the religious and political ones.

In another question, respondents were asked to assess their satisfaction with the quality of Jewish communal activities. Altogether, some 40 per cent of the respondents were unable to answer, stating that they were not in a position to form an opinion. The ability to form an opinion about the Jewish community was closely related to the categories of participation described above in Table 12. A lack of connection with the community was manifested by an inability to form an opinion.

Table 14. Perceptions of the priorities of the Jewish community (%)

The Hungarian Jewish community should pay special attention to	Agree	N
Social work, financial aid	75	1,504
Dissemination of Jewish culture	55	1,107
Combating antisemitism	53	1,068
Developing educational institutions	46	922
Maintaining conditions of religious life	45	909
Representing Jewish interests politically	36	728

Among those who did express an opinion, slightly more people provided a positive assessment than a negative one. Five per cent of those interviewed said they were 'very satisfied' with the way the Jewish community operated, and 19 per cent said they were 'satisfied'. At the other end of the spectrum, 4 per cent said they were 'seriously dissatisfied', 10 per cent said they were 'dissatisfied' and 20 per cent described themselves as 'satisfied as well as dissatisfied'. Age appeared to be important in the responses to this question: the percentage of respondents giving a positive assessment was much higher among the older age groups. However, among the younger population, the youngest group gave a more favourable assessment of the Jewish community. More active or more religiously observant groups tended to be more satisfied; however, the age of the respondents seems to have had the greatest impact on levels of satisfaction.

6 Identity

The assessment of how respondents defined their personal identity was approached from several angles. As demonstrated in Table 15, one approach was to present respondents with five statements defining themselves in terms of being *Hungarian*, *Jewish* or *European*, asking them to select the one with which they most closely identified.

These statements, shown in Table 15, were designed to explore the most frequently encountered identity issue for diaspora Jews: the degree to which they identify both with the general population and with Jewry. At one extreme is someone with a strong Jewish identity who considers his/her Hungarian identity to be incidental: 'I am a Jew who happens to live in Hungary.' At the opposite extreme is the individual who rejects any Jewish identity whatsoever: 'I am Hungarian.' All things considered, the majority of respondents, both in their first as well as their second choice, provided answers that suggested a sense of dual identity: they mostly chose 'I am a Hungarian of Jewish religion/origin', and somewhat less frequently 'I am both Jewish and Hungarian'. These two answers accounted for more than 50 per cent of all responses.

There was also a second set of statements aimed at measuring the intensity of respondents' sense of Jewish identity (see Table 16 and Figure 7). Here, too, we asked the interviewees to select the statement that best represented how they felt.

Table 15: Respondents' sense of identity, by ethno-religious origin (%)

Statements	Full sample		Ethno-religious origins*		
	Highest ranking (N=2,015)	Second highest ranking (N=1,964)	Homogeneous	Partly homogeneous	Mixed
I am a Jew who happens to live in Hungary.	23	16	45	50	28
I am both Hungarian and Jewish.	24	24	51	48	48
I am a Hungarian of Jewish religion/origin.	30	25	61	53	46
I am a European citizen.	12	22	34	40	45
I am Hungarian.	13	10	20	19	40

* These figures represent highest and second highest rankings taken together.

Table 16: Intensity of respondents' sense of Jewish identity, by ethno-religious origin* (%)

Statements	Full sample	Homogeneous	Partly homogeneous	Mixed
I have a very strong awareness of my Jewish identity and it means a lot to me.	15	17	13	10
My feelings about being Jewish are quite strong but other things are also important to me.	52	54	51	45
I know that I am Jewish but I don't care too much about it.	28	25	31	36
Although I was born Jewish, it means almost nothing to me.	5	4	5	9
Total	100	100	100	100
N	1,924	1,399	109	416

* Only valid responses are included here: answers such as 'I don't know' or no response at all made up 5 per cent of all responses.

Figure 7: Intensity of respondents' sense of Jewish identity



The responses to the series of statements shown in Table 16 and Figure 7 suggest that 33 per cent of the sample felt a weak sense of Jewish identity, and 15 per cent felt a strong one. The picture that emerges shows that responses to the two series of statements are closely related.

Respondents who selected either of the two statements representing the extremes of the spectrum in the first question about identity usually selected a correspondingly extreme statement in the second question. Forty-six per cent of those who characterized themselves as having a very strong sense of being Jewish also chose the statement 'I am a Jew who happens to live in Hungary' in the first question. The correlation of responses from the opposite extreme was even more pronounced. Of those for whom being Jewish 'means almost nothing', 52 per cent chose the statement 'I am Hungarian' in the first question; 20 per cent chose 'I am a European citizen'; and 4 per cent chose 'I am a Jew who happens to live in Hungary'.

Specific features of Jewish identity

The survey included ten questions designed to analyse particular features of respondents' sense of Jewish identity. They were asked to assess what significance each of the listed features had for them, on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the greatest significance. Table 18 shows the averages calculated from the sample's answers according to the three categories of ethno-religious origins.

This table shows that a sense of religious belonging seemed to be much less important than that of ethno-cultural belonging. Traditional religious practice and attachment to religious-communal institutions contributed much less to respondents' sense of Jewish identity than a desire to preserve the memory of their forebears or their awareness of a shared history. A need to remember the Holocaust and other persecutions was especially important. Whereas tradition was important for the older generation, historical, cultural or subjective matters were more important for the young, although the generational differences were not marked. Though the general pattern was similar across the various ethno-religious origin categories, all of the listed features of Jewish identity elicited a more positive response from the 'homogeneous' group than from the 'partly homogeneous' or 'mixed' groups. In particular, a feeling of closeness to Israel and a desire to marry someone Jewish were stronger components of identity for the members of the 'homogeneous' group than for the other two.

Table 17: Intensity of feelings about being Jewish* (%)

Statements	Feel very strongly	Feel quite strongly	Don't care much about it	Means almost nothing
I am a Jew who happens to live in Hungary.	46	26	11	4
I am both Hungarian and Jewish.	20	29	21	8
I am a Hungarian of Jewish religion/origin.	30	31	28	17
I am a European citizen.	3	9	18	20
I am Hungarian.	1	5	22	52
N	284	941	504	94

*Figures based on respondents' first choice of statement.

Table 18: Features of Jewish identity, by ethno-religious origin (average scores*)

From the point of view of belonging to the Jewish people, how important is each of the following to you?	Full sample	Homogeneous	Partly homogeneous	Mixed
Awareness of the persecution of the Jews/ memory of the Holocaust	4.47	4.57	4.18	4.22
Awareness of Jewish history and Jewish forebears	4.09	4.17	3.85	3.92
Feeling part of the Jewish people	4.00	4.11	3.87	3.69
Interest in and familiarity with Jewish culture	3.98	4.01	3.84	3.90
Awareness of great Jewish individuals and achievements	3.68	3.77	3.42	3.45
Close relations with other Jews	3.45	3.50	3.33	3.30
Feeling close to Israel	3.24	3.40	2.96	2.77
Marrying a Jewish spouse	2.73	2.89	2.59	2.24
Observing Jewish practices	2.26	2.28	2.19	2.21
Participating in Jewish communal activities	2.01	2.06	1.89	1.89

*Scores on a scale of 1–5: 5 = very important, 1 = not at all important

Attitudes towards Israel

One feature of Jewish identity is the multifaceted relationship of Jews with Israel. Most respondents had personal ties to Israel or had visited the country: 73 per cent had relatives or friends in Israel and 53 per cent of them had been there, some of them several times. The proportion of those who had visited Israel was significantly higher among the young, and was highest in the youngest age cohort (18–25).

Against this background of strong personal links to Israel, the survey examined both the cognitive and emotional attitudes towards the Jewish state held by Hungarian Jews. We asked respondents to evaluate five basic statements about Israel on a five-point scale (1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree). At first glance, it appears that their attitudes were strongly related to personal contacts—relatives and friends—as well as to the degree or form of

Table 19a: Attitudes towards Israel* (average scores and %)

Statement	N	Average	1	2	3	4	5
The existence of Israel gives Jews a sense of security.	1,970	4.52	3	2	8	13	74
The Jewish people can be proud of Israel.	1,956	4.40	2	5	10	18	65
Israel is the spiritual centre of the Jews.	1,945	3.62	10	11	22	20	37
Israel is the real home of the Jews.	1,939	3.34	17	14	22	14	33
Zionists exaggerate the significance of Israel.	1,783	3.22	19	11	23	22	25

Table 19b: Attitudes towards Israel,* by age group

Statement	18–25	26–35	36–45	46–55	56–65	66–75	76+
The existence of Israel gives Jews a sense of security.	4.37	4.25	4.56	4.53	4.59	4.61	4.56
The Jewish people can be proud of Israel.	4.00	4.07	4.20	4.43	4.60	4.64	4.57
Israel is the spiritual centre of the Jews.	3.10	3.13	3.43	3.56	3.97	3.85	3.97
Israel is the real home of the Jews.	3.08	3.13	3.26	3.22	3.36	3.49	3.68
Zionists exaggerate the significance of Israel.	3.48	3.21	3.15	3.30	3.16	3.10	3.13

*Scores on a scale of 1–5: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree

Jewish identity felt personally. Tables 19a and 19b show the responses to these statements, according to the age of respondents, since age was the most decisive factor among the variables investigated.

The statements that characterized Israel as a source of security or reassurance met with general approval. However, the notion that Israel was the national or even the cultural centre of the Jewish people produced a less clear-cut result: 57 per cent agreed that Israel was the 'spiritual centre' of the Jews and 47 per cent that Israel was the 'real home of the Jews'. The distribution of opinions was greatly influenced by education. Those with the highest levels of education displayed the most doubt about Israel being 'the real home of the Jews' (Table 20): among those with a university degree, only 36 per cent of respondents agreed with this statement compared with 67 per cent of those with a primary school education.

Opinions about Zionism differed particularly by age group, with the young being more critical. The differences between the groups organized according to level of education were less marked (Table 21).

Moving away from cognitive attitudes towards Israel and considering purely emotional ones, Table 22 shows the relationship between emotional attachment to Israel and age. Respondents chose from one of the four statements shown in the table.

Very few respondents expressed a negative attitude towards Israel. Even though no strongly negative attitudes were revealed in any age group, among the four oldest age cohorts, a 'strong attachment' was more prevalent than 'no special feelings'. Interestingly, this tendency was reversed for the young, who had the highest level of neutral or negative feelings towards the Jewish state.

Table 20: Response to the statement 'Israel is the real home of the Jews', by educational level (%)

Response	Primary school	Vocational school (*szakiskola*)	Secondary school (*gimnázium*)	College degree	University degree	Total
Strongly disagree	5	7	16	15	22	17
Disagree	10	11	13	14	16	14
Neither agree nor disagree	18	14	21	24	26	22
Agree	15	12	17	12	13	14
Strongly agree	52	56	33	35	23	33
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	199	84	652	340	642	1,916

Table 21: Response to the statement 'Zionists exaggerate the significance of Israel', by educational level (%)

Response	Primary school	Vocational school (*szakiskola*)	Secondary school (*gimnázium*)	College degree	University degree	Total
Strongly disagree	18	21	16	22	21	19
Disagree	9	11	11	13	10	11
Neither agree nor disagree	33	18	24	22	21	23
Agree	19	15	25	18	23	22
Strongly agree	21	34	24	25	25	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	166	71	604	321	617	1,779

Figure 8: Emotional attachment to Israel



Table 22: Emotional attachment to Israel, by age group (%)*

Statement	Total	18–25	26–35	36–45	46–55	56–65	66–75	76+
I feel a strong attachment to Israel.	27	22	21	21	28	32	32	30
I feel some attachment to Israel.	49	44	43	49	51	51	51	47
I have no special feelings about Israel.	22	30	32	29	20	16	15	21
If anything, I have negative feelings about Israel.	2	4	4	1	1	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1,961	252	169	234	364	256	346	337

* 'Other' and 'Don't know' responses totalled 2 per cent; the table excludes these.

Fifteen per cent of the total sample said that they had considered emigrating to Israel; in the case of the most flexible group (the 18–25 age cohort), less than 20 per cent had considered such a move.

However, even fewer respondents (12 per cent) had considered emigrating to a country other than Israel (Table 23). Among the youngest age group responses to these two indicators were practically the same.

Table 23: Attitudes towards emigration to a country other than Israel (%)

Have you considered emigrating to a country other than Israel?	Total	18–25	26–35	36–45	46–55	56–65	66–75	76+
Never	69	46	66	61	66	75	79	81
It has occurred to me	19	34	21	24	20	16	10	11
Yes	12	19	12	15	14	9	10	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1,986	252	169	240	372	245	359	340

7 Attitudes towards Hungarian Jewry and its relations with non-Jews

Attitudes towards Hungarian Jewry

The survey set out to examine attitudes towards two different aspects of the situation of the Jewish population of Hungary: first, its socio-political influence and overall standards of living; and, second, its perception of the level of antisemitism and anti-Jewish prejudice.

Answers to questions regarding Jewish social and political influence in the Hungarian national context revealed that 64 per cent of respondents regarded it as adequate and 31 per cent as insufficient, while 5 per cent thought that Jews had more influence than they should have. With regard to standards of living, about two-thirds (65 per cent) of the participants thought that Hungary's Jews had a standard of living similar to that of non-Jews, whereas about a quarter (28 per cent) thought that their standard of living was higher and only 3 per cent thought that Hungarian Jews were less well off than other citizens.

Attitudes towards antisemitism

The survey asked a series of questions designed to determine how Jews perceived the extent of antisemitism in Hungary. The responses can be divided into three more or less equal groups of viewpoints, as shown in Table 24. About a third (32 per cent) of respondents perceived little antisemitism in contemporary Hungary; just over a third (37 per cent) thought that there was a high level of antisemitism, and around a third (31 per cent) thought that there was neither a high nor a low level of antisemitism. Compared with older respondents, a higher proportion of the younger age groups (especially those under 35) thought that antisemitism was not very significant in Hungary.

Figure 9: Extent of political and social influence of Hungarian Jewry



Importantly, however, when respondents were asked to evaluate the size of groups holding anti-Jewish attitudes, the resulting data contradicted the findings noted in Table 24. The data are shown in Table 25.

With regard to these data, if estimates of 0–10 per cent are, somewhat arbitrarily, taken to represent a 'low level' of perceived animosity, then the findings show that 38 per cent of respondents believed that there was no, or only slight, anti-Jewish feeling in Hungary. This compares with the 32 per cent in Table 24 who felt that the level of antisemitism was

Table 24: Perceived level of antisemitism, by age group (%)

Level	Under 35	35-54	55-69	70+	Full sample
Low	39	33	32	27	32
Medium	28	31	29	35	31
High	33	36	39	38	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	407	602	403	560	1,972

low. The proportion of those who felt that 11–30 per cent of all Hungarians were predisposed against Jews was almost the same as the proportion who felt that there was a 'medium degree' of animosity. The data go on to show that 28 per cent of respondents felt that at least 1 in 3 people viewed Jews negatively, a significantly lower figure than the 37 per cent in Table 24 who declared that they perceived a 'high level' of antisemitism in the country. Several recent sociological surveys carried out in Hungary (in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 2002) have shown that about 25 per cent of the adult population of Hungary harbours antisemitic feelings, and about a third of this group (8–10 per cent of the total population) hold extreme antisemitic prejudices. This means that only about 1 in 6 of the respondents succeeded in gauging accurately the extent of antisemitic prejudice in Hungary.[10]

Table 25: Assessment of Hungarian anti-Jewish feeling

What percentage of people have an aversion towards Jews?	Answers (%)
0	11
1-10	26
11-20	17
21-30	18
31-50	17
Over 50	11
Total (N = 1,845)	100

In response to questions asking whether people believed that there had been an increase or decrease in antisemitism in Hungary 'in the recent past', nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) said they thought that antisemitism had increased (Table 26). Opinions on this issue vary widely. Overall, the proportion of those who sensed an increase of antisemitism was 10 times higher than that of those who thought it had decreased. This difference was evident across all age groups, with the greatest difference observed in the 55–69 age cohort.

Regarding the results of an attempt to identify how respondents formed these opinions, it appears that their attitudes towards the intensity and range of antisemitism in Hungary were based primarily on media reports rather than on personal experience of any antisemitic incident. When we asked whether respondents 'had been personally offended or harmed as a Jew', 82 per cent said 'no'. Those who claimed to have been offended generally categorized the incident as malicious remarks heard in a public place, such as on the street.

Respondents seemed to be generally optimistic about the future. Just over half (52 per cent) thought that current levels of antisemitism would not change in the next decade whereas the other half thought there would be some change; among this latter half, twice as many thought that the change would be for the worse (32 per cent) as opposed to the better (16 per cent) (Table 27). These findings show that about half the number of respondents who thought that antisemitism has increased in the recent past (63 per cent) thought

Table 26: Recent perceived increase/decrease in Hungarian antisemitism, by age group (%)

Perceived change	Under 35	35-54	55-69	70+	Full sample
Decreased	10	5	4	6	6
Has not changed	32	28	30	33	31
Increased	58	67	66	61	63
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	408	604	407	569	1,988

10 See András Kovács, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary*, Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism (ACTA) no. 16 (Jerusalem: Vidal Sasson International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1999).

Table 27: Expected level of antisemitism in the next decade, by age group (%)

Expected change	Under 35	35-54	55-69	70+	Full sample
Decrease	18	14	16	15	16
Remain the same	47	51	51	58	52
Increase	35	35	33	27	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	398	576	386	536	1,896

Table 28: Likelihood of Jewish persecution, by age group (%)

Likelihood	Under 35	35-54	55-69	70+	Full sample
Unlikely	32	29	32	32	31
Possible but not likely	65	66	65	65	65
Likely	3	5	3	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	408	598	399	553	1,958

that it would increase in the future (Table 26). Opinions were not significantly influenced by age.

The data in Table 28 offer a further view on respondents' expectations regarding antisemitism in the future. Most respondents thought the prospect of an outbreak of violent antisemitism was an improbable one. Only 4 per cent of respondents felt that there was a real chance that there would be 'persecution' of Jews in the coming decade. One-third thought this was absolutely impossible. Almost two-thirds thought that some kind of anti-Jewish violence might occur but that it was not very likely. The age of the respondent did not significantly colour the responses.

On the issue of combating antisemitism, despite the fact that the proportion of those who thought that there was a good chance of anti-Jewish acts in the near future was very low, the vast majority (85 per cent) thought that antisemitic hate speech should be thoroughly controlled. (In 2003, 60 per cent of the total Hungarian adult population held the same view.[11]) Age groups differed a great deal in this respect (Table 29). There were particularly divergent views between those aged over 55 (and

Table 29: Attitudes to the control of the open expression of antisemitic views, by age group (%)

Level of control	Under 35	35-54	55-69	70+	Full sample
Should be controlled	81	80	88	92	85
Controlled within limits	2	2	2	0	2
Should not be controlled	17	18	10	8	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	395	576	393	556	1,920

11 Results of a survey carried out by the Szonda-Ipsos Institute, Budapest in October 2003 on a national sample of 1,000 persons.

especially those over 75) and the younger groups. Among the oldest age group, 92 per cent thought that overt expressions of anti-Jewish views should not be permitted. This figure was more than 10 percentage points higher than among the under-55 age group. Likewise, while as few as 8 per cent of the older groups said that overt expressions of antisemitic views should be permitted, one-fifth of the under-55 age group thought so.

Attitudes towards the Holocaust

Since awareness of the Holocaust and the need to remember it are so important in contributing to a sense of Jewish identity among Hungarian Jews (see Table 18), it was particularly important to determine how Jews actually viewed the Holocaust, its meaning and its lessons for Jews and non-Jews today. Respondents were presented with a set of statements regarding the significance of the Holocaust and the way it is viewed today. They were asked to register agreement or disagreement with each statement on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 showing the strongest agreement.

The data indicate that 53 per cent of respondents agreed that the Holocaust should be a major focus of Jewish self-awareness whereas only a minority (15 per cent) thought that there was no point in discussing the Holocaust any longer. In this respect, comparative data from general surveys show that there is a significant difference between Jews and non-Jews. Indeed, as the results of a 1995 survey showed, 66 per cent of Budapest's non-Jewish population with at least a secondary school diploma thought that the issue of the Holocaust should be 'removed from the agenda.[12]

The area of greatest consensus among the sample was in responses to questions about Jewish entitlement to material compensation. Eighty per cent of respondents thought that compensation was justified whereas in 1995 only 36 per cent and, in 2003, 49 per cent of the educated Budapest non-Jewish group thought that Jews had a legal right to compensation from the state.

The majority of the Jewish sample thought that differences of opinion (over compensation and the importance of remembering the Holocaust) did not create irresoluble conflicts between Jews and non-Jews with regard to Holocaust denial. As the 1995 survey showed, more than two-thirds of the non-Jewish population believed that Holocaust denial should be outlawed. In 2003 the proportion of Hungarians who were inclined to support legal sanctions against Holocaust deniers was about 50 per cent of the total adult population, somewhat lower than that of the Jewish sample. The results of the 2003 survey indicate that, though open antisemitism is condemned by the majority, a

Table 30: Significance of the Holocaust for the present (%)*

Statement	Agree		Disagree		Average score
	%	N	%	N	
Holocaust survivors are entitled to compensation from the Hungarian state.	80	1,616	5	147	4.41
Persons denying that the Holocaust took place should be sanctioned by law.	59	1,199	26	522	3.67
The Holocaust should be at the heart of Jewish self-awareness.	53	1,077	24	479	3.57
Frequent references to the Holocaust can obstruct relations between Jews and non-Jews.	25	506	53	1,051	2.43
As so many years have passed since the Holocaust, the subject should be removed from the agenda.	15	303	73	1,475	1.88

*Scores on a scale of 1–5: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree

12 See András Kovács, 'The Holocaust, the persecution of Jews and historical responsibility: findings of a survey in Hungary', *East European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 28, no. 1, summer 1998, 66. The proportion for the total Budapest population was 75 per cent.

substantial group of Hungarians (43 per cent of the respondents) preferred an end to the debate on wartime persecutions and responsibility, and thought that the issue of the Holocaust should be laid to rest.

Attitudes towards assimilation

The survey sought to determine both the degree of Jewish assimilation and attitudes towards it. Specifically, did respondents feel that Jews in Hungary already had a place in mainstream society as Jews or that they should take steps towards further integration? The responses showed a wide variety of sharply differing and even contradictory opinions on these and related issues.

There was a substantial number of respondents who favoured assimilation, and thought that a greater effort was required on the part of Jews themselves to integrate into mainstream society, for example by sanctioning mixed marriages between Jews and non-Jews (70 per cent). On the other hand, 3 respondents in 5 saw no need for further integration, and a third of the sample considered total assimilation to be impossible.

Table 31: Attitudes towards assimilation in mainstream society and mixed marriages

Statement	Agree to some extent		Disagree to some extent	
	%	N	%	N
Marriages between Jews and non-Jews should be avoided as far as possible.	20	393	70	1,416
Jews should more actively pursue ways of becoming integrated in Hungarian society.	26	520	59	520
Because of the persecution they have suffered, Jews are no longer able to become integrated in Hungarian society.	33	668	53	1,067
More mixed marriages between Jews and non-Jews would be desirable.	32	643	45	913

8 Ideological, economic and social attitudes

As a means of gauging the level of Jewish integration, we compared the viewpoints of Jews and non-Jews on issues such as liberalism, conservatism, xenophobia and anomie, as well as on what constitutes 'left' and 'right' in politics. Table 32 compares the responses of the Jewish sample with the views of educated non-Jews on several key social and political issues.[13] Respondents were asked to register their agreement or disagreement with a series of statements.

The distribution of opinions shows that Jews in general tended to adopt far more liberal attitudes than the ambient population, except on the issue of legalizing prostitution. There were conspicuous differences between Jews and non-Jews in 3 out of the 7 statements; on these the two groups were at opposite extremes. Among the non-Jewish population in general, the better-educated had more liberal opinions regarding capital punishment, drug abuse and homosexuality; nevertheless, their attitudes were still a good deal more conservative than those of the Jews. These findings tally with the results of other surveys of Jewish populations.

On economic issues, Jewish opinions were more liberal than those of the population as a whole. Jews were more likely to favour a market economy and were more willing to accept its consequences than was the general population (Table 33).

With regard to joining the EU, Jews supported a strong representation of Hungarian interests. The representation of the interests of ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries was less important to Jews than to non-Jews.

The next group of responses evaluates attitudes towards other ethnic minority groups, and highlight the degree of xenophobia within the Jewish sample.

In general, Jews were less averse to other ethnic minorities in Hungary than the population at large. As the average values show, Jews were positively disposed towards three of the minority groups, Blacks, ethnic Germans and Chinese, whereas the non-Jewish sample had a positive attitude only towards ethnic Germans. Comparing Jews with better-educated Budapest respondents, the greatest

Table 32: Jewish and non-Jewish world-views (%)

Statement	Agree to some extent			Disagree to some extent		
	Jews	non-Jews		Jews	non-Jews	
		I	II		I	II
Abortions should be more strictly controlled.	11	26	28	83	66	67
The entry of refugees should be restricted.	29	70	74	65	26	22
Prostitution should be legalized.	33	31	39	58	64	57
Captial punishment should be introduced for the most serious crimes.	49	84	75	46	13	24
I have an aversion to Gypsies.	23	50	49	70	47	48
Homosexuality should be condemned.	16	63	48	78	29	45
Drug abuse should be punished by imprisonment.	24	55	39	70	39	59

I: the total non-Jewish population (N = 1,500); II: the population of Budapest holding at least a secondary school diploma (N = 152)

13 The source of data about the non-Jewish population is a national survey carried out by the Gallup/Hungary Institute in 1995; the size of the sample was 1,500.

Table 33: Attitudes relating to economic and national interests (average scores*)

Statement	Jews	Non-Jews I	Non-Jews II
We should accept that some citizens must live in need if we are to have economic development.	2.28	2.10	2.22
The free market economy should be restricted in Hungary.	2.52	3.16	3.21
The interests of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries should be more firmly represented.	2.61	3.28	3.31
Private property should be the dominant feature of the economy.	3.21	2.95	3.30
No Hungarian interests should be sacrificed for EU membership.	3.24	-	-
Income differences should be reduced.	3.71	4.22	3.81

*Scores on a scale of 1–5: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
I: the total non-Jewish population (N = 1,500), II: the population of Budapest holding at least a secondary school diploma (N = 152)

differences related to Gypsies and Blacks. The attitudes of the Jews were more positive, even though the prevailing attitude towards the Gypsies was rather negative among Jews as well. The smallest difference between Jewish and non-Jewish Hungarians was in their attitude towards Arabs.

Typical social and political attitudes of the Jewish population

Though we have noted the differences in the social and political attitudes of Jewish respondents and better-educated non-Jews in Budapest, our hypothesis was that there were marked differences within the Jewish population itself. To ascertain these differences, we used a statistical analysis to identify eight attitudes. By looking at the presence or lack of these attitudes, three specific groups within the Jewish population were identified: *liberals, religious conservatives* and *left-wing conservatives*.[14]

The eight attitudes (and the statements representing them) were as follows:

- *Economic liberalism*: agreement with the statement that 'private property should be the dominant feature of the economy', disagreement with the statements that 'income differences should be reduced' and that 'the free market economy should be restricted in Hungary';
- *Trust in the rule of the law*: disagreement with the statements that 'one can become wealthy only by being dishonest' and that 'today most criminals escape legal punishment';
- *Conservative world-view*: agreement with the statement that 'abortions should be more strictly controlled', 'drug abuse should be punished by imprisonment' and that 'homosexuality should be condemned'; disagreement with the statement that 'prostitution should be legalized';

Table 34: Attitudes of Jews and non-Jews towards ethnic minorities in Hungary (average scores*)

Ethnic minority	Jews	Non-Jews I	Non-Jews II
Blacks	5.94	4.19	4.47
Ethnic Germans	5.38	5.41	5.96
Chinese	5.34	4.24	4.37
Romanians	4.81	3.58	3.60
Gypsies	4.60	2.98	3.05
Arabs	3.95	3.83	3.71
Mean average	5.00	4.06	4.19

*Scores on a scale of 1–9: 1 = extremely unsympathetic, 9 = extremely sympathetic
I: the total non-Jewish population (N = 1,500), II: the population of Budapest holding at least a secondary school diploma (N = 152)

14 We used the Principal Components Analysis to determine which opinions correlated, i.e. which opinions were judged to express a similar attitude, something in common. We added the individual statements listed in the tables into the analysis. The result was eight 'opinion clusters'. The labels given to each of the eight clusters expresses the common content that might be seen as typical attitudes. On the basis of each cluster's scores on the principal components, respondents were clustered into the three attitude groups (*liberals*, *religious conservatives*, *left-wing conservatives*). For this procedure we used the quickcluster programme of SPSS.

- *Nostalgia for the socialist system*: agreement with the following statements: 'Under the socialist regime people had more hope for the future'; 'People now have less power to influence the future of the country'; 'Under the old regime it was easier to understand laws and regulations than it is now'; and 'Leaders were keener to listen to people's opinions during the Kadar regime than they are now';
- *Law and order*: agreement with the statement that the 'entry of refugees should be restricted' and that 'capital punishment should be introduced for the most serious crimes';
- *Hungarian national feeling*: agreement with the statement that 'the interests of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries should be more firmly represented' and that 'no Hungarian interests should be sacrificed for EU membership';
- *Strong religious sentiment*: measured by the level of observance of religious laws and the High Holy Days, the intensity of religious feeling and the frequency of synagogue visits;
- *Xenophobic sentiment*: measured by attitudes towards the Chinese, ethnic Germans, Gypsies, Blacks, Romanians and Arabs.

As already noted, three large, well-defined groups within the Jewish population were differentiated.

Liberals

This was the largest group of Jews, comprising about 56 per cent of the sample population. This group was termed 'liberal' because its members exhibited trust in the rule of law and supported economic liberalism. Nostalgia for the old regime, conservative feelings, a law-and-order ideology, strong national feeling and xenophobia were *not* characteristics of this group. The members of this group were not religious (about 60 per cent characterized themselves as non-religious or atheist). In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, men, residents of Budapest, the well-educated and better-off subgroups defined the profile of this group.

Religious conservatives

This group (9 per cent of the sample) comprised those who had difficulty adjusting to the post-Communist socio-economic situation. They were strongly suspicious of the rule of law and unwilling to accept economic liberalism. At the same time, they had negative rather than nostalgic feelings for the old regime. This follows logically from their strong religiosity (more than 70 per cent observed at least the High Holy Days). In this group the proportion of women, elderly people, people living in the larger towns outside Budapest, those with a lower education (up to a vocational school diploma) and poorer people was significantly above the sample average. This group comprised significantly fewer people aged betwee 36 and 55.

Left-wing conservatives

The third group (comprising 35 per cent of the sample), unlike the other two, was strongly nostalgic about the socialist regime. It did not believe in the rule of law, it rejected economic liberalism and espoused a strong law-and-order ideology. Its members were somewhat xenophobic and harboured anti-Gypsy feelings. These characteristics indicate that this group found the post-Communist political and economic changes difficult. People who lived in smaller urban centres, who had been educated to secondary school level only and who had below average standards of living were over-represented in this group. Significantly, this group had no members in the 18–25 age cohort. Its members were generally neutral with regard to religion: neither atheism (9 per cent) nor minimal observance (31 per cent) were characteristic of it.

These findings indicate that the *religious conservatives* had the strongest Jewish identity, with 63 per cent of this small group reporting a strong or a very strong Jewish identity. The weakest Jewish identity was found among the *left-wing conservatives*, who represented over a third of the sample; 7 per cent of this group reported that being Jewish meant 'almost nothing' to them and 27 per cent that it meant only very little. In terms of its Jewish identity, the *liberals* stood between the other two groups.

9 Summary

Some of the findings of this survey of contemporary Hungarian Jewry are, perhaps, predictable given the modern social history of Hungarian Jews and the consequences of the Holocaust in Hungary. However, the research findings also reveal phenomena that reflect specific developments of the post-war years. These may be summarized briefly as follows.

Somewhere between 0.8 and 1.5 per cent of Hungary's present-day population are the offspring of at least one Jewish parent. The average age of the group is high in relation to the general population. One reason for this is the cohort-specific consequence of the Holocaust: first, the small size of the generation born prior to 1944 and, second, emigration after 1945. Another reason is that, on average, Jews live longer than the general population. Due to the age composition of the Jewish population and a relatively low birth-rate, which reflects a general trend in Hungary, the size of the Hungarian Jewish population is likely to continue to decline.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, more than 15 per cent of Hungary's Jewish population lived in Budapest, and Jews comprised more than 20 per cent of the city's total population. During the Holocaust, almost all of Hungary's Jewish population outside the capital lost their lives, while most Jews in Budapest survived. Today, 90 per cent of Hungary's Jews reside in Budapest, reaffirming the historical trend, and they account for about 5 per cent of the capital's total population. In terms of their geographical distribution, relatively large numbers of Jews reside in high-status neighbourhoods, reflecting the economic and social status of the group; in contrast, Jews are also numerous in districts of Budapest that have been traditionally inhabited by Jews. A new phenomenon is the return of small groups of Jews to Hungary's provincial towns and cities, a process that may be explained by economic developments since 1990 and the rapid expansion of universities in the provincial cities.

Contemporary Hungarian Jewry is a high-status group in Hungarian society. One reason for this is that the Jewish population is highly educated. Compared with the population at large, Jews have traditionally attained very high educational qualifications, a trend maintained in the decades after the Holocaust. Forty-five per cent of today's Jewish population hold university or college degrees, a proportion some 20 per cent higher than that for the general population of Budapest. Analysis of educational qualifications by age group allows us to refine our observations further. The number of university or college graduates began to increase rapidly in the immediate post-war years, peaking among those currently aged between 35 and 54 (72 per cent). This was partly the consequence of a delayed realization of the desire for the education and social mobility that had been unachievable during the years of discrimination and persecution, a kind of compensatory mobility. However, it was also the realization of the potential of a population group that has traditionally placed great value on education and knowledge. This trend appears to have broken down in the young generation: just 30 per cent of the under-35s have higher education qualifications than the general population, a performance figure much lower than that for the previous generation, even when those who are currently students (9 per cent) are taken into account. It appears that developments since 1990—in particular the formation of a capitalist market economy—have altered the career paths of younger people. The attractiveness of professions requiring higher education has declined in favour of careers, such as running a business enterprise, that require no such qualifications but do not represent a decline in economic status.

The employment structure and consumption level of the Jewish population reflects that of a highly educated group and most Jews can be located in the upper-middle sector of Hungarian society. Nevertheless, the population of older Jews includes several subgroups that face significant social problems. Analysis of the demographic data reveals a relatively large group of elderly women living alone with a relatively deprived economic status.

The findings show that roughly three-quarters of the Jewish population are from religiously and ethnically homogeneous families, having four Jewish grandparents. Analysed by age group, however, the picture is much more differentiated and indicates a breakdown of the homogeneous family background. Whereas 84 per cent of those aged 56 or over have homogeneous family backgrounds, this ratio falls to just 40 per cent among the under-35s. Underlying this trend is the dramatic increase in the rate of

exogamous marriage since the Second World War. On the other hand, the data also indicate that, from the mid-1950s, the rate of out-marriage stabilized at approximately 50 per cent. As in other countries, the propensity to out-marry is greater among Hungarian men than among women.

The survey of the level of religiosity and the observance of Jewish religious and cultural traditions shows that the contemporary Hungarian Jewish population is highly secularized; the strength of religious belief among Jews is lower than among non-Jewish Hungarians. The process of detachment from religious orthodoxy began among Hungarian Jews after the emancipation and, by 1910, 41 per cent of Jews belonged to non-Orthodox (Neolog) communities. This process was reinforced by the almost complete destruction during the Holocaust of the more observant Jewish population in the provinces, with the vast majority of survivors being from Budapest, which was clearly more secularized than the rest of the country. The Communist authorities' subsequent anti-religious policies reinforced this trend.

For all these reasons, it is no surprise to find that the population surveyed exhibits little interest in religious and cultural traditions. According to our data, around 8–10 per cent of the sample may be considered 'traditionally minded' Jews, while about a quarter state that they do have some contact with Jewish religious institutions. In reality, however, it is likely that this group's share of the total Jewish population is smaller (for the causes of the distortion, see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, there are clear signs that some of the under-35s have begun to re-embrace Jewish tradition and religiosity.

Data relating to both religious belief and practice indicate that, in Hungary, religious and cultural identity do not lie at the centre of a sense of Jewishness. Instead, the central element of identity appears to be a historical memory of persecution and of Jewish forebears. Fifteen per cent of respondents state that they have a strong Jewish identity, while a third describe their Jewish identity as weak or almost non-existent. Most respondents have a dual identity, with Jewish and Hungarian elements existing in tandem. Irrespective of changes in the political make-up of the country, this trend reflects policies followed and supported by Jewish institutions and the Hungarian state ever since emancipation, with the exception of the era of discrimination and persecution. Almost two-thirds of respondents are satisfied with the community's level of integration and consider it unnecessary for Jews to make further efforts towards social integration. Indeed, a relatively large subgroup of the population is opposed to further assimilation: a fifth of respondents consider it better to avoid further marriages between Jews and non-Jews.

Three-quarters of the respondents demonstrate a strong emotional identification with Israel. The Jewish state is important to them, they are proud of it, and they feel that the existence of Israel represents security for Jews. However, this attachment is mostly emotional and the group was considerably more divided when it came to expressing views on whether or not they accepted the Zionist position on the significance of Israel for the diaspora. More than half the respondents and about two-thirds of university graduates do not agree that Israel is 'the real home of the Jews', and even fewer indicate that they have considered emigrating to Israel.

Regarding the relationship between Jews and non-Jews, the findings of the survey indicate that a large majority of Jews in Hungary (64 per cent) are satisfied with the level of social and political influence of Jews, and do not feel that Jews are subject to greater disadvantages in the economic field than are non-Jews. Nevertheless, almost two-thirds of respondents feel that antisemitism has increased considerably in recent decades, and a third fear that this trend will continue. The responses show that this perception of antisemitism is not related to incidents of discrimination or violence since the number of violent acts against Jewish individuals and institutions motivated by antisemitism has been negligible in Hungary over the past decade. The fear stems from the appearance of traditional and 'new' antisemitic views, in both the media and in public political discourse, which, thanks to the right to freedom of speech, may now be openly expressed. A majority of Jews would like to see a change in this situation: 85 per cent consider it acceptable to place legal restrictions on the public expression of antisemitic views, while 59 per cent support such sanctions against Holocaust deniers.

In terms of economic, social and ideological attitudes, statistical analysis shows that a majority of respondents hold liberal views. They believe in the capitalist market economy and support liberal positions on social issues that traditionally separate liberal and conservative standpoints, such as abortion

and the refugee issue. At the same time, there are also two more conservative-minded groups, one of which is a product of the Communist regime that ruled Hungary for almost four decades. This group is anti-capitalist and traditionally leftist, and is the most distant from all forms of Jewish tradition and Jewish identity. The other conservative group comprises mainly traditionally religious Jews. Overall, in terms of its attitudes and probably its party political preferences, contemporary Hungarian Jewry is located on the liberal-left wing of the Hungarian political spectrum.

Appendix 1

Methodology: sample selection and data collection

Several challenges were faced in selecting the sample.

- There are no consistent records on the Jews of Hungary.
- Most Jews in Hungary are not listed members of the Jewish community.
- The significant extent of assimilation and mixed marriage blurs the boundary between who is Jewish and who is not.
- Historical fears related to antisemitism inhibit significant numbers of Jews from openly declaring a Jewish religious-ethnic identity.

Since there was no general database on Jews in Hungary, sampling based on random selection was only partly possible. As a starting point, lists that outlined well-defined groups of the Jewish population were used. As far as the older population (people born before May 1945) is concerned, the list of applicants for Holocaust-era compensation was used as the starting point for sample selection, the assumption being that this register (containing *c.* 20,000 names) covered almost the entire population born before May 1945. We extracted a random sample from this list. Respondents born before May 1945 make up half of the total sample.

In the second stage of sample selection, the issue of representing those born after 1945 was tackled. Two registers were used for constructing a random sample. The first was the records of the Budapest *chevra kadisha* (burial society) because even those Jews without ties to the community generally bury their family members in a Jewish cemetery. In addition to the *chevra kadisha* list, use was made of the membership lists of certain Jewish cultural and social organizations that are independent of the religious community. Only people born after 1945 were considered. In this way, a sample framework was created from which random selection was applied in choosing the addresses of the respondents.

Since the lists included too few addresses of people younger than 55, a second random sample from the compensation list was chosen. Members of the second sample were asked to provide the addresses of their younger relatives (children and grandchildren). However, this still provided too few addresses of younger people, which prompted yet another strategy. Using the data on the older and the younger population already contacted, a quota-sample selection based on three criteria was created: the distribution by detailed place of residence, age and gender. During the quota-interviews, interviewers could choose among the persons who identified themselves as Jews.

Persons on the list received a letter from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary (MAZSIHISZ) asking them to respond to the questionnaire. The interviewers presented the same letter when they met their interviewees. The sample comprised 2,015 respondents. Information was obtained in face-to-face interviews that lasted on average two hours.

As already mentioned in the editor's introduction, there are several reasons for believing that the sample consists of people who are more strongly attached to

Judaism and possess a stronger Jewish identity than the Jewish population as a whole. This assumption is based on several factors. First, when assembling the sample of the younger population, interviewers received information from acquaintances. Finding interview subjects in this way will almost certainly result in the inclusion of those members of the Jewish population who appear more strongly Jewish, who express their Jewishness more freely, who live in a more homogeneously Jewish milieu, and who have stronger Jewish ties. In addition, as many interviewers were Jewish, among them students of the Budapest Jewish University, there was the distinct possibility that the resulting sample would be more closely attached to Judaism, that the interviewers would tend to choose interviewees from among their own social network. Furthermore, knowing how response mechanisms producing 'response biases' usually function, there is reason to believe that, on certain issues, the method of contacting the interviewees (e.g. by a letter from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary) influenced answers in a way that made identification with Judaism more likely. This presumption is made because, in an interview initiated by the Federation and carried out mainly by Jewish interviewers, the interviewees might feel that certain response patterns were expected and in certain cases they might have given answers that they thought would 'conform'. On the other hand, because they felt 'protected' in the interview environment, they might have given answers that they would have avoided under different circumstances. All these features could have distorted the overall picture in favour of heightened Jewish identification and normative response patterns.

Appendix 2

Assessing the size of the Hungarian Jewish population, 1945–2000

The last usable census data on Hungary's Jews are provided by censuses conducted in the four years immediately after the end of the Second World War.[15] Consequently, the current Jewish population of Hungary can only be estimated within certain broad limits. This is partly because there have been no demographic data on religious denominations since 1949 and partly because the data collected between 1945 and 1949 show significant disparities, thus making it difficult to define the size of the starting point from which to estimate, i.e. the number of Jews who survived the war and remained in Hungary. The question of who should be considered a member of the Jewish population raises further difficulties. As a result, the estimates embody much uncertainty.

The first calculation was to define the number of Hungarian Jews who survived the Holocaust. At the end of 1945, the Statistical Information Department of the Hungarian Delegation to the World Jewish Congress prepared a detailed statistical survey of survivors that included 143,624 registered persons. Other calculations—based on indirect means of recording data by German, Hungarian and other diplomatic and internal affairs reports written before peace was declared—estimated the size of post-war Hungarian Jewry at between 220,000 and 260,000. *The former figure of 143,624 persons is considered to be the minimum number of Jewish survivors in 1945 and the latter number of 260,000 persons to be the maximum.* The minimum number basically reflects the number of so-called 'Israelites', while the maximum number reflects the total number of survivors.[16] These are the two data sources from 1945 that were used in estimating the minimum and maximum size of today's Jewish population.

Based on the 1945 numbers, the size of the Jewish population was calculated in five-year periods up to 2000. The demographic patterns of the total population of Budapest—the birth- and death-rates broken down by age groups—were projected on to the Jewish population of Hungary.[17] Growth (in this case decline) of the population was estimated according to the rules of standard demographic calculations based on the size of the female population. In other words, the fertility rates of the total female population of Budapest were projected on to the Jewish female population. Demographic data on the Budapest population were used because, at the end of the war, two-thirds of surviving Jews already lived in Budapest and, over the following decades, most of the Jews in rural areas gradually moved there.

15 For the first time since 1949, the most recent national census of 2000 contained optional questions on religious and ethnic affiliation, but for several reasons (such as the reluctance of Jews to be 'registered') the data concerning the size of Jewish population is considered wholly inaccurate; *c*. 13,000 persons declared that they were Jewish either in a religious or in an ethnic sense.

16 The term 'Israelites' refers to those who declared themselves to be Jewish in the census carried out by the Hungarian Section of the Jewish World Congress in 1945–6, i.e. they were members of the Jewish Religious Community.

17 On demographic data of the Budapest population, see the series of Statistical Yearbooks published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Bureau.

In preparing these estimates, the decline in the population caused by emigration had to be taken into consideration. For these calculations, two large waves of emigration were considered. Based on available sources, it was estimated that 40,000 Jews left Hungary between 1945 and 1949.[18] This number was subtracted from the estimated maximum number of surviving Jews, divided proportionally between the genders and age groups. However, the minimum number of Jews only decreased by 10,000, because this was the difference between the number of Jews registered in 1945 and the number of Jews counted in the 1949 census. For the emigration wave following the 1956 revolution, two figures were calculated: 20,000 and 10,000, i.e. 10,000 were deducted from the number of 'Israelites' and 20,000 from the estimated number of the total Jewish population.

Two final datasets were derived. According to the extrapolation made on the basis of the minimum number of surviving Jews (143,624), the Jewish population of Hungary in 2000 totalled 64,000 persons; on the basis of the maximum number of survivors (260,000) this number amounted to 118,000 individuals.

Table 35: Changes in the estimated number of Hungarian Jews between 1945 and 2000 (matrilineal descent)

Year	Estimated number	
	Minimum	Maximum
1945	143,624	260,000
1950	134,825	236,839
1955	134,195	234,434
1960	118,043	202,721
1965	110,041	187,550
1970	101,100	171,456
1975	94,480	164,120
1980	86,159	153,523
1985	80,353	145,015
1990	73,754	134,648
1995	67,843	124,353
2000	64,000	118,686

18 On Jewish migration, the following sources were used: Anthony H. Richmond, *Postwar Immigrants in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1967); Moshe Sicron, *Immigration to Israel 1948–1953* (Jerusalem: Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel 1957); Kurt R. Grossmann, *The Jewish DP Problem: Its Origin, Scope and Liquidation* (New York 1951); Jacob Lestchinsky, *Jewish Migration for the Past Hundred Years* (New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute, YIVO 1944); the documents of the World Jewish Congress and of YIVO; and the statistics of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

What do these numbers mean? The estimate of 64,000 persons for the year 2000 theoretically represents the minimum Hungarian Jewish population. The final result of the second series of calculations—just under 119,000—represents the maximum number of the Jewish population based on matrilineage. Given that the population estimates calculated were based on the size of the female population, this final result—like all the results of the series—relates to the number of those considered *halakhic* Jews (i.e. Jews according to Orthodox Jewish law). However, this is only true if it is supposed that the female members of the 1945 population of 260,000—considered to be the basis of our calculations—were all considered to be *halakhically* Jewish.

In the calculations the number of children born to a Jewish mother was estimated, regardless of the origin and religious denomination of her spouse. However, the rate of mixed marriage in the age cohorts under 70 is *at least* 50 per cent. Thus, when the group in which only the father is of Jewish origin is also considered, the estimated number of Jews needs to be increased by approximately 25 per cent. On the basis of this calculation, *there are an estimated 80,000 to 150,000 people today with at least one parent of Jewish origin.*

In theory, the results of this population estimate can be tested by comparing them with concrete facts and figures. However, information on the size of the population is incomplete. The data available on the number of Jewish burials are partial and scattered to such an extent that for all practical purposes they are inadequate to verify the calculations. Theoretically, the number of people who applied for Holocaust compensation prior to 1995 could be compared with the relevant data in the tables. However, when reviewing them, it became obvious that the number of applicants and the number of Holocaust survivors who were alive at the time of application—in other words, of those theoretically entitled to compensation—do not correspond.

The information provided by the Hungarian Jewish Heritage Public Foundation (MAZSÖK) regarding persons entitled to a life-annuity (every person of Jewish origin born before 8 May 1945) was more useful in verifying the calculations. According to the Foundation's files, 18,634 individuals had applied to the organization for compensation as of 19 January 1999. Consequently, at this time, this was the minimum number of persons of Jewish origin aged over 54. This number does not differ significantly from the results of the calculations for the year 2000 based on the maximum number of survivors (260,000 individuals), which indicated that there were 21,073 persons over the age of 54 in the year 2000. Although by the end of 2000 deaths had reduced the number of people registered by MAZSÖK to less than 18,000, the difference between the number of applicants for compensation and the demographic estimate is surprisingly small. Moreover, the difference between the estimated population and the registered population is probably even smaller than that shown by the numbers, as in earlier cases not every survivor entitled to compensation contacted MAZSÖK.

Although the similarities between the concrete data on the number of Holocaust survivors and the results of the estimate of the population do not totally verify the calculations, it can be stated that the calculated data—especially the information concerning the overall population of survivors—reflect real demographic processes. Reinforced by two present sociological surveys, the

calculations probably do not differ significantly from reality: in 1999 and in 2003, just over 2 per cent of a sample representing the entire adult Hungarian population (older than 18) claimed to have persons of Jewish origin among their parents or grandparents. Projected on to the entire adult population, this means approximately 170,000 individuals. At the same time it is important to emphasize repeatedly that the population data merely reflect trends, and the numbers published in the tables with five and six digits indicate orders of magnitude only.

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