

AMERICAN JEWRY, 1970: A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

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Introduction

BASIC TO AN EVALUATION of the current status and future prospects of the Jewish community in the United States is an analysis of the group's demographic structure: its size, distribution, and composition, and factors affecting its future growth and character. The demographic structure of the American Jewish population, like that of the United States population as a whole, has been undergoing steady change under the impact of industrialization and urbanization. An evaluation of the Jewish community therefore requires an assessment of changes which are a function of the total American experience, as well as those which may be unique to the Jews. At the same time, the changing demographic structure also calls for continuous further adjustment in the behavior of individual members of the Jewish community and in the structure of the community as a whole. Thus, the sociodemographic structure is both a product and a cause of change in Jewish life in the United States.

From biblical times, Jews have sought to know how numerous they were: even in the wilderness of Sinai, God commanded Moses, "Take ye the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel, by their

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families, by their fathers' houses, according to the number of names" (Numbers 1:2). The United States, too, has, from the very beginning of its history as an independent nation, counted its population. At first, the U.S. census served as a basis for representation in Congress; increasingly, it has become a source of information on a wide range of social and economic topics reflecting current research and policy-related concerns. The 1970 census, for example, collected data on such widely different factors as education, income, occupation, migration, disability, fertility, housing, and the number of washing machines and television sets. Yet, the U.S. census omitted any question on religion.

In the most recent definitive work on the world's Jewish population, Professor U. O. Schmelz of the Hebrew University points out that "the task of drawing even a rough outline of the present demographic situation of world Jewry is greatly complicated by vast lacunae in our knowledge."¹ This is especially true in the United States. Because of the high premium placed on separation of church and state, a question on religion has never appeared in a decennial U.S. census, nor, with the exception of the marriage records of two states, does it appear in any vital registration records.² In the general absence of official and comprehensive information on religion, social scientists concerned with research in which religious differentials are a key focus have had to rely largely on specialized sample surveys to obtain their data. But in most instances, because these surveys focus on the total population, the sample seldom includes more than several hundred Jews, and often considerably less, thereby making comprehensive analyses of the Jewish subgroup difficult, if not impossible. For needed information, Jewish groups have therefore had to collect their own data on the size, distribution, composition, and vital processes of the Jewish population.

Since 1955, more than 20 Jewish communities have undertaken surveys. Yet, because most of the communities have been of moderate size, legitimate questions have been raised about their typicality in relation to the Jewish population of the United States as a whole,

¹ U. O. Schmelz and P. Glickson, *Jewish Population Studies, 1961-1968* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1970), p. 13.

² Conrad Taeuber, "The Census and a Question on Religion" (paper presented at a conference sponsored by the National Community Relations Advisory Council, the Synagogue Council of America, and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, New York, N.Y., October 23, 1967).

and, in particular, about their representativeness of Jewish communities in such large metropolitan centers as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Both to satisfy the need for national data and to insure coverage of large communities, the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) is currently in the process of collecting data that will permit the first comprehensive assessment of the Jewish demographic situation in the United States. Until the results of this study are complete, however, insights must rely heavily on the information provided by the individual community surveys and by the limited number of national surveys focusing on demographic characteristics by religion.

For an understanding of the dynamics of change characterizing the Jews in the United States, a brief outline of the demographic and socio-historical setting is essential.³ Two interrelated factors set into motion the social forces which have determined the pattern of Jewish life in the United States. First, from 1880 to the mid-1920's, the size of the Jewish population increased rapidly, from less than a quarter of a million to an estimated 4.2 million. This phenomenal growth converted the Jewish population in America from an insignificant minority, too small to establish anything more complex than localized Jewish communal life, to a substantial and vibrant national American subsociety. At the beginning of the 1970's the American Jewish community, numbering about 6 million, constitutes the largest concentration of Jews in the world, more than two-and-one-half times the number of Jews in Israel, and accounts for nearly half of world Jewry. Yet, although Jews are considered one of the three major religious groups in the United States, they are less than 3 per cent of the total population, and, in fact, are undergoing a continuous decline in proportion, as the total population grows at a faster rate than do the Jews.

The second major factor transforming the American Jewish community is the source of its population growth. The tremendous increase in number was not the result of natural growth—the excess of births over deaths; nor was the growth evenly spread over the nine decades. Rather, the increase was primarily the consequence of the heavy immigration of East European Jews between 1870 and 1924. Before

³ For a fuller discussion of the socio-historical setting of contemporary American Jewry, see Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1968); also C. Bezalel Sherman, *The Jew Within American Society* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965).

1870, the American Jewish community was composed largely of first- and second-generation German Jews who had immigrated in the 50 preceding years. Of the remaining number, some were of Sephardi origin, descendants of the original Spanish-Portuguese settlers of the colonial period; others were from Central Europe, descendants of a pre-19th-century migration. By the 1920's German and Sephardi Jews no longer constituted the dominant Jewish subcommunity in America, but were submerged in the overwhelming numbers of East European immigrants, 2.5 million of whom arrived between 1870 and 1924. The immigration quota laws of the 1920's ended the mass influx of East European Jews, and since then the growth of the American-Jewish population has been remarkably slow. As a result, the conditions defining the character of the American Jewish community at the beginning of the 1970's evolved out of the Jewish immigration at the turn of the century. Increasingly, however, the character of the American Jewish community is the result of internal changes among native-born American Jews. And the growing dominance of this segment of the population has set the stage for the significant social and cultural changes within the Jewish population, which will take place in the closing decades of the 20th century. The transition from a foreign-born, ethnic immigrant subsociety to an Americanized second- and third-generation community has had, and increasingly will have, major consequences for the structure of the Jewish community and for the lives of American Jews.

Sources and Limitations of Data

As indicated, there is no single authoritative source of information on the demography of American Jews. Under the circumstances, a variety of sources must be used, each varying in the comprehensiveness, representativeness, and quality of its data. For national coverage, the best single source of information probably is the set of data collected by the Bureau of the Census in its March 1957 Current Population Survey,⁴ which included a question on religion. Unlike the decennial census, this survey of some 35,000 households was voluntary.

⁴ U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States, March, 1957," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 79 (Washington, D.C., 1958). All other references in this paper to the 1957 census sample survey refer to this publication or to the unpublished data emanating from the same survey, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March, 1957."

The question on religion was used for two reasons: 1) to ascertain the public reaction to such a question, and 2) to evaluate the quality of the answers to the specific wording of the question. But even before the first results of the survey were made available to the public in February 1958, the director of the census announced that the 1960 census of population would not include any inquiry on religion.⁵ The reason cited was that a considerable number of persons would be reluctant to answer such a question in the census where a reply is mandatory. This decision was reached even though in the 1957 survey only one per cent of all persons 14 years old and over had made no report on religion, thereby suggesting that the American people were quite willing to reply to such a question, at least on a voluntary basis. After giving some consideration to the inclusion of a question on religion in the 1970 census, the director announced again, on November 16, 1966, that a decision had been taken not to add this question because "a substantial number of persons again expressed an extremely strong belief that asking such a question in the Decennial Population Census, in which replies are mandatory, would infringe upon the traditional separation of church and state."⁶ Thus, the 1957 Current Population Survey data remain one of the best bases for determining the religious composition of the American population and the social and economic characteristics of individuals in the various religious groups.

Until recently, the only source of statistics from the 1957 survey was the Current Population Report of February 2, 1958, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March, 1957." When the report was released, it was generally assumed that others would follow; but because of various pressures on the Bureau of the Census, this did not happen, and a wealth of data on the social and economic characteristics of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews was repressed. In 1967, however, the Freedom of Information Act was passed by Congress, and, in accordance with its provisions, the Bureau of the Census made available upon request unpublished tabulations from the 1957 survey, covering a considerable amount of information on the demography of religious groups in the United States.⁷ Although now 13 years old, the data nevertheless provide an im-

⁵ Taeuber, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

⁷ Sidney Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials among Religious Groups in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1969, pp. 612-631.

portant base against which future changes in composition can be measured. And in the absence of other national statistics, they constitute one of the few comprehensive sets of information on the characteristics by religion of the American population.

Other nationwide statistics on religious composition are available from various surveys undertaken by public opinion polls and other organizations. Use of such data has been made by Donald Bogue in *The Population of the United States*, and by Bernard Lazerwitz.⁸ From 1906 to 1936 limited data were available from the Census of Religious Bodies, periodically taken by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, through a questionnaire mailed to the pastors and clerics of the parishes or congregations. It enumerated the membership of the various religious groups, but provided no information on their social and economic characteristics.

Finally, insights into the characteristics of Jews and the differences between the Jewish population and the total population are available from a number of community population surveys, usually sponsored by the local Jewish federation.⁹ These studies differ considerably in quality, depending in particular on the manner of selecting the sample population but also on the quality of the interviewers and the analysis. Some of these surveys relied exclusively on the lists of families available to the local federation. The representativeness of these lists varies considerably and often is strongly biased in favor of individuals and families who identify themselves as Jewish. In other communities, a concerted effort was made to insure coverage of both affiliated and nonaffiliated families. The success of such attempts obviously varies both with the community's size and with the ease of identifying non-affiliated units. In the limited instances where these efforts are successful, the master lists provide a good basis for selecting a representative sample of the entire population. In communities where there is serious doubt about the comprehensiveness of the coverage, use of master lists for sampling purposes must be supplemented by efforts to identify those segments of the population not included in the file.

⁸ Donald J. Bogue, *The Population of the United States* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 688-709; Bernard Lazerwitz, "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, September 1961, pp. 568-579.

⁹ A selected bibliography of community surveys is included in Appendix A of this paper. The reader is referred to this list for citations of specific studies. No separate footnote citations will be given in the text.

Most frequently this is done through area samples in which all households in the area, both Jewish and non-Jewish, are surveyed to screen out the Jewish households for further interviewing. Such screening is essential, since any conclusions concerning such matters as the nature of Jewish identification, membership in Jewish organizations, and intermarriage would be seriously biased if individuals and families who are most assimilated and therefore least likely to be included in a master list are omitted from the survey. Yet community surveys frequently fail in this respect. For this reason in particular, their findings must be interpreted with great care; the patterns noted may apply only to the affiliated segments of the population.

An additional problem is the extent to which any particular community, or group of communities, adequately represents the Jewish population of the United States as a whole, or even a particular region. Most surveys have been conducted in moderate-sized communities, with Jewish populations of 25,000 or less; Boston, Los Angeles, Washington, Detroit, and San Francisco are the exceptions. Conspicuously absent from any such list are New York City, accounting for approximately 40 per cent of the American Jewish population; Philadelphia with approximately 330,000 Jews, and Chicago with an estimated 270,000 Jews. Until data become available from these large communities, the extent to which the findings of the smaller communities are typical of the total American Jewish population must remain questionable. Yet the findings of the individual community surveys display impressively similar patterns for the characteristics of the Jewish populations they analyze.¹⁰ Variations can generally be accounted for by the nature of the community itself, that is, whether it is an older community or a newer suburban area, whether it is in the East or in the West. Taking these variations into account, the relatively high degree of homogeneity suggests that the demographic profile of American Jewry as a whole does not deviate significantly from that depicted by already existing sources, incomplete as they are.

The following discussion of what is known about the sociodemo-

¹⁰ A general review of community surveys was made by Ronald M. Goldstein, *The Nature, Character and Trends of Post World War II American Jewry as Reflected in Communal Surveys* (Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion, master's thesis, 1969). For an extensive summary of the thesis see Ronald M. Goldstein, "American Jewish Population Studies Since World War II," *American Jewish Archives*, April 1970, pp. 14–46.

graphic structure of the American Jewish community, and the implications of this structure for the future, will rely heavily on the sources of data just reviewed. In particular, the data from one of the surveys for which this author was personally responsible—Providence, R.I.—will be cited frequently because, as part of the analysis plan for this survey, special emphasis was placed on using cross-sectional data to gain insights into the nature of past and future changes in the demographic structure. No claim is made that this is a typical American Jewish community. Nonetheless, to the extent that the patterns noted in this community correspond closely with those observed elsewhere, there is also no reason to believe that it is particularly atypical of what may be true of the American scene in general.

Population Growth

From a small community of only several thousand persons at the time of the American Revolution, the Jewish population of the United States has increased to about 6 million persons in 1970.¹¹ But this growth has been very uneven. In the mid-19th century, the Jewish population still numbered only 50,000 persons; and by 1880, the year before the major immigration from Eastern Europe set in, Jews in America were estimated to number only 230,000 (Table 1). Out of a total United States population of 50 million, Jews represented less than one-half of 1 per cent. Within the next 10 years the Jewish population almost doubled, and by 1900 it numbered just over 1,000,000 persons. Thus, in a 20-year period, when the total United States population increased only by 50 per cent, the Jewish population increased four-fold. As a result, at the turn of the century Jews constituted 1.4 per cent of the American population. Rapid growth continued through the first years of the 20th century, interrupted only by World War I. By the mid-1920's, when national-origins quota laws restricted further large-scale immigration from both Southern and Eastern Europe, Jews in the United States numbered 4,250,000 persons, or 3.7 per cent of the total population.

¹¹ Estimates for 1818–1899 are based on “Jewish Statistics,” AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 1 (1899–1900), p. 283. Estimates for 1790 and 1907–1937 are from Nathan Goldberg, “The Jewish Population in the United States,” in *The Jewish People, Past and Present* (New York: Jewish Encyclopedia Handbooks, 1955) Vol. 2, p. 25. The 1950–1968 estimates are from AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 70 (1969), p. 260.

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION GROWTH, UNITED STATES, 1790-1970

Year	Number	Per cent of Total U.S. Population
1790 ^b	1,200	0.03
1818 ^a	3,000	0.03
1826	6,000	0.06
1840	15,000	0.1
1848	50,000	0.2
1880	230,000	0.5
1888	400,000	0.6
1897	938,000	1.3
1900	1,058,000	1.4
1907 ^b	1,777,000	2.0
1917	3,389,000	3.3
1927	4,228,000	3.6
1937	4,771,000	3.7
1950 ^c	5,000,000	3.5
1960	5,531,000	3.1
1968	5,869,000	2.9

^a Estimates for 1818-1899 are based on "Jewish Statistics," AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 1 (1900), p. 623.

^b Estimates for 1790 and 1907-1937 are from Nathan Goldberg, "The Jewish Population in the United States," in *The Jewish People, Past and Present*, Vol. 2 (New York: Jewish Encyclopedia Handbooks, 1955), p. 25.

^c The 1950-1968 estimates are from AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 70 (1969), p. 260.

Since then, except for a slight increase in immigration after the rise of Hitler, when our laws were relaxed to permit the entrance of refugees, immigration has not been a major factor in the growth of the American Jewish community. Between 1964 and 1968, for example, an estimated total of only 39,000 Jews, or 2.3 per cent of all immigrants,¹² entered the United States as permanent residents. Jewish population increase now depends largely on an excess of births over deaths. And since the Jewish birth rate is below that of the general population, the rate of increase of Jews has been below that of the total American population. Thus, whereas the United States population has increased by almost two-thirds between 1930 and 1970, the Jewish population has grown by only 40 per cent. According to the latest estimate prepared by the AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, the Jewish population in 1968 was 5,869,000, or 2.94 per cent of the total American population.¹³ If the rate of growth characterizing the 1950's

¹² Jack J. Diamond, "Jewish Immigration to the United States," *ibid.*, pp. 289-294.

¹³ Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States," *ibid.*, Vol. 71 (1970), pp. 344-347.

and 1960's has persisted, the Jewish population will have reached 6,000,000 by 1970. Because of the differential rates of growth of the Jewish and the total populations, the proportion of Jews in the total, after peaking at about 3.7 per cent in the 1920's, has declined to below 3 per cent. It is likely to continue to decline as long as the Jewish birth rate remains below that of the rest of the nation.

This decline in relative numbers may not be very significant, since Jews have never constituted a numerically large segment of the population. If anything, it is noteworthy that, despite their small numbers, they are generally afforded the social position of the third major religious group in the country. There seems little reason to expect that this situation will change even though their percentage in the total population declines further, particularly since Jews, both as a group and individually, will undoubtedly continue to play significant roles in specific spheres of American life, such as cultural activities, education, and urban politics. From the demographic point of view, more important factors may be influencing the position of the Jewish community within the total American community, among them changes in the geographical concentration of Jews in certain parts of the nation as well as their disproportional representation in selected socio-economic strata of the population. But before turning to these considerations, some attention must be given to the operation of the vital processes in the growth of the Jewish population, since this is a key to understanding the total pattern of Jewish growth in the future.

Mortality

As part of his classic studies of the social and religious history of the Jews, Salo W. Baron observed that, as early as the mid-17th century, it had already become noticeable that the "great destructive forces, contagious diseases and wars, seem to have claimed fewer victims among the Jews than among their Gentile neighbors."¹⁴ The explanation for such differentials favoring greater longevity among Jews has varied, including the effect of religious life on health conditions through prescriptions requiring continual washing, restricted food selection, and a weekly day of rest. Some, including Baron, have also suggested that the relatively longer experience which Jews have had living in a "civilized environment" and in an urban setting may

¹⁴ Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), Vol. II, p. 169.

have affected them genetically to the extent that they are more immune to certain contagious diseases. Still others have suggested that the higher than average socio-economic status of the Jews permits them to obtain more and better medical attention and to live in a better environment.

Whether the health and mortality differentials noted by Baron for the mid-17th century Jewish population in Europe also characterize the American Jewish community has been the subject of only limited research. Again, the limitations of available data restrict the opportunities for exploring the question. Religion is not recorded on death certificates in the United States, and only by resorting to information available through funeral directors and cemetery records has some insight been gained into the mortality patterns of American Jews. At varying times, such studies using different approaches have been conducted for New York City, St. Louis, Providence, Detroit, and Milwaukee.¹⁵

Although the specific findings differ somewhat, the data permit the general conclusion that differences exist between the age-specific death rates, life expectancy, and survival patterns of Jews and of the total white population, generally more so for males than for females (Table 2). Jewish age-specific rates are below those of the white population at younger ages, and higher at older ages. The differences for males tend to be sharper than for females at all ages. The lower death rates of Jews at younger ages may result from a combination of the conditions already outlined. There has been some speculation that proportionately more Jews with physically impaired lives may survive until later years, when the effects of chronic disease may take higher tolls, thereby raising the age-specific death rates of older Jews above those of the general population. For example, the data by cause of death for Providence lend support to such a contention; for Jews aged 65 and over, the death rates from all major chronic diseases were higher than for the total white population.

Comparison of life tables for Jews and total whites suggests that average life expectancy at birth favors Jewish males, but shows little

¹⁵ H. Seidman, L. Garfinkel, and L. Craig, "Death Rates in New York City by Socio-economic Class and Religious Group and by Country of Birth, 1949-1951," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, December 1962, pp. 254-272; K. Gorwitz, "Jewish Mortality in St. Louis and St. Louis County, 1955-1957," *Jewish Social Studies*, October 1962, pp. 248-254; Sidney Goldstein, "Jewish Mortality and Survival Patterns: Providence, Rhode Island, 1962-1964," *Eugenics Quarterly*, No. 13, 1966, pp. 48-61; S. Joseph Fauman and Albert J. Mayer, "Jewish Mortality in the U.S.," *Human Biology*, September 1969, pp. 416-426.

TABLE 2. SELECTED MORTALITY MEASURES, JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE
POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE^a

Age	Death Rates per 1,000 Population				Number Surviving to Specified Age per 1,000 Born Alive ^b				Expectation of Remaining Years of Specified Ages ^b			
	Males		Females		Males		Females		Males		Females	
	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White
Under 1	10.9	25.7	14.3	20.0	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	70.8	67.5	73.4	73.6
1-4	—	0.8	—	0.8	989	975	986	981	70.6	68.2	73.4	74.1
5-14	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3	989	972	986	978	66.6	64.4	69.4	70.3
15-24	—	0.8	0.8	0.4	984	968	984	975	56.9	54.7	60.0	60.6
25-34	0.6	1.1	—	0.7	984	961	976	971	46.9	45.1	50.0	50.8
35-44	2.4	2.7	0.7	1.7	978	950	976	964	37.2	35.5	40.0	41.1
45-54	4.6	9.2	3.2	4.8	955	924	969	948	27.9	26.4	30.3	31.7
55-64	17.2	23.8	13.2	11.7	912	843	938	904	19.0	18.4	21.1	23.0
65-74	55.8	52.5	43.6	31.3	768	664	822	804	11.6	12.1	13.4	15.2
75-84	124.4	108.2	91.1	85.0	433	388	528	587	6.8	7.1	8.0	9.0
85 and over	380.9	232.8	328.1	202.9	101	182	197	237	2.6	4.6	3.0	5.0

^a Deaths to Jewish population, 1962-64; deaths to total white population of Rhode Island, 1959-61.

^b Statistics refer to age at beginning of the age range indicated, e.g., of 1,000 Jewish males born, 989 were alive at age 1 and 955 were alive at age 45. The average number of years of life remaining at ages 1 and 45 were 70.6 and 27.9, respectively.

difference for females. The advantage of Jewish males declines, however, with advancing age and actually becomes less than that of all whites beyond age 65. For females, the life expectancy of Jews remains below that of total whites throughout the life cycle, and the differential tends to become increasingly higher from middle age onward. Because the proportion of individuals surviving to a particular age reflects the effects of mortality only up to that age, the lower Jewish mortality in childhood, as well as in the early and middle adult stages of the life cycle, accounts for higher proportions of Jews surviving into middle age and, in the case of males, even into the lower range of old age.

Since the studies on which these conclusions are based cover a range of 25 years, it appears that identification as a Jew has continued to affect the life chances of individuals. But two points must be stressed: 1) the life table data are cross-sectional, i.e., they are based on the mortality experience of the population at a given point in time rather than on the longitudinal mortality experience of a given birth cohort as it passes through the life cycle. As such, the current experience of the older generation probably does not reflect the patterns which will characterize the younger population at older ages; nor do the current patterns of the younger groups necessarily represent the mortality experience of the older population at earlier ages. Relatively small differences already exist between Jews and the total white population, and these will most likely diminish still further as the socio-economic environment of Jews and non-Jews and their utilization of health services become more similar in the years ahead. 2) The existing differences are not large enough to account for the over-all differences in the rate of natural increase of the Jewish population, compared to the total population. To a much greater extent, that differential is attributable to variations between Jews and non-Jews in levels of fertility.

Fertility

Whatever the source of information, fertility research in the United States has consistently found a lower birth rate for Jews than for members of other religious groups. As early as the late 19th century, a study of over 10,000 Jewish families in the United States revealed that the Jewish birth rate was lower than the non-Jewish.¹⁶ In the

¹⁶ John S. Billings, "Vital Statistics of the Jews in the United States," *Census Bulletin*, No. 19, December 30, 1889, pp. 4-9.

Rhode Island census of 1905, the only state census that obtained information on religion and related it to family size, the average family size of native-born Jewish women was 2.3, compared to an average of 3.2 for native-born Catholics and 2.5 for native-born Protestants.¹⁷ Similarly, the birth rates of Jews in the 1930's were shown to be lower than those of economically comparable Protestant groups; Jews also were found to have a higher proportion using contraceptives, planning pregnancies and relying on more efficient methods to achieve that goal.¹⁸ The Indianapolis fertility study conducted in 1941 included Jews only in the screening phase of the investigation, which was designed to focus exclusively on Protestant couples; but even here the fertility rates, standardized for age, were about 18 per cent higher for Catholics than for Protestants and about 25 per cent lower for Jews than for Protestants.¹⁹

Beginning in the 1950's, a series of important surveys were undertaken to investigate the fertility behavior of the American population. Among these were the Growth of American Families Studies (GAF), the Princeton Fertility Studies, and investigations based on the Detroit Area Studies.²⁰ In each of these, Jews constituted only a small proportion of the total sample, thereby precluding detailed investigation of Jewish fertility. Yet the data on Jews yielded by these studies were clear-cut in pointing to lower Jewish fertility. The results of the GAF study indicate, for example, that in 1955 the average family size of Catholic and Protestant couples was 2.1, compared to an average of

¹⁷ *Rhode Island Census of 1905*, Tables VII and VIII, pp. 550-553.

¹⁸ R. K. Stix and Frank Notestein, *Controlled Fertility* (Baltimore: The William and Wilkins Co., 1940), p. 29; Raymond Pearl, *The Natural History of Population* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 241-242.

¹⁹ Pascal K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Differential Fertility Among Native-White Couples in Indianapolis," *Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility, I, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, July 1943, pp. 226-271.

²⁰ Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton, and Arthur A. Campbell, *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); Pascal K. Whelpton, Arthur A. Campbell, and John E. Patterson, *Fertility and Family Planning in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Charles F. Westoff, Robert G. Potter, Jr., Philip C. Sagi, and Eliot G. Mishler, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Charles F. Westoff, Robert G. Potter, Jr., and Philip C. Sagi, *The Third Child* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); David Goldberg and Harry Sharp, "Some Characteristics of Detroit Area Jews and Non-Jewish Adults," in Marshall Sklare, *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 108-110.

only 1.7 for Jewish couples.²¹ Also, Jews expected significantly fewer children (2.4) than either Protestants (2.9) or Catholics (3.4). Over-all, the GAF study found that Jews had the smallest families, married later, expected and desired to have the smallest families, had the most favorable attitudes toward the use of contraception, were more likely to have used contraception, were most successful in planning the number and the spacing of all their children, and were most likely to use the most effective methods of birth control.²² The 1960 GAF study recorded similar patterns. Although differences may have narrowed since then, the results of the 1965 GAF survey, when published, will undoubtedly show the same pattern.

Although focusing on a somewhat different population, and using a follow-up approach to their original sample rather than an independent cross-section of the population in successive rounds of interviews, the Princeton Fertility Studies of 1960 and 1967 reached the same conclusions as those reported by GAF. Jews, when compared to Protestants and Catholics, desired fewer children and more successfully planned their pregnancies. Over 90 per cent of the Jewish couples used the most effective contraceptive methods, compared to only 66 per cent of the Protestants and 35 per cent of the Catholics.²³ These patterns persisted even when metropolitan residence, social class, and other significant variables were controlled.

In its 1957 sample population survey, the United States Bureau of the Census collected information on the number of children ever born. With this information, it is possible to calculate fertility rates expressed as the number of children ever born to women within specific age groups. Here, too, the results obtained confirmed the lower fertility of Jews. The cumulative fertility rate of Jewish women 45 years of age and over was 2.2, compared to 3.1 for Catholic women and 2.8 for Protestant women. Lower fertility also characterized Jewish women at younger ages. Moreover, controlling for area of residence, the fertility rate for Jewish women in urban areas was 14 per cent below that of urban women of all religions combined. Finally, the evidence available from over a dozen Jewish community studies points to similar lower Jewish fertility (Table 3). In Providence, for example,

²¹ Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 608-610.

²² Whelpton, Campbell, and Patterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72; 247-252.

²³ Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

TABLE 3. JEWISH FERTILITY RATIO: NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5 TO NUMBER OF WOMEN AGED 20-44, SELECTED COMMUNITIES

<i>Community^a</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Fertility Ratio</i>
New Orleans, La.	1953	496
Lynn, Mass.	1955	528
Canton, O.	1955	469
Des Moines, Ia.	1956	596
Worcester, Mass.	1957	525
New Orleans, La.	1958	510
Los Angeles, Cal.	1959	560
South Bend, Ind.	1961	494
Rochester, N.Y.	1961	489
Providence, R.I.	1963	450
Camden, N.J.	1964	480
Springfield, Mass.	1966	418
Columbus, O.	1969	444
U.S. white population	1960	667
U.S. white population	1969	523

^a See appendix for citation of individual community studies.

there were 450 Jewish children under five years of age for every 1,000 women aged 20 to 44. This was significantly lower than the fertility ratio of the total population in the metropolitan area (620) or the total white urban American population (635). A similar differential characterized Springfield.

The low Jewish fertility is significant for Jewish population growth because the average number of children born is so close to the minimum number needed for replacement. Replacement level is generally cited as 2.1, taking into account that a small proportion of adults will never marry and that a small percentage of those who do will not produce children. The importance of fertility is accentuated as the rate of intermarriage increases, contributing to possible losses in the population through both conversion of the Jewish partner away from Judaism and the socialization of children of mixed marriages either in non-Jewish religions or in an entirely nonreligious environment.

Within the Jewish group itself, research, particularly on the Providence community, has shown considerable variations in birth levels among groups differing in religious identifications (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform), social class, and generation status. In particular, the Providence data emphasized the importance of generation changes in the relation of social class to fertility. The data clearly indicate the trend

toward convergence and greater homogeneity in the fertility patterns of socio-economic groupings within the Jewish population, with distance from the first generation. This contraction of socio-economic differentials may be regarded as the result of the widespread rationality with which the majority of contemporary Jews plan their families, the absence of rapid upward mobility characteristic of earlier generations, and the greater homogeneity of the contemporary Jewish social structure.

Third-generation American Jews are largely concentrated in the college-educated group and in high white-collar occupations. The lack of wide social class distinctions for this generation may account for the absence of striking fertility differences within this segment of the Jewish population. It may thus be fortunate from the point of view of Jewish population growth that such a large proportion of the younger generation are concentrated in the higher education and higher socio-economic groups. Reflecting a reversal in the older pattern of high fertility among the lower socio-economic segments of the population, the fertility data from the Springfield survey show that it is the higher educated among the younger groups within the Jewish population who have the highest fertility levels.²⁴ Had the lower fertility characterizing the more educated segments of the Jewish population of earlier generations persisted and become dominant in the younger generations, the problem of demographic survival facing the Jewish community today would be accentuated. For the immediate future, all available evidence continues to point to inadequate birth levels among Jews, insuring little more than token growth. This being so, the total Jewish population is not likely to increase rapidly beyond its present six million level.²⁵

Marriage and the Family

The family, as one of the primary institutions of society, not only functions to reproduce and maintain the species, but acts as one of the major agents of socialization in the transmission of values, at-

²⁴ Sidney Goldstein, "Completed and Expected Fertility in an American Jewish Community," *Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1969* (forthcoming).

²⁵ For a fuller review of patterns and trends in Jewish fertility see Calvin Goldscheider, "Fertility of the Jews," *Demography*, No. 4, 1967, pp. 196-209; Calvin Goldscheider, "Trends in Jewish Fertility," *Sociology and Social Research*, No. 50, 1966, pp. 173-186.

titudes, goals, and aspirations.²⁶ Any investigation concerned with the future of American Jewry must give some consideration to the composition, structure, and nature of the American Jewish family, particularly at a time when broader changes in the society as a whole have had an important effect on family and marriage patterns.

The Jewish family is generally characterized as having strong ties, tightly knit kinship relations, and great stability. Yet, despite the importance Jews have traditionally attached to the family, few community surveys have given much consideration to it. Attention has generally been restricted to the percentage of individuals in the Jewish population who are married, widowed, or divorced. Only recently have surveys also focused on the type and size of the family unit, age of marriage, and frequency of remarriage. Two sets of data are available for examination of demographic aspects of the Jewish family in America: First, the 1957 census survey contains a limited amount of information on marital patterns by religion. Second, insights into family and marriage patterns can be gained from selected community surveys, particularly that of Providence.

The 1957 census survey data confirm that Jews, compared to the general population, are more apt to marry at some point in their life cycle, to marry at a somewhat later age, and to have more stable marriages (Table 4). These statistics show that 70 per cent of the men 14 years and over in the total population were married, compared to 73 per cent of the Jewish males. Concomitantly, lower proportions of Jewish men were widowed and divorced. The gross data, however, reflect the differential age structure of the Jewish and total male populations. Examination by specific age group is more revealing.

Among males aged 25 to 34, for example, only 17.9 per cent of those in the total population were still single, but this was true of 29.8 per cent of the Jewish males, attesting to the later marriage age of Jewish men. By age 35 to 44, however, this differential disappeared and, in fact, was to some degree reversed. Among men aged 65 and over, 7 per cent in the total population were still single, compared to only 4.8 per cent of the Jewish men. Although these data are cross-sectional, they do indicate that by the end of the life cycle a somewhat higher proportion of Jewish men than of males in the

²⁶ William J. Goode, *The Family* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 1-7.

TABLE 4. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION BY MARITAL STATUS, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX AND AGE, UNITED STATES, 1957^a

Age and Sex	Total Population				Jewish Population			
	Single	Married	Widowed and divorced	Total	Single	Married	Widowed and divorced	Total
Males								
14-19	97.5	2.5	—	100.0	99.4	0.6	—	100.0
20-24	51.8	47.7	0.5	100.0	— ^c	— ^c	— ^c	— ^c
25-34	17.9	80.3	1.8	100.0	29.8	69.3	1.0	100.0
35-44	8.6	88.5	3.0	100.0	5.3	92.6	2.1	100.0
45-64	7.7	86.2	6.1	100.0	7.2	90.0	2.9	100.0
65 and over	7.3	68.4	24.2	100.0	4.8	80.0	15.2	100.0
Total unstandardized	23.9	70.5	5.6 ^b	100.0	23.5	73.0	3.5 ^b	100.0
Total standardized for age	23.9	70.5	5.6	100.0	27.9	68.9	3.2	100.0
Females								
14-19	87.0	12.8	0.2	100.0	96.8	3.2	—	100.0
20-24	29.0	69.1	1.9	100.0	— ^c	— ^c	— ^c	— ^c
25-34	9.1	87.6	3.2	100.0	9.1	88.6	2.3	100.0
35-44	6.4	86.7	6.9	100.0	7.7	87.5	4.8	100.0
45-64	7.1	73.2	19.7	100.0	8.6	75.0	16.4	100.0
65 and over	8.0	36.5	55.5	100.0	1.1	42.5	56.4	100.0
Total unstandardized	18.6	66.7	14.9 ^b	100.0	17.7	67.4	14.8 ^b	100.0
Total standardized for age	18.6	66.7	14.9	100.0	20.8	65.8	13.4	100.0

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulation of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957." (Unpublished.)

Percentage of Population Widowed and Divorced, by Sex

	Widowed	Divorced
Jewish males	2.5	1.0
Total males	3.8	1.8
Jewish females	13.4	1.4
Total females	12.6	2.3

^b Jewish males
 Total males
 Jewish females
 Total females
^c Per cent not shown where base is less than 150,000.

general population were married, although in both cases the proportions reached over 90 per cent.

Regretfully, the census statistics by age do not distinguish between the widowed and divorced. Because the two were grouped together, the percentage increased consistently with rising age, from 0.5 per cent of the total male population aged 20 to 24, to just under one in four males of those aged 65 and over. For all age groups, however, the percentage in this particular marital category was considerably lower for the Jewish male population than for all males. The census statistics do not permit us to determine categorically whether this reflects differences in divorce or in survival. But because these differences hold for all age groups including the younger, which are not likely to be affected by mortality to a very great extent, they may reflect differences in divorce rates as well as a greater tendency for Jewish males to remarry after divorce or widowhood. For all age groups combined, a category for which the census data distinguishes between widowed and divorced, Jewish men had proportionately fewer of both, but the relative difference was greater for the divorced than for the widowed.

The census does present standardized statistics on marital status, which show what the marital status of the Jewish population would be if its age composition were that of the total male population, while retaining its own age specific marital characteristics. Reflecting later age at marriage, the percentage for single Jews is greater than was actually the case, but the percentage of widowed and divorced remains well below the corresponding percentages for the total male population. Comparable analyses can be made for the female population. Over-all, differences between Jewish women and women in the total population seem to be less marked than those characterizing the men; and the similarities extend to the age specific characteristics.

The value of the census data is limited because it determines only marital status. Also important for an evaluation of the Jewish family are questions of stability of marriage, as judged by number of times ever-married persons have been married, changes in age at first marriage, and changes in household types.

The one fact emerging from the various community studies which collected information on marital status is the high proportion of the Jewish population that is married, usually three-fourths or more. Also, judging by those studies which present the per cent married and ever-

married by age group, almost all Jews (95 per cent or more) marry at least once. Three other observations emerge from the data: 1) In the Jewish population, as in the general population, the proportion of widows is considerably higher than the proportion of widowers, reflecting the higher mortality rates of men. 2) The average Jewish male marries later in life than does the Jewish female. 3) The rate of remarriage is higher for widowers than for widows.²⁷

The data collected in the Providence survey lend weight to the assumption that the high value placed by Jewish tradition on marriage and the family leads to both a high marriage rate for Jews and a greater stability of Jewish marriages.²⁸ In Greater Providence, among both males and females, a higher percentage of the Jewish population was married (Table 5). On the other hand, the percentages of separated and divorced persons were below those in the general population. The

TABLE 5. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY MARITAL STATUS, AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, AND PERCENT REMARRIED, JEWISH PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, GREATER PROVIDENCE, BY AGE AND SEX

Age and Sex	Marital Status				Total Per Cent	Median Age at First Marriage	Married More Than Once
	Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed			
Males							
14-19	100.0	—	—	—	100.0	—	—
20-29	57.8	42.2	—	—	100.0	22.4	—
30-39	6.8	90.6	2.6	—	100.0	24.8	0.8
40-49	4.1	94.8	0.3	0.6	100.0	26.4	5.4
50-59	2.8	94.4	0.3	2.5	100.0	27.9	7.2
60-69	4.6	92.6	—	2.8	100.0	27.2	9.7
70 and over	1.6	81.2	0.8	16.4	100.0	25.0	15.7
Total	23.2	74.0	0.5	2.2	100.0	26.1	6.3
Females							
14-19	99.6	0.4	—	—	100.0	—	—
20-29	25.7	71.6	2.8	—	100.0	20.8	4.9
30-39	3.2	93.9	2.1	0.7	100.0	21.6	3.3
40-49	5.3	90.9	0.9	2.9	100.0	23.4	4.3
50-59	8.0	82.6	1.5	8.0	100.0	24.0	5.1
60-69	5.2	62.5	4.0	27.5	100.0	23.1	8.4
70 and over	1.5	39.9	—	58.6	100.0	22.6	10.9
Total	19.5	68.7	1.7	10.1	100.0	22.6	5.6

²⁷ Ronald M. Goldstein, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

²⁸ Goldstein and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

differential pattern generally persists even when age is controlled. The differences in the proportion divorced in the total and Jewish populations are affected by the extent of remarriage, as well as by the different age structures of the two populations. Attesting to the higher stability of Jewish marriages is the fact that the proportion of persons married more than once in the Jewish population was one-third lower than in the general population.

In the Providence Jewish population, as in the total population, certain sex differentials in marital status are noteworthy. The percentages of single and married males were greater than comparable proportions in the female population. On the other hand, the percentages of divorced and widowed women exceeded the comparable values for the men. These sex differences are attributable to several factors. Males tend to marry several years later than females. Sex-selective mortality favors the female, which means that the married woman, on the average, outlives her husband by a number of years. With a larger proportion of older persons projected for the Jewish population, the percentage of widowers and, particularly, of widows will increase. The somewhat lower percentage of separated and divorced males may stem from the greater tendency of men to remarry.

Several national studies have found that Jews marry at later ages than do either Protestants or Catholics.²⁹ The 1957 census survey found the median age at first marriage of Jewish women to be 21.3, compared to 19.9 for Protestants and 20.8 for Catholics. The Providence data also revealed such differentials. The average age of Jewish males at first marriage was 26, compared to 23 for the total population; Jewish women, on the average, were married at age 23, compared to age 20 for the total female population. Moreover, grouping women according to the date of their first marriage suggests that later age of marriage has characterized Jewish women since at least 1920. Age at first marriage has been declining since World War II, after having risen between the 1910 and the 1935-39 marriage cohorts from 19 to 23. The decline in the average marriage age of Jewish women parallels a development in the general population, but the change has been greater for Jewish women, resulting in a narrowing of the differences in the average marriage age between women in the Jewish and the

²⁹ Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton, and John W. Smit, "Socio-Economic Factors in Religious Differentials in Fertility," *American Sociological Review*, August 1961, p. 610; Whelpton, Campbell, and Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

total populations. The pursuit of higher education has often been cited as a reason for delayed marriage among Jews. Although this is undoubtedly a factor, it may not be the only explanation, since the decline in the average age at marriage has taken place at a time when the proportion pursuing higher education has been reaching new peaks. Changes in the general social and economic environment and the greater reliance of Jews on birth control, and its more efficient practice, may be factors in explaining the more rapid decline in the marriage age of Jews.

A related dimension of family structure is household composition, that is, whether the Jewish household contains only the immediate family of husband-wife-children or other relatives, such as grandparents. In Providence, the average size of Jewish households was 3.25 persons, similar to the average found in a number of recent Jewish community studies, most varying between 3.1 and 3.3. This reflects both the low level of fertility characterizing Jewish families and the very great tendency for Jewish households to be organized as nuclear rather than extended household units. In Greater Providence, 85 per cent of all households consisted only of the immediate family of husband, wife, and children. Only 8 per cent included other relatives. An equal proportion were one-person units, but almost all of these were concentrated in the older age groups. That the trend is clearly in the direction of nuclear households is evidenced by the generational differences in the percentage of nuclear household units, which rose from 85 per cent of households headed by a first-generation person, to 97 per cent headed by a third-generation individual. Part of the differences stems from the different age composition of the generations, but even when age is held constant, the increase in nuclear households among third-generation Jews remains.

In organizing their families in nuclear units, Jews are conforming to the pattern characterizing families in the United States as a whole. Such a development is consistent with the trend toward greater geographical separation of childrens' from parents' residences. This has significant implications for the strength of Jewish identification as it is reinforced through the extended family unit. It also has a number of immediate and practical implications for the burdens that the community may be asked to assume as nuclear families break up through the death of a spouse, leaving single individuals who will not be absorbed into the household units of children or other relatives. Coupled with the trend

toward an aging population, the predominance of the nuclear family among Jews takes on added significance.

Intermarriage

Increasing concern with the demographic growth and survival of the Jewish population in the United States is based not only on the low fertility of the Jews; low growth rates or actual decline can also result from excessive losses to the majority group through assimilation. A consistent threat, not only to the maintenance of Jewish identification but also to the demographic maintenance of the Jewish population, is interfaith marriage. If marital assimilation takes place at a high rate, the Jewish group faces demographic losses both through the assimilation of the Jewish partner to the marriage and through the loss of children born to such a marriage. In recent years, concern with the "vanishing American Jew" has reached considerable proportions as a variety of evidence has suggested an increasingly high rate of intermarriage. In the face of earlier evidence that the Jewish group had been remarkably successful, compared to other groups, in maintaining religious endogamy, the disquiet caused by this new evidence is understandable.³⁰ It has generated considerable research in Jewish community surveys on the extent of intermarriage, both as an indication of the possible impact of intermarriage on Jewish demographic survival and as an index of the extent of group conformity, loyalty, and cohesiveness among Jews.

No definite assessment of the level and character of Jewish intermarriage and of changes over time can be made without the development of a considerably better body of data than is currently available. Although statistics on rates of intermarriage are available now from a number of community surveys, the quality of the data varies; their use must be preceded by careful attention to the type of community studied, to the comprehensiveness of the study's population coverage, and to the way intermarriage was measured. The rate of intermarriage tends to be considerably higher in areas where Jews constitute a smaller percentage of the population. The rate of intermarriage is also higher if the data are based on a study in which both Jewish and non-Jewish households in the community are surveyed, since such surveys are most apt to find those families which are on the fringes of the Jewish community. Finally,

³⁰ Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 181-182.

care must be given to the manner in which intermarriage itself is measured. Studies relying exclusively on the current religious identification of marriage partners run the serious risk of undercounting intermarriages, since those partners to a mixed marriage who changed their religion in conjunction with the marriage would not be identified as having intermarried.

There is general agreement that the rate of Jewish intermarriage has increased, but because of the lack of data by which to measure trends, as well as serious questions about the quality of available statistics, the extent of the increase has not been clearly determined. A study of intermarriage in New Haven, Conn., showed, for example, that Jewish intermarriages increased from zero in 1870 to 5.1 per cent in 1950;³¹ but New Haven is one of the very few communities where statistics are available over such a long period of time. Most of the other statements concerning increased rates of intermarriage are based on general comparisons of the current levels of intermarriage in various communities with those in a different set of communities at an earlier time.

For example, in a series of communities cited by Nathan Goldberg, where surveys were taken during the 1930's, the rates of intermarriage generally ranged between 5 and 9 per cent.³² These included such communities as Stamford and New London in Connecticut, and Dallas and San Francisco. But during the same period, Duluth, Minn., showed an intermarriage rate of 17.7 per cent. A number of communities surveyed in the late 1950's and 1960's also showed levels of intermarriage between 5 and 10 per cent: Camden, N.J., Rochester, Los Angeles, Jacksonville, Fla., Long Beach, Cal., and San Francisco. Judging by the similarity between these levels and those noted for a number of communities in the 1930's, one could conclude that there has been no significant rise in the level of intermarriage. Also, in the March 1957 nationwide sample survey, the United States Census found that 3.8 per cent of married persons reporting themselves as Jews were married to non-Jews and that 7.2 per cent of all marriages in which at least one partner was Jewish were intermarriages; but both these figures are probably somewhat low, since no information was collected on the earlier religion of the marriage partners. Couples with one converted spouse

³¹ Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "What Has Social Science to Say About Intermarriage?" in Werner J. Cahnman, ed., *Intermarriage and Jewish Life* (New York: Herzl Press, 1963), p. 29.

³² Nathan Goldberg, "The Jewish Population in the United States," *op. cit.*, p. 29.

were therefore not enumerated as mixed marriages. However, in the late 1950's and the 1960's, other estimates of the rate of Jewish intermarriages based on local studies ranged as high as from 18.4 per cent for New York City, 37 per cent for Marin, Cal., and 53.6 per cent for Iowa.³³ Judging from these latter studies, recent intermarriage rates were higher, but the typicality of these high rates remains questionable.

Other data used to document the rising trend in intermarriage are those comparing differentials among either the various age segments or the various generation levels of the population in a given community. An analysis of this kind by Erich Rosenthal for the Jewish population of Washington, D.C., in 1956 found that the rate of intermarriage was directly related to distance from the immigrant generation.³⁴ Whereas the mixed marriage rate was 11.3 per cent for the total Jewish population, it increased from 1.4 per cent among foreign-born husbands to 10.2 per cent among native-born husbands of foreign parentage, up to 17.9 per cent of native-born husbands of native parentage. Questions have been raised, however, about the typicality of the Jewish community of Washington, and whether findings based on it can be generalized to more stable communities.

Rosenthal's more recent research on Indiana, using marriage records and covering the years 1960–1963, cites an extraordinarily high rate of intermarriage, 48.8 per cent of all marriages occurring in that period.³⁵ The data indicate that intermarriage increases as the size of the Jewish community decreases. In Marion county, containing Indianapolis, the intermarriage rate was 34.5 per cent; in counties with very small Jewish populations it rose to 54 per cent. Rosenthal suggests that “the larger the Jewish community, the easier it is to organize communal activities, to effect the voluntary concentration of Jewish families in specific residential neighborhoods, and to maintain an organized marriage market.”³⁶ The key variable is the number of potential marital partners. Although the Indiana situation again cannot be considered typical of United

³³ New York data are taken from Jerold S. Heiss, “Premarital Characteristics of the Religiously Intermarried in an Urban Area,” *American Sociological Review*, No. 25, 1960, pp. 47–55. Iowa data were analyzed by Erich Rosenthal, “Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States,” *AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK*, Vol. 64 (1963), pp. 34–51.

³⁴ Rosenthal, *ibid.*

³⁵ Erich Rosenthal, “Jewish Intermarriage in Indiana,” *AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK*, Vol. 68 (1967), p. 263.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 263–264.

States Jewry, the high rates in themselves are alarming. They do confirm the much greater probability that intermarriage will occur in those regions of the country and in those communities where the Jewish population is of inadequate size to encourage and to permit high levels of in-marriage.

Another small Jewish community illustrating the high level of intermarriage is that of Charleston, W. Va. In 1959 Charleston had a Jewish population of 1,626. By 1970 it had declined to 1,295. In 1958–1959 the Charleston Jewish community's birth rate was just above its death rate, to provide a small natural increase. By 1969–1970 the death rate in the community was twice that of the birth rate. Of the original Jewish residents in Charleston in 1959, only 939 were left in 1970. The excess of deaths over births, coupled with the loss through out-migration of almost 300 Jews, contributed to this reduction. But particularly noteworthy is the heavy rate of intermarriage. In 1959, 18.4 per cent of all couples living in the Charleston Jewish community were intermarried. By 1970 the proportion had reached 26.8 per cent. Of the 12 marriages which took place in the community during 1969, five were intermarriages. Here, as a case in point, is the drastic decline of a small Jewish community due, it would seem, to its very small size, its high degree of isolation, and the particular economic problems of West Virginia. In this process, intermarriage has played a complementary role to net losses through out-migration and the excesses of deaths over births. This is not to suggest that such a development will become characteristic of United States Jewry as a whole. Yet fear of this kind of development, based on the statistics for such communities as Washington and Indiana, has given rise to the very great concern about the impact of intermarriage on the survival of American Jewry. This kind of relationship also leads to the suggestion that greater mobility among American Jewry may lead to increased rates of intermarriage. For if such mobility takes Jews into communities where the size and density of Jewish population are small, the result may differ little from the one noted for Indiana or Charleston, W. Va.

In assessing our current knowledge of intermarriage, it must be recognized that several important areas of research concerning marriages between Jews and non-Jews have been largely neglected. Not all cases of intermarriage necessarily lead to the loss of the Jewish partner. Conversion of the non-Jew to Judaism may actually add to the Jewish population and also increase the likelihood that the children of such a

marriage will be raised as Jews.³⁷ In order to ascertain the extent to which this happens, surveys focusing on intermarriage must obtain information on the extent of conversion, as well as on the religion in which the children of mixed marriages are raised. Both the Providence and Springfield surveys collected such information. Although these are limited by their reliance on master lists, steps were taken to insure maximum opportunity for inclusion of all Jewish households. While no claim is made that the resulting statistics have identified all intermarriages, the findings probably do not depart excessively from the real level of intermarriage. This probability, coupled with the opportunity provided by these data for examining both extent of conversion and extent to which children of mixed marriages are raised as Jews, argues in favor of their brief examination here.

The Providence survey identified 4.5 per cent of all marriages as intermarriages, that is, a marriage in which one of the spouses was not Jewish by birth. In the vast majority of these cases, the husband was Jewish and the wife non-Jewish by birth. Only 0.1 per cent represented the Jewish wife whose husband was born non-Jewish. This pattern of sex differentials, in which more Jewish men than women marry non-Jewish partners, is typical of almost all communities for which data were collected. Compared to the statistics cited for Washington, San Francisco, and Indiana, the intermarriage level in Providence was quite low. Yet it was not atypical, being comparable to levels of intermarriage noted for Rochester, Camden, Springfield, Los Angeles, and New Haven. Since these communities do vary in both size and location, no obvious common denominator helps explain their similar levels of intermarriage.

Of all the intermarried couples, 42 per cent had experienced the conversion of one partner to Judaism, thereby creating religious homogeneity within the family unit. The survey could not fully ascertain the number of Jewish partners to a mixed marriage who converted away from Judaism, canceling out the gains made through conversion of the non-Jewish partner to Judaism. But the survey data do suggest that, in a considerable proportion of intermarriages, conversion to Judaism does occur, thereby enhancing the chances that the family unit will remain identified as Jewish, and that the children will be raised as members of the Jewish community.

³⁷ Marshall Sklare, "Intermarriage and Jewish Survival," *Commentary*, March 1970, pp. 51-58.

For Providence, as for Washington, insights into the trend in level of intermarriage can be gained only by cross-sectional comparison of the intermarriage patterns of different age and generation groups within the population. With the exception of the 30-to-39-year age group, the Providence data pointed to an increase in the rate of intermarriage among the younger segments of the population; the highest per cent intermarried (9 per cent) characterized the youngest group. On the other hand, the proportion of persons who converted to Judaism consistently increased with decreasing age, from none of the non-Jewish spouses in the 60-and-over age group, to 4 out of 10 among those aged 40 to 59, to 7 out of 10 among those under age 40. This clear-cut pattern is consistent with a conclusion reached by Gerhard Lenski, based on a Detroit study, that the probability of mixed marriages leading to a conversion is considerably greater among younger persons.³⁸

Like the Washington studies, the Providence data indicate that generation status affects the rate of intermarriage; however, they also show that it affects the extent of conversion. Among the foreign-born, only 1.2 per cent were reported intermarried. Among third-generation Americans, this proportion was almost 6 per cent. Moreover, the pattern of differentials by generation status operated within the respective age groups. Only one-fourth of the mixed marriages of the foreign-born resulted in a conversion of the non-Jewish spouse, compared to over half of the intermarriages involving third-generation males. This pattern of generational differences remains even when age is held constant. While confirming that the rate of intermarriage has risen among third-generation, compared to first-generation, Jews, the Providence levels are well below those observed for Washington, D.C. The Providence data also show a higher rate of conversion of the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism among the third, compared to the first, generation.

Comparisons of the level of intermarriage among the children of the heads of households surveyed in the Providence study support the higher rates for younger segments of the population. Whereas the intermarriage rate of Jews in the survey was 4.5 per cent, that among the children of these households was 5.9 per cent. Since the children enumerated here included those living outside Greater Providence, the higher rate may reflect not only their younger age but also a tendency for persons who intermarry to move away from their family's community. Although this

³⁸ Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963), pp. 54-55.

may partially represent an attempt at anonymity, it is more likely related to the fact that the child was already living away from home and from parental control, thus enhancing the possibility of courting and marrying non-Jews. Most likely presenting a more correct image of the sex differential in levels of intermarriage, the data for the children of the survey units indicate that almost 8 per cent of the male children intermarried, compared to only 4 per cent of the females.

The Providence data were also used in an attempt to assess the effect of intermarriage on fertility levels.³⁹ Comparison of the fertility of the intermarried with that of the nonintermarried shows that for both women 45 years old and older, who had completed their fertility, and those under 45 years of age, who may still have additional children, intermarried couples had lower fertility than the nonintermarried. Intermarried couples had a lower average number of children ever born; they had a much higher percentage of childlessness; and they had a lower percentage of families with four or more children. Quite clearly, intermarriage resulted in lowered fertility; but the differences were not as great among the younger women in the population as among the older, suggesting that whatever factor served earlier to restrict the fertility of intermarried couples operated to a lesser degree for the younger couples.

Finally, the Providence survey ascertained the religious identification of all children in households of intermarried couples. Of the 280 children in this category, 136 were children of couples in which the non-Jewish spouse had converted to Judaism and were therefore being raised as Jews. Of the 144 children belonging to families in which the non-Jewish spouse had not converted, 84 children were being raised as Jews, and 60 as non-Jews. The fact that only 22 per cent of the 280 children of intermarriages were being raised as non-Jews is in strong contrast to the findings of the Washington survey that 70 per cent of the children of mixed marriages were being raised as non-Jews. Too few studies have explored this relationship, and more research is essential to obtain meaningful data on a national level.

The Springfield survey collected data comparable to that of Providence, and its findings, including an over-all intermarriage rate of 4.4, are so similar that presentation of the detailed results would be repetitious. Finally, mention must be made of the Boston survey of 1965 because of its very comprehensive coverage of the population and because it represents a Jewish community of about 200,000 persons. This sur-

³⁹ Goldstein and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-169.

vey found that 7 per cent of the marriages represented intermarriages. Although higher than the level noted for Providence and Springfield, this percentage is still markedly below the high levels noted in some other communities. However, the Boston data do suggest a sharp rise in the level of intermarriage among the very youngest segment of the population. Intermarriage characterized only 3 per cent of the couples in which the age of the husband was 51 and over, and only 7 per cent of those with the husband between ages 31 and 50; but 20 per cent of the couples in which the husband was 30 years old, or younger, were intermarried. Regretfully, the Boston study did not report how many of the intermarried persons had converted, or in what religion the children of such marriages were being raised.

Another recent investigation of intermarriage, by Fred Sherrow, based its findings on data collected from 1964 follow-up interviews of a national sample survey of 1961 college graduates.⁴⁰ The study thus refers to a young population. By 1964, 57 per cent of the Jewish respondents had married. Of these, between 10 and 12 per cent married non-Jews by birth. The data further show a conversion rate of less than 20 per cent by the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism. This rate is considerably below that found in a number of Jewish community studies, but in the absence of comparable data for older cohorts of college graduates, it is not possible to determine whether conversion is increasing among the young. Sherrow suggests that the low rate of conversion he identified may reflect a weakening of the proscription against intermarriage. In addition, the data reveal that 55 per cent of the Jews who intermarried retained their Jewish identification. Combining this retention rate with the gains from conversion to Judaism indicates an estimated over-all net loss of 30 per cent of the population involved in intermarriages. On this basis, the conclusion seemed justified that the rates are not yet high enough to signal the imminent dissolution of the American Jewish community through intermarriage.

What is the over-all picture that emerges? No simple answer to this seems possible. Quite a heterogeneous pattern characterizes the United States depending on the size, location, age, and social cohesiveness of the particular community. Yet, within these variations in level of intermarriage, the analysis of the data in terms of age and generation status does suggest that the intermarriage rate is increasing among young, native-

⁴⁰ Reported in Arnold Schwartz, "Intermarriage in the United States," *AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK*, Vol. 71 (1970), pp. 101-121.

born Americans. Eventually, intermarriage rates in the United States may reach a plateau around which the experience of individual communities will fluctuate. But for the immediate future, the over-all rate of intermarriage is likely to rise further, as an increasing proportion of the population becomes third-generation Americans and moves away from older areas of dense Jewish population to newly developed, more integrated areas within both the cities and suburbs, and to more distant communities with fewer Jews and less organized Jewish life. At the same time the data for several communities suggest that although the rate of intermarriage may be increasing among the third generation, a high proportion of these intermarriages result in the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism: the rate of conversions is higher among the very groups having a higher intermarriage rate. Moreover, a significant proportion of children in such marriages are being raised as Jews. And finally, among the young, the fertility patterns of intermarried couples also resemble more closely those of the nonintermarried than in the older age groups. These changes suggest that the net effects of intermarriage on the over-all size of the Jewish population may not yet be as serious demographically as suggested by several Jewish community studies. What their effect is on Jewish identification and religiosity is beyond the scope of this evaluation. There can be little doubt that the problem of intermarriage warrants considerable concern on both policy and research levels, but, from a demographic point of view, there is also much need to focus on questions of Jewish fertility and Jewish population redistribution.

Population Distribution

In considering the future of the American Jewish population, attention must be given to its geographical distribution among the various regions of the United States, as well as within the large metropolitan areas where so many of the country's Jews live. That New York City and the Northeastern region contain the greater part of the Jewish population of the United States is well known. Yet this concentration has not always been as great as in recent decades, nor is it likely to remain so.

The 1900 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK estimates (Table 6) indicate that, at that time, 57 per cent of American Jewry lived in the Northeast, in contrast to only 28 per cent of the total American population;⁴¹

⁴¹ "Jewish Statistics," AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 1 (1899-1900), p. 283.

TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES AND JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGIONS, 1900, 1930, AND 1968

Region	1900			1930 ^c			1968 ^d		
	Jewish ^a	United States ^b	Jewish	United States	Jewish	United States	Jewish	United States	
Northeast	56.6	27.7	68.3	27.9	64.0	24.2			
New England	7.4	7.5	8.4	6.6	6.8	5.7			
Middle Atlantic	49.2	20.3	59.9	21.3	57.1	18.5			
North Central	23.7	34.6	19.6	31.4	12.5	27.8			
East North Central	18.3	21.0	15.7	20.5	10.2	19.8			
West North Central	5.4	13.6	3.9	10.9	2.3	8.0			
South	14.2	32.2	7.6	30.7	10.3	31.2			
South Atlantic	8.0	13.7	4.3	12.8	8.1	15.0			
East South Central	3.3	9.9	1.4	8.0	0.7	6.6			
West South Central	2.9	8.6	1.9	9.9	1.5	9.6			
West	5.5	5.4	4.6	10.0	13.2	16.8			
Mountain	2.3	2.2	1.0	3.0	0.9	4.0			
Pacific	3.2	3.2	3.6	7.0	12.2	12.8			
Total United States	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Per cent	1,058	75,994	4,228	123,203	5,869	199,861			
Number	(in 1,000's)								

^a "Jewish Statistics," AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 1 (1900), pp. 623-624.
^b U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population*, Vol. 1, *Characteristics of the Population* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-16.
^c H. S. Linfield, "Statistics of Jews," AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 33 (1931), p. 276.
^d Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States," AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 70 (1969), p. 266.

and virtually all these Jews were in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, with New York alone accounting for about 40 per cent of the national total. The North Central region accounted for the next largest number of Jews—about one-fourth—with most concentrated in Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan. By contrast, one-third of the total United States population lived in this region in 1900. Compared to the general population, Jews were also underrepresented in the South, where 14 per cent were located, largely in Maryland. Florida at that time had only 3,000 Jews. The proportion of Jews in the West in 1900 was identical to that of the general population, just over 5 per cent.

The decades following 1900 saw continued mass immigration from Eastern Europe, resulting in a four-fold increase of the Jewish population between 1900 and 1930. Reflecting the tendency of the immigrants to concentrate in the large cities of the Northeast, and especially New York, considerable change occurred in the regional distribution of the American Jewish population. The AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK estimates for 1927 place over two-thirds of the Jewish population in the Northeastern region, with 60 per cent in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania;⁴² New York State alone accounted for 45 per cent of the Jews in the United States. This considerable increase in the number of Jews in the Northeast, from 57 per cent in 1900 to 68 per cent in 1927, contrasts with the stability of the American population as a whole; both the 1900 and 1930 censuses found 28 per cent of all Americans living in the Northeast. The percentage of Jews living in each of the other regions declined. In 1927 only one in five lived in the North Central region, only 8 per cent in the South, and just under 5 per cent in the West. As a result, the over-all differential between the distribution patterns of the Jewish and the total population increased. The sharpest changes were in the South and West. The South's share of the total Jewish population declined from 14 to 8 per cent, while it continued to account for about 30 per cent of the total population. The West increased its share of the total population from 5 to 10 per cent in these 30 years, but its Jewish population declined from 5.5 to 4.6 per cent of the national total.

For the United States population as a whole, the period between 1930 and the present showed a continuous westward shift. The proportion of Americans living in the Western region had increased to 17 per cent

⁴² H. S. Linfield, "Statistics of Jews," *ibid.*, Vol. 33 (1931-1932), p. 276.

by 1968; and both the Northeastern and North Central regions accounted for smaller proportions of the total American population than they did in 1930. The South's share increased a little, but this was entirely attributable to the greater population concentration in the South Atlantic states, particularly Florida.

With the cutoff in large-scale immigration, changes in the distribution of the Jewish population of the United States in the period between 1930 and 1968 became largely a function of their geographic mobility. These changes were considerable; in fact, Jewish redistribution represented to a somewhat accentuated degree the general redistribution of the population as a whole. For example, between 1930 and 1968, the proportion of all American Jews living in the Western region increased from under 5 to 13 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of Jews living in the South increased from under 8 per cent of the total to 10 per cent. By contrast, the proportion living in the North Central region declined from one out of five in 1927, to only 12 per cent in 1968. And by 1968 the Northeastern region, including both New England and the Middle Atlantic states, although containing almost two-thirds of all American Jews, had a smaller proportion of the total American Jewish population than it did in 1930.

This decline in the proportion living in the Northeast may be indicative of developments that will become more accentuated in the future: 1) as Jews increasingly enter occupations whose nature requires mobility because of the limited opportunities available in particular areas; 2) as family ties become less important for the third-generation Jew than they had been for the first- and second-generation; 3) as more Jews no longer feel it necessary to live in areas of high Jewish concentration. In short, the available data suggest the beginning of a trend toward the wider dispersal of Jews throughout the United States.

Assuming that such a pattern develops, the Jewish population in the future will not only be an increasingly smaller proportion of the total American population, but it will also be increasingly less concentrated in the Northeastern part of the United States. In an ecological sense, therefore, the population will become more truly an American population, with all this implies regarding opportunities for greater assimilation and less numerical visibility. Although this may be a trend of the future, it must be emphasized that the Northeast, and New York in particular, will remain a very large and obviously dynamic center of American Jewry. At the same time, its population will probably grow increasingly

older because more and more of the younger Jews will leave this section of the country to become part of the mainstream of American life through the process of geographic mobility.

Urban-Rural Residence

Closely related to the concentration of Jews in the Northeast is their distribution between urban and rural places of residence. Jews in the United States are unique in their exceptionally high concentration in urban places, particularly in very large ones. The best source of information for this, the 1957 Bureau of the Census survey, found that 96 per cent of the Jewish population 14 years old and over lived in urban places, compared to only 64 per cent of the total American population (Table 7). Moreover, 87 per cent of all Jews in the United States 14

TABLE 7. URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL CIVILIAN POPULATION, UNITED STATES, MARCH 1957^a

<i>Residence</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Total urban	63.9	96.1
Urbanized areas of 250,000 or more	36.6	87.4
Other urban	27.3	8.7
Rural non-farm	24.4	3.6
Rural farm	11.7	0.2
Total per cent	100.0	100.0
Total number (in 1,000's)	119,333	3,868

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March 1957," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 79 (February 2, 1958), Table 3.

years old and over lived in the large urbanized areas of 250,000 population or more, in contrast to only one out of every three persons in the general population. The high concentration of Jews in New York City is, of course, a major factor in this differential.

The census data also show that under 4 per cent of American Jewry live in rural places, and almost all of these in nonfarm residences. The reasons for the heavy concentration in large urban places are well known and require no discussion here. However, it is noteworthy that, though Jews constituted only 3 per cent of the total American population, they comprised almost 8 per cent of the total urban population; in all other types of residence Jews accounted for 1 per cent or less of the total. In this respect, the experience of the Jews may foreshadow that of the

total population, for one of the major demographic and ecological developments in the United States over the last several decades has been the increasing concentration of the American population in metropolitan areas. As this trend continues, the proportion of Jews in the metropolitan population will decline, as more of the total American population comes to live in such areas. Since the American Jewish population is so highly concentrated in major metropolitan areas, a key focus must be on what is happening to the population within such areas.

Suburbanization

There is a considerable sociological literature on the Jewish ghetto in the United States.⁴³ Yet, from a demographic point of view, there are few reliable statistics for documenting either the character of the ghettos into which the immigrant populations moved or for measuring the speed with which such ghettos broke down. For few cities have there been demographic studies of the Jews of either adequate historical depth or sufficient comparability over time to permit such documentation. In very few communities has more than one population survey of the Jewish community been undertaken, so that opportunities of measuring trends in residential patterns are quite limited. Yet, given the very high concentration of Jews in urban areas and the fact that they tended to live in a very segregated fashion, an analysis of the distribution of the Jewish population must take note of this situation and attempt to suggest the future pattern of development.

The pattern of Jewish settlement in large cities by no means remains stable. The radical shifts in distribution are clearly evident, for example, from estimates of the Jewish population in New York City in 1930 and 1957, and a projection for 1975.⁴⁴ Although the New York data are only crude estimates, they do point to the pattern of development in the single largest American Jewish community, and therefore have special significance.

By 1930 the large area of Jewish population density on the lower East Side had already passed its peak: only 16 per cent of New York

⁴³ See, for example, Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928); Peter I. Rose, ed., *The Ghetto and Beyond* (New York: Random House, 1969).

⁴⁴ C. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, *The Jewish Population of the New York Area, 1900-1975* (New York: Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1959).

TABLE 8. JEWISH POPULATION OF NEW YORK AREA, 1923-1975^a

<i>Distribution of New York City Jews Among 5 Boroughs</i>				
<i>Area</i>	<i>1923</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1957</i>	<i>1975</i>
Manhattan	37.4	16.3	16.0	15.1
Bronx	20.3	32.1	23.3	21.1
Brooklyn	39.3	46.6	40.3	38.6
Queens	2.7	4.8	20.0	24.8
Richmond	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in 1,000's)	1,882	1,825	2,115	2,133

<i>Distribution of New York Area Jews Between City and Selected Suburbs^b</i>		
	<i>1957</i>	<i>1975</i>
New York City	81.9	78.5
Nassau	12.8	14.6
Suffolk	0.8	1.2
Westchester	4.5	5.7
Total per cent	100.0	100.0
Total number (in 1,000's)	2,580	2,715

^a C. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, *The Jewish Population of the New York Area, 1900-1975* (New York: Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1959), Table 9.

^b A revised estimate prepared for the AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 64 (1963), shows a total Jewish population of 1,836,000 for New York City in 1960 and a total of 2,688,000 for the N.Y.-Northeastern N. J. Standard Consolidated Area: 68.4% in N.Y.C., 20.2% in Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester, and 11.3% in Rockland, N. Y., county and 8 counties of New Jersey.

City's Jews lived in all of Manhattan (Table 8). By contrast, one-third lived in the Bronx and almost one-half in Brooklyn; less than 5 per cent of the total Jewish population of New York City lived in Queens. Within one generation, a sharp redistribution occurred. In 1957 only one in four Jews in the city lived in the Bronx, whereas Queens now accounted for one in five. Manhattan continued as the residence of 16 per cent of New York City's Jews, but the proportion living in Brooklyn had decreased. While the projections for 1975 must be taken as very tentative, they indicate a continuation of the trends already observed for the 1930-1957 period: relatively fewer Jews living in the Bronx and Brooklyn, and more in Queens.

What these data do not show is the considerable development of Jewish communities in the suburban sectors of the New York metropolitan area. Although the data for the larger area are restricted, both in the area covered and in the method of estimates, they do, in a crude way, point to the nature of developments. According to the statistics,

the total Jewish population in 1957 in the New York area, including both the city and adjoining Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties, numbered 2,580,000 persons, of whom 81.9 per cent lived in the city proper.⁴⁵ While the number of Jews in the city between 1957 and 1975 is estimated to remain relatively stable at 2.1 million persons, it is expected to grow for the total area from 2.58 million to 2.72 million. Thus, the proportion of Jews living in the suburbs will increase from 18.1 per cent in 1957 to 21.5 per cent in 1975. The New Jersey and Connecticut segments of New York's suburbs are not included here; if they were, much sharper changes would doubtless be noted.

Even more dramatic changes occurred in the distribution of the Jewish population of Chicago. In 1931, 47.6 per cent of Chicago's Jews were concentrated on the West Side. According to 1958 estimates, only 5.5 per cent remained in that area of the city, a decline from an estimated 131,000 to 12,000 persons. By contrast, the North Side of Chicago had increased its Jewish population from 56,000 persons in 1931 to 127,000 in 1958, or from 20 to 57.7 per cent of the total. In 1958 an estimated 62,000 of the Chicago area's 282,000 Jews were living in the suburbs.

A somewhat similar picture emerges from a comparison of the 1949 and 1959 residential patterns in Detroit. In 1949 Dexter, the largest single area of residence, accounted for almost half of the Detroit area's total Jewish population; the second largest was the North West, accounting for one-fourth. In 1949 no Jews lived in the suburban Oak Park and Huntington Woods sections. By 1959, 18 per cent of the Detroit area's total Jewish population had moved to the suburbs. The old center of Dexter was virtually abandoned as an area of Jewish settlement, with only 10 per cent of all Detroit Jews remaining. It was replaced as a leading center of residence by the North West, with 50 per cent of the total. In fact, by that time research had identified a new residential area, the New Suburbs, which extended beyond the older suburban areas; 3 per cent of the Jewish population already lived there, and future growth was expected. Over-all, the Detroit area data point to a pattern quite common in many of the metropolitan areas with Jewish communities. The total geographic area in which Jews live has become much larger. Their dispersion within that larger area has increased considerably, yet distinct areas of Jewish concentration remain identi-

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

able; even as the older areas disappear, newer concentrations are emerging. The resultant strain on Jewish institutions represents a major adjustment problem which many Jewish communities must face as they undergo significant population redistribution.

Compared to New York, Chicago, and Detroit, the Jewish community of Greater Providence is small. But because I have researched the community in depth, Providence is used to illustrate what I believe to be a pattern common in many other cities throughout the United States.

In 1970 the 19,500 Jews living in the Providence metropolitan area constituted approximately 4 per cent of the area's total population. However, their distribution was not uniform, reflecting the historical tendency of Jews to concentrate in cities and in selected areas within cities (Table 9). Just under two-thirds of the households were living

TABLE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS IN GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1951, 1963, AND 1970

<i>Residence</i>	<i>1951</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>Change 1951-1970*</i>
Total urban	88.5	72.5	64.2	-31.6
Old urban	45.3	22.4	16.6	-66.3
New urban	43.2	50.1	47.6	+ 5.4
Suburban	11.5	27.5	35.8	+199.3
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	

* Number of households in 1970, compared to 1951.

in the urban center of the metropolitan area. Also within the urban center itself, the large majority of Jews lived in the newer settlement area, one of comparatively high socioeconomic status. By comparison, only 23 per cent of Greater Providence's total population lived in the new urban area. The heavy concentration of Jews is reflected further in the fact that in four census tracts in the heart of this area Jews constituted from one-third to one-half of the total population. Of the remaining 102 census tracts encompassed by the study, Jews accounted for as much as 10 per cent of the total population in only six, and were below 2 per cent in 83 tracts.

The considerable change in the distribution of the population can be seen in the comparative statistics from a 1951 study. Although the size of the population has changed minimally during the 19 years, very sharp alterations have occurred in its distribution within the metropolitan area. In 1951, 88 per cent of the Jewish population lived in the central cities, in contrast to 64 per cent in 1970. Changes for the older urban

area are even more striking; the number of Jewish families living in the old sections declined by two-thirds. Within the total urban area, only the newer section experienced growth after 1951, and even this area is beginning to experience decline as Jews increasingly move to the suburbs. The old ghetto disappeared almost completely, except for some vestiges of various Jewish institutions; the newer urban area had located within its boundaries an increasing number of Jewish religious, educational, and social institutions.

The changes in the suburbs of Greater Providence have been even more dramatic. From 679 Jewish households in 1951, 11 per cent of the entire metropolitan area's Jewish population, the suburban community had increased by 1970 to over 2,000 households, comprising over one-third of the total. More interesting, Jewish participation in the movement to the suburbs took place at a much more accelerated pace than that of the general population. Here again the evidence suggests that Jews may be in the forefront of demographic and ecological developments occurring on the American scene as a whole. It is also interesting that the Jewish pattern of suburbanization resulted in quite different degrees of dispersal of the Jewish population than was true of the urban area itself. Within the central cities of the metropolitan area, 90 per cent of all Jews were concentrated within one-fourth of the census tracts. By contrast, 40 per cent of the census tracts must be cumulated to encompass 90 per cent of all suburban Jews, and these tracts are scattered over a larger geographic area. In Providence therefore, as in Detroit, the data point to a general dispersal of the Jewish population over the metropolitan area; but, at the same time, there remains a significant concentration of this population within the newer area of urban settlements. Yet, even the newer area may be entering a period of decline.

The developing pattern seems to be even greater dispersion and more general residential integration of the Jewish community. As a result, institutions become located at quite widely separated points in the metropolitan area, and the community finds it increasingly difficult to decide upon a central location for those institutions serving the community as a whole. In the past, residential clustering has been an important variable in helping to perpetuate traits, values, and institutions important to Judaism. In metropolitan areas with large Jewish populations such clustering undoubtedly will continue to characterize a number of Jewish settlement areas both within the central cities and in some of the suburbs. But greater dispersal and greater integration seem likely

to be the more common developments in the future, becoming critical factors in explaining changes in the extent and character of ties to Judaism.

In a recent investigation, Serge Carlos analyzed the influence of the urban and suburban milieu on religious practices.⁴⁶ Although his study focuses on Catholics, it may have some significance for religious behavior in general. Carlos found that the level of church attendance increases as people move from the central area of the city to the periphery. He interprets this pattern as an effect of the need for community identification and integration, both largely missing in suburban communities. At the same time he notes that the higher rates of suburban church attendance represent mainly nominal religious participation, with the result that the proportion of churchgoers who engage in devotional religious practices is lower in the suburban areas. As a reflection of the older age structure of the Jewish population living within central cities, as well as the higher proportion of Orthodox and Conservative, one would expect a higher degree of devotional religious practice in urban than in suburban places of residence. Indeed, research on Greater Providence, where an attempt was made to measure residential differences in religious assimilation, suggests a pattern of greater assimilation for suburban residents.⁴⁷ They have higher intermarriage rates, lower scores on indices of ritual observance, higher rates of non-affiliation and higher proportions with no Jewish education. These appear even after controlling for generation status, suggesting both that the migration to the suburbs may be selective of those not eager to maintain as strong Jewish identity as those in the cities, and that the greater residential dispersion of Jews within the suburbs removes the reinforcement of traditional patterns formerly provided by the older, more densely populated urban areas. Despite this weakening, a high percentage of suburban Jews do continue to identify as Jews and to follow selected religious practices. In short, residential differences exist, but they are not so sharp as to lead to the conclusion that suburbanization itself will cause high rates of assimilation. Similar changes in identification and practice are also occurring to a considerable degree in the older

⁴⁶ Serge Carlos, "Religious Participation and the Urban-Suburban Continuum," *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1970, pp. 742-759.

⁴⁷ Goldstein and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-163, 181-183, 190-191, 208-210, 241-242.

urban areas, as the generation composition of their population changes.

Jewish communities in the United States vary considerably in their patterns of residential distribution. We have inadequate information on why, despite redistribution, some communities in both suburbs and central cities continue to maintain areas of considerably higher Jewish concentration than do others. Little is known about the extent to which, or way in which, high density of settlement substitutes, as it seems to do in the New York area, for high levels of organizational affiliation and participation as the mechanism for Jewish identification. Research in depth, like that undertaken by Carlos, is needed to ascertain how the communal orientation of Jews living in the cities and in suburbs of differing Jewish density varies and what meaning the various activities have for the individuals, particularly as they relate to the larger question of Jewish identification and survival.

Migration

Among the demographic concerns which have received the least attention in research on the American Jewish population is the extent and character of Jewish migration within the United States. For such an analysis, national data are essential. But, to my knowledge, no such data exist. Even the March 1957 census survey provided no information on migration patterns. On a national level, therefore, only indirect insights into the migration of Jews can be obtained, through examination of available statistics on the changing distribution of the Jewish population among the various regions of the country. These were examined earlier. More direct insights on the role of migration in Jewish population redistribution come from local Jewish community surveys. Questions on date of movement into the state, city, and house of residence at the time of the survey, and place of residence before the last move, permit determination of the redistribution of population in the area under investigation and of the role of in-migration in the growth of the total area's Jewish population. Losses through out-migration are more difficult to identify, since most local surveys restrict themselves to current residents in the area. However, limited insights into out-migration can be obtained from questions on residence of children of heads of household in the survey sample. Also, insights into possible future movement are possible through questions on plans to move within the next one to five years and the anticipated destination.

The importance of migration in the future development and growth

of the American Jewish community has been seriously underrated. Data on both the national regional distribution of population and the increasing suburbanization of the Jews suggest that population mobility is a major development in the United States and may have significant impact on the vitality of the local Jewish community. As indicated before, more widespread distribution within the metropolitan area will have an impact on rates of intermarriage, on the degree of integration of Jews into the local community, on the ease with which Jewish identity can be maintained, and on the strength of Jewish institutions themselves, as the population they serve becomes more dispersed. On the national scene, a higher rate of redistribution may also be occurring as Jews, in increasing numbers, enter the salaried professional and executive world and transfer, or are transferred, to branch firms located in places where large Jewish communities do not exist. Moreover, the repeated movement associated with such occupations may well be a new phenomenon on the American Jewish scene, one that may lead to less stable family and communal ties.

What does the evidence available from local Jewish community surveys indicate? The 1963 Detroit study, which ascertained the place of birth of the resident population, found that only one-third of the total Jewish population of Detroit was born in the city; another 28 per cent were foreign-born; 36 per cent had come to Detroit from other places in the United States, a little over half of these from other cities or towns in Michigan, and the rest from other states. A somewhat similar picture emerges from comparable statistics on Camden, N.J., where one-third of the residents were born in the Camden area, and almost 60 per cent had moved there from other places in the United States; a small percentage were foreign-born. Using the state as a unit, the Providence study found that 60 per cent of all Jews living in Greater Providence were born in Rhode Island. Of the 40 per cent who were born elsewhere, 16 per cent were foreign-born and the remaining 24 per cent were equally divided between natives of New England and of other states. Virtually identical patterns emerged for Springfield, Massachusetts. Comparison of the mobility of Jews with that of the general population is best achieved by examining the proportion of the native-born who were living in their state of birth. For Greater Providence, 76 per cent of the general population, compared to 72 per cent of the American-born Jews, were born in Rhode Island. Judged by state of birth, therefore, the Jewish population closely resembles the total population in its

migration level. It also resembles the general pattern in that most of the movement of native-born Jews to the state is from nearby areas.

Mobility can also be judged by length of residence in the area. The Milwaukee study, for example, found that 60 per cent of the city's Jews had been living at their current address for less than 10 years, and 40 per cent for less than 5 years. These data suggest a high degree of residential mobility among Jews, although they do not specify whether it took the form of intra-urban mobility or migration across larger distances. The recent Boston study also suggests a high degree of mobility. Half the population had lived at their present address for under 10 years, and 31 per cent for 5 years or less. These percentages varied considerably by age. Among those 21 to 29 years of age, 70 per cent were at their present addresses for less than 5 years; by contrast, at the other end of the age hierarchy, only 10 per cent of those 60 to 69 years old were living in their present homes under 5 years. Further reflecting the high mobility of Boston's Jews is the finding that 34 per cent intended to move within the next two years. Thus a high turnover is indicated both by the recency of the in-move and by the high percentage intending to move in the near future. A very high proportion of the intended mobility is within the Boston metropolitan area itself, and the projected patterns indicate a heavy movement to the newer suburban areas. At the same time, the decline of the older areas in Boston is underscored by the very low percentage of persons moving into them, and the high percentage of those still living there who indicated an intention to move out. For example, less than 25 per cent of those living in Central Boston came in the last five years, but 42 per cent planned to move out during the next two years. In contrast, of the population living in the south suburbs, 32 per cent moved in within the last five years, and only 12 per cent indicated an intention to move out within the next two.

The population survey of Greater Providence measured the level of mobility through a series of statistics showing recency of arrival in the state, in the city, and in the present place of residence. Of the total population, 10 per cent had moved into the state in the last 10 years, and 5 per cent within three years of the survey date. But these percentages were considerably higher for those between ages 20 and 39, which tend to be the peak migration periods in the life cycle. About one in five individuals in this age range had moved into the state between 1955 and 1963. The role of the suburbs in population movement

was also clearly evidenced. For example, in the suburb with a high concentration of professionals and business executives, almost one out of every four Jews had moved in from outside the state during the preceding eight years. By contrast, the corresponding proportion for the older sections of Providence was under 4 per cent. If the combined effect of movement from without the state and movement within the area itself is taken into account, the pattern is even more accentuated. Between 46 and 61 per cent of the persons living in the suburbs had moved there during the eight years preceding the survey. In the older urban areas of Providence, the corresponding proportion was 4 per cent, and for the newer urban area 21 per cent.

In Providence, 15 per cent of the individuals studied were members of households which had definite plans to move within a five-year period. The Providence data, like those from Boston, suggest that the highest percentage intending to move occurs among those living in the older urban areas and the lowest percentage in the suburbs. In sum, evaluation of both the past and future mobility patterns in Greater Providence suggests two simultaneous developments in the distribution of the population. A significant proportion of Jews will continue to be concentrated in the newer urban section of the central cities. At the same time, greater decentralization of the total Jewish population within the metropolitan area will take place through the growth of the suburban sector.

The 1968 Columbus, O., survey distinguished between Jews living in areas of high-Jewish density and those living in areas where the Jewish population was more dispersed. Examination of a variety of characteristics for these two populations indicates that the Jews living in the more concentrated areas of settlement were older, were more likely to have been born in the community itself, had a lower education, included a higher proportion of businessmen and a lower proportion of professionals, and inclined toward more traditional religious beliefs and practices. These findings suggest, as do the data for Providence, that, although within the larger community some degree of segregation still occurs among Jews, the importance of religion as a basis for selecting neighborhood of residence is diminishing in favor of other socio-demographic criteria.

The Columbus survey also examined the religious composition of the neighborhood in which Jews lived and asked respondents what type of neighborhood they preferred. (Table 10).

TABLE 10. JEWISH COMPOSITION OF PRESENT NEIGHBORHOOD AND PREFERRED COMPOSITION, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1969^a

<i>Per cent Jewish</i>	<i>Present composition</i>	<i>Preferred composition</i>
About 100	1	3
At least 75	8	8
About 50	20	48
25 to about 50	31	25
Under 25	30	2
No other Jews	6	0
Don't know	4	14
Total Per Cent	100	100

^a Albert J. Mayer, *Columbus Jewish Population Study, 1969* (Columbus: Columbus Jewish Welfare Foundation, 1970), p. 87.

The results document quite clearly that only a small minority of Jews was living in neighborhoods that were at least 75 per cent Jewish and little more than one-quarter of the Jewish population in sections that were as much as 50 per cent Jewish. In fact, 30 per cent were in neighborhoods where less than one in four of the population was Jewish. Yet, respondents expressed preference for neighborhoods with higher proportions of Jews, generally in a 50-50 balance. The over-all conclusion therefore points to the desire on the part of Columbus Jews to live in an integrated neighborhood, but one having a substantial number of other Jewish families.

These data refer only to a single community and quite obviously cannot be generalized to the total American Jewish population. They do suggest, however, that, in the process of movement, many Jews will, if possible, seek out areas where other Jews are living and which have Jewish institutions to meet their religious and educational needs. Problems will arise if movement occurs to areas where these opportunities do not exist. The degree to which such considerations will in the future influence whether or not Jews move from one section of a city to another and, more particularly, from one metropolitan area to another, or from one region of the United States to another, will be an important factor in the extent to which increased population mobility represents a serious threat to the cohesiveness of the Jewish community.

Migration and population redistribution are important for the development of an area. They affect not only its size, but also the characteristics of its residents if they are selective of particular age, education, occu-

pation, and income groups. At the same time, migration may have an important effect on the migrant himself, particularly on the degree of his integration into the community. A large turnover of population may also have a significant impact on community institutions. To the extent that community ties within the Jewish population are expressed through membership in temples, enrollment of children in educational programs, participation in local organizations and philanthropic activities, a high degree of population movement may either disrupt such patterns of participation or weaken the loyalties they generate. More seriously, they may result in the failure of families and individuals to identify with organized life in the local community. Sociological research has suggested, for example, that recent migrants to a community are much less active in its formal structure than are longtime residents.⁴⁸ Although their participation eventually increases, the adjustment has been shown to take at least five years, and sometimes migrants never reach the same level of participation as persons who grew up in the community. Obviously, if a significant proportion of in-migrants know in advance that their residence in the community is not likely to be permanent, tendencies toward lower rates of participation and affiliation may be even stronger.

We have a minimum of historical evidence for the Jewish population to document whether the level of mobility is increasing. The available data, both on mobility and on changes in the educational level of Jews and the type of occupations they are entering, suggest that one of the major changes taking place in the American Jewish community is an increasing rate of population movement. For example, some recent statistics from Toledo, O., indicate that one-fifth of the city's Jews move each year. The study reports that national chain operations have brought to Toledo a surprisingly large number of Jewish men in managerial positions, and that the university had a substantial increase in the number of Jewish faculty. At the same time, the study reported that 45 to 60 per cent of young Jews raised in Toledo seek, and find, permanent residence in distant cities after graduation from college. This pattern is likely to be more typical of the general American scene, resulting not only in the increasing migration of Jews within the United States, but also in an increasingly higher rate of repeated movement by the same persons. We know from general migration studies that higher than average mobility

⁴⁸ Basil Zimmer, "Participation of Migrants in Urban Structures," *American Sociological Review*, 1955, pp. 218-224.

rates have always characterized professionals and highly educated individuals because of the more limited demands for their talents in particular localities. Also, as Toledo shows, in recent years many national firms have adopted a company policy of repeated relocation of their executives and professionals to different branches of their firms. As the proportion of Jews holding such positions increases, the rate of Jewish population mobility is likely to increase.

As Glazer and Moynihan observed: "The son wants the business to be bigger and better and perhaps he would rather be a cog in a great corporation than the manager of a small one. He may not enjoy the tight Jewish community with its limited horizons and its special satisfactions—he is not that much of a Jew any more."⁴⁹ In short, they suggest that status may be the drawing force of third-generation Americans, as financial success was the major consideration of second-generation Americans. Finally, as discriminatory practices diminish and executive positions formerly closed to Jews open up, this too will be conducive to the greater geographic dispersal of Jews willing to develop occupational careers outside the communities where they grew up.

Some evidence of this trend is already available through limited statistics from Providence. That study collected information on the residence of all children of family units surveyed, permitting comparison of place of residence of children in relation to that of their parents living in the Providence area (Table 11). Lenski noted that one of the best indicators of the importance attached to family and kin groups by modern Americans is their willingness to leave their native community and migrate elsewhere.⁵⁰ Since most migration is motivated by economic or vocational factors, he suggests, migration serves as an indicator of the strength of economic motives compared to kinship ties. In modern society the continual removal of economic rewards out of the hands of kinship and extended family groups lessens the dominance of Jewish families over the placement of its young within the socio-economic world. The changing kinship relations, coupled with more fluid labor markets, contribute to higher mobility rates.

If this interpretation is correct, the Providence data suggest that kinship ties of Jews have been weakening. Among all Providence families

⁴⁹ Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 150.

⁵⁰ Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963), p. 214.

TABLE 11. RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN LIVING AWAY FROM PARENTAL HOME, JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963, BY AGE AND SEX OF CHILDREN

Age	<i>Residence of Children in Relation to Parental Residence (Per Cent)</i>					
	<i>Same city</i>	<i>Different Part of Metropolitan Area</i>	<i>Elsewhere in State</i>	<i>Other States in New England</i>	<i>Other United States</i>	<i>Abroad</i>
<i>Sons</i>						
Under 20	11.6	7.7	15.4	19.2	42.3	—
20-39	24.4	20.4	2.7	15.1	34.4	2.4
40 and over	43.6	19.5	1.5	12.4	21.9	1.1
Total	30.4	19.8	2.8	14.1	30.0	2.1
<i>Daughters</i>						
Under 20	18.2	12.8	3.6	25.4	36.4	3.6
20-39	27.1	20.9	2.9	23.3	24.9	0.7
40 and over	50.0	23.1	—	14.1	12.2	0.6
Total	33.2	21.0	2.2	20.6	21.6	1.1

surveyed, there were 748 sons 40 years old and over, of whom one-third were living outside Rhode Island. Compared to this, just one-half of the 1,425 sons between ages 20 and 39 were living outside the state. Moreover, a higher proportion of the younger group were living outside New England. Further accentuation of the trend is suggested by the fact that almost two-thirds of children under age 20 who were living away from their parental home were outside Rhode Island, and 42 per cent of the total were outside New England. Although fewer daughters lived away from their parental community, the basic age pattern was the same as for males.

These data lend weight to the assumption that the American Jewish community is increasingly mobile and that such mobility must be taken into account in any evaluation of Jewish life in the United States. Mobility is not a new facet of Jewish life. But whereas at a number of points in Jewish history it may have served to strengthen the Jewish community and indeed to insure its very survival, there is serious question whether this is generally true of increased internal migration. Such mobility may still serve a positive function in a given situation. Small Jewish communities may benefit considerably from the influx of other Jews who are

attracted by nearby universities or modern, technological industries. Such in-migration may be crucial in creating the critical mass prerequisite to initiation and maintenance of the institutional facilities essential for continued Jewish identification. Migration may thus constitute the "blood transfusion" which greatly enhances the chances of the community's survival.

More often, however, and especially in the case of repeated movement, mobility may weaken the individual's ties to Judaism and to the Jewish community, which in turn weakens the community as it becomes more difficult to call upon the individual's loyalty to local institutions. For all too long the local Jewish community has assumed that most Jews remain within it for a lifetime, and that they are therefore willing and obligated to support it. This may no longer be true for many Jews. An increasing number may be reluctant to affiliate with the local community, not so much because they do not identify with Judaism, but because they anticipate that they will not remain in the local area long enough to justify the financial investment required. All this suggests the need for greater concern with the role of migration than of intermarriage in the future of American Judaism. The latter may largely be only a by-product, along with other undesirable consequences, of increased mobility.

Generational Change

Of all demographic characteristics of the Jewish community perhaps the one with the greatest relevance for its future character is the changing generation status of the Jews, i.e., how many are foreign-born, how many are children of foreign-born, and how many are at least third-generation Americans. In the past, a major factor in the continued vitality of the American Jewish community has been the continuous "blood transfusions" it received through the massive immigration of Jews from the ghettos of Eastern Europe. Now, for the first time in the community's history, a third-generation Jewish population faces the American scene without large-scale outside reinforcement; at the very same time, it enjoys much greater freedom than ever before. The Jewish community in the United States is increasingly an American Jewish community in every sense of the word.

Information on the generation status of American Jews must be gleaned from local community studies. These show beyond any doubt that the vast majority of America's Jews today are native-born (Table 12). Of all community studies presenting information on the nativity

TABLE 12. NATIVITY OF JEWISH POPULATION, SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Community ^a	Year of Study	Nativity		
		U.S. born	Foreign-born	Total ^c Per Cent
Trenton, N.J.	1949	77	24	100
New Orleans, La.	1953	81	17	100
Los Angeles, Cal.	1953	68	32	100
Canton, O.	1955	77	23	100
Des Moines, Ia.	1956	78	22	100
Washington, D.C.	1956	83	17	100
Memphis, Tenn.	1959	81	18	100
San Francisco, Cal.	1959	72	26	100
Los Angeles, Cal.	1959	75	25	100
Rochester, N.Y.	1961	79	21	100
South Bend, Ind.	1961	80	20	100
Trenton, N.J.	1961	85	15	100
Providence, R.I.	1963	83	17	100
Detroit, Mich. ^b	1963	62	38	100
Pittsburgh, Pa.	1963	88	12	100
Camden, N.J.	1964	91	9	100
Milwaukee, Wis. ^b	1964	65	35	100
Springfield, Mass.	1966	85	14	100
Boston, Mass.	1966	83	15	100
Columbus, O. ^b	1969	74	26	100

^a See Appendix for citation of individual community studies.

^b Head of household.

^c Includes small per cent of unknown nativity.

of the Jewish population, the one of Dade County, Fla., reported the highest percentage of foreign-born, 33 per cent in 1961, and the one of Camden, N.J., the lowest, reporting 9 per cent in 1964. But these extremes largely reflect the differential age composition of the population of the two areas. For most communities the percentage of foreign-born ranges between 20 and 25. Yet, even this range is somewhat high because the surveys in many of the communities were conducted in the 1950's. If one considers only those communities where surveys were taken in the 1960's, the proportion of foreign-born was generally under 20 per cent. In several communities comparable data were collected at two different points in time, indicating the pattern of change. For example, the 1953 Los Angeles survey reported 32 per cent foreign-born; by 1959, the proportion had fallen to 25 per cent. The Trenton, N.J., survey of 1949 reported 24 per cent of the population as foreign-born; by 1961 the percentage was only 15. In 1937 the foreign-born in Des Moines comprised 35 per cent of the Jewish

population; in 1956, only 22 per cent were foreign-born. An even sharper decline in the foreign-born characterized Pittsburgh in the 25-year period between 1938 and 1963, from 38 to 12 per cent.

Evidence of the growing Americanization of the Jewish community is also provided by the comparative data on the percentage of foreign-born in different age segments of the population. Here, the Greater Providence statistics provide a useful example. They have the added advantage of not only distinguishing between the foreign-born and native-born segments of the population, but of subdividing the latter into second and higher generations. Of the total 1963 Jewish population of Greater Providence, only 17 per cent were foreign-born. The remaining 83 per cent were almost equally divided between second-generation Americans (that is, with either one or both parents foreign-born) and third- or fourth-generation Americans (both parents born in the United States). The statistics on generation status by age indicate that not only was the percentage of foreign-born in the population declining, but that of second-generation Jews as well; at the same time, the proportion of third- and fourth-generation persons was increasing (Table 13).

TABLE 13. GENERATION STATUS BY AGE, JEWISH POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963

<i>Age</i>	<i>Generation Status</i>				<i>Total Per Cent</i>
	<i>First^a</i>	<i>Second^b</i>	<i>Mixed^c</i>	<i>Third^d</i>	
Under 15	1.7	2.4	9.3	86.6	100.0
15-24	3.1	5.3	15.2	76.4	100.0
25-44	7.6	44.8	19.9	27.7	100.0
45-64	25.9	63.9	6.5	3.7	100.0
65 and over	72.9	24.5	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	17.0	32.2	11.0	39.8	100.0

^a Foreign born.

^b U.S. born of foreign-born parentage.

^c U.S. born of one foreign-born and one U.S. born parent.

^d Persons of third, fourth, or higher order generation.

The percentage of foreign-born Jews declined also according to age, from 73 per cent of those 65 years old and over, to less than 2 per cent of those under 15 years of age. Furthermore, among those under age 15, only 13 per cent were either foreign-born or even the children of foreign-born parents; a vast majority (87 per cent) were American-born children of American-born parents. In the absence of any large-scale immigration, the Jewish population of Greater Providence, and

that of the United States as a whole, should be well over 90 per cent native-born within several decades; and an increasing proportion of this number should be third- or fourth-generation Americans.

Moreover, the majority of the foreign-born have spent the greatest proportion of their lives in the United States. Over one-third have been in this country for over half a century, and another one-third for at least 25 years. The fact that 84 per cent of all foreign-born were over 45 years old and that most of these came to the United States as children and have lived here for three decades or more lends further weight to the evidence suggested by the over-all analysis of the changing generation status of the Jewish population—that it is an increasingly American-bred and -raised population.

The New York community represents a unique situation. Stemming from the city's role as a port of entry, it still has a disproportionately large foreign-born population, estimated at 37 per cent of its 1963–1964 adult population. This contrasts with about 20 to 25 per cent of all adults in most other communities. Attesting to its attraction for new immigrants, 11 per cent of all New York Jews between ages 20 and 34 were foreign-born, compared to only 1 per cent in other places. As a result, the changes in the generation composition of New York's Jewish population will lag behind that of the balance of the United States.⁵¹

Because of the importance of generational change for the structure of the Jewish community, Dr. Goldscheider and I based our analysis of Jewish Americans on a comparison of the demographic, social, economic, and religious characteristics of three generations in the Jewish community.⁵² That study emphasizes that the future of the American Jewish community depends to a great degree on how its members (largely third-generation) are reacting to the freedom to work toward integration into the American social structure as an acculturated sub-society, or toward complete assimilation and loss of Jewish identification. Whether they are reversing or accelerating certain trends toward assimilation, initiated by their second-generation parents or by the smaller number of older third-generation Jews, provides the insights for the detection and projection of the patterns of generation change.

The physical dispersal and deconcentration of the Jewish population were rapid. They marked for many not only a physical break from the

⁵¹ AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 69 (1968), p. 273.

⁵² Goldstein and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*

foreign-born, but symbolized the more dramatic disassociation of American-born Jews from the ethnic ties and experiences that had served as unifying forces in the earlier generation. The degree of identification with Judaism of the third-generation Jews who participate in this dispersal has become a key issue. At the same time, sharp rises have taken place in secular education, as distance from the immigrant generation increased. This provided the key to Jewish participation in the professions and, more recently, in high executive positions.

Dispersal of the Jewish population and its greater exposure to public education increased the interaction between Jews and non-Jews and, as later analysis will document, has resulted in higher intermarriage rates with increasing distance from the immigrant generation. These generational changes in residential location, social class structure, and marriage patterns have been accompanied also by redirections of the religious system. Striking shifts were observed between first- and third-generation groups in identification and membership from Orthodox to Conservative and Reform, as well as declines in regular synagogue attendance, observance of *kashrut*, Jewish organization affiliation, and use of Yiddish as a spoken language. Yet, these trends were counteracted by a clear tendency toward increased Jewish education for the young, as well as increases in selected religious observances. Over-all, some aspects of religiosity appeared to be strengthened, others declined, and some remained stable over the generations. Religious change among three generations of Jews is a complex process involving the abandonment of traditional forms and the development of new forms of identity and expression more congruent with the broader American way of life. Our generational analysis suggests that, evolving out of the process of generational adjustment, the freedom to choose the degree of assimilation was exercised in the direction of Jewish identification.

Age Composition

Among all demographic variables, age is regarded as the most basic because so much of the socio-demographic structure of the population, as well as the processes of birth, death, and migration, are affected by age composition. The significant impact of age on the generation status of the Jewish population has already been noted. At present, the only source of information on the national age composition of Jews is the 1957 census survey. Changes have undoubtedly occurred since then; Jewish community studies indicate that the differences observed by the census have been accentuated.

The 1957 census data clearly indicated that the Jewish population was, on the average, older than the general white population of the United States (Table 14). The median age of the Jewish group was 36.7 years, compared to 30.6 years for the total white population. The sharpest differentials in distribution characterized the youngest age group, under 14 years of age, and the 45-to-64 age category. The youngest group constituted 23 per cent of the total Jewish population, compared to 28 per cent of the total white population. By contrast, only 21 per cent of the white population of the United States was between 45 and 64 years of age in 1957, this was true of 28 per cent of the Jewish group. Both the Jewish and the total white populations had quite similar proportions in the 65-and-over age category, 10 and 9 per cent, respectively, of the total population. The significant differential in the proportion of young persons reflects the lower fertility of the Jewish group, which leads to fewer children in the population and, in turn, results in an older population. The same phenomenon helps account for the lower proportions of Jews in each of the age groups between 14 and 34.

TABLE 14. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION BY AGE, SELECTED COMMUNITIES AND UNITED STATES

Community ^a	Date of Study	Age Distribution				
		Under 15	15-24	25-44	45-64	65 and over
Washington, D.C.	1956	30	9	38	18	5
Worcester, Mass.	1957	27	11	26	26	10
Los Angeles, Cal.	1959	27	12	25	28	8
Rochester, N.Y.	1961	25	12	24	26	13
St. Joseph, Ind.	1961	30	14	24	24	8
Pittsburgh, Pa.	1963	27	14	25	26	8
Providence, R.I.	1963	25	14	24	27	10
Detroit, Mich.	1963	31	11	25	25	8
Milwaukee, Wis.	1964	24	15	23	28	10
Camden, N.J.	1964	30	13	23	28	6
Springfield, Mass.	1966	24	16	21	27	12
Boston, Mass.	1966	23	17	25	24	11
Flint, Mich.	1967	29	10	30	23	8
Columbus, O.	1969	27	13	23	28	9
United States Jews	1957 ^b	23	12	28	28	10
United States whites	1957 ^b	28	14	28	21	9

^a See Appendix for citation of individual community studies.

^b For United States, lowest age categories are "under 14" and "14-24."

In his review of "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," Ben Seligman examined the age composition of 13 Jewish communities which were surveyed between 1947 and 1950.⁵³ He found the median age in these communities to range between 28 and 40, compared to an estimated median age of 31 for the total white population of the United States in 1950. Comparison of more recent community surveys with earlier ones suggests an increasing proportion of individuals in the older age groups. The upsurge in the birth rate after World War II, in which Jews participated, somewhat increased the proportion of Jews in the younger age groups; but differentials persisted between the Jewish and general population. In 1963, 10.5 per cent of the total United States white population was under 5 years of age. But in the Jewish communities of Camden, Detroit, and Providence the percentage of children under 5 varied between 6.2 and 8.5 per cent, the highest being in Camden, which in many respects is a suburban community and therefore has a disproportional number of mothers of child-bearing age. The type of community also affects the proportion of aged persons. In 1963, just under 10 per cent of the United States white population was 65 years and over. In Providence, the comparable proportion for the Jewish community was 10.1 and in Detroit it was 8.0; but in Camden it was only 5.7.

The age structure of the American Jewish community is clear: on the whole, the Jewish population is older than the total United States white population; and over time, both because of its lower fertility and because it has in most places such a large proportion of individuals in the 45-to-64 age group, the Jewish population can be expected to become increasingly older. In American society the problems associated with an aged population are many. During the next few decades such problems may become even more serious for the Jewish community than for the population as a whole. This can be illustrated by projections made for the age composition of the Jewish population of Greater Providence for 1978, fifteen years after the survey. It must be emphasized that these projections assume that fertility and mortality will continue at the 1960 levels and that the total metropolitan area's population will not be affected by migration. The resulting projections definitely point to an aging of the population: a rise from 10 to 17 per

⁵³ Ben B. Seligman, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," in Marshall Sklare, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

cent in the proportion of the persons 65 years of age and older. In actual numbers, there will be a 70 per cent increase in the number of aged. At the same time, the percentage under 15 years of age will decline from 25 in 1963, to 19 in 1978. Reflecting both the low fertility rates of 1960 and the fewer women of child-bearing age, the absolute number of children under 15 will be 20 per cent lower in 1978 than in 1963, affecting the community's task in educating and providing leisure activities for youngsters. But changes will also occur in the middle segment of the age hierarchy, as the reduced number of persons resulting from the especially low Jewish birth rate during the depression move into the 45 to 54 age range. The percentage of this group is projected to decline from 16 of the total in 1963, to only 10 in 1978. In actual numbers, there will be a decline of almost one-third. This may create some serious problems for the community, as the pool of persons to whom it can turn for leadership and financial contributions is greatly reduced. Given the possibility of these developments, Jewish communities may want to reevaluate and reorganize their services, deciding, in particular, which to retain for the Jewish community because of their Jewish component, and which to relegate to the larger community because of their secular character.

Over-all, therefore, the dynamic character of the Jewish age structure requires continuous monitoring, not only for the demographic impact it will have on births, deaths, migration, and socio-economic structure, but also because of its broader social implications.⁵⁴ While recognizing the general trend toward an aging population, with its associated problems of housing for the aged, financial crises resulting from retirement, more persons in poor health, one must also be aware that changes are taking place at other points in the age hierarchy and that the need for schools, playgrounds, camps, and teenage programs also vary as the age profile changes. Too often the Jewish community has been guilty of planning its future without taking account of the basic considerations of the probable size, distribution, and age composition of the population.

Education

For a large majority of the Jews who immigrated to America in the late 1800's and early 1900's, the major incentive was the supposed

⁵⁴ See Gosta Carlsson and Katarina Carlsson, "Age Cohorts and the Generation of Generations," *American Sociological Review*, No. 35, August, 1970, pp. 710-718.

equal opportunities permitting significant social and economic mobility. But lacking secular education, adequate facility in English, and technical training, many found that rapid advancement proved an unrealistic goal. For others, both educational and occupational achievement were made difficult, if not impossible, by factors related to their foreign-born status or, more specifically, to their identification as Jews. Frustrated in their own efforts to achieve significant mobility, many Jews transferred their aspirations to their children. The first-generation American Jews recognized the special importance of education as a key to occupational mobility and higher income, and made considerable effort to provide their children with a good secular education. Reflecting the great value placed by Jews on education, both as a way of life and as a means of mobility, the Jews of America have compiled an extraordinary record of achievement in this area.

Ben Seligman notes in his article on Jewish demography that very few Jewish community studies covering the period before and around 1950 yielded usable information on the secular education of Jews.⁵⁵ On the basis of the very limited data available he concluded that in the period around 1950 the average education of Jews was higher than that of the general population, at about a 12-year average, compared to a 9.7-year average for the general United States white population. He also found that the few studies showing the data by sex revealed "nothing that might be interpreted as a notable difference as between males and females."⁵⁶ In recognition of the important effect of education on the social position of the Jew in the larger community, as well as its possible influence on the degree and nature of Jewish identification, most recent surveys have collected information on education. All these clearly document the high educational achievement of the American Jewish population (Table 15).

On the national level, the 1957 census survey data⁵⁷ permit the best comparisons between the educational achievement of the Jewish and the general population. The results of that survey show that for the population 25 years old and over in the United States the median

⁵⁵ Ben Seligman, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," *op. cit.*, pp. 83-86.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁵⁷ This and the following two sections of this paper—Occupation and Income—are based largely on data from unpublished statistics of the 1957 census survey sample and on Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials Among Religious Groups in the United States," *op. cit.*

TABLE 15. EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ADULT JEWISH POPULATION, SELECTED COMMUNITIES^a

Community	Year	Educational Distribution ^b (Per Cent)				
		8 Grades and Less	1-3 High School	4 High School	1-3 College	4 or More College
Trenton, N.J.	1949	22	7	32	9	18
Canton, O.	1955	21	10	33	18	8
Des Moines, Ia.	1956	18	7	32	19	19
Washington, D.C.	1956	10	8	27	16	36
New Orleans, La.	1958	10	8	18	20	28
Los Angeles, Cal.	1959	9	15	—	49 ^c	23
South Bend, Ind.	1961	17	8	33	18	22
Rochester, N.Y.	1961	21	12	30	30	23
Providence, R.I.	1963	15	8	34	16	25
Detroit, Mich.	1963	9	—	37 ^c	—	54 ^c
Camden, N.J.	1964	11	9	34	18	28
Milwaukee, Wis.	1964	11	11	28	23	27
Springfield, Mass.	1966	11	7	33	19	27

^a See Appendix for citation of individual community studies.

^b Table omits the "Unknowns."

^c Figures refer to sum of 2 columns.

number of school years completed by Jews was 12.3, compared to 10.6 for the general population. But even this large difference does not fully convey the sharp differentials distinguishing educational patterns of Jews from those of the general population (Table 16).

As of 1957, 17 per cent of the adult Jews were college graduates, compared to only 7 per cent of the general population. If those who attended college without graduating are included, the percentage of Jews was 30, or exactly twice the 15 per cent of the general population. At the other extreme of the educational hierarchy, 29 per cent of all adult Jews had received only an elementary school education; this was considerably below the 40 per cent of the total population so classified. Since these data refer to the total population, they are considerably affected by differential age composition which, in turn, is correlated with immigrant status. Later examination of community survey data will control for age.

Judging by median years of school completed, Seligman's conclusion that the educational level of men and women did not differ is confirmed. The median education of Jewish men was 12.5, that of Jewish women 12.3; for both sexes these were above the averages for the total pop-

TABLE 16. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX, UNITED STATES, 1957^a

<i>Years of School Completed</i>	<i>Total Population</i>		<i>Total Population</i>		<i>Total Population</i>	
	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
	<i>Males</i>		<i>Females</i>		<i>Total</i>	
Elementary: 0-7	23.2	14.7	20.3	16.6	21.7	15.6
8	18.5	13.1	17.4	13.1	17.9	13.1
High school: 1-3	17.3	9.7	18.1	10.2	17.7	10.0
4	22.1	21.5	29.5	35.8	26.0	29.0
College: 1-3	7.3	12.6	7.4	12.8	7.3	12.7
4 or more	9.4	25.6	5.7	9.7	7.5	17.3
Not reported	2.2	2.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median school years completed	10.3	12.5	10.9	12.3	10.6	12.3

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March, 1957." (Unpublished.)

ulation. However, for Jews in particular, these medians mask some important sex differences in educational achievement. Whereas 22.5 per cent of Jewish women had had some college education, this was true of 38.2 per cent of all adult Jewish men. Moreover, one out of every four Jewish males had completed four or more years of college, whereas only one out of every ten Jewish females had done so. Clearly, these data not only show that, as of 1957, more Jewish men than women had gone to college, but that more of the former had completed their college education. For the total population, this sex differential was much less marked. Moreover, for both sexes combined, approximately twice as large a proportion of Jewish adults had had a college education than was true of the population as a whole.

Unfortunately, the census data on education by religion are not cross-tabulated by age, and therefore do not permit determination of the extent to which the differences between Jews and the general population were narrowing among the younger age groups. Since 1957, there has been a considerable increase in education among the younger segments of the American population. For example, the March 1967 Current Population Survey shows a continuous rise in the median school years completed, from 8.5 among males aged 65 and over to 12.6 among men aged 25 to 29; and from 8.7 to 12.5 for females. Jewish community surveys indicate similar increases in education among the younger

segments of the Jewish population. The data from Providence illustrates this.

The 1963 educational differentials between the Jewish and the total population of Providence were even greater than those characterizing the United States as a whole in 1957 (Table 17).

The median education of Jews was 11.8 years, compared to 9.1 for the total population. But, again, this large difference masks an even more striking differential in the extent of college education. By 1963, 25 per cent of all adult Jews in Providence had graduated from college and an additional 16 per cent had had some college education. The corresponding percentages for the total population were 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. In fact, the percentage of Jews who had continued on to graduate school, 13.4, was greater than the percentage of adults in the total population who had had any college education. But of particular interest here are the age differentials within the population, clearly documenting that a significant change has taken place in the education

TABLE 17. EDUCATION COMPLETED BY AGE AND SEX, JEWISH POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963.

<i>Education</i>	<i>Age</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>25-44</i>	<i>45-64</i>	<i>65 and over</i>	
None	0.2	2.1	23.7	4.8
Elementary				
1-4	0.0	0.8	5.7	1.2
5-7	0.4	2.5	9.1	2.7
8	0.3	6.9	15.7	5.7
High school				
9-11	2.8	11.1	10.2	7.8
12	34.4	40.0	16.5	34.2
College				
1-3	22.9	14.8	3.7	16.2
4	18.4	9.5	3.0	11.9
5 or more	20.3	10.8	3.9	13.4
Unknown	0.4	1.7	8.5	2.2
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median years	14.5	12.6	8.2	12.8
Median years, males	15.9	12.7	8.3	13.0
Median years, females	13.6	12.5	8.1	12.7

level of the Jewish population. For males, the median level increased from only 7.6 years for those 70 years old and over, to over 15 years for those under 40 years of age. The same general pattern characterized the females. In each age group, the median level of education for males was higher than for females; but the differential was greatest for those in the two youngest age groups, reflecting the considerably higher proportion of men than women who took postgraduate work.

The high proportion of persons aged 25 to 29 who had completed their college education and the fact that an estimated 80 per cent of those in the college age group were enrolled in college emphasize that a college education is becoming virtually universal for the younger segments of the Jewish population. Within the Jewish population itself, the important educational differential will thus be between those who had only some college education and those who went on to postgraduate work. At least one caveat should be added to the conclusion concerning virtually universal college education for Jews in the future: If the current emphasis on recruitment of minority-group members and underprivileged students persists, especially to the point of meeting certain enrollment quotas, the higher rates of enrollment by members of other segments of the population may necessarily be reduced. Jews, in particular, might be affected by such a development because of their very high enrollment rates.

As part of a larger survey of inequality in educational opportunity in the United States, the Bureau of Census Current Population Survey of October 1965 gathered information about school-age children.⁵⁸ A 1970 report, limited to white boys and girls aged 14 to 19 who were enrolled in elementary or secondary public or private schools, reviewed the college plans of the sample respondents. Since religion was one of the three key variables for which information was collected (the other two were race and national origin), this analysis provides an opportunity to compare the college intentions of Jewish teenagers and teenagers in general.

The religious composition of the student body was based on the principal's estimate of the percentage of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in his school. Of the estimated 330,000 Jewish students enrolled in public and private elementary and secondary schools, 74,000, or 22.4

⁵⁸ A. Lewis Rhodes and Charles B. Nam, "The Religious Context of Educational Expectations," *American Sociological Review*, April 1970, pp. 253-267.

per cent, were enrolled in schools with half or more of their students Jewish; 118,000, or 35.8 per cent, were in schools where less than half of the students were Jewish; an additional 41.8 per cent were in schools for which no religion composition could be obtained.

The study found that 86 per cent of the 330,000 Jewish students planned to attend college, compared with only 53 per cent of the general student body. Interestingly, the percentages differed strikingly between those teenagers who were receiving their education in schools with heavy Jewish populations and those in schools with less than 50 per cent Jewish students. Among the former, 94 per cent planned to attend college; among the latter, only 80 per cent did.

Other variables obviously affect plans for college. The study attempts to control for the effects of intelligence, mother's education, occupation of household head, and family income. Adjusting for all these factors reduced the differences among the various religions in the percentage of students with college plans. Yet, part of the religious differences persisted; and even after controlling for all these variables, 70 per cent of all the Jewish students, compared to the general average of 53 per cent, had college plans. Even within the high-IQ sub-group, comparisons between Jews and other segments of the population showed that Jews continued to have the highest proportion planning for college education.

The authors conclude:

The high rate of college plans (86 per cent) for pupils with Jewish mothers is particularly noteworthy, especially when the effect of religious context is added to the analysis. If the majority of the student body is Jewish the college plans rate for Jewish students is fourteen percentage points higher than the rate for Jewish students in schools where Jews are in the minority. The rate is fifteen percentage points higher even when the intelligence, mother's aspiration, occupation, and income are included in the analysis. The same results are observed for high-IQ Jews. These results suggest that it would be worthwhile to test the hypothesis that exposure of a Jewish student to the norms and values of a Jewish sub-community is important in formation of educational expectations.⁵⁹

These data have a number of implications for the types of demographic developments considered in this paper: First, they clearly confirm the projection that college education will be virtually universal among Jewish students, if they can realize their aspirations. Second, because plans for attending college are still quite low for a number of other religious groups, ranging in the 40 to 50 per cent level, it will be some time before college attendance becomes universal among the non-Jewish

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

population. As a result, some of the differences noted with respect to education can be expected to persist for a number of decades, and indirectly continue to affect occupation and income differentials. Also important is the finding that the proportion planning to go to college differed significantly (14 percentage points) between those receiving their elementary and secondary education in a largely "Jewish environment" and those doing so in more heterogeneous schools. If the Jewish population becomes more generally dispersed and tendencies toward migration increase, a much higher proportion of Jewish youth may be attending schools that are less densely Jewish. If either residence or school environment is so important for motivating individuals toward higher education, increased population redistribution may lower somewhat the proportion of Jewish youth planning to go to college. This must, however, remain speculative, pending more research on the role of the Jewish sub-community, as compared to the role of the family, in forming education expectations.

In the meantime, high level of educational achievement significantly affects several areas of Jewish life in the United States. To the extent that education is highly correlated with occupation, an increasing proportion of college graduates in the Jewish population will affect its occupational composition. More Jews will be engaged in intellectual pursuits and in occupations requiring a high degree of technical skill. Concomitantly, there also will probably be a reduction in the number of self-employed, both because small, private business will not provide an adequate intellectual challenge and because patterns of discrimination, which thus far have excluded Jews from large corporations, are likely to continue to weaken. However, the impact will go beyond occupation.

In order to obtain a college education, particularly at the post-graduate level, a large proportion of young Jews must leave home to attend colleges in distant places. As a result, their ties to both family and community will weaken. A high proportion of these college-educated youths probably never return permanently to the communities in which their families live and in which they were raised. Thus education serves as an important catalyst for geographic mobility and eventually leads many individuals to take up residence in communities with small Jewish populations, to live in highly integrated neighborhoods, and to work and socialize in largely non-Jewish circles. The extent to which such a development occurs needs to be closely followed during the decade of the 1970's.

Finally, Jews with higher education may have significantly higher

rates of intermarriage and greater alienation from the Jewish community. This involves not only the possible impact of physical separation from home and the weakening of parental control on dating and courtship patterns, but also the general "liberalization" a college education may have on the religious values and Jewish identity of the individual. It would be ironic if the very strong positive value that Jews traditionally have placed on education and that now manifests itself in the very high proportion of Jewish youths attending college may eventually be an important factor in the general weakening of the individual's ties to the Jewish community.

Occupation

In an analysis of the social characteristics of American Jews prepared in 1954 for the tercentenary celebration of Jewish settlement in the United States, Nathan Glazer observed that, outside New York City, the homogeneous character of the occupational structure of Jewish communities was beyond dispute.⁶⁰ Basing his conclusions on a number of local Jewish community surveys conducted between 1948 and 1953, he noted that the proportion of Jews in the nonmanual occupations ranged from 75 to 96 per cent, compared to 38 per cent for the American population as a whole. According to Glazer, these studies also suggest that even in New York City, where one would expect to find a substantial proportion of Jewish workers, as many as two-thirds of the gainfully employed Jews were engaged in nonmanual work.

Comparing his findings for the 1948–1953 period with the results of ten surveys conducted during 1935–1945, Glazer found that the proportion of professionals had risen, on the average, from about 11 per cent of the Jewish gainfully employed in the earlier period to about 15 per cent in the later period, and that this change was accompanied by a decline in the number of Jews engaged in the lower levels of white-collar work. Interestingly, this rise in the number of Jews in the professions evidently occurred without any significant change in the proportion of independent Jewish businessmen. Glazer explains:

The American Jew tries to avoid getting into a situation where discrimination may seriously affect him. In a great bureaucracy, he is dependent on the im-

⁶⁰ Nathan Glazer, "The American Jew and the Attainment of Middle-Class Rank: Some Trends and Explanations," in Marshall Sklare, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

pression he makes on his superiors and, increasingly in recent years, dependent on the degree to which he approximates a certain "type" considered desirable in business. The Jew prefers a situation where his own merit receives objective confirmation, and he is not dependent on the goodwill or personal reaction of a person who may happen not to like Jews.⁶¹

Whether this point of view is still justified in 1970 will be considered later.

Another of Glazer's relevant observations is that the extreme rapidity of the rise in social and economic positions is especially characteristic of Jewish experience in America. Citing a 1947 study of American college graduates, he notes that more Jews than non-Jews became professionals, proprietors, managers, or officials, and fewer Jews than non-Jews became lower white-collar or manual workers. Yet, this study found that fewer of the parents of these Jews than of the non-Jews had been professionals, proprietors, managers, or officials. In a single generation Jews had increased their proportion of professionals by close to 400 per cent, non-Jews by only about 25 per cent. Between 1910 and 1950 the proportion of the population engaged in nonmanual work rose from 20 to 38 per cent. This development offered Jews great opportunities and, given their strong motivation for social mobility, they proceeded to take full advantage of them. Thus, at a time when the total American population became more markedly middle-class in its occupational structure, Jews became even more so.

Glazer further notes a general tendency for the ethnic concentration in a single occupation to suffer dilution as the native-born generation becomes better educated and more familiar with occupational opportunities. But, he points out, for the Jews, "this dilution upward becomes a concentration, for the Jews begin to reach the upper limit of occupational mobility relatively early." For Jews to reflect the general occupational structure of the United States would, in fact, require downward mobility for many. He concludes that since this is not going to happen, "we may expect the Jewish community to become more homogeneous in the future, as the number of first generation workers and the culture they established, declines."⁶² On the basis of evidence that became available since Glazer's analysis (Table 18), such a conclusion is warranted, provided the reference is to broad occupational classes, such as professionals and

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

TABLE 18. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, MALE JEWISH POPULATION,
SELECTED COMMUNITIES
(Per cent)

<i>Community^a</i>	<i>Year of Study</i>	<i>Occupational Distribution</i>			
		<i>Professionals</i>	<i>Proprietors</i>	<i>Clerical and Sales</i>	<i>Manual Workers</i>
Canton, O.	1955	14	55	14	12
Des Moines, Ia.	1956	14	53	24	5
Washington, D.C.	1956	38	24	21	10
San Francisco, Cal.	1958	28	27	34	11
New Orleans, La.	1958	25	49	18	8
Los Angeles, Cal.	1959	25	31	24	20
South Bend, Ind.	1961	18	57	15	11
Rochester, N.Y.	1961	27	30	24	20
Trenton, N.J.	1961	27	54	13	5
Providence, R.I.	1963	21	41	25	12
Detroit, Mich.	1963	23	54	13	10
Milwaukee, Wis.	1964	22	35	26	15
Camden, N.J.	1964	34	31	22	13
Springfield, Mass.	1966	25	39	27	9
Boston, Mass.	1966	32	27	31	10
Flint, Mich.	1967	36	50	7	7
Columbus, O.	1969	36	43	15	6

^a See Appendix for citation of individual community studies.

managers. At the same time, however, this kind of concentration of Jews may be followed, although not to exactly the same degree, by a similar concentration of the general population. In this sense, the marked differentials noted by Glazer and also in later studies can only diminish as upward mobility becomes increasingly characteristic of the general population as well. Here, again, the experience of the Jews may be in the forefront of developments on the larger American scene.

The 1957 census sample survey provides data on the national labor force participation and occupational composition of the Jewish population and permits us to compare their patterns with those of the general population (Table 19). In 1957, for the United States as a whole, 81.1 per cent of all males 14 years old and over, and 35.1 per cent of all females were in the labor force. The proportion was quite similar for Jewish males, 81.5 per cent, but somewhat lower for Jewish females, 30.7 per cent. These over-all differences mask some significant variations within specific age groups. Reflecting the higher educational achievement of Jews, which results in many remaining

TABLE 19. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY AGE AND SEX, TOTAL AND URBAN UNITED STATES, 1957^a

<i>Age and Sex</i>	<i>Total United States</i>		<i>Urban United States</i>	
	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Both sexes	57.0	55.1	58.5	55.1
Male	81.1	81.5	81.5	81.5
14-17	30.5	^b	28.4	^b
18-24	79.1	53.9	78.1	51.7
25-34	97.0	97.0	96.8	96.8
35-44	97.8	99.1	98.1	99.1
45-64	92.7	96.1	93.4	96.0
65 and over	37.4	46.9	35.0	48.0
Female	35.1	30.7	38.3	30.8
14-17	17.7	^b	19.2	^b
18-24	45.5	57.2	50.7	57.2
25-34	34.8	25.5	38.7	25.9
35-44	42.6	33.5	45.7	34.2
45-64	41.1	38.2	44.1	37.9
65 and over	11.5	8.5	12.8	8.6

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March, 1957." (Unpublished.)

^b Base is less than 150,000.

in school for a longer time instead of entering the labor force, the levels of labor force participation by Jews between the ages of 18 to 24 were considerably below that of the general population, only 53.9 per cent in contrast to 79 per cent. Between ages 25 and 44, labor force participation by men in the Jewish and general population was virtually universal, but beyond that age, the proportion of Jewish males in the labor force was higher than that of the general population. This was especially true of the Jewish men 65 years old and older, of whom 47 per cent were still working, compared to only 37 per cent of aged males in the total population. To the extent that retirement is more voluntary for professionals and the self-employed generally, the proportionately larger number of Jews in these categories contributes to their higher than average labor force participation rates in the older age groups.

For females, too, the age specific labor force participation patterns of Jews differ from those of the total adult groups. In the 18-to-24-year age group, Jewish women had the highest labor force participa-

tion rate: 57 per cent, compared to 45 per cent of the general population. The high rates for the Jewish group may reflect their relatively high educational achievement accompanied by a somewhat later age of marriage. Greater and more successful use of family limitation may also contribute to this pattern. Since this difference persists in the urban population, it does not stem from the higher concentration of Jews in urban places. Further insights can be gained from examination of participation rates of married women with varying numbers of children in the household (Table 20). The over-all levels of participation vary only minimally, but significant age differentials do exist. In each age group between 25 and 65, participation rates of Jewish women were below those of the general population, especially of women between ages 25 and 45. The presence of very young children in Jewish families significantly reduced Jewish labor force participation below that of the total population. For example, 30 per cent of the Jewish women having no children under 18 years of age worked, compared to 36 per cent of that category in the general population. Among those

TABLE 20. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR JEWISH AND ALL MARRIED WOMEN LIVING IN SAME HOUSEHOLD AS HUSBAND, BY AGE, AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, UNITED STATES, 1957^a

<i>Age and presence of children</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Total married women, husband present	29.6	27.8
Age		
Under 25	29.1	^b
25-34	27.2	18.7
35-44	35.7	24.5
45-64	32.3	30.6
65 and over	6.4	^b
Presence of children		
No own children under 18	35.6	30.0
With children 6-17, none under 6	36.7	28.6
With children under 6	17.0	11.8

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

^b Base is less than 150,000.

with children under six years of age, only 12 per cent of the Jewish women worked, compared to 17 per cent of women in the general population. The lower participation levels of Jewish women at all ages between 25 and 65 suggests that higher socio-economic status, together with the presence of small children, plays a key role in influencing participation levels.

Sharp differentials characterized the occupational composition of the Jewish group, compared to the general population (Table 21). Three-fourths of all Jewish employed males worked in white-collar positions, compared to only 35 per cent of the total white male population of the United States. These large differences were to a very great extent attributable to the much greater concentration of Jewish men in professional and managerial positions. Of the total Jewish male labor force, one in five was a professional, compared to only one in ten in the general population; and one out of every three Jews was employed as manager or proprietor, compared to only 13 per cent of the total male population. The proportion in clerical work was similar for Jews and the total labor force, but in sales work it was almost three times as high for Jews as for total males. Conversely, the proportion of Jews in manual work was very small: only 22 per cent, compared to 57 per cent of the total male labor force.

Compared with males, women in the labor force were much more concentrated in white-collar positions, but the differentials between Jewish women and all women were less marked than those for the men. Just over four out of every five Jewish women were in white-collar jobs, compared to just over half of the total female labor force. A similar pattern emerged from examination of the specific occupational categories. Among professionals, for example, the proportion of Jewish women was 15.5 per cent, compared to 12.2 per cent for the total female labor force. Like men, Jewish women were considerably underrepresented in manual labor categories: only 17 per cent, compared to 44 per cent of the total female labor force.

Special tabulations of survey data from the National Opinion Research Center show quite similar patterns of differentiation between Jews and the total population.⁶³ So, too, do data from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.⁶⁴

⁶³ Donald J. Bogue, *op. cit.*, pp. 702-705.

⁶⁴ Bernard Lazerwitz, "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," *op. cit.*, pp. 574-575.

TABLE 21. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 18 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX, TOTAL AND URBAN UNITED STATES^a, 1957^b

Major Occupation Group	Total United States				Urban United States			
	Total Population		Jewish		Total Population		Jewish	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Professional	9.9	20.3	12.2	15.5	11.5	9.9	12.5	8.9
Farmers & farm managers	7.3	0.1	0.7	0.2	0.4	—	—	—
Managers & proprietors	13.3	35.1	5.5	8.9	14.6	36.8	5.3	8.9
Clerical workers	6.9	8.0	30.3	43.9	8.6	8.0	33.5	41.3
Sales workers	5.4	14.1	6.9	14.4	6.3	15.0	7.1	19.0
Skilled laborers	20.0	8.9	1.0	0.7	21.3	11.7	1.1	1.0
Semi-skilled laborers	20.9	10.1	17.1	11.2	21.7	14.0	17.7	15.1
Service workers	6.1	2.3	22.7	5.1	7.7	3.4	22.1	5.9
Farm laborers	2.5	0.1	3.0	—	0.3	0.1	0.1	—
Unskilled laborers	7.7	0.8	0.6	—	7.7	1.1	0.5	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total white collar	35.5	77.5	54.9	82.7	41.0	69.7	58.4	78.1
Total blue collar	57.2	22.2	44.4	17.0	58.7	30.3	41.5	22.0

^a Standardized by years of school completed.

^b U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957." (Unpublished.)

The different occupational composition of Jews compared to the general population has often been attributed to their higher concentration in urban places and to their higher educational achievement. The census tabulations enable analysis of the occupational data for the urban population, while controlling for years of school completed by religion. By restricting the data to a more homogeneous social and economic environment and by holding constant the wide differences in educational achievement, it becomes possible to ascertain more clearly to what extent occupational differences are directly related to religious affiliation and to what degree they may simply be a reflection of differential opportunities available to Jews because of their places of residence and levels of education.

With residence and education controlled, 70 per cent of the Jewish males were white-collar workers, compared to 41 per cent of the general male population. Thus, the concentration of Jews in white-collar positions remained far above that of the total population; but the difference was no longer in the ratio of two to one, as indicated by the unstandardized data. Moreover, for selected occupational categories there also was a dramatic change. For example, with residence and education controlled, only 10 per cent of the Jewish males were professionals, compared to 12 per cent of the total male population. What originally was a two-to-one differential completely disappeared and was even reversed. On the other hand, differentials in the managerial and the sales categories remained about the same. Similar conclusions held for occupational differentials for females after the data were restricted to urban residence and standardized by education. Over-all, therefore, controlling for both education and residence suggests that both these factors explain some, but not all, variations in occupational differentials between Jews and the total population.

In a further attempt to assess the relation between education and occupation, special tabulations of the occupational distribution of employed college graduates in urban areas were examined. Such control again eliminated a considerable part of the differential in occupational distribution between Jews and the total population (Table 22). Of Jewish college graduates, 97 per cent were in white-collar occupations. For the total population, this was true of 93 per cent. Similarly, 58 per cent of all Jewish college graduates were professionals, compared to 63 per cent of those in the total population. The only important difference characterizing the college-educated group was the significantly higher proportion of Jewish graduates who earned their living

TABLE 22. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED COLLEGE GRADUATES IN URBAN AREAS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, JEWISH AND TOTAL UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1957^a

<i>Major Occupation Group</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Professional	63.2	58.2
Managers & proprietors	15.7	22.1
Clerical workers	8.2	8.9
Sales workers	5.8	7.8
Skilled laborers	3.2	0.9
Semi-skilled laborers	1.5	1.3
Other occupations	2.4	0.9
Total per cent	100.0	100.0

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

as managers, proprietors, and officials: 22 per cent, compared to 16 per cent of the total population. But this differential, too, was considerably below that characterizing the population as a whole when education was not controlled.

The 1957 census data obviously are outdated by now. For evidence of the occupational composition of the Jewish population in the 1960's, one must turn to the various community surveys taken during that period. In 1960, 45 per cent of the American white urban male population was engaged in white-collar work, but in such communities as Providence, Camden, Springfield, Rochester, and Trenton the percentage for Jews ranged from a low of 80 to a high of 92 per cent. While the percentages in specific occupational categories varied among communities, depending on the character of the community and the nature of occupational opportunities, the proportion of professionals among Jews was from two to three times greater than among the general population, and the differentials in the proportion of managers and proprietors were even larger.

Some indication of the changes that may be taking place in the occupational composition of Jews can be gained from statistics on occupation by age for Providence (Table 23). These point in the direction of a reduced percentage of Jews in the managerial and proprietor group, and an increasing proportion in the professions and in sales work. For example, among males the proportion of professionals increased from 17 per cent of those 65 and over, to 25 per cent of those 25 to 44; and conversely, the proportion employed as

TABLE 23. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY AGE AND SEX, JEWISH POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963
(Per Cent)

Age	Occupation				
	Professionals	Managers	Clerical Workers	Sales Workers	Manual Laborers
<i>Males</i>					
15-24	12.3	24.6	13.9	24.6	21.5
25-44	24.6	37.9	4.8	24.3	9.2
45-64	19.0	43.6	3.5	19.5	13.4
65 and over	17.2	50.5	4.0	11.1	17.2
Total	20.7	41.0	4.5	20.9	12.1
<i>Females</i>					
15-24	22.0	4.0	64.0	2.0	6.0
25-44	32.3	10.3	34.8	16.1	5.8
45-64	8.9	15.3	42.8	22.9	7.6
65 and over	1.3	31.6	21.5	26.1	16.4
Total	17.9	12.9	41.6	18.4	7.2

managers declined from over half of the oldest group to just about one-third of the 25-44 year group. At the same time, the proportion of sales personnel increased from 11 per cent of the oldest to almost one-fourth of the 25-44 year group. The concentration of older males in managerial positions must be interpreted within the context of the high percentage of self-employed who tend to remain in the labor force, while those in the white-collar and manual-labor group must retire. Yet, as many as 17 per cent of the aged segment of the employed population still held manual jobs, compared to only 13 per cent of those in the 45-to-64-year group and 8 per cent of those aged 25 to 44. In general, the same pattern by age characterized the employed females, although the differentials were not always as sharp.

Survey data on the occupation of head of Jewish families for Detroit covering 1935, 1956, and 1963 provide a unique opportunity to compare changes over 28 years in the occupational composition of the Jewish population. The evidence clearly points to a pattern of occupational concentration. In 1935, 70 per cent of the heads of Jewish families were employed as white-collar workers. By 1963 their percentage had risen to 90. The most striking changes characterized the professionals, who increased from 7 per cent in 1935 to 23 per cent in 1963, and the manager-owners, who grew from 31 to 54

per cent of the total in that period. At the same time, the proportion of lower white-collar workers, that is, sales and clerical workers, declined from 32 to only 13 per cent. Using the 1940 and 1960 censuses as bases for comparing changes in the general population, the data also show some upward concentration. In 1940, 31 per cent of the population was in white-collar occupations; by 1960 this had risen to 38 per cent. The proportion of professionals also grew considerably, from 5 to 12 per cent, and that of managers-owners increased slightly, from 9 to 10 per cent, compensated by a small decline in the proportion of lower white-collar workers, from 17 to 16 per cent. Again, the patterns for the Jews and the total population were parallel, but the occupational movement of Jews has been much more accentuated. The conclusion seems warranted that, in time, increasing occupational concentration will also take place in the population as a whole, and differentials between Jews and the total population will decline. But in the short run, the discrepancies may be greater as Jews move up more quickly.

The Detroit data by age for 1963 also confirm occupational shifting within the white-collar segment of the occupational hierarchy. For example, only 19 per cent of the 45-to-64-year age group were professionals, compared to 42 per cent of the 20-to-34-year age group. As in Providence, a lower proportion of younger men were managers-owners: 40, compared to 56 per cent. Particularly noteworthy is the decline in the proportion of independent businessmen within the managerial-proprietor group, from 42 per cent among those aged 45 to 64, to only 30 per cent of the younger group. Even if a considerable portion of those currently engaged as managers or sales and clerical workers should become owners at a later stage of the life cycle, the total percentage is not likely to exceed the proportion in the 45-to-64-year group classified as owners in 1963. Again, the data analyzed here suggest that, in the years ahead, business ownership is likely to decline among the Jewish population.

What do these varied data suggest for future trends in Jewish occupational composition? Although restricted because of their cross-sectional character, they point to a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in professional work, and to either stability or actual decline for the managerial and proprietor group. Possibly, a number of younger persons currently classified as sales workers will at later stages of their life cycle move into managerial and proprietor positions, but evidence for Providence indicates that half or more

of these younger individuals were working for others, outside of family businesses. With the gradual disappearance of small businesses, an increasing proportion of these Jewish men may turn to executive positions in business corporations instead of operating their own firms, as did many of their parents and grandparents.

It seems reasonable to assume that, with the general rise in educational level, educational differentials among members of the various religious groups will lessen; and as discriminatory restrictions on occupational choice weaken, occupational differentials will also decline. The very high proportion of Jews in white-collar occupations leading to the "concentration" which Glazer predicted will persist; but within this concentration, there may in fact be more diversity in the future than there was in the past. At the same time, the total population will also concentrate more in higher occupational categories, with a decline in occupational differentials as the net result.

In commenting on educational and occupational changes within the Jewish population, Albert Mayer, the author of the 1968 Columbus, O., study, made a most important observation. He stressed that the organized Jewish community must come to recognize that its constituency is now almost entirely high white-collar as well as college-educated. Unless the community takes full recognition of this crucial fact in all its activities, it will find much difficulty in gaining the loyalty, interest, and support of its membership. The reaction of the organized community to its membership may very well still be in terms of earlier 20th-century stereotypes, i.e., a largely foreign-born, immigrant group in need of welfare and social services. This is a false image in view of generation changes, education, and occupational mobility; and any approach ignoring these changes runs the risk of serious failure. Such an attitude on the part of the community may be compounded by changes in identification patterns within the population itself. More Jews in scientific and executive positions may well lead to increased channelling of self-identification through the professional or intellectual sub-societies rather than through the Jewish community. Increased geographic mobility would reinforce such a development and pose still further challenges for the organized Jewish community.

Income

The demographer probably encounters greater difficulty in collecting information on income than on any other standard variable that

interests him. Not until 1940 was the first income question included in the federal census. Social surveys focusing on fertility in the United States today often find it harder to obtain accurate information on income than on such intimate matters as birth control practice and sexual activity. Not surprisingly, therefore, few among the large number of Jewish community surveys collected such information; and if they did, the data are often either of questionable quality or limited because there are no comparable figures for the general population. Yet, in a consideration of the position of Jews in American society, it is important to look at Jewish income levels, to ascertain whether they differ from those of the general population and, if so, why. For such purposes three sets of national data are available: the findings of the 1957 census surveys; the Lazerwitz study based on survey research statistics from the University of Michigan;⁶⁵ and Bogue's analysis of the National Opinion Research Survey data.⁶⁶

The Lazerwitz material clearly documents that the income level of Jews is above that of the general population. Measured in terms of total 1956 family income, 42 per cent of Jewish families had incomes of \$7,500 and over, compared to only 19 per cent of the general population. At the other extreme of the income hierarchy, only 8 per cent of the Jewish families had incomes under \$3,000, compared to one-fourth of all families in the United States. Yet, if comparison is with other specific religious groups, the high position of the Jews is surpassed by the Episcopalians, among whom 46 per cent of families had incomes of \$7,500 and over and only 6 per cent below \$3,000. The higher income of the Episcopalians who, like the Jews, are highly urbanized is also consistent with their high educational and occupational achievements.

Using National Opinion Research Survey materials compiled in 1953 and 1955, Donald Bogue also investigated the relation between religious preference and family income. His data, like those of Lazerwitz, point to higher income levels for the Jewish population. The median income for heads of Jewish households was \$5,954, compared to \$4,094 for the total population. Of the Jewish families, 30 per cent had incomes \$7,500 and over, compared to only 13 per cent of the families of the total population. Only 15 per cent of the Jewish

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Bogue, *op. cit.*, pp. 705-708.

households had incomes under \$3,000, compared to 31 per cent of all families.

Bogue also found that Jewish household heads employed as professionals, proprietors, or managers tended to have higher median incomes than did the members of other religious groups belonging to those broad occupations. The same was generally true for Episcopalians. He suggested that this pattern was probably due to internal variations between occupations within each of the broad occupational categories. Thus he concluded that occupation is much more potent than religious preference as a factor determining the income level of household heads.

Similarly, Bogue's comparison of the median income of religious groups by educational attainment suggests that Jewish household heads tended to receive larger incomes than did household heads in the general population with comparable education. He added, however, that these differences may be due to intervening variables, such as age of head, number and type of secondary earners, family structure, and occupation, as well as to cultural factors associated with religious affiliation, and that education, like occupation, was much more important than religious preference in determining the income level of households.

However, the Lazerwitz and Bogue materials are limited in that they present only gross comparisons. The census data have the advantage of permitting more detailed analysis to document the influence of other factors on differences in income between Jews and the total population. For each person in the 1957 census sample, information was solicited on the amount of money income received in 1956 (Table 24). This included income from such varied sources as wages and salaries, self-employment, pensions, interest, dividends, and rent. Since both high education and high white-collar employment are highly correlated with income, the fact that the \$4,900 median income of Jewish males was well above the \$3,608 median for the male population as a whole comes as no surprise. This sharp differential was also reflected in the more detailed statistics on distribution by income class. Incomes of \$10,000 and over were reported by 17 per cent of the Jewish males, compared to only 3.6 per cent of the males in the total population. On the other hand, just over one-fourth of the Jews, but 41 per cent of the total male population, had incomes under \$3,000. These differences extended to females as well,

TABLE 24. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY INCOME IN 1956, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX, TOTAL AND URBAN UNITED STATES^a

Income	Total United States						Urban United States					
	Total Population		Jewish		Total Population		Jewish		Total Population		Jewish	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Under \$1,000	17.2	10.0	46.9	39.0	5.6	4.1	23.2	22.5	5.6	4.1	23.2	22.5
1,000-1,999	11.7	9.0	19.3	16.6	6.1	6.4	20.6	18.8	6.1	6.4	20.6	18.8
2,000-2,999	12.1	7.4	15.7	15.2	10.8	7.6	24.3	24.7	10.8	7.6	24.3	24.7
3,000-3,999	14.8	11.0	11.0	15.1	17.4	13.9	19.6	19.1	17.4	13.9	19.6	19.1
4,000-4,999	15.9	14.0	4.3	6.5	21.4	23.3	7.8	9.7	21.4	23.3	7.8	9.7
5,000-5,999	11.9	13.4	1.5	3.6	16.0	17.0	2.7	2.8	16.0	17.0	2.7	2.8
6,000-9,999	12.7	18.0	0.9	2.3	17.6	18.9	1.4	1.7	17.6	18.9	1.4	1.7
10,000 and over	3.6	17.2	0.2	1.5	5.0	8.7	0.3	0.7	5.0	8.7	0.3	0.7
Total Per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median income	\$3,608	\$4,900	\$1,146	\$1,663	\$4,472	\$4,773	\$2,255	\$2,352	\$4,472	\$4,773	\$2,255	\$2,352

^a Standardized for major occupation group; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

as evidenced by the 50 per cent higher median income of Jewish women, compared to that of the total female population.

Controlling the census statistics for urban residence and major occupational groups eliminated the sharp differentials noted for the unstandardized data. For males, the standardized data showed a median income for Jews of \$4,773, just slightly above the \$4,472 median for the total population. Narrowing of differentials also extended to the over-all distribution by income level. For the standardized data, 18 per cent of the Jewish males, compared to 23 per cent of the total male population, had incomes under \$3,000; and the proportion with incomes of \$10,000 and over was 8.7 and 5.0 per cent, respectively. The same narrowing of differentials appeared for women, as evidenced by the reduction of the difference between the median incomes of Jewish women and all women to less than \$100.

Clearly, then, the considerably higher income level characterizing Jews, compared with the general population, is a function of their concentration in urban areas and in high white-collar positions. This suggests that, as educational differentials between Jews and the rest of the population narrow and as increasing proportions of non-Jews enter higher white-collar positions, the existing income differentials between Jews and the general population will diminish. Such a conclusion seems justified by additional information showing that for Jews, as for the total population, the median income level consistently rises with increasing education (Table 25). For example, for Jews with less than an eighth grade education, the average median income was

TABLE 25. MEDIAN INCOME IN 1956 OF JEWISH AND ALL UNITED STATES URBAN MEN 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED^a

<i>Years of School Completed</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Elementary: 0-7	\$2,654	\$2,609
8	3,631	3,844
High school: 1-3	3,858	4,672
4	4,563	4,913
College: 1-3	4,526	5,026
4 or more	6,176	8,041

^a U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

\$2,609; but for those with a college degree, it was \$8,041. If Jews and the total population with similar levels of education are compared, however, the differences in median income are generally less than 10 per cent for all educational categories below the college level. For the college groups, and particularly for those with a college degree, the differences increase. In all likelihood, the sharp differential within the college-graduate group reflects the higher proportion of Jews who have postgraduate education and are in high-income professional and executive positions. As proportionately more persons in the general population obtain a postgraduate education, differences in income level between the Jewish and the total population will probably diminish.

Without further controls, the question of whether religion, occupation, or education is a more important factor in determining income level cannot be clearly ascertained. Control for occupation and place of residence reduces the income differentials in the three major religious groups, but it does not eliminate them completely. Similarly, comparisons of median income level among various educational categories suggests minimal differences for all but the college educated. Moreover, the range of differences by education within both the Jewish and total population is far greater than the differences in median income between the Jewish group and the total population. Whereas the difference between Jews and the total for most educational levels was only several hundred dollars, the range of difference between the lowest and highest educated Jewish group was \$5,400. On this basis, the conclusion suggested by Donald Bogue that education is a much more potent factor than religion in determining the income level of households seems justified.⁶⁷ This conclusion is further confirmed by a highly sophisticated statistical analysis of the relation between income and religious affiliation undertaken by Galen L. Gockel, which controlled for occupation, education, race, region, and size of place of residence, using 1962 national sample survey data.⁶⁸

In interpreting Gockel's, Bogue's, and this writer's conclusions that nonreligious factors account for a considerable portion of religious differentials in income level, we must realize that, in actual fact, the differentials do exist; their statistical elimination merely serves to identify the causes of the differences rather than to do away with

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 708.

⁶⁸ Galen L. Gockel, "Income and Religious Affiliation," *American Journal of Sociology*, No. 74, May 1969, pp. 632-647

them. The fact remains that, on the whole, both the average income of Jews and the proportion of Jews in high income groups are well above those of most of the population. To the extent that a considerable part of this difference is attributable to factors other than religion, the differences are likely to diminish in the future, both as the occupational composition of the Jewish population changes and particularly as higher proportions of non-Jews achieve higher education and move into better paying occupations.

Overview of Future Demographic Trends

From existing information on the demographic history of the American Jewish community and on its structure in 1970, what patterns of development can be anticipated?

Numbering about 6 million in 1970, after slow growth during all but the first several decades of this century, the Jewish population is likely to continue its slow increase. The low rate of growth results particularly from the low level of Jewish fertility, which is below that of Protestants and Catholics and hovers close to the minimum needed for replacement. Limited data suggest that death rates of Jews are slightly below those of the general population, but the over-all death rate of the Jewish population is likely to rise as the average age increases. This, together with possible larger losses from intermarriage, will contribute to maintenance, if not accentuation, of the slow growth rate. As a result, the Jewish population, even while growing slightly, will come to constitute an increasingly smaller proportion of the total American population, having already declined from the peak of 3.7 to less than 3 per cent by 1970.

While declining as a per cent of the total population, Jews will also become more dispersed throughout the United States. As a result of continuously higher education and changing occupations, lower levels of self-employment, weakening family ties, and reduced discrimination, Jews are likely to migrate in increasing numbers away from the major centers of Jewish population. This will operate on several levels. Regionally, it will lead to fewer Jews in the Northeast. Jews will continue to be highly concentrated in metropolitan areas; but, within the metropolitan areas, ever increasing numbers will move out of the urban centers and former ghettos into the suburbs. In doing so, the Jewish population will become much more geographically dispersed, even while distinct areas of Jewish concentration remain.

At the same time that its over-all numbers and distribution change, the Jewish population will also undergo significant changes in selected aspects of socio-economic composition. In others, it will show less change; but, because of changes in the general population, differences between Jews and non-Jews may narrow.

As a result of the significant reduction in Jewish immigration to the United States since the 1920's and the subsequent aging and death of the immigrants, the most striking compositional change characterizing American Jewry is the reduction in the per cent of foreign-born. Indeed, even the proportion of second-generation American Jews will increasingly diminish as third- and fourth-generation persons become an even larger proportion of the Jewish population, with all this implies for questions of Jewish identification and assimilation. Reflecting their lower fertility, the Jewish population, already six years older on the average than the general population, is likely to undergo further aging. This will mean a considerable increase in the proportion of older persons as well as of the widowed, especially women.

Already unique in their high concentration among the more educated, high white-collar and high income groups, the Jews may undergo still further changes. College education will be an almost universal phenomenon among them, and an increasing proportion will pursue graduate studies. At the same time, continuously rising education levels among non-Jews may narrow educational differentials between Jews and non-Jews. The high proportion of Jews who obtain specialized university training, their tendency to move out of small family businesses and into salaried employment, and their increasing willingness to seek and take positions away from their community of current residence may bring an increase in the number of Jews in technical and executive occupations within the top professional and managerial occupational categories, where they already are heavily concentrated. At the same time, the general upward shift in the occupational level of the general population will narrow existing differences in the occupational structure of the Jewish and non-Jewish populations. In turn, this narrowing in both educational and occupational differences will lead to reduction in the income differences currently characterizing Jews and non-Jews. Such a development is strongly suggested by the fact that, with control for education and occupation, income differences between Jews and non-Jews have been shown to be greatly reduced, and sometimes reversed.

These demographic changes point to a number of challenges which the American Jewish community must face. In the last three decades of the 20th century, increasing Americanization will continue, as judged by greater geographic dispersion, a higher per cent of third- and fourth-generation Americans, and narrowing of such key socio-economic differentials as education, occupation, and income. To what extent will the diminution in the distinctive population characteristics of Jews and their greater residential integration lead to behavioral convergence? The risks or opportunities for this to occur, depending on how one views the situation, are increasingly present. Recent research suggests that, while growing similarity on the behavioral level is likely, structural separation and the continuity of Jewish identification will persist.⁶⁹ The direction of changes appears to be the adjustment of American Jews to the American way of life, creating a meaningful balance between Jewishness and Americanism.

⁶⁹ Goldstein and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-243.

APPENDIX

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