Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey

by SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN

IN THE INTRODUCTION TO *The Jews in America*, Chaim Potok points up the key challenge facing the American Jewish community in the 1990s.[1] In contrast to the situation in Europe, he emphasizes, Jews have become part of the very fabric of American life. This has created both enormous opportunities and significant risks, including the potential for the disintegration of core Jewish values and the splintering of the Jewish community into a multiplicity of factions. The issue that remains open, Potok argues, is whether Jews in the United States will succeed in fashioning an authentic American-Jewish civilization, one rich in new forms of individual and communal expression, or whether they will become fully absorbed into the larger culture and disappear as a distinct group.

Epitomizing Potok's concern in the extreme is the "silent Holocaust" described by Leslie Fiedler:[2] "Not a single one of my own eight children has, at the present moment, a Jewish mate; nor for that matter do I. . . . In any case, there is no one to say kaddish for me when I die. I am, in short, not just as I have long known, a minimal Jew—my Judaism nearly non-existent—but, as I have only recently become aware, a terminal one as well, the last of a four-thousand-year line. Yet, whatever regrets I may feel, I cannot deny that I have wanted this, worked for it."

Neither the concerns embodied in Potok's assessment nor the outcome implied in Fiedler's family account are new; they have been expressed and debated for years by leading observers of the Jewish scene.[3] Some have held that American Jewry is progressively weakening demographically as a result of low fertility, high intermarriage, significant dispersion, and assimilatory losses.[4] Others argue that the demographic issues are of marginal

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[1]Chaim Potok, "Introduction," in *The Jews in America*, ed. David Cohen (San Francisco, 1989), pp. 10–11.

[2]Leslie Fiedler, *Fiedler on the Roof* (Boston, 1991), as quoted in the *New York Times Book Review*, Aug. 4, 1991, p. 3.

[3]Edward Norden, "Counting the Jews," *Commentary*, Oct. 1991, pp. 36–43; Gideon Shimoni, "How Central Is Israel?" *Moment*, Oct. 1991, pp. 24–27.

[4]See, e.g., U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in American Jewish Demography*, Jewish Demography Papers (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1988).

importance and that what counts is the quality of Jewish life.[5] In the latter view, concerns about population size, growth, fertility, and migration represent misplaced emphases; concerns should focus on Judaism, Jewish culture, Jewish education, the perpetuation of Jewish communal institutions, and the linkages between the American Jewish community and Israel.

Regrettably, the evidence needed to assess the validity of the different perspectives remains limited. To the extent that quality and quantity are inexorably linked in a complex fashion, it is generally recognized that we must be concerned about both, and about the connections between them. The need to do so is made all the more important by the impressive success of American Jews in their struggle over the last century for acceptance into the larger American society. Jews have reached new heights in educational achievement and occupational choice, as well as greater freedom in selection of place of residence, memberships, friends, and spouses. Together, these changes help explain associated demographic features such as later age at marriage, low fertility, more intermarriage and divorce, and high mobility. The major question is the extent to which these changes have contributed to the weakening of American Jewry, especially in terms of the ties of individual Jews to the Jewish community.

The issues are intensified because the American Jewish community has evolved from a collection of largely self-contained local communities into a national Jewish community, judged demographically by the increasing proportion of the population that is third, fourth, and higher generation American, by the extensive dispersal of the population across the United States, and by the movement of population among communities.[6] Some of the unique features of local Jewish communities—features grounded in their historic development, particular sociodemographic composition, and institutional structure—may continue and, in some cases, may even be exacerbated. But overlying such differences, ongoing trends have led individuals, both movers and stayers, to become part of familial, social, and economic networks that span the nation, reinforcing the national character of the community.

THE SEARCH FOR DATA

Recognition of the importance of a national perspective and the multiplicity of interactions between the national and the local communities has reinforced the need for demographic, social, and economic information at

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[5]Cf. Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986).

[6]*The Emergence of a Continental Jewish Community: Implications for the Federations*, Sidney Hollander Memorial Colloquium (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1987).

both levels. Because separation of church and state precludes a question on religion in the U.S. Census, there is no core of information about those who identify themselves as Jewish by religion. It has thus been necessary to look for alternate sources of data needed for assessment and planning purposes.[7]

A variety of alternate sources have been tapped or developed, but most have had limitations for an analysis of American Jewry. Omnibus sample surveys directed at the general population, such as the Gallup Poll, seldom include more than a few hundred Jews and often considerably fewer, so that the number of Jews is inadequate for in-depth assessment.[8] Aggregating the results of several years of such surveys helps to overcome the small-numbers problem but raises new concerns about comparability of information from year to year and about possible changes in attitudes and behavior over the interval encompassed by the surveys.

Use of census data on country of birth, and in recent censuses on ancestry, on the assumption that those born in Russia are largely Jewish, runs the risk of error due to lack of exact comparability between birthplace or ancestry and Jewish identity.[9] Information on Jews identified by the census as Yiddish speakers at home or while growing up is also subject to serious bias because of sharp age differentials in the use of Yiddish.[10] Moreover, the value of this and other approaches based on ancestry will decrease as the country origins of American Jews change and as they become further removed from their immigrant ancestors.

The same concern applies to use of distinctive Jewish names (DJNs) as a way of identifying and estimating Jews in the population.[11] This approach also loses its usefulness as the rate of intermarriage rises, especially as more Jewish women intermarry and take the "non-Jewish" names of their husbands (even if their husbands convert to Judaism).

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[7]Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Jewish Population in the United States 1987: Counting Jewish Populations: Methods and Problems*, Reprint No. 3 (New York, North American Jewish Data Bank and CUNY Graduate Center, 1988); Sidney Goldstein, "A National Jewish Population Study: Why and How," in *A Handle on the Future—The Potential of the 1990 National Survey for American Jewry*, Reprint No. 4 (New York, North American Jewish Data Bank and CUNY Graduate Center, 1988), pp. 1–9; Steven M. Cohen, Jonathan S. Woocher, and Bruce A. Phillips, eds., *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research* (Boulder, Colo., 1984).

[8]Alan M. Fisher, "The National Gallup Polls and American Jewish Demography," AJYB 1983, vol. 83, pp. 111–26.

[9]Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1988).

[10]Sidney Goldstein, "A Further Assessment of the Use of Yiddish in Rhode Island Households," *Rhode Island Jewish Historical Notes* 9, Nov. 1985, pp. 209–19.

[11]Barry A. Kosmin and Stanley Waterman, "The Use and Misuse of Distinctive Jewish Names in Research on Jewish Populations," in *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1985*, ed. U.O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola (Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, 1989), pp. 1–10.

Local Jewish communities have increasingly recognized that effective planning must be based on comprehensive, accurate assessments of the population.[12] A large number of communities have therefore undertaken their own surveys. While these have added greatly to our knowledge, that knowledge remains incomplete. The surveys have varied considerably in scope and quality: They have relied on different questionnaires, varying sampling designs and coverage of the Jewish population, and diverse tabulation plans. The absence of standardized methods and definitions (including who was to be counted as a Jew) made it difficult and sometimes impossible to compare findings across communities, either to obtain a better understanding of a particular community or to obtain insights into the national Jewish community.

Recognizing the problems of coverage and variation in quality among local studies and the need for a national profile, the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF) in 1970/71 undertook the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS-1970/71). The national sampling design relied on a combination of local Jewish federation lists of Jewish households and standard area probability methods to ensure representation of Jewish households not included on lists.[13] Housing units of the combined list and area samples were screened for Jewish occupants. Three criteria were employed to identify Jews: whether any of the occupants had been born Jewish, had a parent who had been born Jewish, or regarded themselves as being Jewish.[14]

In all, a national sample of 7,179 units, each of which had at least one member meeting one of the three criteria, was identified. The resulting weighted estimate of the national Jewish population was 5.4 million Jews. After adjusting for housing units whose religion could not be ascertained and for biases resulting from area-sample cutoffs, Bernard Lazerwitz estimated the total population to range between 5.6 and 6.0 million.[15] Of the persons identified as Jewish by one of the three criteria, 97.3 percent were born Jewish and were still Jewish at the time of the survey; 1.2 percent were born Jewish but no longer considered themselves Jewish; and 1.5 percent were not born Jewish but were reported as Jewish at the time of the survey.[16] In addition, 6.4 percent of all the members of the sampled households

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[12]Lester I. Levin, "Federation and Population Studies," in *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research*, ed. Steven M. Cohen, Jonathan Woocher, and Bruce A. Phillips (Boulder, Colo., 1984), pp. 57–64.

[13]Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB 1973, vol. 74, pp. 264–306.

[14]Bernard Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group: The U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography* 15, Aug. 1978, pp. 389–94.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Fred Massarik, "The Boundary of Jewishness: Some Measures of Jewish Identity in the United States," in *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973*, ed. U.O. Schmelz, P. Glickson, and S. DellaPergola (Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, 1977), pp. 117–39.

consisted of persons neither born Jewish nor currently Jewish. These were largely the non-Jewish spouses of Jewish household members or the children of mixed marriages who were not being raised as Jews. As Fred Massarik concluded, "Interpretations of the Jewish population must therefore give careful attention to the number of persons living in Jewish households and the number of members who specifically meet clear criteria of Jewishness. Failure to do so can lead to quite discrepant estimates of the total Jewish population."[17] This caveat has even greater importance in the 1990s.

NJPS-1970/71 was a milestone in the development of American Jewish demography. Unfortunately, exploitation of its rich data was limited, so that the full value of the survey for understanding the Jewish population was not realized. Nonetheless, the experience both in implementing that survey and trying to utilize the results served the Jewish community well.

In the 1970s, because the national survey was seen as obviating the need for new local surveys, few such surveys were initiated. Since 1980, however, about 50 Jewish communities, including most larger ones, have undertaken surveys. Over the last several decades, some have already done so twice, and a few, like Boston, have done so three times. Still, questions remained about how well these local surveys represented the Jewish population as a whole and, in the case of some surveys, about the quality of coverage.

In the absence of another NJPS in the early 1980s, but with keen recognition of the need for national assessments of the Jewish population, individual groups and scholars have attempted to develop national samples. Studies undertaken for the American Jewish Committee, largely by Steven Cohen, have been in the forefront of such efforts. A number of these earlier surveys[18] employed samples based on distinctive Jewish names derived from lists of persons affiliated with a wide range of Jewish organizations or activities. Whether a sample based on such lists of affiliated or identified Jews was representative of the entire adult Jewish population and especially of those at or near the margins of the community remained questionable, as Steve Cohen himself recognized.[19]

In more recent surveys, a stronger effort has been made to achieve less biased coverage by relying on a different base for developing the sample. A consumer mail panel of 200,000 households developed by a marketing and survey research firm contained 4,700 households which had been identified as containing at least one member reported as currently Jewish. Based on

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[17]Massarik, "Boundary of Jewishness," p. 119.

[18]Steven M. Cohen, "The 1981–82 National Survey of American Jews," AJYB 1983, vol. 83, pp. 89–110; Cohen, *Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis: The 1983 National Survey of American Jews and Jewish Communal Leaders* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1983).

[19]Steven M. Cohen, *Ties and Tensions: The 1986 Survey of American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1987).

the total sample, a demographically balanced subsample (based on region, income, population density, age, and household size) was developed containing over 2,000 Jewish households. The data collected suggest that this sample "succeeded in reaching a slightly larger number of marginally Jewish respondents" than did the earlier samples based on distinctive Jewish names.[20] Still, doubts about the representativeness of such samples were raised both by the self-selective character of participants in the panel and the fact that the sample presumably reflected current religious identification—therefore missing individuals who did not report themselves as currently Jewish by religion.

THE NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION SURVEY OF 1990[21]

Planning for NJPS-1990

This situation presented a major challenge to any effort to undertake a national assessment of the Jewish population. In preparing for a possible new CJF national survey, advantage was taken of the many improvements introduced in sampling and survey procedures since NJPS-1970/71, the experience gained from the large number of local Jewish community surveys completed since then, and the various limited efforts to collect national data. Moreover, the new survey benefited from the much stronger professional credentials of the recent planning and research staffs of local federations, the CJF, and other national agencies, as well as the availability and commitment of a substantial number of Jewish scholars interested and often experienced in surveying and assessing both the general and the Jewish populations. Thus, there was a greater appreciation of the need for data of high scientific quality and a far greater potential for employing the most sophisticated methods to obtain such data and for using them effectively for analytic and planning purposes.

In order to correct problems of comparability among local surveys and to design better sampling methods and a core questionnaire that could be used both locally and eventually in a national survey, in 1984 CJF created the National Technical Advisory Committee on Population Studies (NTAC). In 1986, through the cooperative efforts of CJF and the Graduate

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[20]Ibid. See also Steven M. Cohen, *Content or Continuity? Alternative Bases for Commitment* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1991).

[21]This section draws heavily on the paper prepared for the Sidney Hollander Colloquium on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, cosponsored by the Wilstein Institute of the University of Judaism and the Council of Jewish Federations, July 1991.

School and University Center of the City University of New York, the Mandell L. Berman North American Jewish Data Bank (NAJDB) was founded; its goal, to enhance comparability of the data collected locally and nationally and to facilitate analysis of the various data sets.

Operating through the concerted efforts of NTAC and NAJDB, planning for a 1990 National Jewish Population Survey was initiated in the late 1980s. The decision to undertake the survey coincided with worldwide interest in launching a "world census" of Jewry parallel to the 1990 round of censuses being undertaken by national governments. The October 1987 World Conference on Jewish Population, held in Jerusalem, with over 20 countries represented, recommended a stocktaking of world Jewry as the basis for obtaining information for future study and action in the Jewish population field.

The Field Survey

In late 1988, CJF's endowment committee and its board of directors approved undertaking a 1990 national Jewish population study in the United States. Organization of the sample survey was the responsibility of NTAC. In close consultation with federation planners, it designed the core questionnaire. With assistance from a number of national sampling experts, several of whom serve on NTAC, and following consultation with a number of survey companies, it developed a sample design that was intended to ensure the widest possible coverage of the Jewish population, encompassing all types of Jews, ranging from those strongly identifying themselves as Jewish, at one extreme, to those on the margins of the community or even outside it, at the other; it sought to include born Jews who no longer considered themselves Jewish and the non-Jewish spouses/partners and children of Jewish household members, as well as other non-Jewish members of the household.

Following receipt and review of proposals from a number of survey firms, CJF commissioned the ICR Survey Research Group of Media, Pa., to collect data in a three-stage national telephone survey. Since the universe of Jewish households was not known, Stage I involved contacting a random sample of 125,813 American households using computer-assisted telephone interviewing. The sampled households represented all religious groups in continental United States, as well as secular households; the Jewish households were identified among them.

This initial screening was carried on as part of the twice-weekly nationally representative omnibus market-research surveys conducted by ICR. One thousand households were contacted in each of 125 successive rounds over the course of the period April 1989 to May 1990. Each household was

selected using a random-digit-dialing (RDD) methodology; within each cooperating household, to ensure random selection, the adult chosen as respondent was the one with the most recent birthday. The overall procedure allowed for an equal probability of Jews to be selected from every state (except Alaska and Hawaii) and from locations of all sizes, so that a national profile could be obtained. Representation of Alaska and Hawaii was incorporated into the national sample in the third stage of the survey.

In addition to traditional census-type questions on sociodemographic, economic, and household characteristics, the screening survey asked "What is your religion?" Only 2.2 percent of the respondents refused to reply to this question. One by-product of this phase of the study, which was conducted in tandem with CUNY Graduate Center, was a unique profile of religious identification and of denominations in the United States. In fact, the responses provide the largest contemporary data set on American religious adherence. The results of this first stage—the National Survey of Religious Identification— were publicly announced in April 1991 and received wide dissemination in the press.[22]

To ensure the comprehensive coverage desired in NJPS for current and former Jews, additional questions were included in the Stage I screening phase for those who did not respond "Jewish" to the question on current religion. Whereas in the initial screening question respondents only had to answer for themselves, follow-up questions required that respondents provide information both on themselves and on other members of the household. Three follow-up sets of screening questions were successively directed to all respondents who did not identify themselves as Jewish by religion: 1. "Do you or anyone else in the household consider him/herself Jewish?" 2. "Were you or anyone else in the household raised Jewish?" 3. "Do or did you or anyone else in the household have a Jewish parent?" A positive answer to any of these questions qualified the household for initial classification as "Jewish."

This procedure, using multiple points of qualification, more than doubled the unweighted sample of identified "Jewish households." It now added households in which respondents reported themselves as Jewish by criteria other than religion as well as households of mixed composition, which included respondents who had either indicated they had some other religious identification on the religious screening question or had even initially refused to answer. The four screening questions identified 5,146 households containing one or more "qualified" Jews.

Over the course of a year, a panel was thus created to be used in the summer of 1990 as the basis for an intensive assessment of the sociodemo-

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[22]Ari L. Goldman, "Portrait of Religion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises," *New York Times*, Apr. 10, 1991.

graphic, economic, and identificational characteristics of the American Jewish population. To requalify potential respondents and to minimize loss to follow-up between the initial screening and the in-depth survey, 2,240 members of the 5,146 Jewish sample identified in the early months of the screening survey were recontacted in Stage II, the inventory stage. This took place in the months before the final interview stage. During this procedure, a number of potential respondents dropped out of the survey sample due to changes in household composition or disqualification upon further review.

Stage III, the in-depth survey, was conducted during ten weeks in May to July 1990. During this stage, the entire sample of 5,146 "Jewish" households was requalified. In order to meet the original goal of obtaining about 2,500 completed interviews, 2,441 households of those qualified were interviewed, using the extensive questionnaire prepared by NTAC for in-depth assessment of the sociodemographic and economic characteristics of the American Jewish population and of a wide array of attitudinal and behavioral variables related to Jewish identity. Completed interviews were obtained from 2,439 households, encompassing 6,507 individuals; these constitute the final sample for NJPS-1990.

Identifying the Jewish Population

The results of both the screening phase and the in-depth interviews attest to the validity and importance of the view that conceptual and measurement concerns should enter not only into the initial sample selection process but also into the analytical process. The complexity and fluidity of the contemporary American Jewish community are clearly demonstrated by the survey findings, beginning with the qualifying round.

Of the 5,146 households that qualified in Stage I as having at least one Jewish member under one of the four criteria specified earlier, just under half qualified on the basis of religion, just over one-third as containing an ethnic Jew (persons who consider themselves Jews), 5 percent on the basis of some member having been raised Jewish, and another 12 percent on the basis of at least one member reporting a Jewish parent.[23] The results of this self-ascription process demonstrate that any survey that restricts its identification of the Jewish population only to those reporting being Jewish by religion runs the risk of excluding a substantial part of the total population of Jewish religio-ethnic identity.

Moreover, among the 5,146 households that were initially screened as

[23]Sidney Goldstein and Barry A. Kosmin, "Religious and Ethnic Self-Identification in the United States 1989–1990: A Case Study of the Jewish Population," paper presented at the Population Association of America, Washington, D.C., March 1991.

being eligible for the in-depth survey, only 3,665 of the respondents themselves qualified as Jewish under one of the four criteria and only 57 percent of these on the basis of being Jewish by religion. The other 1,481 respondents qualified because members of the household other than the respondent met one of the criteria employed in the screening phase. This situation reflects the large number of households whose members were of mixed religious/ethnic identification or contained persons of Jewish descent who did not profess to be currently Jewish. That so many households were religiously and ethnically mixed is largely due to the sharp increase in mixed marriages in the last several decades.

One might question whether individuals should be counted as part of the Jewish population if they do not regard themselves as currently Jewish, even though born of one or two Jewish parents or raised as Jews, and particularly if they currently report identification with another religion. The answer to this depends, of course, on the religious and sociological perspectives adopted and the use for which the analysis is being undertaken. The great advantage of NJPS-1990 is that it provides the information on these persons and gives scholars and planners the option of including or excluding them, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Assessment of their behavioral characteristics with respect to Jewish practices should provide a more definitive answer as to how they should be classified sociologically and demographically as well as what factors may explain their current status with respect to Jewish identity. Unless it is known how many are in each category, including those on the margins and those who have left, the community cannot design realistic programs to maintain its strength, to retain those in it—especially those on the margins—and to attract back those who have opted out.[24]

Extension and Exploitation of NJPS-1990

Two other features of NJPS-1990 are relevant to this description of the organization of the study and the plans for exploiting the data. The first relates to the efforts NTAC undertook to develop a consortium of communities which would undertake surveys, at their own expense, approximately at the same time as NJPS-1990, and which would employ as much as possible the same basic sample design and core questionnaire. Such an

[24]This survey, like all sample surveys, is subject to sampling error arising from the fact that the results may differ from what would have been obtained if the whole population had been interviewed. Surveys are also subject to errors arising from nonresponse and respondents providing erroneous information; NJPS-1990 is no exception. Readers interested in sampling and nonsampling errors are referred to the Methodological Appendix in *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (Kosmin et al., 1991, pp. 38–39) and to other documents on NJPS-1990 available through the North American Jewish Data Bank.

arrangement was motivated by recognition that, while the size of the national sample can adequately provide reliable insights into the characteristics of the national Jewish population and allow comparisons by region and community type, it is not large enough to permit in-depth assessment of individual communities, with the possible exception of New York. While the idea of a consortium was favorably received, financial and logistic considerations restricted the number of participating communities. That they include New York and Chicago and such smaller communities as Columbus, Seattle, and South Broward County, Florida, should greatly enhance the richness of the insights gained into American Jewry in 1990, both nationally and locally, and also the opportunities for evaluating methodological aspects of the various surveys.

The second major feature of NJPS-1990, and one which sharply distinguishes it from the NJPS-1970/71, is the extensive attention paid in the early stages of the study to the uses to which the data would be put analytically and for planning purposes. A subcommittee of NTAC developed an agenda for disseminating the findings. Beginning with a report at the 1990 CJF General Assembly, and through two major news releases in 1991, the findings were publicized in leading newspapers, on national TV, and on radio. A number of papers have already been presented at professional meetings; more are scheduled. The Sidney Hollander Colloquium in July 1991, cosponsored by the Wilstein Institute of the University of Judaism and the Council of Jewish Federations, focused on the initial findings of the survey and served to encourage utilization of the data by both planners and researchers. A second conference—"A Consultation on Conceptual and Policy Implications of the 1990 CJF National Population Survey"—was sponsored in October 1991 by the Hornstein Program in Jewish Communal Service at Brandeis University.[25] Through CJF Satellite, the findings have been reviewed with local federations. *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*[26] was published and is available to both professionals and the public.

Most significantly, a number of scholars and planners, many of them leaders in their fields, agreed to author individual monographs, with the State University of New York (SUNY) Press undertaking to publish the series, beginning perhaps in late 1992. The monograph topics encompass, among others, the elderly, marriage and the family, population redistribution and migration, women, socioeconomic status, fertility, Jewish identity,

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[25]A key discussion at the consultation, initiated by Steven M. Cohen and Gabriel Berger, revolved about the allocation of the surveyed population into the Jewish identity subcategories and the impact of alternative categorizations on rates of intermarriage and assimilation.

[26]Barry A. Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, Council of Jewish Federations, 1991).

intermarriage, philanthropy, Jewish education, apostasy, and voluntarism. While these monographs are being prepared, the authors, as well as others who will have access to the data through a public-use tape, are being encouraged to prepare papers for conferences and articles for journals. Clearly, every effort has been made to ensure that the results of the survey will be widely exploited and disseminated, thereby enhancing their value for scholarly and planning purposes.

Over the past several decades, the *American Jewish Year Book* has occupied a key role in keeping the leadership and the public informed about the demographic situation of American Jewry. In addition to its regular inventory of the size and distribution of Jews among the various localities in the United States and overseas, it has published an impressive number of articles on various demographic features of world and especially American Jewry. Among these articles have been two overviews which attempted, within the limits of available data, to present profiles of the American-Jewish population in 1970 and in 1980.[27] Between the two reports, the results of NJPS-1970/71 had become available, adding to the insights that could be drawn from individual community studies. Now, with the initial findings of NJPS-1990 available, this decennial monitoring of American Jewry's profile and of the ways it has changed in the second half of the 20th century can be undertaken again.

In doing so, as before, the emphasis will be on the major areas of demographic concern—size, composition, distribution, and the processes of marriage (including intermarriage), fertility, and migration. As far as possible, comparisons will be made with the patterns that emerged from the analysis of NJPS-1970/71, in order to gain insights into the extent and direction of change. However, differences in coverage and in the definitions and classifications used in the two surveys sometimes preclude meaningful comparisons. Most important, the 1990 profile will take advantage of the much greater attention given by NJPS-1990 to providing coverage of the full range of American Jewry, including both persons born of one or two Jewish parents but not professing to be currently Jewish and persons not born and not currently Jewish but living with persons qualifying as Jewish under the criteria employed by the survey. By doing so, a more accurate and useful overview of American Jewry can be obtained, with deeper insights into where we have come from, where we are heading, and what implications the demographic situation has for the future of the community.

In undertaking this overview, it must be stressed that the wealth of data available in NJPS-1990 can only be tapped superficially here. Simple cross-

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[27]Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," AJYB 1971, vol. 72, pp. 3–88; Goldstein, "The Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography," AJYB 1981, vol. 81, pp. 3–59.

tabulations are used to profile the population, without controls for other variables affecting the relationships. Fuller analyses, using multivariate techniques, must await preparation of the individual articles and monographs and the in-depth treatment that they can give to particular aspects of the Jewish demographic situation.

THE COMPLEXITY OF JEWISH IDENTITY

The fluid character of the American Jewish community is at the heart of the findings of NJPS. How many Jews there are depends on who is counted as in and who is counted as out of the population. From a policy perspective, this raises questions about how the community can retain those still in the core, how it can bring back those at the margin and those who may have left, and how it can draw in those still in situations where they must choose between being or not being Jewish. Depending on how these questions are answered over the next several decades, the Jewish population has the potential of growing or declining.

On the basis of the weighted sample,[28] NJPS-1990 estimated that 3.2 million households in the United States contained one or more persons who were Jews or former Jews, using the four criteria specified earlier. These 3.2 million households contained 8.1 million persons. The total estimated population is raised to 8.2 million by another 70,000 Jews living in nursing homes and other long-term care institutions (mainly elderly persons), 10,000 living in prisons or homeless, and 20,000 immigrants estimated to have arrived after the survey was initiated.

Just over half (4.2 million) of the 8.1 million individuals in qualified households were born Jews who regarded themselves as Jewish by religion (table 1); this number includes the 100,000 institutionalized and unenumerated persons, for whom detailed data on type of Jewish identity were not obtained). Augmented by the estimated 185,000 who indicated they were Jews by choice, about 70 percent of whom reported having beeen converted, Jews by religion numbered 4.4 million in 1990 and constituted 54 percent of all members of qualified households and almost two-thirds of all persons

[28]After the survey information was collected and processed, each respondent was assigned a weight. When the weights are used in tabulations of the survey data, the results provide estimates of the U.S. population in each category shown in the tabulations. The weighting method ensures that key demographic characteristics of the adult population of the total weighted sample of 125,813 responding households in Stage I matched the most current estimates of these demographic characteristics produced by the Census Bureau. The weighting procedure adjusted for noncooperating households, for those who were not at home when the interviewer telephoned, and for households which did not have telephones or had multiple lines.

of Jewish descent and preference. An additional 1.1 million persons were classified as having been born Jewish but were secular Jews; they did not report their current religion as Jewish nor did they identify themselves with any other religious group. In combination with those claiming to be Jews by religion, these 5.5 million persons compose the "core Jewish population": all those professing to be currently Jewish by religion, ethnic or cultural identity, or birth and not reporting any other religious affiliation. This population is the one which most Jewish communal agencies recognize as their clientele.

Reflecting the broad net which the screening design for NJPS-1990 employed, an additional 1.3 million persons included in the survey are persons of Jewish descent who at the time of the survey reported a religion other than Jewish. They comprise 16 percent of all household members and 19 percent of all those of Jewish descent or religious preference.

Of these, 210,000 are persons who were born or raised Jewish but who currently follow another religion.[29] A majority are offspring of intermarriages, about half of whom were raised as Christians. Comparing this number with the enumeration of Jews by choice suggests a near balance in the exchange between Jewish and non-Jewish groups of those choosing to change religious identification.

Distinct from the converts out of Judaism are those 415,000 adults of Jewish descent who were raised from birth in a religion other than Judaism. They constitute 5 percent of the 8.2 million persons encompassed in the survey and 6 percent of those of Jewish descent or preference. Usually the children of intermarriages, they report an almost equal balance of Jewish fathers and mothers. (It needs to be stressed here that the classification of individuals was based on the information provided by the respondent, not on Jewish legal—halakhic—criteria.) Interestingly, a number of these persons consider themselves Jewish by ethnicity or background, and some follow selected Jewish religious practices. Since they profess another religion, however, they are not treated as core Jews in NJPS-1990.

Exceeding the number of adults of Jewish background but not currently identified as Jews are those 700,000 children under 18 years of age who have a "qualified Jew" as a parent (stepparent in a few cases), but who are being raised in a religion other than Judaism. They constitute almost 9 percent of the 8.2 million persons represented in the survey and 10 percent of all persons of Jewish descent and preference.

Among these children, about 40 percent have a parent who either is a Jew by religion or who is a secular Jew in an interfaith marriage; these children are usually being raised in the religion of the non-Jewish parent. The

[29]Some have undergone formal conversion, but others have simply switched to another religion. In the text and tables of this report, all such persons are referred to as converts out.

majority of the children in this category are children of converts out of Judaism or of a parent of Jewish descent who was raised from birth as a non-Jew. Their connection to Judaism is through one or more Jewish grandparent(s). Since they have been away from their Jewish roots for two generations, they have had little opportunity for exposure to Judaism. It remains to be determined in future years whether any of this group will come to identify positively as Jews by ethnicity or to convert to Judaism if required to do so to satisfy Jewish law.

In total, the combined population represented by the core population and those of Jewish descent, some of whom regard themselves as ethnic Jews even while professing another religion, numbers 6.8 million persons. That 19 percent of the total are outside the core population attests to the cumulative impact over one or more generations that intermarriage has had on the demographics of the Jewish population. Concurrently, it suggests the heterogeneous character of the population that now constitutes, by one or another criterion, the "Jewish" population of the United States. This heterogeneity is exacerbated further because 1.35 million adult Gentiles were living with those persons identified as "Jewish" by one of the foregoing criteria. These Gentiles were not and never had been identified as Jewish by religion or ethnic origin. Most are the spouses of a "Jewish" man or woman, but some may be persons who share the living quarters as partner or roommate.

The fact that Gentiles constitute 16 percent of the 8.2 million persons encompassed in the survey highlights further the very heterogeneous nature of the Jewish population, particularly if household composition is considered. It also suggests that, to the extent that the Gentile household members, and possibly even their relatives outside the household, are affected by their interaction with the Jewish members of the household, the potential "Jewish audience" in America is far greater than the 5.5 million core population or even the larger group represented by the core Jews and those of Jewish descent. Moreover, such heterogeneity points to the challenges that Jewish communal agencies and religious institutions face in the years ahead in delineating their client population. Who, for example, should be eligible for services rendered by a home for the aged, a community center, or a family service? Who, indeed, should be eligible for burial in a Jewish cemetery? What distinctions, if any, should be drawn between Jewish individuals and Jewish households, between core Jews and Jews by descent, between Jews by either of these criteria and non-Jews living with them? While all would agree that every effort needs to be made to retain those in the core and to strengthen their Jewish identity, what efforts, if any, should be made to attract back into the core those of Jewish descent who now profess another religion? And what missionary efforts should be exerted to make "Jewish households" more homogeneous by attempting to convert to

Judaism the Gentile spouses and partners of those already in the core?

Reflecting the complexity that characterizes individual Jewish identity, the composition of "Jewish households" is also complex. Of the 3.2 million units represented in the survey, only 57 percent were composed entirely of members of the core Jewish population, that is, were entirely Jewish in their current composition. Just over one-quarter (27 percent) were mixed, consisting of at least one person belonging to the core population but including at least one other who was non-Jewish at the time of the survey. As many as 16 percent had no core Jewish household members, having qualified for inclusion in the survey only because one or more members of the household were of Jewish descent even though currently professing another religion. If the number of Jewish households is restricted to those containing at least one core Jew, the total count decreases to 2.7 million units, of which two-thirds are entirely Jewish and one-third are mixed.

NUMBERS, DISTRIBUTION, AND MOBILITY

Changing Numbers, 1970/71 to 1990

At no time in American history has there been a complete enumeration of the nation's Jewish population. Any statistics on the number of Jews in the United States must therefore remain an estimate. Given the complexity of identifying who is Jewish, the estimates vary considerably, depending on the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the criteria used and the success achieved in identifying the various subsets of the population. As the results of NJPS-1990 indicate, depending on which criteria were used, the number of Jews in the United States varies from a low of 5.5 million to a high of 6.8 million, or even up to 8.2 million if we choose to include the Gentile members of "Jewish households." In fact, some analysts of the 1990 data may conclude that there are far fewer than 5.5 million Jews if they apply halakhic criteria. Such variation for any given year, and the use of different criteria in different years, makes any evaluation of changes over time difficult if not dangerous.

NJPS-1970/71 counted persons as Jewish if they had been born Jewish, had a parent who had been born Jewish, or regarded themselves as being Jewish. It estimated the national Jewish population to be 5.4 million, or 2.9 percent of the total American population. A later adjustment of this estimate by Bernard Lazerwitz took account of housing units whose religion could not be ascertained and of biases resulting from area-sample cutoffs in field sampling for economy reasons. The resulting estimates showed the total Jewish population to range between 5.6 and 6.0 million. However,

since no adjustments were ever made for the socioeconomic subcategories of the 1970/71 population, and full evaluation of the 1990 data remains to be completed, it seems advisable to continue to use the 5.4-million original estimate yielded by NJPS-1970/71 in any comparisons undertaken here between the results of that survey and those of the 1990 survey.

Table 2 shows the comparative statistics on population and households for the 1970/71 and the 1990 surveys. It clearly indicates that the extent of change in the 20-year interval varies sharply depending on the criteria used to classify individuals as Jewish. If the broadest set of criteria is used, the Jewish population increased by 40.2 percent, from 5.85 to 8.20 milllion. This is a faster rate of growth than even the total American population, which increased by 22.4 percent in this same interval. However, much of the growth in the "Jewish" population (using the broadest definition) reflects the very large increase in the number of Gentiles living with Jews.

If the comparison is restricted to individuals who are either currently Jewish or of Jewish descent, the increase is much smaller, from 5.48 to 6.84 million or 24.8 percent. Here, too, the indicated growth may be misleading, since almost one in five of the 6.8 million are not currently Jewish. The impressive growth within this category is largely attributable, therefore, to the growing number of persons who are Jewish by descent but currently profess a different religious affiliation.

Restricting the comparison to those currently Jewish, that is, in the core population, the data point to only a slight increase in the Jewish population since 1970, from 5.42 to 5.51 million or 1.8 percent. This is a far slower rate of growth than that of the American population as a whole. Nonetheless, these statistics indicate that the sharp declines in the Jewish population that some scholars anticipated after the 1970/71 survey have not been realized; yet little more than stability has been achieved, probably due to immigration from overseas. However, if Lazerwitz's adjusted data for 1970/71 are more accurate than the lower 1970/71 estimate used here, compared to our 1990 data, the population did decline in the 20-year interval by about 4.6 percent (based on Lazerwitz's medium estimate of 5.78 million Jews).

Reflecting the high rates of intermarriage and the consequent vast increase in the number of households containing a Jew (two Jews marrying each other form one household, whereas two Jews who intermarry form two households), the number of households in 1990 (3.19 million) far exceeded the number identified in the 1970/71 survey (1.95 million). Again, it needs to be stressed that half a million of the households in the 1990 survey did not include any person who was a core Jew.

The net result of the changes in the size and Jewish identity subcategories of the "Jewish population" compared to changes in the size of the population of the nation as a whole is a variable percentage of Jews in the total.

If the broadest definition is used, including Gentiles, then the proportion has risen from 2.9 percent in 1970 to 3.3 percent in 1990, and for some purposes (e.g., political), this may be the relevant statistic. However, if the comparison is restricted to all persons of Jewish descent and preference, it remains unchanged at 2.7 percent. If, further, the comparison is limited to those identified as core Jews, it decreases from 2.7 percent in 1970 to only 2.2 percent 20 years later. The drop would be even sharper if Lazerwitz's adjusted 1970 statistics were used. Clearly, unless the currently non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households are included in the count, Jews have become a smaller percentage of the total population.

Nonetheless, according to estimates emanating from the National Survey of Religious Identification,[30] made on the basis of the first stage (screening phase) of the national survey, which obtained information on the religious composition of the total American population, Jews remain by far the third largest major religious group in the United States. Restricted to the adult population and to those professing a religion, that survey found 86.5 percent of the population to be Christian (including 26.5 percent Catholic and 55.7 percent Protestant; the balance reported "Christian") and 1.8 percent Jewish. The remainder of the adult population was distributed among a number of other groups (e.g., Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus) as well as among agnostics and those reporting no religion. No single religion of the other groups exceeded 0.5 percent of the total adult population. Thus, although constituting a small minority in comparison to the overwhelming Christian majority in America, Jews are clearly the predominant minority religious group in the country.

While total numbers are an important issue, the composition and distribution of the population probably are more relevant factors affecting the dynamics of change in Jewish life in the United States. Thus, we turn next to examination of a range of compositional variables, such as geographic distribution, age, education, and occupation, as well as such components of demographic change as migration, fertility, and intermarriage. The value of NJPS-1990 for such purposes is greatly enhanced by the opportunity to compare the characteristics and demographic behavior of Jews belonging to different identity subcategories of the core population and to compare the core Jews both with those of Jewish descent who in 1990 professed another religion and with the Gentile members of the surveyed households who were born and remain non-Jewish. Such comparisons should allow some insights into how these subcategories of the population differ from one another and suggest what implications observed differences have for the future of the community. Concurrently, they may provide some insights

[30]Goldman, "Portrait of Religion."

into the factors accounting for the location of individuals in particular identity categories.

For purposes of analysis, the core population will be subdivided into three groups: (a) those born Jewish and reported as Jewish by religion; (b) the secular-ethnic Jews—those born Jewish but not reporting themselves as Jewish by religion and not reporting any other religion; (c) Jews by choice—those converted to Judaism and those simply choosing to regard themselves as Jewish. Since the criteria for conversion vary among denominations, this analysis does not try to distinguish between the two subgroups. The currently non-Jewish population also consists of three sub-groups: (a) converts out of Judaism—adults who were born or raised Jewish but who were following another religion at the time of the survey; (b) persons who reported Jewish parentage or descent, but who were raised from birth in another religion (some of these and of the converts out consider themselves Jewish by ethnicity or background); (c) persons who were not and had never been identified as Jewish by religion or ethnic origin.

Regional Distribution

NJPS-1970/71 documented the high mobility levels of American Jews and their increasing dispersion across the United States.[31] Migration, which has played a key role throughout Jewish history, had by 1970 become the major dynamic responsible for the growth or decline of many local Jewish communities and for the changing distribution of the Jewish population among regions of the country and among metropolitan areas.

The high level of education of American Jews and the kinds of occupations which they have increasingly been able to enter, coupled with the growing freedom of choice which Jews have had about where they reside, often result in movement away from parental family and place of origin. This often also means movement out of centers of Jewish concentration.[32] Moreover, the shift away from self-employment to employment for others can result in more frequent movement, because repeated transfers are often associated with high white-collar positions. Such geographic mobility has the potential for weakening individual ties to a particular Jewish community by reducing the opportunites for integration locally and by increasing opportunities for greater interaction with non-Jews, especially as occupational identification and affiliation take on increased importance.

Migration may also have positive effects on the vitality of Jewish life by

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[31]Sidney Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution Among American Jews," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 24, June 1982, pp. 5–23.

[32]Sidney Goldstein, "Jews on the Move: Implications for American Jewry and for Local Communities," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 32, June 1990, pp. 5–30.

bringing additional population to smaller communities or to formerly declining ones, thereby providing the kind of "demographic transfusion" needed to help maintain or to develop basic institutions and facilities essential for a vital Jewish community. It may also do so by bridging the traditional age and affiliation cleavages, thereby providing the social cement needed to hold the community together.[33]

Concurrently, mobility may contribute to the development of a national Jewish society, characterized by greater population dispersion and by greater population exchange among various localities.[34] Both processes require more effective networking among locations in order to ensure continuing opportunities and stimuli for mobile individuals and families to maintain their Jewish identity and their links to the Jewish community, regardless of where they live or how often they move from place to place. Greater dispersion, especially to smaller communities and to more isolated ones, also requires development of methods to ensure that such communities are better able through their own facilities or through links to other, larger communities to service the various needs of both their migrant and nonmigrant populations.[35]

In 1900, two decades after the onset of the massive movement of East European Jews to the United States, 57 percent of American Jewry was concentrated in the Northeast region of the country, reflecting the attractiveness of the major ports of entry and their nearby areas to the new settlers. Only one in five Jews lived in the South or the West; the remaining one-quarter resided in the Midwest. The continued heavy influx of immigrants over the next few decades reinforced the concentration in the Northeast and especially in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. By 1930, 68 percent of all of America's Jews were living in the Northeast region; the proportions in each of the other three regions had declined, with only 12 percent reported in the South and West combined.

With the great reduction in immigration, internal movement became an increasingly important force in redistributing the Jewish population among regions of the country. Succeeding decades witnessed a continuous decline in the percentage living in the Northeast and particularly sharp rises in the proportion living in the West and to a lesser extent in the South. For 1971, the *American Jewish Year Book* reported 63 percent of the population in the Northeast and 25 percent in the Sunbelt states of the South and the West; the Midwest had declined to only 12 percent of the total.[36] NJPS-

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[33]Barry D. Lebowitz, "Migration and the Structure of the Contemporary Jewish Community," *Contemporary Jewry* 2, Fall/Winter 1975, p. 8.

[34]Sidney Goldstein, "American Jews on the Move," *Moment*, Aug. 1991, pp. 24–29ff.

[35]Goldstein, "Jews on the Move."

[36]AJYB 1973. The grouping of states has been changed to ensure comparability with the census assignment of states among regions.

1970/71 found slightly more (64 percent) in the Northeast, and considerably more in the Midwest, about 17 percent, and fewer in the Sunbelt, 19 percent. The difference has never been satisfactorily resolved.[37]

The trend in redistribution documented for 1970–71 has continued (table 3). According to NJPS-1990,[38] considerably fewer Jews were living in the Northeast, only 43.6 percent. Together the South and the West accounted for 45.1 percent, almost equally divided between them. The Midwest continued to contain the smallest percentage of Jews, only 11.3 percent of the total. This overall distribution pattern shows a major realignment of the Jewish population and strengthens the assumption that Jews have participated, perhaps in accentuated form, in the movement out of the Northeast and the Midwest to the South and West that in recent decades has characterized the American population generally.[39] While Jews remain heavily concentrated in the Northeast, the changing regional distribution suggests that Jews feel increasingly accepted in America and are paralleling mainstream America in shifting to the Sunbelt regions of the country.[40] Whether all types of Jews are doing so equally can be assessed by the data on regional distribution by type of Jewish identity.

Differences in regional distribution by type of Jewish identity cannot be ascribed entirely or even mainly to the effects of selective migration. They may well stem from differences in the historical development of various Jewish communities, to variations in socioeconomic and denominational composition, to the size of the local Jewish communities, and to the norms regarding intermarriage and conversion.

The NJPS-1990 sample shows that, in a comparison of core Jews and non-Jews, more of the core Jews are concentrated in the Northeast, which includes the New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania areas of original heavy immigrant settlement. By contrast, relatively more of the non-Jews in "Jewish" households live in each of the other three regions. This finding suggests either that regions outside the Northeast attract a disproportional number of the marginal Jews or that conditions in these regions are more conducive to marginality and the intermarriages that result in Gentile spouses and children being in "Jewish" households.

The sharp locational differences among the subgroups of core Jews confirm these regional variations. Whereas almost half of the Jews by religion

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[37]Fred Massarik, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1973," AJYB 1974–75, vol. 75, pp. 295–304.

[38]These findings differ from the statistics reported in the 1991 *American Jewish Year Book*, whose data are based largely on reports from local federations and on local community studies.

[39]Larry Long, *Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States* (New York, 1988), pp. 137–88.

[40]Cf. William M. Newman and Peter L. Halvorson, "American Jews: Patterns of Geographic Distribution and Change, 1952–1971," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, June 1979, pp. 183–93.

are concentrated in the Northeast, less than one-third of the secular Jews and those who are Jews by choice are located there. Clearly, the Northeast, while no longer the majority area of Jewish residence in the United States, is by far the dominant location of persons identifying themselves as Jewish by religion. Both secular Jews and Jews by choice are relatively more likely to live in each of the other three regions. The differences are particularly sharp for the West. Such variable distribution may have serious implications for the future strength of Jewish identity of those living in the respective regions.

Variations in regional distribution also characterize the non-Jewish members of the sampled households. Those who are converts out of Judaism and those of Jewish descent who grew up in and now practice another religion each have a quite low proportion living in the Northeast, just over one-quarter. This is considerably below the proportion of Jews by religion and even below that of the secular Jews and the Jews by choice. Many more live in the Midwest and the South than do any of the core identity groups. However, while somewhat more live in the West than is true of Jews by religion, the percentage of both secular Jews and Jews by choice in the West exceeds the percent of the converts out of Judaism and of those of Jewish descent but now non-Jews.

Gentile household members, unlike the other non-Jewish members, are relatively more concentrated in the Northeast and less so in the Midwest and South. In fact, their distribution pattern quite closely parallels those of the secular Jews and Jews by choice. Whether this stems from high rates of marriage to secular Jews remains to be determined in the in-depth assessment of intermarriage patterns.

The net result of the differential regional concentration of the various identity subtypes is that the Jewish identificational composition of the different regions also varies. As the data in panel "b" of table 3 show, 61 percent of the sampled population in the Northeast consists of Jews by religion, compared to just under half in the South and only four in ten in the West. The relatively greater concentration of Jews by religion in the South is undoubtedly related to the heavy in-migration of older persons. Significantly, the West contains relatively more secular Jews than do the other regions. Except for the comparatively small percentage of Jews by descent/other religion in the Northeast, the regions seem to differ minimally in the concentrations of non-Jewish household members.

Compared to all other regions, in the Northeast fewer of the sampled household members are secular, Jews by choice, converts out of Judaism, and born to Jewish parents but practicing another religion. The Northeast clearly continues to be the major "bastion" of Judaism in the United States, even as its position is diluted through the redistribution of population to

other regions of the country. Given such redistribution, it is also clear that the mix of Jewish identities varies considerably from region to region and that losses to the core Jewish population through intermarriage, conversion out, and children not raised as Jews are more common among those living outside the Northeast. Such a pattern has particular implications for the future of the national community if redistribution continues to be toward the Sunbelt areas.

Metropolitan/Nonmetropolitan Residence

Historically, Jews in the United States have been overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas. In 1957 about nine out of every ten Jews age 14 and over lived in urbanized areas of 250,000 or more persons, in contrast to only 37 percent of the total American population. Almost all of the remaining Jews resided in smaller urban places; only 4 percent of the total lived in rural areas, compared to 36 percent of Americans as a whole.[41]

Greater dispersal was already evident in an analysis of changes in geographic distribution undertaken by Newman and Halvorson covering the period 1952–1971.[42] Based on data reported in the *American Jewish Year Book*, their study found that the highest growth in Jewish population occurred in counties other than those of traditional Jewish residence, many of them in areas new to Jewish settlement. By contrast, areas of high Jewish concentration in 1952 displayed moderate or low growth. The observed changes pointed to both higher rates of dispersion and continued growth associated with the processes of urbanization and metropolitanization.

This pattern of redistribution was corroborated in an analysis completed by Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner,[43] which compared the distribution of Jewish population among the 30 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence in 1936 and 1986. In 1936, 90 percent of the country's Jewish population was found in the 17 largest metropolitan areas; by 1986, the top 30 metropolitan areas had to be considered in order to encompass so high a proportion of American Jewry. As Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner conclude, ". . . there are more Jewish population centers than in the past, but with fewer Jews in each center."[44]

In 1936, only one of the 30 largest Jewish communities was farther south than Washington, D.C., or St. Louis, and that was Houston, with its 16,000

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[41]U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States, March 1957," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 79, 1958.

[42]Newman and Halvorson, "American Jews."

[43]Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1986," AJYB 1987, vol. 87, pp. 164–76.

[44]Ibid.

Jews. By 1986, the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale metropolitan area had the third largest Jewish population in the United States, with 367,000 persons, and six other southern metropolitan areas were among the leading 30, including two more in Florida with a combined population of over 100,000 Jews. Similar developments occurred in the West. Only three of the leading communities in 1936 were west of the Rockies, and none of these exceeded 100,000 Jews. By 1986, there were six, and Los Angeles, with its 604,000 persons, ranked as the second largest Jewish community in the United States. Meanwhile, metropolitan communities in the East and Midwest experienced declines. The New York metropolitan area's reported Jewish population decreased from 2.6 million to 2.2 million in the 50-year interval, and Chicago's went from 378,000 to only 254,000. Declines also characterized Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. While some of these changes may be an artifact of the way the basic statistics were collected and/or reported, the overall pattern suggests major basic changes in patterns of Jewish population growth and distribution among metropolitan areas. The new geography has serious implications for integration and assimilation and for other areas of social, economic, political, and even religious concern.

Of particular interest is the extent to which Jews have participated in movement to smaller locations. Such dispersion, especially when it involves movement to communities with few Jewish inhabitants, has particular relevance for the strength of individual ties to the Jewish community. It has the potential of weakening opportunities both to interact with other Jews and to have easy access to Jewish facilities, agencies, and institutions. Much more research is needed on how the "Jewish environment," as indicated by density of Jewish population and facilities, affects individual Jewish identity and the vitality of the community.

Some insights into the impact of metropolitan/nonmetropolitan residence[45] can be obtained from NJPS-1990. In 1990, Jews continued to be concentrated in metropolitan areas: three-quarters of all core Jews enumerated in NJPS-1990 were living in metropolitan areas (table 4), virtually identical with the 77 percent of the total American population in 1988. Yet, as many as one-quarter of all Jews were living in nonmetropolitan areas, that is, not only outside the central cities of the 283 metropolitan areas of the United States but also beyond their suburban areas. About two-thirds of the nonmetropolitan core population lived in areas of 150,000 persons and over, but the balance were in smaller places. In all, therefore, almost 8 percent of American Jews resided in nonmetropolitan areas of less than

[45]Metropolitan area residents are those who live in a county that lies within a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropolitan areas are persons living in counties that are not in metropolitan areas; the population size refers to the number of residents of the given counties.

150,000 total population. This finding justifies the concerted efforts made by NJPS-1990 to include representation of areas with sparse Jewish populations in the national sample. Such areas were not covered in NJPS-1970/71, which may help to explain some of the differences in the findings between the two surveys, especially as this relates to Jewish identity and behavior.

The residential pattern of the core Jews varies considerably by type of Jewish identity. Jews by religion were much more concentrated in metropolitan areas than either secular Jews or Jews by choice, 79 percent compared to 65 and 59 percent, respectively. Whether nonmetropolitan location leads to greater secularism and outmarriage or whether secular and intermarried persons choose to live in nonmetropolitan areas and smaller communities needs to be studied in greater depth; that they are disproportionally located in such places is clear. Whereas only one in five of the Jews by religion lived in nonmetropolitan areas, one-third of the secular Jews and four in ten of the Jews by choice did so; moreover, a substantial proportion of the latter two groups lived in nonmetropolitan areas of less than 150,000 persons.

The relation between metropolitan/nonmetropolitan residence and Jewish identity is also suggested by the residential patterns of the non-Jewish members of the sampled households. For the total group, only 60 percent were located in metropolitan areas, compared to three-quarters of the core Jews. This percentage varied minimally for the three subcategories of non-Jews, and more closely resembled that of secular Jews and Jews by choice than it did Jews by religion. That approximately four out of every ten of the non-Jews in the sampled households lived in nonmetropolitan areas, and as many as 15–18 percent in areas of less than 150,000 population lends weight to the thesis that identity is correlated with residence, either as effect or cause. It suggests for community planners that efforts to reach those more marginal to the community must give concerted attention to smaller communities of the country.

Migration Patterns

Migration is a key factor in helping to explain the national redistribution of the Jewish population. It is also the salient factor in the changing distribution between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. NJPS-1970/71 documented the extensive mobility of American Jewry.[46] At that time, 17 percent of the Jewish population aged 20 and over were living in a different city or metropolitan area than that in which they had resided in 1965. As many as 9 percent had moved to a different state in the five-year interval,

[46]Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution."

and an additional 6 percent had moved elsewhere within their state of residence. While the system of classifying persons as residentially stable or mobile differed some in 1990 compared to 1970, the information collected in NJPS-1990 suggests that the high level of migration observed for 1965–70 also characterized the period 1985–90 (table 5). About one-fourth of the Jews in the core population moved beyond their local area in the five years 1985–90. Almost 11 percent moved between states, and another 11 percent changed areas of residence within their state. Overall, both the proportion migrating intrastate and those moving a greater distance seem to have increased some over 1965–70.

The mobility levels of American Jews very closely parallel those of the total white American population; for the latter, 20 percent migrated beyond their local area between 1980 and 1985, the most recent period for which national five-year data are available. Nine percent had moved between states, and 9 percent had made intrastate moves beyond the local area. The virtually identical levels of mobility suggest that the underlying economic and social forces that account for a very mobile American population operate among Jews as well. This is not surprising, given the educational and occupational composition of the Jewish group. Evidently, the stimulus that these provide for movement outweighs any countervailing impact that ties to family and community may have for Jews.

The cumulative effect of such extensive mobility is evidenced in the proportion of Jewish adults who had moved during their lifetime (table 6). Less than one in five were living in the same city/town in which they were born. By contrast, one-quarter of all adults had moved elsewhere in their state, and almost one-half were living in a different state in 1990 from their state of birth. Those who were foreign-born constituted the remaining 10 percent of the adult population. Using this lifetime index of mobility, Jews are considerably more mobile than the general population, among whom only 30 percent had changed state of residence, and 6 percent had moved from another country. That 57 percent of all Jews were living outside their country or state of birth attests to the key role which migration occupies as a dynamic of change for American Jewry.

That it does so for both Jews by religion and secular Jews is suggested by the comparative data on migration for these groups. The comparison will be limited here to the recent migrants, i.e., to those who had moved in the five years before the survey (table 5). Ten percent of Jews by religion had made an interstate move between 1985 and 1990, and another 10 percent moved intrastate beyond their local area. Jews by choice were more mobile, and secular Jews were the most mobile of all, probably reflecting both their somewhat younger age composition and a greater willingness to leave places of concentrated Jewish settlement.

Age affects the propensity to move, since migration is closely linked to events in the life cycle. Thus, whereas 72 percent of Jews aged 18–24 resided in the same city/town in 1990 as in 1985, this was true of only 54 percent of the 25–34 age group (table 7); graduate studies, marriage, and beginning a career all help explain the heightened mobility. That as many as 22 percent of the latter were interstate migrants attests to the dramatic role of migration in this stage of the life cycle. (Similar patterns were observed for 1970.)[47] Thereafter, increasing age is associated with greater stability: A rising proportion lived in the same house in 1985 and 1990, reaching a high of 83 percent of those 65 years and over, compared to a low of only 21 percent of those aged 25–34; a corresponding reduction was noted in the percent who reported interstate migration. Nonetheless, a majority of those aged 35–44 and over one-quarter of those 45–64 years changed residences during the five-year interval, many between states or outside their local area within state; mobility is certainly not restricted to the younger segments of the population. Moreover, a considerable part of the mobility of middle-aged and older persons seems, from data not presented here, to be repeat movement.

The NJPS-1990 data also allow comparison of the five-year mobility patterns of the core Jewish adults and the currently non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households (table 5). Such a comparison indicates that the core Jews as a whole are somewhat less mobile than the total non-Jews. More of the non-Jews had changed residence locally and through moves to other parts of their state as well as outside the state, suggesting that ties to family and community may be somewhat weaker than among Jews. Examination of the subgroups within the non-Jewish group indicates, however, that greater mobility is mainly characteristic of the Gentile members of the households and, to a lesser extent, those born of Jewish parents but not raised Jewish. The converts out of Judaism displayed greater stability. Fuller explanation of these differences must await in-depth analysis, taking account of variation among groups in socioeconomic composition, in age patterns, and in strength of social ties.

That migration is not restricted to the adult population is evident in the statistics showing the percentage of persons under age 18 who were living in a state other than the one in which they were born (not shown in table). Among all the children classified as core Jews, 21 percent were interstate migrants by the time of the survey. The level of migration is considerably higher for children classified as Jewish by religion than for those categorized as secular Jews. Almost one-quarter of the former, compared to only 16 percent of the secular children, had moved interstate. The high degree of

[47]Ibid.

mobility among Jewish youth points to the necessity of assessing more fully the implications that such movement has on their integration into the Jewish community, particularly into systems of Jewish education.

Among the 700,000 children in the sampled households classified as currently non-Jewish, interstate migration occurred more frequently than among the Jewish children; 29 percent had made such moves, compared to only 21 percent of the Jewish children. The higher migration level of the non-Jewish children contrasts with the pattern of the parental generation, suggesting that core Jewish families with children may be less mobile than their non-Jewish counterparts in the sampled households. Specific reasons for this need in-depth evaluation.

The Impact of Mobility on Regional Distribution

NJPS-1990 provides information on the origin and destination of the interstate migrants, thereby permitting evaluation of their regional redistribution patterns across the country (table 8).

The highest migration rates characterized those core Jews born in the Northeast and Midwest; 30 percent of the former and 42 percent of the latter were living in a different region in 1990 than that in which they were born. By contrast, only 23 percent of those born in the South and even fewer, 13 percent, of those born in the West had changed region of residence.

The direction of the shift among those who moved is clearly to the Sunbelt. About half of the 838,500 leaving the Northeast moved to the South, and another third migrated to the West. Of the 335,900 leaving the Midwest, almost one-third went to the South, and just over half headed to the West. Of the much smaller numbers leaving the South and the West, almost half shifted to the Northeast; the second largest stream was the interchange between the South and the West. The direction of the overall shift is most evident in the streams for the Northeast and Midwest: Whereas 60 percent of all interregional migrants originated in the Northeast and another 24 percent in the Midwest, by 1990 only 12 percent of the interregional migrants had moved to the Northeast and 8 percent to the Midwest. By contrast, only 10 and 7 percent of all interregional migrants were born in the South and the West, respectively, but 44 and 36 percent resided in these regions by 1990. On balance, this redistribution resulted in a net loss of almost 677,000 Jews to the Northeast and 219,000 to the Midwest. By contrast, the South gained 485,000, and the West netted 411,000. Clearly, migration has produced a massive redistribution of Jews among the major regions of the United States.

The movement of the non-Jewish members of the surveyed households closely parallels that of the Jews, with a net shift from the Northeast and

the Midwest to the South and the West. The former two regions experienced a lifetime loss of 115,000 and 113,000 persons, respectively, while the South gained 84,000 and the West 143,000. With the small exception of the interchange between the Northeast and the Midwest (Jews shifted from the Northeast to the Midwest, whereas for non-Jewish household members the exchange was reversed), the overall direction of interregional migration patterns of Jewish and non-Jewish household members was similar. However, the shift of the Jewish members to the South and West was more marked, reflecting the fact that relatively fewer of the non-Jews originated in the Northeast and comparatively more moved there and to the Midwest from other regions of the country.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Age Composition

Jews in the United States have long been characterized by a relatively older population. Reflecting the combined effects of lower fertility and the growing concentration of the large numbers of immigrants from the early 1900s among the aged, the core Jewish population continues to be older than the white population of the United States (the difference is even greater if nonwhites are included). In 1990, the median age of the Jewish core was 37.3 years, almost four years higher than the 33.6 median of the total whites (table 9). Since 1970, both the Jewish and the total population have aged, with both groups adding about four years to their median ages.

The 1990 differences in age composition suggested by the medians are reflected in the proportions in different age segments. For example, 19 percent of the Jewish group is under age 15, compared to 21 percent of all whites. These proportions are well below the 23 and 28 percent, respectively, recorded in 1970 and reflect both lower Jewish fertility and the reduction in general fertility. By contrast, relatively more Jews are aged; even excluding the 80,000 Jews living in institutions, most of whom are above age 65, 17.2 percent of the core Jewish population was age 65 and over, compared to only 13.3 percent of the white population. This difference extends even to the old aged; almost 8 percent of the Jews were age 75 and over, compared to 5.5 percent of the whites.

The differences are not as great in the middle ages, suggesting that the relative burden of supporting the dependent population, the young and the aged combined, is quite similar for Jews and for the population as a whole. However, compared to all whites, the dependency of the aged is greater for the Jews and that of the children and youth is less, although for both groups,

those under age 25 still considerably outnumber the aged.

The age composition within the Jewish population also varies among the different identity subcategories. The median age of those who are born Jews and currently Jews by religion was 39.3 years, compared to a median of only 29.9 years for those classified as secular Jews. This difference is clearly reflected in the much larger proportion of secular Jews under age 25 and in the much higher percentage of aged among the Jews by religion. Even within the middle age range, 25–64 years, Jews by religion are more skewed toward the higher ages. These cross-sectional data suggest a shift toward secular identification with Judaism among younger generations, but, as these persons age, they may well shift from viewing themselves as secular to regarding themselves as Jews by religion.

Jews by choice have the highest median age, 41.1 years, for obvious reasons. Few children make a decision to change their religion or have this decision made for them. Conversion is largely an adult phenomenon, with the religion of the children being largely determined by their parents. Just over half of Jews by choice are found in the narrow age range of 25–44 years, reflecting the upsurge in recent decades in marriages of Jews to persons not born Jewish.

Finally, NJPS-1990 allows comparison of the age composition of the Jewish members of the surveyed households with those who were not Jewish at the time of the survey. Such a comparison shows that the non-Jewish members are younger than either the Jewish members or the total U.S. white population. Their median age of 31.7 is almost six years below that of the Jews and two years below all whites in the nation. This difference, like that of the Jews by choice, is probably a function of the recent high rate of intermarriage and the fact that a large proportion of the children of mixed marriages are not being raised as Jews. The particularly high proportion of children in the Jewish descent/other religion category is a case in point. The differences are even sharper if the comparison is made with those classified as Jewish by religion. In fact, the age composition of the non-Jewish members of households quite closely resembles that of the secular Jews. This suggests that the same social factors that lead more younger Jews to identify themselves as secular may also underlie the greater number of younger non-Jews, who are either descended from Jews but are not themselves Jewish or are Gentile members of the household.

The variations in the comparative age structures of the Jewish population by type of identity are important considerations for institutions and agencies in planning current programs and future directions. At the same time, these age patterns call for more research attention to whether these cross-sectional differentials are indicative of future trends; longitudinal studies are very much in order.

Gender Differentials

The gender composition of the Jewish population reflects the combined effects of a variety of demographic and social forces. In general, males outnumber females at birth, but thereafter mortality tends to be more heavily selective of males. As a result, more women than men reach the older ages. Other factors also affect sex composition, however. For Jews, sex-selective rates of intermarriage, conversion into and out of Judaism, and immigration could affect the gender composition of the different subcategories. The omission of the institutionalized population from these statistics on gender composition is also likely to significantly affect the sex ratios of the aged, since the population in nursing homes and institutions for the aged tends to be heavily female; the aged still living in households may consist disproportionally of married couples and therefore be more balanced in gender composition than the aged as a whole.

For the total core Jewish population, a near balance exists in gender composition with 98.8 males for every 100 females; this is only slightly above the 95.8 ratio for the total white population (table 10). The higher ratio for the Jews is largely attributable to the omission from the Jewish group of the institutionalized population.

Within the Jewish group, gender composition varies among the different identity categories. The sex ratio is just over 100 for both the Jews by religion and the secular Jews, but far below a balanced composition for the Jews by choice. The latter suggests that intermarriages resulting in conversion of the non-Jewish spouse more often involved a Jewish-born male whose wife chose Judaism than a Jewish-born female whose husband made such a choice. Women may also be more likely to choose Judaism for reasons unrelated to marriage.

The total non-Jews in "Jewish" households have a somewhat lower sex ratio than the Jews, and are quite similar to the total U.S. white population. While this group, too, would be affected by the omission of the institutionalized population, the effect would not be as great as for the Jews since considerably fewer of the non-Jews are in the aged group. The more important factor affecting the sex composition of the non-Jews is the sex-selective patterns of intermarriage and conversion out of Judaism. Among those who have converted out of Judaism, the sex ratio is heavily skewed toward women. Among the larger number of others of Jewish descent who were born or raised as non-Jews, the overall sex ratio is quite balanced, reflecting the large percentage of children. For those aged 25 and over, however, the sex ratio is also unusually low, possibly reflecting the greater tendency of women to acknowledge their Jewish descent. Whether this relates in any way to halakhic considerations needs further research. Such an explanation is further suggested by the high sex ratio of those reported as Gentile

members of the households: 103.1 males per 100 females. But this higher ratio may also reflect a lesser tendency, especially in earlier years, of men to become Jews by choice upon marriage to a Jew.

Generation Status

The changing generation status of the American-Jewish population has great importance for the future of American Jewry.[48] In the last half century, third and higher generation Jews have had to face the American scene without massive reinforcement from immigrant flows from overseas. Although this situation has been modified by the influx of Israelis and Soviet Jews, their relatively small numbers do not seem to have significantly altered either the overall demographic composition of American Jewry or its socioreligious profile. Confronted with the growing freedom that Jews have come to experience in virtually all spheres of American life, the greater distance at which more Jews now find themselves from their immigrant origins takes on added significance.

Already in 1970, the growing Americanization of the Jewish population was evident. NJPS-1970/71 found only 23 percent of household heads in the Jewish population to be foreign-born, and one out of every five was already third generation.[49] Succeeding community surveys showed declining proportions of foreign-born and rising percentages of third generation. For example, the Boston studies of 1965, 1975, and 1985 reported the foreign-born to be 22, 12, and 8 percent, respectively, of the total population. By contrast, those with American-born parents rose from 20 to 49 to 61 percent over the three surveys.[50]

By NJPS-1990, the percentage of foreign-born in the core Jewish population had declined to 9 percent. The relation to age is clear, directly reflecting the changing volume of Jewish immigration to the United States; 17 percent of the population aged 65 and over were foreign-born, declining to only 4 percent of those under age 18. In all, 55 percent of all foreign-born persons are 45 years old and over.

Indicative of the changing generation status of the population is the number of U.S.-born grandparents (table 11, panel *a*), which can range

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[48]Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968).

[49]Massarik and Chenkin, "U.S. National Jewish Population Survey."

[50]Morris Axelrod, Floyd J. Fowler, and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning* (Boston, Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1967); Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1977); and Sherry Israel, *Boston's Jewish Community: The 1985 CJP Demographic Study* (Boston, Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1987).

between none and four for any single individual. Only 2 percent of those 65 years old and over had all four grandparents U.S.-born, but four out of ten of those aged 18–24 years did so. Whereas 94 percent of the aged reported none of their grandparents born in the United States, this was true of only 23 percent of the youngest adult group. Judged by generation status, the Jewish community in the United States is clearly becoming an increasingly American-Jewish community.

To what extent is generation status associated with Jewish identity? The NJPS-1990 data point to a clear relation. Among core Jews, including children, 10 percent of the Jews by religion were foreign-born, compared to 7 percent of the secular Jews and slightly fewer of the Jews by choice (not shown in table). Much of the difference between the Jews by religion and the secular Jews stems from the larger proportion of older persons among the Jews by religion, but even in younger groups, more of the Jews by religion were foreign-born. More detailed examination shows Jews by religion had the highest proportion with no American-born grandparents (70 percent) and the lowest with all four grandparents born in the United States (9 percent). By contrast, only 38 percent of the secular Jews had no American-born grandparents, and 28 percent had all of their grandparents American-born. Not surprisingly, more Jews by choice had all their grandparents born in the United States, and fewer had no American-born grandparents. Incorporation of Jews by choice into the core Jewish population has the effect, therefore, of increasing the average generation status of the core Jewish population. That the non-Jewish members of the sampled "Jewish" households have a much higher proportion with American-born grandparents, 46 percent compared to 14 percent of the core Jews, is not unexpected.

Of special interest are the Jews who have converted out of Judaism. Overall, their generation-status profile most closely resembles that of the secular Jews; almost one-third reported all four of their grandparents as American-born, and only 30 percent had no grandparents born in the United States. Consistent with such a pattern as well as with expectations, even higher percentages of those of Jewish descent who were not born or raised Jewish reported having all four grandparents American-born, and few had no American-born grandparents.

The changing generation status of the Jewish population can best be summarized by their average number of American-born grandparents (table 11, panel *b*). For all Jews in the core population, this amounts to exactly 1.00. It varies, however, from a low of only 0.75 for those who are Jewish by religion to a high of 2.44 for those who are Jews by choice; secular Jews are intermediate. Moreover, within each identity group, the average number of American-born grandparents is inversely related to age. The average for young adult Jews by religion, for example, is over twice as high as for the

aged. Those who converted out of Judaism most closely resembled the secular Jews, except for a considerably higher number of American-born grandparents among aged converts. Not surprisingly, the other currently non-Jewish members in the sampled households had higher averages than did the Jewish subgroups. Interestingly, however, the differences were minimal among identity groups for those aged 18–24, pointing to greater similarity among younger cohorts as the foreign-born and their children die.

While much fuller research is needed to assess the impact of generation status on Jewish identity, these data suggest that the greater distance from ethnic ties and experiences that served as integrating forces for earlier generations has altered the socioreligious profile of American Jewry. Rising Americanization, judged by generation status, seems to be associated with both higher levels of secularism and higher rates of conversion to another faith, probably largely in association with intermarriage. Generational change is inevitable and involves a complex process leading to the abandonment of traditional forms and the development of new forms of identity and expression which are seen by many as more congruent with the broader American way of life. Whether these changes have resulted by 1990 in the weakening or strengthening of American Jewry remains to be tested.

Educational Achievement

Reflecting the great emphasis placed on education, both as an intrinsic value and as a means for mobility, the Jews of America have compiled an extraordinary record of educational achievement. By midcentury, the children and grandchildren of the immigrants from Eastern Europe were averaging about 12 years of schooling, two years higher than the average of the white population.[51] Moreover, over twice as many Jews as whites in the population had completed college.[52]

NJPS-1970/71 indicated that these differentials had continued. Just over half of all Jews age 25 and older had some college education, in contrast to only 22 percent of all whites age 25 and over. Moreover, only 16 percent of the Jews, compared to 46 percent of the whites, had less than 12 years of schooling. Particularly sharp differences characterized the proportion that had some graduate education—18 percent of the Jews, compared to only 5 percent of white adults. While Jewish women, like those in the general population, had, on average, less education than men, the levels of educational achievement for both Jewish men and women were well above

[51]Ben Seligman and Aaron Antonovsky, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," in *The Jews*, ed. Marshall Sklare (Glencoe, Ill., 1958).

[52]Sidney Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials Among Religious Groups in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 74, May 1969, pp. 612–31.

those of their counterparts in the general population.

In the 1970s it seemed likely that educational levels might remain at the very high plateau already achieved or even dip slightly, as young Jews integrated more into the larger society. Jews, it was thought, might then pattern their educational behavior more on the model of the general population. What do the data from NJPS-1990 indicate?

For the core Jewish population 25 years old and over, a college education had become increasingly common (table 12A). Almost three-quarters had at least some college, and as many as one-quarter had some graduate education. Overall, therefore, educational achievement of the adult Jewish population rose substantially between 1970/71 and 1990. The general U.S. white population also experienced an impressive improvement in its educational level, but sharp differentials persisted between them and the Jews. In 1990, almost twice as high a percentage of Jews had some college education as whites, and the percentage with graduate training was three times greater.

Some of this increase for both groups reflects the changing composition of the population aged 25 and over. As the older persons with less schooling die, and as the more educated younger population ages, the average for all ages will rise. A fairer comparison of changes between 1970/71 and 1990 and of differences between groups would be with both age and gender controlled. For such purposes, the focus here will be on the 30–39 age group (table 12B and table 13). Such a focus is useful because most of these persons are young enough to be affected by recent educational patterns, and most of them are likely to have completed their education.

In 1970/71, 83 percent of the males had some college education; 70 percent had graduated college; 45 percent had done some graduate studies. For the total white male population, the comparable levels were only 34, 20, and 11 percent. By 1990, 87 percent of the Jewish males aged 30–39 years had some college education, 69 percent had graduated college, and 37 percent had had some graduate studies. These data show no rise in levels of education among Jewish males. Sharp differences persist, however, between the Jewish males aged 30–39 and this age cohort in the white population. Only slightly more than half (52 percent) of white males aged 30–39 received some college education and less than a third (31 percent) graduated college. Only 13 percent did any graduate studies. Similar patterns characterize Jewish and white females. Clearly, educational achievement remains a very strong value in the Jewish community, even though young people in the last two decades have not achieved higher levels of education than their immediate predecessors.

Of particular interest is whether levels of education vary by type of Jewish identity. The data from NJPS-1990 strongly suggest this to be the case. It

may well help to explain why the levels of education have not risen more for the younger Jewish population as a whole.

Among all adults in the three Jewish core groups, similar proportions obtained a college or graduate education. These comparisons are distorted, however, by the different age compositions of the three groups. If the comparison is restricted to those aged 30–39, a different picture emerges. Many more of the secular Jews had less than a college education, and a much higher percent of the Jews by religion had completed college than was true of the Jews by choice or of the secular Jews. Similarly, the secular Jews had the lowest percentage reporting graduate studies. These very different educational patterns suggest that the value placed on education generally associated with Jews occurs most frequently among those professing to be Jews by religion and next most frequently among those who have chosen to be Jews. Have the secular Jews assimilated the less positive attitude toward higher education that seems to characterize the American population in general? Does this help to explain why fewer younger Jews have pursued graduate studies?

Differentials extend to the non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households. Thus, among all the currently non-Jewish household members aged 30–39, almost one-third had less than a college education compared to only 14 percent of the Jewish members. Moreover, only 43 percent of the non-Jewish members had completed college and about one in five had pursued graduate studies, in contrast to 66 and 33 percent, respectively, of the Jewish members. For all three of the non-Jewish groups, the percentage who completed college was well below the levels of college completion of all three of the core Jewish groups. Moreover, the percentage of all three categories of Jews who had undertaken graduate studies was well above that of the three non-Jewish groups.

The differences among the various subcategories of core Jews and of non-Jews suggest that the intensity of Jewish identity is related to levels of education; the stronger the intensity, the higher the level of achievement. Evidently, the values and norms associated with being Jewish or becoming Jewish, especially regarding oneself as Jewish by religion, have a significant impact on the amount of education obtained. Full demonstration of this relation requires an in-depth analysis that gives attention to a number of additional variables and also uses information on the type and intensity of religious identity before and at the time that education was being pursued.

Labor-Force Status and Occupation

The labor-force participation of men and women closely reflects the life-cycle stage, being intimately tied to whether individuals are pursuing

education, beginning a career, marrying and raising a family, or retiring. Consistent with patterns in the general population, the proportion of men in the core Jewish population in 1990 actively participating in the labor force rose, as education was completed, from a low of 40 percent of those aged 18–24 to a peak of 94 percent in the prime working ages 35–44. At first gradually and then precipitously, the percent in the labor force declined to 26 percent of those aged 65 and over. Compared to the levels found by the 1957 census survey,[53] the data suggest a considerably lower level of labor-force participation by Jews in recent years, especially in the younger and older ages. In 1957,[54] as many as 54 percent of men aged 18–24 were working, reflecting lower rates of college enrollment, while 46 percent of those aged 65 and over were in the labor force, reflecting a lesser tendency to retire. The latter difference even extends to the 45–64 age group, 96 percent of whom were in the labor force in 1957 compared to only 81 percent in 1990. Only in the peak ages, 35–44, is there close similarity, with well over 90 percent working in both 1957 and 1990.

The overall pattern of age differentials for women closely parallels that of men, with labor-force participation rising in 1990 from 43 percent of those 18–24 to a peak of 76 percent at ages 25–34, and then declining to only two-thirds of those aged 45–64 and 10 percent of the aged. However, the peak occurs ten years earlier, and the levels of participation are lower than those of men at all ages but the youngest. The latter reflects a somewhat lesser tendency of women to be enrolled as students (49 percent compared to 57 percent of the men).

Most significant, however, is the substantial proportion of women aged 25–44 and 45–64 in the labor force, about three-fourths of the former and two-thirds of the older group. These levels represent dramatic increases. In 1957, for example, only about 30 percent of Jewish women aged 25–44 were employed, reflecting the greater likelihood that they were engaged in home management. That labor-force participation in 1957 rose to 38 percent of those aged 45–64 resulted from the tendency of some women to enter the labor force once children were older; even this level is far below the 66 percent of women aged 45–64 in the labor force in 1990. As for men, fewer young women were labor-force participants in 1990 than in 1957, 43 percent compared to 57 percent; unlike men, however, there was minimum change

[53]U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population."

[54]Since the 1970 data on labor force refer to heads of household, they are not fully comparable to the 1990 data that encompass all adult household members. To assess change, therefore, the 1957 Census survey data are used, even though the coverage of Jews differs from 1990; the 1957 data refer to persons reported as Jewish by religion. However, since Jews by religion constitute a very high proportion of the 1990 core Jewish population, and the labor-force rates of the total core and of the Jews by religion are quite similar, the differences between 1957 and 1990 in coverage are not serious.

in the proportion of employed older women, 10 percent in 1990 compared to just over 8 percent in 1957. Whether this pattern will change as women aged 25–64 (who have had more labor-force experience than earlier cohorts) age needs to be monitored in future research. It is clear that, for the age range 25–64, Jewish women's participation in the labor force has become a common pattern, with significant implications for family, fertility, income, and participation in the organized activities of the community.

The high occupational achievement of Jews, paralleling their distinctive educational record, has long been documented.[55] Community studies in every decade since the 1950s, as well as NJPS-1970/71, have shown Jews to be heavily concentrated in the upper ranks of the occupational hierarchy. Moreover, comparative data over the last four decades point to a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in white-collar work; and within the white-collar category, a shift has occurred toward more professionals and fewer managers.[56] These shifts in occupational composition likely reflect the continued operation of forces identified earlier by Simon Kuznets[57] as affecting the Jewish occupational structure: decreased self-employment as more Jews entered professional, technical, and executive positions in firms and large corporations; a decline in the share of industrial blue-collar jobs; and a lesser concentration in trade, especially small proprietorships, in contrast to many of their parents and grandparents. The non-Jewish population has also moved up the occupational hierarchy in response to changing opportunities and labor-force needs. The question then for 1990 is whether Jews persist in their occupational distinctiveness and, if so, whether the differential between Jews and non-Jews has narrowed or widened.

Differentials clearly persist (table 14). In 1990, 80.1 percent of all core Jewish employed males held white-collar positions, well above the 47.6 percent for the total white population of the United States.[58] Within the white-collar group, the differential for professionals was even sharper, with 39.0 percent of all Jewish males so employed compared to only 15.8 percent of all employed whites. The percentage employed as managers was quite similar for the two groups, but the proportion in sales and clerical work was higher for the Jewish men.

Despite these large current differences within the white-collar group, the

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[55]Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970"; Goldstein, "The Jews in the United States," pp. 3–59.

[56]Barry R. Chiswick, "The Economic Status of American Jews: Analysis of the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," paper presented at Conference on Policy Implications of the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, Los Angeles, July 1991.

[57]Simon Kuznets, *Economic Structure of U.S. Jewry: Recent Trends* (Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, 1972).

[58]U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, vol. 38, Jan. 1991.

comparative data from 1970 point to continued narrowing of differences between males in the Jewish and the total white population. While the level of white-collar employment for Jewish men has declined from the 87-percent level reported in NJPS-1970/71, that of whites generally has risen. The data indicate that more Jewish males are now engaged as operatives and service workers, suggesting that for the first time in recent history, American Jews are increasingly turning to manual labor for their livelihood. This finding confirms the speculation offered in 1981 that, motivated by different values and attracted by new life-styles and income opportunities, especially during times of economic uncertainty, more Jews may turn to making a living through manual labor. Bienstock[59] may have been right when he suggested that Jews might turn in increasing numbers to opportunities in new areas where demands for services were likely to grow. As a result, the occupational structure of Jewish males in 1990 more closely resembles that of the whites than it did in 1970. The index of dissimilarity[60] declined substantially from a high of 56.9 in 1970 to 32.6 in 1990.

That some of the narrowing may be due to the changing Jewish identificational composition is suggested by the comparative data on occupational composition by identity type. Whereas 82.3 percent of the male Jews by religion are in white-collar work, only 72.4 percent of both the secular Jewish men and those males who are Jews by choice are so employed. Most of the difference is concentrated in the lower proportion of the latter two groups in sales and clerical work, although secular males also tend to have fewer managers. Furthermore, more of those not Jewish by religion are concentrated in the manual-laborer groups. If the secular Jews and the Jews by choice constitute a growing proportion of the total core population, their different pattern of occupational choice could well account for the narrowing differential between the Jewish core group and the general white population. We shall have to await the results of the more in-depth evaluation of the occupational data for fuller insights into the factors explaining this change.

Jewish women have also been characterized by much higher levels in white-collar work than all white females; and, as for men, the differentials have narrowed. In 1990, the proportion of Jewish women in white-collar work was similar to that in 1970—90 percent—but for white women generally, it had risen from 65 to 72 percent. Unlike their male counterparts, Jewish women were not characterized by a rising percent of manual workers in the two decades since NJPS-1970/71.

Within the white-collar group, the differences between Jewish women

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[59]Herbert Bienstock, quoted in *New York Times*, June 25, 1972.

[60]The index shows the percent of cases that would have to be redistributed in order for the two groups to have identical distributions.

and all white women held only for professionals, with over twice as many Jewish women in the group. Between 1970 and 1990, the proportion of Jewish women working as managers remained constant, but the percentage of professionals rose significantly, from 24 to 36 percent, with a corresponding drop in clerical and sales workers. These changes are consistent with the rising level of education among women.

Among the Jewish women, Jews by religion closely resembled the secular Jews and the Jews by choice in the total percentage who were in white-collar occupations; the percentage varied only between 87 and 91 percent, being highest for the Jews by religion. Although the percentage of professional women was highest for Jews by choice, much of this difference is attributable to age composition. Once age is controlled, Jews by choice have the lowest proportion of white-collar persons, including professionals, and far fewer in sales and clerical work; with age controlled, secular Jews have more in professional work than do Jews by religion. By contrast, more of the Jews by choice are in managerial positions. For all three groups, most of the small number engaged in manual work are employed as service workers. As for men, these data for women suggest that somewhat more of the secular Jews and Jews by choice than Jews by religion are in the lower ranks of the occupational hierarchy. This differential sharpens when age is controlled.

Comparisons can also be made between the Jewish members of the sampled households and the non-Jewish members. If dichotomized in terms of white-collar and blue-collar workers, the non-Jewish members tend to fall between the Jews and the total American white population. Among males, 56 percent are white-collar, in contrast to 80 percent of the core Jews and 48 percent of all whites; among females, 74 percent of the non-Jewish members are white-collar, in contrast to 90 percent of the core Jewish group and 72 percent of the white population. Age does not seem to change these patterns. Clearly, the underlying factors that account for occupational composition seem to operate in an intermediate fashion for the non-Jewish members of "Jewish" households. Multivariate assessment should indicate what these specific variables are and whether they relate to general sociodemographic conditions or to factors more closely tied to Jewish identity.

Marriage Patterns

Marriage and the family have been basic institutions for Judaism, playing a key role in providing for the future, first through reproduction and then by serving as the major agents of socialization and the transmission of values, attitudes, goals, and aspirations. Given the high value that Judaism has traditionally placed on marriage and the family and the changes occurring in these institutions in American society as a whole, a major question

is whether Jews have changed their marriage patterns. If so, how, and what implications does this have for the maintenance of the demographic and social vitality of the Jewish population in the future?

The 1957 census survey[61] provided one of the first opportunities to compare Jewish marital composition with that of the general population. That comparison indicated that Jews were more apt to marry at some time in their life, to marry at a somewhat later age, and to have more stable marriages.

NJPS 1970/71 found three-quarters of all men and 85 percent of all women aged 25–29 had been married; this compared to 81 and 89 percent, respectively, of men and women in this age group in the U.S. white population. Above age 35, over 95 percent of all Jewish men and 98 percent of all Jewish women had been married,[62] attesting to a strong adherence to traditional values concerning marriage.

NJPS-1990 indicates some change in the patterns suggested by these earlier surveys (table 15). By 1990, the current marital status of the Jewish population almost matched that of the general U.S. white population. Just over 26 percent of all Jewish adult males had never married, compared to 24 percent of the total adult white population; slightly more of the total whites were married and divorced than were Jews. These overall similarities are misleading, however, because of pronounced differentials among younger age groups. In the 18–24 age group, for example, only 4 percent of the Jewish men had been married, compared to 17 percent of men in the general population; by ages 25–34, just half of all Jews but two-thirds of all whites had been married. Even as late as ages 35–44, substantial differences persisted. Only by age 45 and over were the differences minimal, with approximately 92 percent or more of the men in both groups having been married.

The key question is whether these cross-sectional data indicate the likely levels of marriage of the younger cohorts. Comparison with the 1957 census statistics and the NJPS-1970/71 data shows a basic change. For example, whereas only 29 percent of Jewish men in 1957 and 17 percent of those in 1970/71 were still single at ages 25–34, this was true of half of all Jewish men in this age range in 1990. At ages 35–44, 17 percent were still single in 1990 compared to only 5 percent in 1957 and 4 percent in 1970/71. Only at age 45 and over were the levels quite similar, with 5 percent or fewer still single. The sharper differential between the younger and older groups in 1990 compared to 1957 and 1970/71 suggests that the percent married by the time they reach middle and old age may in the future be less for the currently younger segments of the Jewish population than was true earlier.

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[61]U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population."

[62]Schmelz and DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in American Jewish Demography*.

By 1990, like women in the general population, Jewish women were marrying at older ages than was true in 1957 and 1970/71. For example, among all Jewish women aged 25–34, in 1957, 91 percent had married and in 1970/71, 90 percent had done so, but by 1990 this was true for only half. Even at ages 35–44, a differential persisted, with 89 percent of all Jewish women having married, compared to 94 percent in 1957 and 98 percent in 1970/71. Moreover, by 1990 the decline in proportions marrying by age 45 was considerably sharper for the Jewish than for the white women. For those aged 45 and over, however, minimal change had occurred between 1957 and 1990, either for Jewish women or for white women generally; in both periods, over 90 percent were married.

As for men, the difference in patterns for the younger and older women raises questions about whether the cross-sectional patterns can point to future levels of marriage for those under age 45 in 1990. Whether changes in marriage behavior associated with higher rates of cohabitation will reduce the percentage who eventually marry, or whether other factors, such as AIDS, will lead to rising marriage rates will need monitoring over the next decade. To the extent that marriage in 1990 had been delayed for a substantial proportion of younger men and women, the impact of such delays on fertility as well as on intermarriage heightens the significance of this change in marital behavior.

Is type of Jewish identity differentially associated with marriage patterns? For men, the data point to somewhat more younger Jews by religion remaining single longer than secular Jews and especially Jews by choice. Among those aged 25–34, 51 percent were never married compared to 47 percent of the secular Jews and only 19 percent of the Jews by choice. By ages 35–44, the differences were minimal. The higher proportion of Jews by religion who pursue graduate education may explain the lower proportion who marry before age 35. For women, more of those aged 18–24 who were Jews by religion were never married than were secular Jewish women or Jews by choice. For those between ages 25 and 44 years, the percentages never married among Jews by religion and secular Jews were similar and higher than among Jews by choice. Although the differences apply to a narrower segment of young Jewish women than of men, the same explanations may hold, particularly since fewer women than men receive higher education, and women marry on the average about 2–3 years earlier than men.

AVERAGE AGE AT MARRIAGE

For those who do marry, there is no strong evidence of significant changes in age at marriage among the different age cohorts (table 16). For

males in the core Jewish population, the average age at first marriage was 26.0 years and varied irregularly within a narrow range for the age groups between 25–34 and 65 and over. The 20.6-year average for those under age 25 is distorted because such a high percentage of this age cohort is still single. Since more of those single in the younger age groups may still marry later, the average age at marriage among these cohorts is likely to rise, but only time will tell how many marry and at what ages.

The average age of marriage of core Jewish women is almost three years lower than that of men. The difference tends to be narrower, however, among younger cohorts, but varies irregularly by age. The absence of a clear pattern of change in average age at marriage suggests that the percentage of persons marrying, rather than the age at which they marry, may be the more important change in marriage behavior among the Jewish population.

MARITAL STABILITY

The central role that the family has played in Jewish life has given rise to growing concern about the extent to which Jews share in the growing general tendency of broken marriages. Information on current marital status is not a good indicator since divorce can be followed by remarriage; data on current marital status do not therefore indicate the extent of divorce. Information on number of marriages and type of marital dissolution for those married more than once must also be considered.

Some insight into the extent of marital dissolution among Jews can be obtained by examining the number of marriages of the adults represented in NJPS-1990. In obtaining such an enumeration, the survey also ascertained the reason for the marital dissolution of the first marriage and of the last marriage in all cases of multiple marriage. Since few persons had married more than twice, the divorce record is complete for virtually all ever-married persons.

Among all ever-married men in the core Jewish population, 83.5 percent had been married only once at the time of the survey; 14 percent had been married twice; and 2.5 percent had been married three or more times (table 17). Marital stability was slightly higher for women, with 87.2 percent married once, only 11.2 percent married twice, and fewer than 2 percent having had three or more marriages. Overall, therefore, these data point to a relatively high rate of marital stability among Jews, particularly since some of the broken marriages were attributable to death of spouse and temporary separations rather than divorce. However, the data by age point to changing patterns and relations.

The percentage of men married more than once increases from none of those under age 25 to a high of 22 percent of those aged 45–64 years. Of

those aged 65 and over, somewhat fewer had multiple marriages, but more had been married three or more times (5.4 percent) than any other group. For women the pattern was somewhat different, with the percent married more than once rising from none of those under age 25 to 18 percent of those aged 35–44 years; it then declined to only 10 percent of the oldest group. The higher level in the middle ages may reflect changing divorce patterns.

Of those married only once, NJPS-1990 found that 5.5 percent of all men and 10.4 percent of all women were divorced at the time of the survey. That the level is twice as high for women as for men points to the much higher remarriage rate of divorced men. For this subset of the ever-married population, the age data indicate a particularly high divorce rate for the small number of men who were married before age 25 (27 percent of all those who had married only once) and for women between ages 35 and 54 (about 15 percent). For the men this suggests a high risk of marital break-up of young marriages; for the women it again points to a stronger tendency to remain divorced for some time after a marriage dissolves.

Since a number of those whose first marriages ended in divorce have remarried, a more accurate basis for assessing the stability of first marriages is to examine the first-marriage divorce rate among all ever-married persons. Such assessment shows that among all ever-married men in the core population, 16.4 percent ended their first marriage in divorce. For women the comparable percentage was 18.2 percent. Of the men who remarried after their first divorce, 10.5 percent experienced a second divorce; 11.9 percent of the remarried women had also been divorced again by the time of the survey. Taking account of both first and last divorce among all ever-married persons, the evidence indicates 18 divorces for every 100 ever-married men and 19 for every 100 ever-married women. While comparative data are not available for earlier points in time, this finding suggests that divorce has become relatively common among American Jews.

Of particular interest is whether the rate of divorce varies by Jewish identity. Hypothetically, given the strong value placed on marriage and the family, divorce should occur less frequently among persons who report being Jews by religion than among those reported as secular Jews. The data (not shown in table) support such an expectation. Among the ever-married men, those classified as Jewish by religion reported 13.6 percent of their first marriages broken by divorce. The rate was almost twice as high among secular Jews (24.5 percent), and the differences generally applied across most age groups. A large difference also characterized women, among whom 16.3 percent of the Jews by religion and 27.2 percent of the secular Jews had experienced a divorce in their first marriage. Clearly, being secular is associated with greater risk of marital break-up.

The relation of marital dissolution to status as a Jew by choice differs by

gender (not shown in table 15). For men, it is associated with an unusually high divorce rate. Among almost four out of every ten male Jews by choice, the first marriage ended in divorce, although the data available for this overview do not indicate if the divorced marriage involved a Jewish or non-Jewish spouse. For women the rate was only 18.4, quite similar to that of Jews by religion and well below that of secular Jews. The reasons for these gender differences among the Jews by choice need to be explored in later analyses.

If the analysis focuses on cumulative divorces in first and last marriage (for those married more than once), the same pattern of differentials by identity noted for first marriage persists. Being a Jew by religion has a positive correlation with stability as does, for women, being a Jew by choice. Secular Jews are more prone to divorce, and the greatest risks characterize male Jews by choice. These data suggest that, to the extent that changes in the identity composition of the Jewish population are associated with changing marital stability, any trend toward higher levels of secularism and intermarriage by Jewish women are likely to be associated with higher levels of marital instability.

Fertility Differentials

American Jews have been characterized by lower fertility than non-Jews, and some data sets have even pointed to below-replacement levels of Jewish reproduction.[63] This situation, coupled with the reduced immigration in the second half of the 20th century and the increasing rates of intermarriage, has given rise to concern about whether, in fact, the Jewish population in the United States will continue to grow. The debate continues and seems likely to become accentuated, in view of the evidence from NJPS-1990 showing very high rates of mixed marriage, low rates of conversion, and a high proportion of children of mixed marriages not being raised as Jews (see discussion below).

NJPS-1990 provides the opportunity to assess fertility changes in the 20 years since the 1970/71 national survey. Using that survey, DellaPergola found that since the beginning of the century, Jewish fertility was consistently lower than among total whites. He reported that "Jewish fertility levels basically followed over time the general fluctuations of the total whites, but patterns of response to period societal change were relatively earlier as appropriate to a more perfectly contracepting population."[64] Moreover, the younger cohorts of women tended toward increasingly lower

[63]Sergio DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Identity," *Demography* 17, Aug. 1980, pp. 261–73.

[64]Ibid., p. 270.

fertility, even though young ever-married women indicated an expectation of slightly more than two children. DellaPergola speculated that these expectations seemed unrealistically high, given other patterns observed. The evidence from NJPS-1990 seems to validate his doubts.

Comparison of the Jewish fertility reported in 1990 with that of all white women in childbearing years in 1988 shows Jewish fertility to be substantially below that of the general population (table 18). For example, Jewish women aged 25–29 averaged only 0.5 children, whereas white women in this age group had already had one child. By ages 40–44, Jewish women averaged 1.6 children, considerably below the 2.1 average of all white women in that age group. These differentials suggest that the motives for small families among Jews reflect a complex combination of factors involving both conditions unique to the Jews and those shared with the larger population.

The 1970/71 data showed an average completed fertility of 2.4 children for all Jewish women aged 45–49.[65] In 1990, the comparable age group had averaged only 1.9 children. This was not only 20 percent below the Jewish average for those aged 45–49 20 years earlier, but also 19 percent below the average for all white women aged 45–49 in 1988, and 10 percent below the 2.1 level needed for replacement. Clearly, Jewish fertility has declined, resulting in below-replacement fertility for those at the end of childbearing. This contrasts with the above-replacement levels achieved by Jewish women in the age groups between 50 and 65, who were in their peak childbearing years during the baby-boom period.

To date, Jewish women currently aged 35–44 have also had fewer than 2.1 children. Again, their averages are below the 2.3 levels achieved by women in this age range in 1970/71. Moreover, based on their expected completed family size, the women in the 1990 survey will remain at below-replacement levels. This suggests a marked change in fertility behavior over the past 20 years.

Even among women below age 35, except for those aged 20–24 who were just beginning childbearing, the fertility levels reported in 1990 were about half those in 1970/71 for comparable age groups. Nonetheless, as in 1970/71, in 1990 women under age 35 indicated that they expected to have more than two children. If realized, this would represent a significant reversal in fertility behavior. Like DellaPergola, however, we can question how realistic these expectations are. Ever-married women aged 20–24 in 1970/71 expected to average 2.5 children by the end of childbearing. Twenty years later, ever-married women in this same age cohort (not necessarily represented by the same women since some had died and some may have left the core Jewish group) had had only 1.7 children. For the 25–29 age group in

[65]DellaPergola, "Patterns."

1970/71, the 2.0 actual completed births by the end of the next 20 years also fell below the expected average of 2.2 indicated in 1970/71. Only for the women above 35, most of whom were well along in their fertility by 1970/71, did completed fertility come close to resembling expectations. While it is possible that the younger 1990 cohorts will be more realistic in their expectations than were the 1970/71 women, especially if patterns of late childbearing change, the experience of cohorts included in the 1970 study provides no sound basis for believing this will be the case.

If the age group 45–49 is used as marking the end of childbearing, comparison among the subgroups of core Jews shows considerable variation in the average number of children ever born. Whereas Jews by religion averaged 1.9 children, secular Jewish women averaged 1.7; Jews by choice constituted the only group to exceed replacement with their 2.3 average. For the next youngest group, however, most of whom had also completed childbearing, minimal difference characterized the Jews by religion and the secular Jews; each averaged about 1.6 children ever born. Again, the Jews by choice had higher fertility, averaging 1.9 children. For all three groups, fertility was below replacement levels at this late point in the reproductive cycle.

Within this overall pattern, the higher fertility of Jews by choice is notable. Their average number of children was higher than that of Jews by religion and of secular Jews at every age below 50, except the very youngest. This suggests that couples involving one spouse who converted to Judaism do not restrict the number of children below the average of all Jews. Why Jews by choice should generally have higher fertility than born Jews remains to be explored. It may be related to the differences in socioeconomic and cultural background that may also help to explain the higher fertility of the white population.

Moreover, the fertility of the Jews by choice at ages 40–44 and 45–49 is about 10 percent higher than that of converts out of Judaism, who averaged 1.8 and 2.0 children, respectively. However, for younger age groups, the number of children born by the time of the survey was higher for the converts out of Judaism. At all ages, the fertility of the converts out exceeded that of the Jews by religion and the secular Jews. How much of this higher level reflects differences in timing of childbearing rather than number of children born by the end of reproduction and how much is attributable to background factors similar to those characterizing the non-Jewish white population which the convert has presumably joined remains to be ascertained.

Except for those women within ten years of the end of the childbearing period, whose below-replacement fertility levels are consistent with expectations for completed fertility, women generally expected to have more than

two children. However, in only a few age/identity categories did the expected averages exceed replacement level. These data on expectations, therefore, provide no strong evidence of a major upswing in Jewish fertility. Among all Jewish women under age 45 at the time of the survey, the average completed fertility would be only 1.9 children even if expectations were fully realized, and this would vary between the narrow range of 1.8 and 2.1 for the three categories of core Jews, with secular Jews having the lowest average and Jews by choice the highest. With an average just above 2.1, converts out of Judaism expect only slightly more children than those choosing Judaism.

The overall prospects for Jewish fertility, based on the results of NJPS-1990, therefore apppear to differ minimally from those based on NJPS-1970/71 and intervening surveys. For the immediate future and most likely for the longer run as well, birth levels among Jews seem likely to operate at below-replacement levels or at best to hover at about replacement. Coupled with the higher than average death rates that are associated with an aging population, natural increase is likely to be low or even negative. If intermarriage continues high, with low levels of conversion into Judaism and high percentages of children in mixed marriages being reared as non-Jews, there seems little prospect that the total core Jewish population of the United States will rise above the 5.5 million estimated on the basis of NJPS-1990. If anything, in the absence of strong reversals in fertility and/or intermarriage or large upsurges in immigration, the chances are more likely that the core population will decline toward 5.0 million and possibly even below it in the early decades of the 21st century. All this remains speculative, and different scenarios can be developed based on the assumptions one is willing to adopt.

Intermarriage

Interest in the levels and impact of intermarriage of Jews has a long history. Initially, it was viewed not so much as a potential threat to the demographic maintenance of American Jewry but as an index of the loss of Jewish identification and the weakening of the social and religious cohesiveness of the community. Increasingly, however, concern has focused on the effect of intermarriage on the future size of the Jewish population, especially at a time when fertility is at or even below replacement levels. This concern became particularly acute after the popularization of the concept of the "vanishing American Jew" in the 1960s, based on evidence from community studies of increasing rates of intermarriage with greater distance from immigrant origins.[66]

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[66]Erich Rosenthal, "Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States," AJYB 1963, vol. 64, pp. 3–53.

The 1957 Bureau of the Census sample survey provided the first national set of estimates of Jewish intermarriage.[67] It found that 3.8 percent of married persons reporting themselves as Jewish were married to non-Jews, and that at least 7.2 percent of all marriages in which one partner was Jewish were mixed marriages. Both these statistics are probably low since no information was collected on the earlier religion of marriage partners; couples with one converted spouse were not separately identified, so that it was not possible to ascertain the rate of conversion either into or out of Judaism.

NJPS-1970/71 provided the first nationwide set of comprehensive data on Jewish intermarriage patterns since it also ascertained the religious identity of the marriage partners before marriage.[68] Of all Jewish persons married at the time of the survey, 8.1 percent were married to a person not born Jewish. Although this level was higher than the 1957 finding, in itself it was not considered unusually high. What shocked the community was the reported rise in the level of intermarriage from less than 2 percent of those individuals who had married before 1925, to about 6 percent of those marrying between 1940 and 1960, to 12 percent of the 1960–64 marriage cohort, to a high of 29 percent of all Jews marrying in the five years preceding the survey. While such a finding was not inconsistent with earlier evidence, the magnitude of the rate, the fact that it reflected a national pattern, and projections that the rate would rise still higher aroused the community to new concerns about its demographic survival.[69]

The impact of intermarriage on demographic growth may largely be determined by the extent of conversion to Judaism of the non-Jewish partner and by the extent to which the children of interfaith marriages are raised as Jews. NJPS-1970/71 found that in 23 percent of the intermarriages in which the husband was originally Jewish, the wife converted; among those couples in which the wife was originally Jewish, only 4.0 percent of the husbands converted. Of the non-Jewish partners in intermarriages, a very substantial percentage identified themselves as Jews even though they had not undergone official conversion to Judaism, i.e., they were functioning as Jews by choice. This was true of 46 percent of the non-Jewish wives and 44 percent of the non-Jewish husbands. Moreover, the study found that 63 percent of the children of Jewish fathers and 98 percent of those of Jewish mothers were being raised as Jews.[70]

The combined findings with respect to conversion, self-identity of the non-Jewish spouse, and children being raised as Jews (even if not always

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[67]Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials Among Religious Groups."

[68]Massarik and Chenkin, "U.S. National Jewish Population Survey"; Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."

[69]Elihu Bergman, "The American Jewish Population Erosion," *Midstream*, Oct. 1977, p. 9.

[70]Massarik and Chenkin, "U.S. National Jewish Population Survey."

halakhically Jewish) meliorated the concerns raised by the high rates of intermarriage. Yet, it was also recognized that the study may have underestimated the levels of intermarriage and overestimated the gains to Judaism through conversion and identification because of inadequate representation of areas containing very low levels of Jewish concentration and of those Jews who had converted out of Judaism. The more encompassing design of NJPS-1990 was intended to correct the defects of NJPS-1970/71 in coverage of more marginal Jews and those who had converted out of Judaism. To the extent that it succeeded, the data obtained on intermarriage should be more accurate than were those for 1970/71.

NJPS-1990 estimated that 2.6 million adults were born Jewish and were married at the time of the survey.[71] Of this number, 69 percent were married to someone also born Jewish and 4 percent were married to a person not born Jewish who had chosen to be Jewish either through conversion or through self-identification. Of the Jews by choice, about 70 percent had converted. The remainder of the born Jews were married to Gentiles, including the 6 percent of born Jews who converted to another religion. Compared to the findings of NJPS-1970/71, therefore, these data point to a very substantial rise in the level of intermarriage, from 8 percent in 1970/71 to 31 percent of all born Jews.

That this higher level reflects a continuation of the trend suggested by the cohort data of the 1970/71 study is evidenced in the statistics by marriage cohort.[72] Whereas 89 percent of born Jews who married prior to 1965 married another born Jew, only 69 percent of those marrying between 1965 and 1974 did so. This percentage, in turn, declined to only 49 percent for the group marrying between 1975 and 1984, and in the five years preceding the survey, 1985–1990, it reached a low of 43 percent. Of the intermarriages, some involved conversions to Judaism or a choice on the part of the non-Jewish spouses to regard themselves as Jewish even if not formally converted. If all such Jews by choice are counted as Jewish, the percent of Jews marrying other Jews rises to 91 percent among those marrying before 1965, and to 48 percent of those marrying in the most recent period, 1985–1990. The high rate of mixed marriages in 1985–1990 means that for every new

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[71]Intermarriage can be defined in different ways, depending on whether the Jewish identity of the marriage partners is ascertained according to religion at time of birth, at time of courtship, at time of marriage, or at time of the survey. Depending on the definition used, the rate of intermarriage will vary. Consistent with NJPS-1990's goal of encompassing current as well as former Jews, intermarriage is measured in terms of the religious identification of the current marriage partner of anyone who was born Jewish and is now married, irrespective of current Jewish identity.

[72]Egon Mayer, "Jewishness Among the Intermarried: A Record of Lost Continuity or Lost Opportunity?" Paper presented at the Sidney Hollander Colloquium on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, July 1991.

couple consisting of two Jewish partners there were approximately two new couples in which only one of the partners was Jewish. The magnitude of the change that has occurred in the extent of mixed marriages is indicated by the fact that among those marrying before 1965, five times as many Jewish marriages were homogamous as mixed.

The extent of change in intermarriage patterns is further illustrated by the changing levels of conversion to, or choice of Judaism by, the non-Jewish partner. Among those spouses not born Jewish in the pre-1965 marriage cohort, one out of every five chose to be Jewish. In each succeeding cohort, the NJPS-1990 data indicate that the percentage declined, reaching a low of only 9 percent in the 1985–1990 cohort. Of course, these percentages may change in future years as spouses respond to family and community pressures, as they learn more about the religion of the other spouse, and particularly as parents face decisions about the religious training and identification of their children.

One of the major concerns about the demographic implications of high rates of mixed marriages is the Jewish identity of the children of such marriages. The households identified as mixed-married in NJPS-1990, that is, households in which children live with a core Jewish and a non-Jewish parent, contained 664,000 children under 18 years of age. Of these children, only 25 percent were being raised as Jews at the time of the survey; 45 percent were being raised in another religion;[73] and 30 percent were being raised without any religion. Unless a large majority of the latter opt to be identified as Jews when they reach adulthood, most children of mixed marriages will be lost to Judaism; they will be Jews by descent only, either through the maternal or paternal line. These potential losses constitute a major challenge to the Jewish community. Seen in the context of the high rate of mixed marriage that has come to characterize the community, the failure to attract more of these children into the Jewish fold could contribute to declines in the number of Jews in the future. That virtually all of the children of Jews by choice married to born Jews were being raised as Jews points to the importance of increasing the rate at which the non-Jewish partner to a marriage chooses to become Jewish and of strengthening the opportunities that the mixed-married and their children have to develop stronger ties to the Jewish community.[74]

The changing levels of intermarriage and conversion (both formal and informal) reflect a complex set of changes in the American social structure and the position of Jews in this structure, as well as in the attitudes of Jews and non-Jews about intermarriage generally and mixed marriages in particular. The greater freedom in choosing where to be educated, in type and

[73]These included children reported being raised as both Jewish and something else.

[74]Cf. Mayer, "Jewishness Among the Intermarried."

place of employment, in location of residence, and in choice of friends have all contributed to greater freedom in choice of spouse. Associated with such freedom has been the greater freedom extended to both partners to decide whether, upon marriage, to make the couple religiously homogamous or to maintain individual religious identity as well as to decide in what, if any, religion to raise children.

Accompanying the structural changes that have been conducive to more mixed marriages and less conversion have been the sharp changes in attitude among the Jewish population about the acceptance of intermarriage. NJPS-1970/71 asked respondents whether "it is all right for Jews to marry non-Jews." Half maintained that it was not, and most of these disagreed strongly. The question was asked differently in 1990: "Hypothetically, if your child were considering marrying a non-Jewish person, would you: strongly support, support, accept or be neutral, oppose or strongly oppose the marriage?" Among the respondents classified as Jews by religion, only 22 percent reported that they would oppose the marriage, and far fewer of those who were secular Jews, only 4 percent, reported opposition. Indeed, one-third of the Jews by religion and 45 percent of the secular respondents said they would support such a marriage, and about half of each group said they would accept it.

Clearly, a large proportion of the Jewish population has reconciled itself to the possible or actual marriage of their children to non-Jews even though they might prefer Jewish children-in-law. Given this set of attitudes and the growing opportunities for mixed marriages to occur, there seems little likelihood that the trend revealed by both NJPS-1970/71 and NJPS-1990 will reverse itself. At best, it may reach a high level plateau. This means, as Egon Mayer has stressed, that reactive, defensive, preventive measures are not likely to achieve much in the decades ahead.[75] Rather, what he refers to as proactive, culturally, and even politically assertive measures seem more in order, measures which would lead to the strengthening of the weak ties that many intermarried still retain.

JEWISH PRACTICES AND ATTACHMENTS

Denominational Identification

Religious denomination constitutes a major dimension along which the American Jewish community subdivides itself. Denominational divisions are particularly pertinent because of the different attitudes and practices

[75]Ibid., p. 33.

about such issues as intermarriage and conversion, patrilineal descent, and divorce, all of which affect who is to be considered a Jew. Stimulated in part by Rabbi Irving Greenberg's provocative essay questioning whether there will be one Jewish people by the year 2000,[76] a heated debate has ensued on the demographic and religious implications these different practices have for social interaction among Jews, for their survival as one people, and even for survival demographically at a level at which Jews can remain a key segment in the larger American community.

The discussion of the complexity of defining and measuring what constitutes the Jewish population of the United States in this essay touches on these concerns only superficially. Introduction of halakhic issues would add profoundly to the complexity and would alter considerably the categories of Jewish identity used by NJPS-1990. While full discussion of the issues must await other occasions, their significance is clearly relevant to examination of the current denominational composition of the Jewish population and of changes in such identity.

For all respondents, NJPS-1990 asked: "Referring to Jewish religious denominations, do you consider yourself to be Conservative, Orthodox, Reform, Reconstructionist, or something else?" The wide range of responses, in addition to the four specific denominations, reflects the religious heterogeneity of the respondents, including those professing no religion and those reporting themselves as non-Jewish even though born to Jewish parents. A number of secular Jews and even some of the currently non-Jewish respondents indicated that they considered themselves to be identified with one of the major denominations. Whether they were responding in terms of family identity, sympathy with a particular outlook, or on some other basis cannot be ascertained. The fact that they did so testifies to the difficulty and complexity of ascertaining both who is a Jew and what types of Jews there are. The information collected from the respondents and referring to the respondents only has been weighted to reflect the denominational affiliation of all adults. The results may differ some from the actual denominational composition of the total adult population, based on giving individual members in each household the opportunity to answer for themselves.

For the entire adult core Jewish population, the largest single denomination was Reform, with 38 percent of the total (table 19). It was followed closely by Conservative, with 35 percent. Orthodox constituted 6 percent of total adults and Reconstructionist just over 1 percent. Those who indicated a nondenominational category, such as secular, just Jewish, and traditional, made up 10 percent of the total; a residue group of miscellaneous small categories accounted for almost 9 percent.

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[76]Irving Greenberg, "Will There Be One Jewish People by the Year 2000?" *CLAL Perspectives* (New York, National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership, 1986), pp. 1–8.

Not surprisingly, compared to the secular Jews, more of the Jews by religion were in the major denominational groups. Whereas 91 percent of the Jews by religion reported a denominational affiliation, only 25 percent of the secular Jews did so; one-fifth of the latter were in the "just Jewish"/secular category and another 52 percent said they were something else. Jews by choice, on the other hand, more closely resembled the Jews by religion in denominational composition. More of them were Reform; fewer were Conservative, and about the same proportion were Orthodox. That a total of 92 percent of Jews by choice identified denominationally, even though a considerable proportion did not go through formal conversion, suggests the significance of their having made the choice to identify as Jews.

Among those born Jewish and still Jewish by religion, denominational affiliation varies across age groups (table 20). The aged group contains the highest percent of Orthodox and the lowest percent Reform, reflecting its heavier immigrant composition. Twelve percent of all older persons, compared to only 5 percent of those between ages 25 and 64, are Orthodox. By contrast, the percent who are Reform rose from 31 percent of the aged to half of those aged 25–44, and the percentage Conservative declined with lower age to only 33 percent of those aged 25–44. A major realignment in denominational affiliation has occurred with distance from the older, more heavily immigrant or second-generation cohorts. Yet, the data for those aged 18–24 at the time of the survey suggest, as have those for some community studies,[7] that the pattern may be altering again. Among the youngest cohort, almost twice as many were Orthodox (10 percent) as among those aged 25–64, and more were Conservative than at ages 25–44. By contrast, Reform accounted for only 35 percent of the youngest cohort, a level not too far above that of the aged and well below that of the 25–44 age group. Among the 18–24 group, 10 percent identified themselves as "just Jewish"/secular. This percentage is the highest of any age group, possibly pointing to an underlying movement away from denominational identification, even among persons professing to be Jewish by religion. But this group may change once its members marry and settle in a career and a community. Whether the change in denominational identification among the young reflects a basic reversal among the Jews by religion or whether it reflects a shift of the younger Reform raised/educated Jews from the Jews by religion category into the secular category, leaving relatively more of the Jews by religion in the Conservative and Orthodox groups, needs to be researched in depth. In doing so, particular attention needs to be given to the role of Jewish education, both type and amount.

To assess changes in denominational identification, respondents were

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[7]Calvin Goldscheider and Sidney Goldstein, *The Jewish Community of Rhode Island: A Social and Demographic Survey* (Providence, Jewish Federation of Rhode Island, 1988).

asked a parallel question about the denomination in which they were raised. Comparison of this information with that on current identification allows evaluation of changes over the course of the lifetime of the individual respondents. The data point to substantial shifts in the denominational identity of American Jewry.

For the core population, Conservative Judaism constitutes the denomination in which the largest proportion of Jews were raised, one-third (table 21). An additional 26 percent were raised as Reform Jews, and almost as many (23 percent) as Orthodox. Not even 1 percent grew up in the Reconstructionist movement. Just over four out of every five core Jews thus reported being raised in a specific denomination.

Comparison of the data on current denomination with that in which individuals were raised shows that, on balance, the proportion Conservative has hardly changed, remaining close to one-third, although specific individuals so identified may have changed denominations. On the other hand, the percentage of Orthodox declined from 23 percent to only 6 percent, and the proportion of Reform increased from 26 to 38 percent. Reconstructionists rose to 1.3 percent of all core Jews. In total, the percentage of core Jews reporting a denomination declined only slightly, from 83 percent based on denomination raised to 81 percent based on current denomination, suggesting the persistence of denominational identification among Jews despite some tendency toward greater secularism. Seven percent reported being raised as "just-Jewish"/secular and 10 percent reported such an identity at the time of the survey. For both reference periods, about 9 percent classified themselves as something else, but for most of the Jews by choice this was non-Jewish at the time they were growing up.

The dynamics of change in denominational identity can be better measured by comparing the denomination in which born Jewish and currently Jewish individuals were raised and their denomination at the time of the survey (table 22). These data point to much greater movement into the Conservative and Reform groups than into the Orthodox. Whereas 89 percent of all Orthodox respondents reported they were raised Orthodox, only 60 percent of the Conservative adults and 58 percent of the Reform reported their "origins" as being in the same denomination. Of the 11 percent of the Orthodox who were not raised as Orthodox, almost half shifted from Conservative; almost all the others had been secular/"just Jewish." Three-fourths of the 40 percent of Conservatives who were drawn from other denominations came from an Orthodox background; and most of the others were raised Reform. The situation was different for the 41 percent moving into Reform; of all adult Reform Jews, one-fourth came from the Conservative movement and about one in ten had been raised Orthodox. Clearly, most of the considerable shifting among denominations

involved transitions to the denomination most nearly similar to the one in which the individual was raised. A majority of both the Reconstructionist and the "just Jewish" groups were not raised with these identities; most were drawn from the other major denominations, especially the Conservative group.

The absolute effect in numbers of the exchanges among denominations between early socialization and the time of the survey, plus the gains resulting from the addition of Jews by choice, is crudely indicated by the size of the denominations at these two points (not in table). Since adults of varied ages are included, the changes do not cover a specific number of years. On balance, over the lifetime of the respondents, the greatest numerical changes characterized the Orthodox and Reform. The former declined by about 731,000 adherents, or 73 percent, from the one million adults reported raised as Orthodox. The Reform grew by about 533,000 persons, or 46 percent, from the 1.17 million who were raised Reform. Conservative remained virtually stationary, increasing by only about 40,000, or 3 percent, from the 1.53 million who reported themselves as having been raised as Conservative Jews. The small Reconstructionist movement experienced the largest relative growth, just over 200 percent, but this increase involved only about 46,000 adults.

The number not identified with any of the four specific denominations also grew, by 112,000 persons, or 15 percent. While this finding points to some increase in secularization of the core population, the change is not particularly sharp. It is augmented, however, by those who have left Judaism entirely and by the large numbers of Jews by descent who were not raised and are not currently Jewish. On balance, therefore, these data suggest that those still classifiying themselves as Jewish have been shifting away from Orthodoxy toward Reform and secular Jewish identity.

Ritual Practices and Organizational Involvement

The heterogeneity of the population surveyed by NJPS-1990 raises questions about whether the subgroups differ in how they manifest their Jewish or former Jewish identities. Does converting out of Judaism mean cessation of all observance of Jewish ritual practices and other manifestations of Jewish identity or does some retention occur, particularly of practices that provide links to one's Jewish family? For those choosing to be Jewish, how closely do their Jewish observances resemble those of persons raised Jewish, and how much do they continue to observe the practices associated with former religious identification? Do secular Jews differ from those who reported themselves as Jewish by religion? Do secular Jews forego all ritual practice?

The data available from the large number of questions included in NJPS-1990 on ritual practice, organization memberships, philanthropy, ties to Israel, and attitudes toward a range of topics lend themselves to providing some answers to such questions. To do so thoroughly requires an in-depth assessment that is beyond the scope of this overview report. Because only a superficial evaluation, limited to a few behavioral indicators, can be undertaken here, the reader should be aware that some of the conclusions may change when fuller controls for age, denomination, family history, and other key background variables can be introduced into the analysis. The comparisons are suggestive of underlying differences and whet the appetite for fuller understanding of the reasons for the observed patterns and their implications for the future of Jewish life in the United States.

RITUAL PRACTICES

Attention turns first to selected ritual practices (table 23). Most pertain to the household as a whole, though a few questions related specifically to individual behavior are also examined. In our discussion, ritual practices are analyzed along two dimensions: in terms of the respondent's Jewish identity and other characteristics and in terms of household composition (entirely Jewish, mixed Jewish-Gentile, no core Jews). It should be noted that even though, to simplify presentation, the discussion may refer to the practices as if they were performed by the individual, the data for a given household do not necessarily reflect the behavior of the individual responding for that household.

Observance of the Sabbath is at the very heart of Judaism and lighting Sabbath candles is an important aspect of that observance. Of all respondents in the core Jewish group, 62 percent reported that candles were never lit in their households on Friday evening; only 17 percent reported lighting Sabbath candles always or usually. Not surprisingly, almost nine out of ten respondents who were either formerly Jewish or of Jewish descent never lit candles Friday evening; 11 percent did so sometimes, and 2 percent even reported regular lighting of candles. This may involve behavior by someone else in the household who is currently Jewish or may be a vestige of earlier behavior that is done without religious connotation.

Within the core Jewish group, sharp differences exist by type of identity (table 24). Whereas almost one in five of those reporting themselves as Jewish by religion reported Sabbath candles being lit in their household always or usually, and another 23 percent reported sometimes lighting candles, only 11 percent of the secular Jews fell in these two categories; almost nine in ten of the secular Jews indicated that candles were never lit in their households, virtually identical to the non-Jewish respondents. By

contrast, but surprising by its magnitude, 57 percent of the Jews by religion reported never lighting candles. While adhering more closely than the secular Jews to this key element of ritual, still, a majority of Jews by religion do not practice it.

The level of adherence is reported as highest among the Jews by choice. Almost one-third reported Sabbath candle lighting always or usually, and only 32 percent reported never doing so. Evidently, candle lighting has particular symbolic value in households that include a Jew by choice. The significance of this for outreach programs designed to achieve higher levels of religious homogamy in intermarried households needs to be recognized. Fuller understanding of the reasons that lead to such a differential might also prove useful in enhancing ritual practices among other segments of the Jewish population.

Consistent with the differences observed among respondents with different types of Jewish identity, sharp differences characterize household types. One in five of the entirely Jewish households lit Sabbath candles always or usually compared to just under 5 percent of the mixed households and only 1 percent of those with no core Jews as members As important, just over half of the entirely Jewish households reported never doing so. Less surprising, just over 80 percent of the mixed and almost nine out of ten of the non-core households reported no such observance.

The observance of *kashrut* (dietary laws) was also assessed. Since buying kosher meat and other kosher products has become widespread, even among non-Jews, purchase of kosher meat no longer serves as a good index of *kashrut* observance. Keeping separate dishes within the household is a more sensitive index. That it is no longer a common practice is evidenced by the fact that eight of every ten households in the core Jewish population were reported as not using separate dishes for meat and milk products. Only 13 percent did so always/usually. These statistics differed only slightly from those reported by the non-Jewish respondents, among whom 83 percent never used separate dishes, compared to 9 percent who did so always/usually.[78]

Again, the data for the subtypes within the core population point to differences. Fifteen percent of the Jews by religion reported using separate dishes, compared to only 4 percent of the secular Jews. While it is not surprising that 92 percent of the secular Jews did not practice *kashrut*, that 80 percent of the Jews by religion failed to do so points to the high degree of attenuation of this religious tradition. As with candle lighting, Jews by choice reported the highest rate of *kashrut* practice in their households. One in five such households used separate dishes always/usually, and only 59

[78]Some non-Jews misunderstood this question to refer to everyday dishes and those used for special occasions.

percent reported never doing so, a high percentage but well below that of the Jews by religion.

A vast majority of households, including entirely Jewish ones, reported never or only sometimes using separate sets of dishes in observance of *kashrut*. Almost four out of every five entirely Jewish units and about 90 percent of the mixed households were in these nonuse categories. Clearly, this aspect of religious behavior is now practiced by only a small minority of Jewish households, undoubtedly largely concentrated among those regarding themselves as Orthodox.[79]

Observing Passover through attendance at a seder has been one of the most common practices reported in community surveys, reflecting both its religious significance and its role in reinforcing family and community linkages. In contrast to Sabbath candle lighting and observance of *kashrut*, NJPS-1990 reveals a fairly strong continuation of seder attendance. It is, however, not nearly as universal as some community studies have reported. Almost 62 percent of the respondents in the core population reported that their households always/usually attended a seder, and another 19 percent did so sometimes. Yet, one in five indicated they never did so, suggesting that a substantial number of Jews forego this family/religious event. Most persons who are no longer Jewish but are of Jewish descent never attend a seder, but that 10 percent reported doing so always/usually and another 14 percent as sometimes suggests that family ties may lead to continued involvement in observance of Passover through seder participation on the part of these non-Jews.

Within the core group, attendance at a seder is highest for Jews by religion, almost three-fourths of whom reported always or usually participating and another 18 percent doing so sometimes. They were followed closely by Jews by choice. However, only a minority of secular Jews attended a seder at least sometimes (44 percent). Evidently, most secular Jews see little value in even observing the humanistic/cultural aspects of the Passover holiday as manifested in the seder.

Seder attendance, like Sabbath candle lighting and *kashrut*, varies by household composition. Whereas 69 percent of the entirely Jewish households were reported as having someone in the household always or usually attending a seder, only 40 percent of the mixed households and far fewer, 8 percent, of the noncore households did so. By contrast, only 14 percent of the entirely Jewish households were reported as having no one attending a seder, compared to almost four in ten of the mixed households and almost eight in ten of those having no core Jews as members.

Hanukkah, like seder attendance, has been noted as one of the mainstays

[79]Cf. Goldscheider and Goldstein, *Jewish Community of Rhode Island*.

of Jewish religious practice in the United States today, even though the popular importance attached to it is far out of proportion to its significance religiously, being strongly determined by its location in the secular calendar close to Christmas. Over three times as many respondents (60 percent) reported that Hanukkah candles were always/usually lit in their households as reported lighting Sabbath candles. Like attendance at a seder, observance of Hanukkah serves as an important symbol of Jewish identity. Nonetheless, a not insignificant part of the survey population does not light Hanukkah candles. Among the non-Jewish respondents, the extent of observance of Hanukkah closely resembled that of seder attendance and probably for the same reasons.

Among the core population, the observance of Hanukkah by Jews in the various identity-type categories also closely resembles the patterns already discussed for seder attendance. A large majority (70 percent) of Jews by religion always/usually lit Hanukkah candles, and only 17 percent never did so. These were followed closely by the Jews by choice. Only 16 percent of the households of secular respondents always/usually lit candles, and two-thirds never did so. Evidently, the competition of Christmas is not a major stimulus for manifesting one's Jewishness through Hanukkah candle lighting.

Like attendance at seders, lighting of Hanukkah candles is a popular practice in entirely Jewish households; just under two-thirds reported doing so always or usually. By contrast, only four in ten mixed households did so this frequently. Among households with no core Jews in them, lighting Hanukkah candles occurred regularly among only 8 percent.

Because of the increasingly religiously mixed composition of Jewish households, interest has grown in the extent to which non-Jewish practices have been introduced. Full evaluation of this requires far more in-depth analysis than is possible here. Attention to whether the surveyed households had a Christmas tree provides some initial insights.

The evidence is that this non-Jewish practice has penetrated Jewish households to a considerable degree. While 62 percent of the respondents in the core population reported never having a Christmas tree in their household, 28 percent indicated that they did so always/usually, and another 10 percent said sometimes. Whether they regarded the tree as a religious or as a seasonal symbol was not ascertained. That over one-third of the core households sometimes or always/usually had a Christmas tree is largely explained by the fact that about one-third of the households containing at least one core Jew also included at least one person who was not a core Jew, i.e., someone professing another religion. Given such a composition, the high proportion of households having a Christmas tree is more comprehensible. Not surprisingly, nine out of every ten respondents

in the currently non-Jewish group reported having a Christmas tree sometimes, usually, or always.

Some households in each of the Jewish identity categories had a Christmas tree, although the frequency varies. Far fewer of the Jews by religion than of the secular Jews reported having a tree always or usually, and the Jews by choice more closely resembled the Jews by religion. The high proportion of secular Jews having a tree may reflect a high rate of mixed marriage among them. That almost half of the Jews by choice had a Christmas tree suggests that a number continue to observe Christmas in this way even while professing Judaism. This may relate to maintenance of family ties in the same way that a proportion of the Jews who have converted to another religion continue to light Hanukkah candles and to attend a seder. Whether those Jews by choice who have converted to Judaism differ from those who are Jews by choice without conversion with respect to having a tree remains to be determined.

Another perspective for viewing the practice of having a Christmas tree is in terms of household composition. As many as 10 percent of those households composed entirely of Jews reported always or usually having a Christmas tree; two-thirds of the mixed households did so as did about 80 percent of those with no core Jews as members. Given the comparatively high percentage of mixed households that regularly observe Hanukkah, this suggests that many concurrently observe both Hanukkah and Christmas. The data support such an assumption; of the four in ten mixed households that always or usually light Hanukkah candles, two-thirds also always or usually have a Christmas tree. This means that almost 30 percent of all mixed households always or usually have both a Christmas tree and light Hanukkah candles. This finding suggests that mixed religious composition quite often also involves mixed religious practices.

Next to be considered is an individual trait, fasting on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Of the core Jews, 48 percent reported that they personally did so, and 48 percent did not. The remainder could not for health reasons. The high percentage who did not fast reflects the comparatively low level of traditional behavior within the Jewish community. Among the currently non-Jewish population, 12 percent reported fasting, again suggesting that, like candle lighting and *kashrut*, a small number continue to observe the practices with which they became familiar while being raised in a Jewish environment. Alternatively, it may reflect deference to other members of the household who are Jewish.

Consistent with patterns already noted, fasting was far more common among Jews by religion and Jews by choice than among secular Jews. The secular Jews and the currently non-Jewish respondents were virtually identical in proportion fasting. Clearly, this is a practice very largely restricted

to persons identifying themselves as Jewish by religion or choice, although it is not even observed by all the members of these identity groups.

PHILANTHROPY

Still another expression of Jewish identity is represented by charitable donations to Jewish causes. For philanthropy, as for synagogue/temple membership, behavior varied by household composition. Whereas almost two-thirds of the entirely Jewish households contributed to Jewish causes in 1989, only 28 percent of the mixed households and far fewer of the households with no core Jews did so. Interestingly, contributing to Jewish causes on the part of entirely Jewish households ranks high, along with seder attendance and Hanukkah candle lighting, suggesting that philanthropy persists as one of the key channels through which Jewish households express their Jewishness. For mixed households, Jewish philanthropy also ranks higher than such traditional ritual practices as Sabbath candle lighting, but it characterizes only a minority of such households and ranks lower than seder attendance and Hanukkah candle lighting in frequency. We can thus expect that, other things being equal, a growing proportion of mixed households will reduce the aggregate amount of giving to Jewish causes. Contributions to secular charities are much more uniform across all types of households. Two-thirds of both the entirely Jewish and the mixed composition households reported such contributions, as did just over half of the noncore units. This uniformity in secular philanthropy reenforces the significance of the differentials observed for contributions to Jewish causes.

ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

Identity can also express itself through participation in the organized life of the larger community, such as synagogues/temples and Jewish organizations. Respondents were asked whether they or any members of their household belonged to a synagogue or temple. Only one-third of those in the Jewish core population reported such membership. Among those respondents outside the core, only 3 percent did. Within the core group, membership was highest (56 percent) among households in which the respondent was a Jew by choice and virtually nonexistent among secular Jews. Just over one-third of the households represented by a Jew by religion belonged to a synagogue. Not surprisingly, over three times as many households composed entirely of Jews held synagogue membership as did mixed households. Data not shown here indicate that affiliated households are larger than average, suggesting a life-cycle pattern of membership wherein households with children of school age are more likely to be affiliated in order

to enable their children to enroll in programs of Jewish education.[80] Such a relation evidently does not characterize a high proportion of the mixed households. How to attract their Jewish members and especially their children remains a major challenge for the community.

Membership in Jewish organizations other than a synagogue/temple is another way to express one's Jewish identity. Yet 72 percent of the respondents in the core population indicated that they were not members of any Jewish organization, and only 13 percent belonged to two or more groups. Membership in Jewish organizations was even lower among noncore respondents; only 5 percent belonged, and most of these held membership in only one group. Once again, Jews by religion and Jews by choice closely resembled each other. Although about two-thirds of both groups did not belong to any Jewish organization, somewhat more of the Jews by choice were active, reiterating earlier findings that being a Jew by choice is associated with more intense manifestation of Jewishness. In sharp contrast, secular Jews had very low affiliation rates, with only 8 percent belonging to a group.

ISRAEL VISITS

The final indicator examined here is the number of times the respondent had visited Israel. One quarter of the core respondents had been to Israel, 15 percent once and 12 percent twice. Far fewer of the noncore respondents, only 6 percent, had visited Israel. Identifying as a Jew by religion is associated with a higher rate of visiting Israel (31 percent) than is being a secular Jew or a Jew by choice (11 percent each). Aside from differences in degree of identification with Israel, the higher rate among Jews by religion may be partially explained by the popularity of organized trips to Israel for teens, in which they would have been most eligible to participate as members of synagogue/temple youth groups. This is the single index of Jewishness in which the Jews by choice more closely resemble the secular Jews than the Jews by religion and one of the few on which they have the lowest "score," although their ranking is closely shared with the secular Jews.

Overall, what do these indicators tell us about Jewish practices and affiliation in America? First, it must be stressed again that the comparisons undertaken here are superficial, not having taken account of a host of background variables that could affect the outcomes. Such analyses will have to await fuller exploitation of the rich data available in NJPS-1990. Within these limitations, the data seem to point to several conclusions. The

[80]Kosmin et al., *Highlights*, p. 37.

overall level of Jewish identity as manifested in ritual practice, organization membership, and ties to Israel is comparatively low for the core population and much lower still for those of Jewish descent who do not profess to be currently Jewish. It is considerably higher for entirely Jewish households than for households of mixed composition. To the extent that the latter may be a growing group because of increasing numbers of mixed marriages and the very large reservoir of children of such marriages who are not being raised as Jews, levels of nonobservance and nonmembership may rise in the future.

If observance and involvement are important mechanisms for maintaining the strength of individual identity and integration with the larger community, then, even for many core Jews, the reinforcement and the links are weak. It may well be that other mechanisms for maintaining identity and integration are replacing the traditional ones.[81] Some of these, such as social affinity through work and friendship with other Jews, can and will be measured through NJPS-1990 data. Whether they are sufficient to serve as substitutes for traditional practices and more formal involvement with the community remains to be tested.

CONCLUSION

At the heart of the findings of NJPS-1990 is the fluid character of the American Jewish community. The broad net intentionally built into the design of NJPS in its effort to identify all types of Jews in America has shown that we are constituted of different Jewish populations for different purposes, that we need to think of ourselves not so much in total numbers but in terms of who and what we are and whom the community is serving.

We consist of a central core made up of persons identifying themselves as either Jews by religion or as secular Jews, many of whom live in entirely Jewish households. Yet even within this core group wide differences exist in socioeconomic characteristics and Jewish practices. In addition, a substantial number of Jews are married to non-Jews. Still others, because of earlier family histories of intermarriage, qualify as Jewish only by descent, either having been born to a Jewish parent but not raised Jewish or having chosen to adopt another religion as a corollary of intermarriage. Forming the outer ring are Gentiles, who, though never Jewish through parentage or socialization, are members of households composed partially of current or former Jews and in this way may be affected by their exposure to Jewish values and practices and by worldwide events that have relevance for the

[81] Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change*.

Jewish community. In short, there is no one Jewish population in America today. From both a demographic and a planning perspective, how many we are and who we are depends on who we count as in or out, and this depends, in turn, on what our goals are—to identify the basic core, to reach out to those on the margins, to make concerted efforts to attract those still confronting choices as to who they should be.

The differences observed in both socioeconomic composition and behavioral indicators among the different categories of Jews identified by NJPS-1990 seem to justify the distinctions made by the classification system adopted for the analysis. Jews by religion are more traditional and involved in their community; Jews by choice more closely resemble those who are Jews by religion; the secularists operate closer to the margins of traditional behavior. In fact, for most indicators, Jews by choice tend to be the most observant and the most involved. In view of the high rates of intermarriage, this finding suggests that "conversion" of the non-Jewish partner should enhance the Jewish component of family life and possibly even raise the overall level of observance in the community.

Major challenges face the community as a result of the high rates of intermarriage, the persistence of low fertility, the greater dispersal of the population, comparatively high rates of marital instability, the evidence of growing secularism, the loss of the more traditional members through aging and death, and growing Americanization. Yet, there are also signals of potential for continued strength as American Jews continue their efforts to find a meaningful balance between being American and being Jewish.

The demographic base of the Jewish population seems to have reached a plateau and may well decline in future years. Only if the mixed-married and especially their children, as well as the substantial number who are secular, can be retained or brought back into the core and their ties to Judaism and the Jewish people strengthened can our numbers grow. As I have argued before,[82] the potential for continued vitality remains. Stability of numbers, or even declining numbers, need not constitute a fundamental threat to the maintenance of a strong Jewish community and to high levels of identity, although the impact of size is clearly more relevant on the local than national level because of the need for sufficient Jewish population density to allow a vital Jewish communal life. What is most important both nationally and locally is that the community be willing to develop new institutional forms designed to mitigate the negative effects of population decline and dispersal and the growing numbers of mixed households. These must provide increasing opportunities for Jewish self-identification and for greater participation of individuals in organized Jewish life, regardless of

[82]Goldstein, "Jews in the United States."

whether they live in large or small communities or whether they are in entirely Jewish or in mixed households. Jews will surely become increasingly American in the years ahead. The question is whether the Jewish community will enhance the opportunities and means for them to remain Jewish and possibly facilitate a more intensive identification with their Jewishness.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY

Jewish Identity	Number	Percent of Core Jewish Population	Distribution of Total Pop. in Qualified Households
Jews by Religion[a]	4,210,000	76.3	51.4
Secular Jews	1,120,000	20.3	13.7
Jews by Choice	185,000	3.4	2.3
Core Jewish Population	5,515,000	100.0	
Converts Out	210,000		2.6
Jewish Descent/ Other Religion	415,000		5.0
Children under 18 being raised in other religion	700,000		8.5
Gentiles	1,350,000		16.5
Total population	8,190,000		100.0

[a]Includes 100,000 institutionalized and unenumerated persons.

Note: In this and all subsequent tables the following definitions are used: The Core Jewish Population consists of (1) persons born Jewish and identified as being Jewish by religion (Jews by Religion); (2) persons born Jewish reporting no current religious identity (Secular Jews); and (3) those born non-Jews but identified as Jewish by religion—whether converted or not (Jews by Choice). Non-Jewish Household Members include (1) persons born/raised Jewish reporting adherence to another religion (Converts Out); (2) persons with Jewish parent(s) brought up in and reporting other religious identity (Jewish Descent/Other Religion); (3) those born in and reporting another religion (Gentiles); and (4) children under age 18 who have a "qualified Jew" as a parent, i.e., one currently Jewish or of Jewish descent, but who are being raised in a non-Jewish religion.

TABLE 2. THE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970 AND 1990

Population	1970	1990	Percent Change
Total population in Jewish households	5,850,000[a]	8,200,000[b]	+40.2
Total Jews: currently Jewish and Jewish background	5,480,000	6,840,000[c]	+24.8
Total core Jews: currently Jewish religion/identification	5,420,000	5,515,000	+1.8
Number of households with one or more Jews	1,950,000	3,186,000	+63.4
U.S. resident population	203,211,000	248,710,000	+22.4
U.S. households	63,449,000	91,947,000	+44.9
Jews as a percent of U.S. population			
Total population in Jewish HH	2.9	3.3	
Total Jews	2.7	2.7	
Total core Jews	2.7	2.2	
Average household size			
Total households with Jews	3.0	2.6	
Entirely core Jewish households	NA	2.2	
Mixed households	NA	3.2	
Households with no core Jews	NA	2.7	
Total U.S. households	3.1	2.7	

[a]Includes 50,000 institutionalized population.
[b]Includes 100,000 institutionalized and unenumerated population.
[c]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent who are currently not being raised as Jews.

TABLE 3. REGION OF RESIDENCE OF POPULATION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

a. Percent Distribution by Region

Region	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population
Northeast	47.8	30.4	30.4	43.6	21.1
Midwest	10.8	12.7	13.5	11.3	26.1
South	21.7	20.4	27.9	21.6	32.8
West	19.7	36.6	28.2	23.5	20.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	4.10	1.12	0.18	5.40	199.7

Region	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[a]	Gentiles	Total
Northeast	25.2	28.4	36.6	32.3
Midwest	22.6	14.7	13.8	14.9
South	31.0	29.8	23.8	26.9
West	21.2	27.1	25.8	26.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.21	1.12	1.35	2.68

TABLE 3.—*(Continued)*

b. Percent Distribution by Jewish Identity

Region	Core Jewish Population			Non-Jewish Household Members			Total Percent	Total Number (in mill.)
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[a]	Gentiles		
Northeast	60.8	10.6	1.7	1.7	9.8	15.4	100.0	3.22
Midwest	43.9	14.1	2.5	4.8	16.3	18.5	100.0	1.01
South	47.1	12.7	2.7	3.5	17.6	17.0	100.0	1.89
West	41.1	20.8	2.6	2.3	15.5	17.7	100.0	1.96
Total	50.7	13.9	2.3	2.7	13.8	16.7	100.0	8.08

[a]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

Note: On this and subsequent tables, percentages or numbers may not always add to totals, due to rounding.

TABLE 4. METROPOLITAN/NONMETROPOLITAN RESIDENCE[a] OF POPULATION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

a. Distribution by Metro/Nonmetro Residence

Residence	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
Metropolitan	79.1	65.0	58.6	75.4
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	15.2	22.2	26.2	17.0
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	3.5	8.8	10.1	4.9
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	2.2	4.0	5.1	2.7
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Residence	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[b]	Gentiles	Total
Metropolitan	58.2	55.7	64.8	60.4
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	26.1	26.9	21.3	24.0
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	5.6	9.5	8.0	8.5
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	10.1	7.9	5.9	7.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4.—*(Continued)*

b. Distribution by Jewish Identity

Residence	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Number (in millions)
Metropolitan	79.1	18.3	2.6	100.0	3.76
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	67.2	27.7	5.1	100.0	0.85
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	54.6	38.4	7.0	100.0	0.24
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	62.0	31.7	6.3	100.0	0.13
Total	75.4	21.3	3.3	100.0	4.99

Residence	All Household Members: Current Religion Jewish	Secular Jews	Jews by Choice	Non-Jewish Members	Total	Number (in millions)
Metropolitan	56.1	13.0	1.8	29.1	100.0	5.31
Nonmetropolitan 150,000+	39.0	16.0	3.0	42.0	100.0	1.46
Nonmetropolitan 40–150,000	28.8	20.2	3.7	47.3	100.0	0.46
Nonmetropolitan under 40,000	26.4	13.5	2.7	57.4	100.0	0.31
Total	49.8	14.0	2.2	33.9	100.0	7.55

[a]Metropolitan area residents are those who live in a county that lies within a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropolitan areas are persons living in counties that are not in metropolitan areas; the population size refers to the number of residents of the given counties.
[b]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

TABLE 5. FIVE-YEAR MIGRATION STATUS OF ADULTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Migration Status	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total Jews	U.S. White Pop. Mobility 1980–85[a]
Same house	60.5	44.0	52.5	57.1	58.7
Diff. house/ same local area	19.2	24.0	21.2	20.1	21.4
Intrastate	9.4	18.2	13.1	11.2	9.3
Interstate	10.0	12.4	10.8	10.5	8.7
International	0.9	1.4	2.5	1.1	1.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	3.16	0.76	0.17	4.09	171.37

Migration Status	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total Non-Jews
Same house	61.1	48.3	46.2	48.3
Diff. house/ same local area	22.2	27.8	24.2	24.8
Intrastate	11.4	9.9	15.1	13.6
Interstate	4.6	13.5	13.2	12.3
International	0.7	0.5	1.3	1.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.20	0.41	1.28	1.89

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1987.

TABLE 6. LIFETIME MIGRATION STATUS OF ADULTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Migration Status	Core Jewish Population			
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total Jews
Same house	2.0	2.6	2.3	2.1
Diff. house/ same local area	18.3	14.0	10.7	17.2
Intrastate	24.8	22.2	22.7	24.2
Interstate	44.0	51.8	58.4	46.1
International	10.9	9.4	6.0	10.4
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	3.18	0.77	0.17	4.12

Migration Status	Non-Jewish Household Members			
	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total Non-Jews
Same house	0.5	3.3	2.9	2.7
Diff. house/ same local area	19.7	10.6	13.8	13.7
Intrastate	30.1	32.8	29.5	30.2
Interstate	41.7	44.9	44.3	44.2
International	8.0	8.4	9.5	9.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.20	0.41	1.29	1.90

TABLE 7. FIVE-YEAR MIGRATION STATUS OF CORE JEWISH ADULTS, BY AGE (PERCENT)

Migration Status	Age Group				
	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–64	65 & Over
Same house	54.3	21.0	48.6	73.1	82.7
Diff. house/ same local area	17.3	33.0	26.9	14.3	9.1
Intrastate	16.5	21.3	12.8	5.7	3.9
Interstate	11.5	22.1	10.4	6.2	4.1
International	0.3	2.6	1.4	0.7	0.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.42	0.84	0.92	1.02	0.90

TABLE 8. REGION OF 1990 RESIDENCE, BY REGION OF BIRTH AND INTERREGIONAL LIFETIME MIGRATION, U.S.-BORN POPULATION, CORE JEWS AND NON-JEWISH HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

Region of Birth	Region of Residence				Total	Distribution by Region of Birth
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West		
			Core Jewish Population			
			Percent Distribution of Total Population			
Northeast	69.7	2.9	17.2	10.2	100.0	
Midwest	6.9	57.6	13.3	22.2	100.0	
South	11.5	4.0	76.8	7.7	100.0	
West	5.9	1.8	5.4	86.9	100.0	
			Percent Distribution of Outmigrants			
Northeast	—	9.7	56.7	33.6	100.0	59.9
Midwest	16.2	—	31.4	52.4	100.0	24.0
South	49.5	17.2	—	33.3	100.0	9.6
West	45.3	13.6	41.1	—	100.0	6.5
Total	11.6	8.4	44.2	35.8		100.0

TABLE 8.—*(Continued)*

Region of Birth	Region of Residence				Total	Distribution by Region of Birth
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West		
			Interregional Lifetime Migration			
Total inmigration	+161,930	+116,970	+618,330	+501,860		
Total outmigration	−838,500	−335,860	−133,570	−91,160		
Net migration	−676,570	−218,890	+484,760	+410,700		
Northeast	—	+27,040	+409,310	+240,220		
Midwest	−27,040	—	+82,440	+163,490		
South	−409,310	−82,440	—	+6,990		
West	−240,220	−163,490	−6,990	—		
			Non-Jewish Household Members			
			Percent Distribution of Total Population			
Northeast	76.1	3.7	15.2	5.0	100.0	
Midwest	7.3	57.2	15.5	19.9	100.0	
South	7.6	8.8	71.7	12.0	100.0	
West	4.1	3.0	6.8	86.1	100.0	
			Percent Distribution of Outmigrants			
Northeast	—	15.3	63.7	21.0	100.0	32.7
Midwest	17.1	—	36.4	46.5	100.0	32.2
South	26.7	31.1	—	42.2	100.0	24.7
West	29.6	21.5	48.9	—	100.0	10.4
Total	15.2	14.9	37.6	32.3		100.0

TABLE 8.—*(Continued)*

Region of Birth	Region of Residence				Total	Distribution by Region of Birth
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West		
			Interregional Lifetime Migration			
Total inmigration	+99,070	+97,630	+245,840	+211,010		
Total outmigration	−213,970	−210,220	−161,660	−67,700		
Net migration	−114,900	−112,590	+84,180	+143,310		
Northeast	—	−3,150	+93,160	+24,890		
Midwest	+3,150	—	+26,110	+83,330		
South	−93,160	−26,110	—	+35,090		
West	−24,890	−83,330	−35,090	—		

TABLE 9. AGE COMPOSITION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Current Age	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population
0–14	18.3	23.9	4.5	19.0	20.7
15–24	9.5	16.3	7.3	10.9	14.2
25–34	15.0	19.9	18.0	16.1	17.6
35–44	16.8	17.0	33.1	17.4	14.9
45–64	20.0	16.2	26.9	19.5	19.3
65 & over	20.4	6.6	10.2	17.2	13.3
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median age	39.3	29.9	41.1	37.3	33.6

Current Age	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[a]	Gentiles	Total
0–14	—	55.7	—	23.2
15–24	8.6	11.5	16.1	13.6
25–34	19.3	9.6	28.3	19.8
35–44	28.8	11.0	26.2	20.1
45–64	31.8	7.4	21.6	16.5
65 & over	11.7	4.7	7.8	6.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median age	42.7	13.5	37.1	31.7

[a]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

TABLE 10. SEX RATIOS[a], BY AGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY

Age Group	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population
0–14	113.3	87.1	118.8	106.2	105.4
15–24	105.7	95.5	40.9	100.4	102.8
25–44	99.4	113.4	41.3	98.1	101.0
45–64	99.5	96.2	32.1	94.3	93.8
65 & over	91.0	140.0	342.6	96.5	68.9
Total	100.6	102.2	52.6	98.8	95.8

Age Group	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.[c]	Gentiles	Total
0–14	[b]	112.7	—	112.7
15–24	176.8	110.4	84.6	96.4
25–44	68.6	81.4	100.6	92.7
45–64	39.3	60.4	114.6	87.3
65 & over	60.7	48.2	140.0	91.8
Total	62.2	96.6	103.1	96.5

[a]Number of males per 100 females.
[b]All females.
[c]Includes 700,000 children under age 18 of Jewish descent being raised in another religion.

TABLE 11. GENERATION STATUS: PERCENT OF GRANDPARENTS BORN IN U.S., BY AGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY, AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF U.S.-BORN GRANDPARENTS

a. Percent U.S.-Born Grandparents

	Core Jewish Population							
	By Religion		Secular		By Choice		Total	
Age Group	None	All	None	All	None	All	None	All
18–24	27.1	33.7	12.7	51.0	—	59.6	22.5	39.1
25–44	53.5	12.8	25.3	31.6	18.8	38.6	45.6	18.2
45–64	85.0	3.7	62.0	17.0	27.9	48.2	78.4	8.1
65 & over	95.8	1.1	88.7	4.2	41.7	33.4	94.3	2.0
All ages	70.0	9.3	38.3	28.4	22.6	42.3	12.5	14.1

	Non-Jewish Household Members							
	Converts Out		Jewish Descent/ Other Religion		Gentiles		Total	
Age Group	None	All	None	All	None	All	None	All
18–24	27.4	62.8	7.5	44.5	17.4	57.3	16.3	55.3
25–44	22.4	34.2	21.4	45.9	28.5	51.4	26.2	48.3
45–64	35.1	17.7	21.3	37.4	48.9	37.8	40.7	34.8
65 & over	51.7	33.4	20.3	62.0	55.4	40.0	44.2	45.6
All ages	30.0	32.4	19.6	45.8	33.0	48.7	29.5	46.2

TABLE 11.—(*Continued*)

b. Average Number of U.S.-Born Grandparents

Age Group	Core Jewish Population: By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
18–24	2.16	2.87	3.52	2.39
25–44	1.12	2.08	2.37	1.39
45–64	0.34	1.05	2.44	0.56
65 & over	0.89	0.31	2.08	0.14
All ages	0.75	1.78	2.44	1.00

Age Group	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
18–24	2.71	2.93	2.83	2.84
25–44	2.09	2.49	2.46	2.43
45–64	1.66	2.28	1.80	1.89
65 & over	1.63	2.75	1.72	2.02
All ages	1.98	2.52	2.33	2.33

TABLE 12A. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, BY JEWISH IDENTITY, ALL ADULTS AGE 25 AND OVER (PERCENT)

	Core Jewish Population				
Education	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population[a]
High school or less	28.5	25.1	21.9	27.7	62.2
Some college	18.7	21.5	20.3	19.3	17.3
College completed	26.8	25.0	29.6	26.7	11.8
Graduate studies	25.9	28.4	28.2	26.4	8.7
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	2.67	0.56	0.13	3.36	129.17

	Non-Jewish Household Members			
Education	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
High school or less	42.7	48.8	44.5	45.2
Some college	29.6	22.2	17.6	20.0
College completed	15.3	15.1	23.8	20.9
Graduate studies	12.4	13.9	14.1	13.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.17	0.32	1.00	1.46

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 1988, table 2.

TABLE 12B. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, BY JEWISH IDENTITY, ALL ADULTS AGES 30–39 (PERCENT)

	Core Jewish Population				
Education	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Population[a]
High school or less	12.6	19.9	10.2	14.0	50.8
Some college	16.7	29.3	29.4	20.0	21.8
College completed	34.5	26.1	32.3	32.7	16.2
Graduate studies	36.2	24.7	28.0	33.4	11.2
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.59	0.16	0.05	0.81	33.60

	Non-Jewish Household Members			
Education	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
High school or less	27.6	33.7	32.3	32.1
Some college	33.6	30.3	22.3	25.3
College completed	20.3	21.8	26.7	24.9
Graduate studies	18.4	14.2	18.7	17.7
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.06	0.10	0.33	0.49

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 1988, table 2.

TABLE 13. EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, BY JEWISH IDENTITY, MEN AND WOMEN AGES 30–39 (PERCENT)

	Core Jewish Population				Non-Jewish Household Members				
Education	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Religion	Gentiles	Total	Total U.S. White Pop.[a]
					Males				
High school or less	12.4	16.6	10.6	13.2	18.4	36.9	38.2	35.9	47.9
Some college	14.5	26.2	32.2	17.8	22.6	23.1	20.5	21.2	21.5
College completed	33.2	26.5	32.0	31.7	44.8	23.0	27.3	28.3	17.5
Graduate studies	39.9	30.7	25.2	37.3	14.2	17.0	14.0	14.6	13.1
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in thousands)	296	83	18	397	24	43	161	228	16,841
					Females				
High school or less	12.8	23.3	10.0	14.7	34.5	31.5	26.9	28.9	53.8
Some college	18.9	32.4	27.7	22.2	41.7	35.5	24.0	28.7	22.0
College completed	35.8	25.8	32.6	33.6	2.3	20.9	26.1	22.0	14.9
Graduate studies	32.5	18.5	29.7	29.5	21.5	12.1	23.0	20.4	9.3
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in thousands)	297	80	31	408	32	59	173	264	16,760

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 1988, table 2.

TABLE 14. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, BY JEWISH IDENTITY AND SEX, POPULATION AGE 18 AND OLDER (PERCENT)

Occupation	Core Jewish Population				U.S. White Population[a]
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	
			Males		
Professionals	38.8	40.1	36.7	39.0	15.8
Managers	17.8	11.8	20.2	16.7	14.3
Clerical/sales	25.7	20.5	15.5	24.4	17.5
Crafts	7.6	11.7	11.1	8.5	19.8
Operatives	5.3	9.8	11.6	6.4	19.6
Service	4.7	6.1	4.9	5.0	8.9
Agriculture	—	—	—	—	4.2
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	1.47	0.37	0.05	1.89	55.78
			Females		
Professionals	34.7	39.8	43.6	36.1	15.2
Managers	13.4	9.6	18.0	13.0	16.0
Clerical/sales	42.9	37.5	27.5	41.1	41.3
Crafts	1.7	2.0	1.3	1.8	2.2
Operatives	1.4	4.1	1.1	1.8	7.8
Service	5.8	7.1	8.5	6.2	16.5
Agriculture	—	—	—	—	0.9
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	1.51	0.36	0.11	1.98	45.73

TABLE 14.—*(Continued)*

Occupation	Non-Jewish Household Members: Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total Non-Jews
		Males		
Professionals	20.2	31.9	27.3	27.5
Managers	9.5	10.4	13.2	12.3
Clerical/sales	12.5	20.5	15.6	16.2
Crafts	22.2	20.8	15.8	17.3
Operatives	18.1	9.7	16.4	15.3
Service	14.3	6.7	10.9	10.4
Agriculture	3.1	—	0.9	1.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.08	0.16	0.62	0.85
		Females		
Professionals	21.2	22.7	31.7	28.2
Managers	17.0	11.7	12.2	12.7
Clerical/sales	37.2	35.8	30.7	32.8
Crafts	2.8	1.3	5.1	3.9
Operatives	10.2	15.3	4.4	7.7
Service	11.6	13.3	16.0	14.8
Agriculture	—	—	—	—
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number (in millions)	0.12	0.23	0.59	0.93

[a]*Source:* U.S. Department of Labor, Jan. 1991, table 823.

TABLE 15. MARITAL STATUS OF THE ADULT CORE JEWISH POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX; AND PERCENT NEVER MARRIED BY JEWISH IDENTITY

Age	Marital Status: Never Married	Married	Divorced/ Separated	Widowed	Total	U.S. White Pop. Percent Never Married[a]
			Core Jewish Males			
18–24	96.2	2.8	1.0	—	100.0	83.0
25–34	49.5	46.5	4.0	—	100.0	33.7
35–44	17.4	72.5	9.2	0.9	100.0	11.7
45–64	7.4	80.8	9.4	2.4	100.0	5.3
65 & over	3.1	82.1	3.4	11.3	100.0	4.0
All ages	26.4	64.2	6.1	3.3	100.0	24.1
U.S. white	24.1	66.2	7.2	2.6	100.0	
			Core Jewish Females			
18–24	85.4	11.7	2.9	—	100.0	68.2
25–34	31.2	60.9	7.2	0.8	100.0	20.4
35–44	11.4	74.3	13.8	0.5	100.0	7.2
45–64	4.5	72.9	14.9	7.7	100.0	4.0
65 & over	1.6	56.7	4.0	37.7	100.0	4.9
All ages	19.6	63.7	9.6	7.1	100.0	16.9
U.S. White	16.9	61.9	9.0	12.2	100.0	

Age	Percent Never Married: Core Jewish Males — By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Core Jewish Females — By Religion	Secular	By Choice
18–24	97.3	93.6	100.0	89.9	74.4	42.0
25–34	51.0	47.0	19.4	31.4	32.8	22.1
35–44	17.6	16.8	17.4	11.4	11.5	11.1
45–64	7.3	8.9	—	4.5	6.6	—
65 & over	3.2	3.8	—	1.7	—	—
All ages	24.8	34.4	13.7	17.9	27.4	15.4

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, May 1991, table 1.

TABLE 16. AVERAGE AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE BY CURRENT AGE, SEX, AND JEWISH IDENTITY, POPULATION AGE 18 AND OVER

Age	Core Jewish Population			
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
		Males		
18–24	19.7	21.4	—	20.6
25–34	25.6	24.3	24.9	25.2
35–44	26.3	25.3	24.5	26.0
45–64	25.9	25.4	26.4	25.8
65 & over	27.0	25.5	25.0	26.8
All ages	26.3	25.0	25.2	26.0
		Females		
18–24	20.5	20.3	—	20.4
25–34	23.0	23.1	23.6	23.1
35–44	24.4	23.7	23.2	24.2
45–64	21.9	21.8	24.3	22.0
65 & over	24.3	22.4	25.0	24.2
All ages	23.4	22.6	23.8	23.3

TABLE 16.—*(Continued)*

Age	Non-Jewish Household Members			
	Converts Out	Jewish Descent/ Other Rel.	Gentiles	Total
		Males		
18–24	21.0	21.1	20.9	20.9
25–34	22.5	22.5	24.2	23.8
35–44	26.7	25.0	26.9	26.4
45–64	25.4	23.7	25.4	25.1
65 & over	25.4	24.7	31.0	28.6
All ages	25.0	24.0	25.9	25.4
		Females		
18–24	17.8	19.6	18.6	18.8
25–34	20.6	21.5	23.8	22.9
35–44	21.8	22.6	24.1	23.4
45–64	19.8	20.7	23.6	21.9
65 & over	21.3	21.4	21.3	21.3
All ages	20.6	21.5	23.4	22.5

TABLE 17. NUMBER OF MARRIAGES, BY AGE, SEX, AND JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Age	Number of Marriages (Males) 1	2	3+	Total Percent	Number of Marriages (Females) 1	2	3+	Total Percent
Total Core Jewish Population								
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	97.6	2.4	—	100.0	92.6	6.5	0.9	100.0
35–44	81.5	16.4	2.1	100.0	82.5	14.8	2.7	100.0
45–64	78.5	20.1	1.4	100.0	84.3	13.9	1.7	100.0
65 & over	83.0	11.6	5.4	100.0	90.1	8.9	1.0	100.0
Total	83.5	14.0	2.5	100.0	87.2	11.2	1.6	100.0
Jews by Religion								
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	98.0	2.0	—	100.0	92.1	6.5	1.4	100.0
35–44	85.8	13.7	0.5	100.0	85.6	12.4	2.0	100.0
45–64	83.0	15.2	1.8	100.0	84.5	13.8	1.7	100.0
65 & over	83.9	10.9	5.2	100.0	89.5	9.6	1.0	100.0
Total	86.0	11.7	2.4	100.0	87.7	10.8	1.5	100.0
Secular Jews								
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	96.6	3.4	—	100.0	92.8	7.2	—	100.0
35–44	68.7	24.6	6.7	100.0	69.2	26.5	4.5	100.0
45–64	63.2	36.8	—	100.0	82.1	15.2	2.6	100.0
65 & over	84.3	6.7	9.0	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
Total	76.3	20.0	3.6	100.0	84.6	13.5	1.9	100.0

TABLE 17.—*(Continued)*

Age	Number of Marriages			Total Percent	Number of Marriages			Total Percent
	1	2	3+		1	2	3+	
	Males				Females			
	Jews by Choice							
18–24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
25–34	100.0	—	—	100.0	96.2	3.8	—	100.0
35–44	80.5	17.3	2.2	100.0	31.3	11.9	5.7	100.0
45–64	30.9	69.1	—	100.0	87.5	12.5	—	100.0
65 & over	54.8	45.2	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
Total	61.8	37.4	0.8	100.0	88.3	9.8	1.9	100.0
	Total Non-Jewish Household Members							
18–24	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—	—	100.0
25–34	89.9	10.1	—	100.0	88.6	11.0	0.3	100.0
35–44	76.4	17.2	6.4	100.0	76.4	19.2	4.5	100.0
45–64	75.5	19.4	5.1	100.0	72.4	21.3	6.3	100.0
65 & over	84.1	10.1	5.8	100.0	63.5	32.9	3.5	100.0
Total	81.6	14.4	4.1	100.0	79.1	17.5	3.5	100.0

TABLE 18. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN PER WOMAN, BY AGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY

	Core Jewish Population				
Age	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total	Total U.S. White Women[a]
15–19	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
20–24	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4
25–29	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.5	1.0
30–34	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.1	1.5
35–39	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.9
40–44	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.6	2.1
45–49	1.9	1.7	2.3	1.9	2.3
50–54	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.8
55–59	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.6	3.0
60–64	2.2	2.1	1.4	2.2	2.9
65 & over	2.0	1.8	2.8	2.0	2.4
Total	1.6	1.2	1.7	1.5	

	Non-Jewish Household Members			
Age	Was Jewish	Jewish Descent/ Other Religion	Gentiles	Total
15–19	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
20–24	1.2	0.3	0.2	0.3
25–29	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.8
30–34	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.3
35–39	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.6
40–44	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.7
45–49	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.3
50–54	2.2	3.3	2.4	2.5
55–59	3.0	5.0	2.5	2.8
60–64	2.1	2.8	3.9	3.2
65 & over	2.4	2.6	3.1	2.7
Total	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.6

[a]*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, May 1989, table 1; U.S. Bureau of the Census, March 1984, table 270.

TABLE 19. CURRENT DENOMINATION OF CORE JEWISH ADULT RESPONDENTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Current Denomination	Jewish Identity			
	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
Orthodox	7.0	0.8	7.9	6.1
Conservative	39.6	13.0	32.4	35.1
Reform	42.7	11.3	51.3	38.0
Reconstructionist	1.5	0.9	0.6	1.3
Just Jewish	8.0	21.7	5.7	10.1
Something else	1.1	52.4	2.1	9.4
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 20. CURRENT DENOMINATION OF ADULT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE JEWS BY RELIGION, BY AGE (PERCENT)

Current Denomination	Age			
	18–24	25–44	45–64	65 & over
Orthodox	9.7	5.2	4.8	11.8
Conservative	43.1	32.6	42.4	48.6
Reform	34.8	50.6	42.6	31.2
Reconstructionist	1.1	1.6	2.7	0.2
Just Jewish	10.3	8.0	7.2	7.8
Something else	1.0	2.0	0.3	0.5
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 21. DENOMINATION RAISED OF CORE JEWISH ADULT RESPONDENTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Denomination Raised	By Religion	Secular	By Choice	Total
Orthodox	26.6	6.9	2.5	22.5
Conservative	38.0	21.7	7.8	34.3
Reform	28.4	21.5	1.4	26.3
Reconstructionist	0.4	0.1	—	0.3
Just Jewish	5.6	16.2	7.5	7.4
Something else	0.7	33.6	80.8	9.3
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 22. CURRENT DENOMINATION OF RESPONDENTS WHO WERE BORN JEWS, BY DENOMINATION RAISED (PERCENT)

	Current Denomination				
Denomination Raised	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Reconstructionist	Just Jewish
Orthodox	89.1	32.4	11.7	17.1	15.5
Conservative	4.8	60.1	25.9	44.4	18.4
Reform	0.4	4.2	58.6	13.9	14.5
Reconstructionist	—	—	0.3	17.2	—
Just Jewish	5.0	1.5	2.4	5.5	46.7
Non-Jewish	0.7	1.7	1.0	1.9	5.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 23. JEWISH RITUAL PRACTICES AND ATTACHMENTS OF ADULT RESPONDENTS, CORE JEWS AND NON-JEWS (PERCENT)

Practices	Always/ Usually	Sometimes	Never	Total Percent
		Core Jews		
Sabbath candles	16.9	20.9	62.2	100.0
Attend seder	61.7	18.5	19.8	100.0
Separate dishes	13.0	4.8	81.4	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	59.7	14.4	25.9	100.0
Christmas tree	27.6	10.1	62.3	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				48.5
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				28.2
Percent who have been to Israel				26.2
Percent who are synagogue members				32.9
		Non-Jews		
Sabbath candles	1.6	10.7	87.7	100.0
Attend seder	10.3	13.9	75.8	100.0
Separate dishes	9.8	7.5	82.7	100.0
Hanukkah candles	9.4	10.7	79.9	100.0
Christmas tree	81.8	8.1	10.1	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				11.6
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				5.1
Percent who have been to Israel				5.5
Percent who are synagogue members				3.2

[a]Includes 0.8 percent who are vegetarians.

TABLE 24. JEWISH RITUAL PRACTICES AND ATTACHMENTS OF CORE JEWISH ADULT RESPONDENTS, BY JEWISH IDENTITY (PERCENT)

Practices	Always/ Usually	Sometimes	Never	Total Percent
		Jews by Religion		
Sabbath candles	19.4	23.3	57.3	100.0
Attend seder	71.4	17.6	11.0	100.0
Separate dishes	14.7	4.4	80.1	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	70.2	13.2	16.6	100.0
Christmas tree	20.7	7.2	72.1	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				57.8
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				32.8
Percent who have been to Israel				30.8
Percent who are synagogue members				38.5
		Secular Jews		
Sabbath candles	3.1	8.4	88.5	100.0
Attend seder	22.1	21.5	56.4	100.0
Separate dishes	4.3	3.2	91.5	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	15.9	17.9	66.1	100.0
Christmas tree	55.9	19.5	24.6	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				10.3
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				7.8
Percent who have been to Israel				10.9
Percent who are synagogue members				5.6
		Jews by Choice		
Sabbath candles	32.9	35.2	31.8	100.0
Attend seder	63.9	20.7	15.4	100.0
Separate dishes	19.4	20.1	59.4	100.0[a]
Hanukkah candles	64.5	21.3	14.1	100.0
Christmas tree	27.3	21.6	51.1	100.0
Percent who fast on Yom Kippur				71.5
Percent belonging to one or more Jewish organizations				38.1
Percent who have been to Israel				11.4
Percent who are synagogue members				55.5

[a]Includes small percentage who are vegetarians.