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Sergio DellaPergola
The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem

Edited by

Arnold Dashefsky
University of Connecticut

Sergio DellaPergola
The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem

Ira Sheskin
University of Miami

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Center for
Judaic Studies
and Contemporary
Jewish Life

DataBank Staff:

Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Director

Ron Miller, Senior Research Consultant

Arnold Dashefsky, Director Emeritus and
Senior Academic Consultant

Graphic Designer:

Carla Willey

Berman Jewish DataBank
The Jewish Federations of North America
Wall Street Station
PO Box 157
New York, NY 10268

Web: www.jewishdatabank.org

Email: info@jewishdatabank.org

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Sergio DellaPergola

The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Jerusalem, Israel

sergioa@huji.ac.il

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The American Jewish Year Book 2019

The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899

This Report derives from Chapter 8 of the *American Jewish Year Book, 2019*.

The *American Jewish Year Book* is "The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899." This volume is a very important and prestigious annual publication because it has acted as a major resource for academic researchers, researchers at Jewish institutions and organizations, practitioners at Jewish institutions and organizations, the media, both Jewish and secular, educated leaders and lay persons, and libraries, particularly University and Jewish libraries, for up-to-date information about the American and Canadian Jewish communities. For decades, the *American Jewish Year Book* has been the premiere place for leading academics to publish long review chapters on topics of interest to the American Jewish community.

Obtaining *The American Jewish Year Book, 2019*

Hard bound and Kindle copies are available at www.amazon.com. Persons with access to University libraries that offer Springer's eBook Collection can obtain a soft cover copy or an electronic copy. In addition, copies at a special bulk discount are available at www.contemporaryjewry.org in December of each year.

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For more information about the American Jewish Year Book:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_jewish_year_book
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World Jewish Population, 2019

Sergio DellaPergola

The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Jerusalem, Israel

sergioa@huji.ac.il

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WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2019

At the beginning of 2019, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 14,707,400—an increase of 100,900 (0.69%) over the 2018 revised estimate of 14,606,500 (DellaPergola 2019a). The world's total population increased by 1.11% in 2018 (Population Reference Bureau 2019). The rate of increase of world Jewry hence amounted to 62% of that of the total population.

Section 1 Assessing Jewish Population¹

Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in the rest of the world (the *Diaspora*)—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2019. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core* Jewish population concept addresses a human collective whose identification is mutually exclusive with respect to other subpopulations, while acknowledging that the number of persons who carry multiple cultural and religious identities tends to increase in contemporary societies (Josselson and Harway 2012). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews from 11 million to 12 million after the tragic human losses of World War II and the *Shoah* (Holocaust) (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 2000), 40 more years were needed to add another million from 12 million to 13 million. From the 1970s onwards, world Jewry stagnated at nearly *zero population growth* for nearly 20 years, but some demographic recovery occurred since 2000, mostly reflecting population increase in Israel. It took about 14 years to add another million from 13 million to 14 million. In historical perspective and based on the same definitions, world Jewish population has not recovered its size on the eve of World War II—16.5 million—and it may take decades more to do so, if ever.

World Jewish population size reflects a combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 and 630,000 in 1948 to over 6.6 million in 2019. The Jewish population of the Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable in number until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing, reaching less than 8.1 million in 2019. The world's total population increased more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.621 billion by mid-2018. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.93 per 1,000 currently—or one per 518 inhabitants in the world.

Two countries, Israel and the US, accounted for over 84% of the 2019 total; 23 countries, each with 10,000 Jews or more, accounted for another 15%, and another 73 countries, each with Jewish populations below 10,000, accounted for the remaining 0.9%. **Figure 2** shows the size of the 20 largest *core* Jewish populations in 2019.

Map 1 shows the geographical distribution of the 20 larger Jewish communities worldwide.

¹ This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Professor Sidney Goldstein of Brown University, for many years the dean of Jewish demographic research, who passed in 2019. See the obituary later in this volume.




Fig. 1 World total population and core Jewish population, 1945-2019

Israel's Jewish population (*not* including 426,700 persons not recorded as Jews in the Ministry of Interior's Population Register but who are members of families initially admitted under the *Law of Return*) reached 6,665,600 in 2019 (45.3% of world Jewry by the *core* definition)—out of Israel's total legal population of 8,970,900. This represented a Jewish population increase of 111,100 (1.70%) in 2018. In the same year, the total Jewish population of the Diaspora was estimated to have decreased by 10,200 from 8,052,000 to 8,041,800 (-0.13%). Following the 2013 Pew Research Center (2013) *A Portrait of Jewish Americans*, the US *core* Jewish population was assessed at 5,700,000 and we estimate it to have remained stable, constituting 38.8% of world Jewry in 2019. Core Jews in the US were estimated to have increased slightly since the year 2000, following several years of moderate decline after probably reaching a peak around 1980 (DellaPergola 2013a). Jews in the rest of the world were assessed at 2,341,800 in 2019 (15.9% of world Jewry). Since all of the decline of 10,200 among Diaspora Jews occurred in countries other than the US, that amounted to an annual loss of -0.43% in the aggregate for those countries. For the total world population, growth was 1.4% in less developed countries and zero in the more developed countries where most Jews live.





Fig. 2 Twenty largest core Jewish populations, 2019

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel hosts the largest *core* Jewish community worldwide. Some dissenting opinions (Saxe and Tighe 2013, Saxe 2019, Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume) are mostly based on different definitions of the target population. Since Israel's independence in 1948, demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in Israel, their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, slow, and diverse changes reflecting births and deaths, geographical mobility, and the choice of millions of persons to express or to deny a Jewish collective identification not subordinated to nor on par with other explicit religious or ethnic identifications. At the same time, Jewish majority status in Israel faces a significant demographic challenge vis-à-vis the more rapidly growing Palestinian Arab population within the boundaries of the State of Israel as well as in the West Bank and Gaza.

Core Jewish Population



Map 1 Countries where 99% of world Jewish population live, 2019

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility and a relatively young age composition. These two drivers of demographic growth do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example Canada and Australia and, until recently, the US and Germany), and possibly some growth due to local natural increase (plausibly in the UK and Mexico, and minimally in Australia) the total number of Jews in Diaspora countries tends to diminish at varying rates.

The fundamental equation of demography is that a population size at a given time reflects an uninterrupted chain of events that change the size of that population from an earlier to a later date. Of the three possible determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths) where low Jewish birth rates and an increasingly elderly population generate higher death rates and an overall deficit; and (b) the variable balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). The third determinant consists of identification changes or *passages* (accessions and secessions)—in this case to and from a Jewish identity—and applies only to subpopulations defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific characteristic, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group.

All this holds true regarding the *core* Jewish population, which does *not* include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews with family connections to Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters. (See further discussion below.) The detailed mechanisms and supporting evidence of Jewish population change have been discussed extensively in previous issues of the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and will not be repeated here (see DellaPergola 2015a).

Jewish population size and composition reflect the day-by-day interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola et al. 2005; DellaPergola 2017a).

The 2019 Jewish population data were updated from 2018 and previous years in accordance with known or estimated vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. The world Jewish population estimate results from the sum of national estimates. While individual country estimates can be obtained from nationwide sources as well as from the sum of local sources, in the case of the world's total, in the lack of a global population census, there is no alternative to the summation of local figures. In each of the country update procedures, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another in a particular country, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective over the years of our monitoring of world Jewish population. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be on target. Where needed, previous estimates were adjusted based upon newer, better evidence.

The research findings reported here tend to confirm the estimates reported in previous years and, perhaps more importantly, a coherent and conceptually robust interpretation of the trends prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011a). While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2019 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes involving bi-local residences and leading to double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study, special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally and nationally mobile and bi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one religious, ethnic, or cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to the other. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities; hence, Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage, but analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

Definitions

Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact the numbers. A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population as well as data quality, is addressed at all. This problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework for Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes, it would not be acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country, although in the daily conduct of Jewish community affairs such differences do prevail across countries.

In such an open, fluid, and somewhat undetermined environment, the very feasibility of undertaking a valid and meaningful study of the Jewish collective—let alone by the use of quantitative tools—generates debates between different intellectual stances facing Jewish population studies (DellaPergola 2014d). In particular, the study of a Jewish population (or of any other subpopulation) requires addressing three main problems:

- 1) *Defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;
- 2) *Identifying* the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting the target group from the rest of the population—primarily by systematic canvassing of populations and personally ascertaining personal identifications. Identification is also often performed through membership lists, distinctive Jewish names, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
- 3) *Covering* the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews, by telephone, by mail, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on *operational*, not *prescriptive*, definitional criteria. The main conceptual aspects, besides being rooted in social theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility—not the least, available research budgets. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as response rates and cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social surveys (Keeter et al. 2017), the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. While response rates for Jewish surveys tend to be much better than general surveys, the quality of the data is certainly impacted.

No method exists to counter these decreases in response rates and cooperation rates. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible to uncover, namely the degree of involvement with or indifference to feeling Jewish by respondents. Something that cannot be uncovered directly can

sometimes be estimated through various imperfect indirect techniques. However, there exist unsurmountable limits to what research methodologies can deliver. For example, large representative samples and small qualitative studies are not interchangeable regarding the answers they can provide to specific research questions. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of beliefs, hopes and fears, myths, and corporate interests. No methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these claims—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction and non-advocacy work such as this.

Keeping these limits in mind, four major definitional concepts will be considered here to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography worldwide (**Figure 3**): (a) the **core Jewish population (CJP)**—the group who consider Judaism their mutually exclusive identification framework, including both those who do see or do not see religion as a major avenue for identification (Jewish only, religion: Circle 1 in Figure 3; Jewish only, no religion: Circle 2 in the Figure); (b) the **population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)**—including those who say they are partly Jewish because their identity is split between two or more different and relevant identification frameworks (Circle 3), and those who say they are not Jewish but have Jewish background in the form of at least one Jewish parent (Circle 4). Taken together Circles 3 and 4 may also be referred to as the “Jewish Connected” population; (c) the **enlarged Jewish population (EJP)**—including others who say they have Jewish background but not a Jewish parent (Circle 5), and all non-Jewish household members who live in households with Jews (Circle 6); and (d) the **Law of Return population (LRP)** (Circle 7). More detail on these definitions is presented in the Appendix.

This typology is relevant because not only it does mark-off alternative population definition approaches, but it also delineates different analytic approaches grounded on alternative social theories as well as different possible Jewish institutional strategies in designating the respective catchment constituencies. It is important to realize that the categories in **Figure 3** are not static but continuous passages occur across the different circles, from center to periphery and vice-versa, and from the whole configuration outside, and vice-versa. Further definitional extensions (not shown in **Figure 3**) may address those additional non-Jewish persons who feel some degree of **affinity with Judaism**, sometimes because their more distant ancestors were Jewish or because of other personal cultural or social connections with Jews. Moreover, some studies may have reached people whose **ancestors ever were Jewish** regardless of the respondents' present identification. Several socio-demographic surveys indeed ask about the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some population surveys, however, *do* ask about more distant ancestry. Historians may wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are descendants of those Jews—for example, *Conversos* who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages, or the descendants of Jews who lived during the Roman Empire, or the Lost Tribes (Parfitt 2002; Parfitt and Fisher 2016; Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018; Gross et al. 2019). The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010; Carmi et al. 2014, Tian et al. 2015). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.




Fig. 3 Configuring and defining contemporary Jewish populations, 2019

1-2 = Core Jewish population (CJP)

1 to 4 = Population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)

1 to 6 = Enlarged Jewish population (EJP)

1 to 7 = Law of Return population (LRP)

Areas represented are not proportional to actual populations

The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers and by Jewish organizations tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on population estimates beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core* definition. These decisions may reflect local needs and sensitivities, but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here. The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, country, and major metropolitan area, are consistently anchored to the concept of *core* Jewish population. The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any broader definition such as the population with Jewish parents, the *enlarged* definition, or the *Law of Return* definition (see detail in the **Appendix table**).

Data Sources

The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including access to unpublished databases regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband et al. 1988; DellaPergola 2014c and 2014d). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, data users should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of Jewish population estimates.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. These data consist of national population censuses, national population registers, national and international public and private sponsored surveys, and national or Jewish community records of vital statistics, migration, and conversions. Some of this ongoing data compilation is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Jewish population projections undertaken by the author, in light of the latest data, also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data. Other existing estimates of total world Jewish population and of its geographical distribution (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012; Johnson and Zurlo 2014) provide findings quite close to ours. Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew comparisons often rely on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. As Jews are usually an extremely small fraction of the total, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affected by large sampling errors. A full list of the types and

quality of documentation upon which Jewish population estimates are based is reported in the **Appendix** below.

Section 2 World Jewish Population Size and Distribution by Major Areas

As noted, in our current estimates, we corrected previously published Jewish population data in light of new information. In recent years, the most significant correction was an addition of about 300,000 Jews in the US following the 2013 Pew study. This revision generated retrospective revisions of the whole annual series of data for the US, for the total Diaspora, and for World Jewry since 2000. **Table 1** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945 through 2019, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book* and retroactively corrected as now, also adjusting all revisions that had been suggested in previous years. These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published by other authors until 1980 and since 1981, by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* in the past based on the information that was available on each date. It is possible that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

Table 1 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2019

Year	World Jewish Population			World Population		Jews per 1000 total population
	Original estimate ^a	Revised estimate ^b	Annual% change ^c	Total (millions) ^d	Annual % change	
1945, May 1	11,000,000	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,303,400	11,297,000	0.59	2,526	1.76	4.47
1960, Jan. 1	12,792,800	12,079,000	0.67	3,026	1.82	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	13,950,900	12,585,000	0.41	3,691	2.01	3.41
1980, Jan. 1	14,527,100	12,819,000	0.18	4,449	1.81	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,810,300	12,868,000	0.04	5,321	1.74	2.42
2000, Jan. 1	13,191,500	13,150,000	0.22	6,127	1.42	2.15
2005, Jan. 1	13,034,100	13,460,000	0.47	6,514	1.23	2.07
2010, Jan. 1	13,428,300	13,854,000	0.58	6,916	1.20	2.00
2015, Jan. 1	14,310,500	14,311,600	0.65	7,236	0.91	1.98
2016, Jan. 1	14,410,700	14,407,600	0.67	7,336	1.38	1.96
2017, Jan. 1	14,511,100	14,507,600	0.69	7,436	1.14	1.95
2018, Jan. 1	14,606,000	14,606,500	0.68	7,536	1.13	1.94
2019, Jan. 1	14,707,400		0.69	7,621	1.11	1.93

a As published in the *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some estimates reported here as of Jan. 1 were originally published as of Dec. 31 of the previous year

b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

c Based on revised estimates, except latest year

d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations Population Division (2018), Population Reference Bureau (2019)

The time series in **Table 1** clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally between the 1960s and the 1990s. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 282,000 in the 1990s. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 704,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2019, world Jewry increased by 853,400, but Israel's Jewish population increased by 962,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish population decreased by 108,000. **Table 1** also demonstrates the slower world Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of the world population. In 2019, the share of Jews among the world population (1.93 per 1,000) was 40.6% of the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

Table 2 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population by major geographical regions at the beginning of 2019 as compared to 2018. The originally published estimates from the 2018 *American Jewish Year Book* were slightly revised reflecting retroactive corrections due to improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of 500 persons in the 2018 world Jewry estimate, reflecting a subtraction of 3,600 from the previous estimate for Israel, and a net increase of 4,100 in the Jewish Diaspora total.

Looking first at global trends, the number of Jews in Israel increased from the revised 6,554,500 in 2018 to 6,665,600 at the beginning of 2019, an increase of 111,100, or 1.70%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora *decreased* from the revised 8,052,000 to 8,041,800—a decrease of 10,200, or -0.13%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and to a lesser extent from France, from the small remnants of Jewish communities in Moslem countries, and from other countries, and the internal decrease due to an excess of deaths over births typical of the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In the absence of final accountancy for 2018 we know that in 2017, of a total increase of 108,400 core Jews in Israel, 96,700 reflected the balance of births and deaths, and 11,700 reflected the estimated Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration) and to a minor extent net conversion to Judaism (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual; Fisher 2015 and 2019; Nissim 2018). Israel's net migration balance includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants, returning Israelis, and Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time. Therefore, internal demographic change produced 89.2% of the total Jewish population growth in Israel. According to these estimates almost all of the Diaspora's estimated decrease is explained by a negative migration balance. This quite certainly underestimates the actually negative vital balance in most countries, resulting in higher than real population estimates for the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. Adjustments could be needed in the future.

Table 2 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2018 and 2019^a

Region	2018 Revised ^b		2019		Percentage change 2018-2019	Jews per 1000 total population in 2019
	Estimate	Percent ^c	Estimate	Percent ^c		
World total	14,606,500	100.0	14,707,400	100.0	0.69	1.93
Diaspora	8,052,000	55.1	8,041,800	54.7	-0.13	1.06
US	5,700,000	39.0	5,700,000	38.8	0.00	17.38
Other	2,352,000	16.1	2,341,800	15.9	-0.43	0.32
Israel ^d	6,554,500	44.9	6,665,600	45.3	1.70	743.02
America, total	6,469,800	44.3	6,469,900	44.0	0.00	6.38
North ^e	6,090,600	41.7	6,092,100	41.4	0.02	16.68
Central, Caribbean	57,000	0.4	57,000	0.4	0.00	0.26
South	322,200	2.2	320,800	2.2	-0.43	0.75
Europe, total	1,349,200	9.2	1,340,200	9.1	-0.67	1.62
European Union ^f	1,079,500	7.4	1,078,900	7.3	-0.06	2.11
Other West	20,600	0.1	20,500	0.1	-0.49	1.42
Balkans ^g	17,100	0.1	16,900	0.1	-1.17	0.17
FSU ^g	232,000	1.6	223,900	1.5	-3.49	1.11
Asia, total	6,589,400	45.1	6,699,700	45.6	1.67	1.50
Israel	6,554,500	44.9	6,665,600	45.3	1.70	743.02
FSU	16,000	0.1	15,300	0.1	-4.38	0.17
Other	18,900	0.1	18,800	0.1	-0.53	0.00
Africa, total	72,600	0.5	72,000	0.5	-0.83	0.06
Northern ^h	3,400	0.0	3,300	0.0	-2.94	0.01
Sub-Saharan ⁱ	69,200	0.5	68,700	0.5	-0.72	0.07
Oceania^j	125,500	0.9	125,600	0.9	0.08	3.06

a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2018. Source: United Nations (2018), Population Reference Bureau (2019)

b Compare with the original in DellaPergola (2019). The corrections reflecting newly available data are for Israel (-3,600), Russia (-2,000),

South Africa (-1000), UK (+1,000), Australia (+4,500), Austria (+1,000), Ukraine (+500), Gibraltar (+100)

c Minor discrepancies due to rounding

d Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

e US and Canada

f Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and the UK

g FSU excluding the Baltic countries. Asian regions of Russian Federation and Turkey included in Europe

h Including Ethiopia

i Including South Africa and Zimbabwe

j Including Australia and New Zealand

Recently, for sure, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or “return” to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia, some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this same phenomenon of return or first-time accession to Judaism occurs throughout Diaspora communities as well. The addition of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to a minimal fraction of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel (DellaPergola 2017c).

In descending order by continents, over 45% of world Jewry lived in **Asia**, overwhelmingly in Israel (**Table 2** and **Appendix table**). Asia is defined herein to include the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asiatic areas of the Russian Federation and Turkey. The Jewish presence in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel which accounts for more than 99% of the continental total. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia account each for less than one-half of one percent of the total. Clearly, the fast economic development in Southeast Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and especially China, is attracting Jewish professionals, businesspeople, and technicians. The numbers are still small but growing.

Over 44% of the world's Jews resided in **the Americas**, with 41.4% in North America. The Jewish population in the Americas, estimated at 6,469,900 in 2019, is predominantly concentrated in the US (5,700,000, or 88% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (392,000, 6%), South America (320,800, 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (57,000, 1%). Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in Central and South America, reflecting emigration motivated by recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). Panama and Mexico were the exceptions and absorbed Jewish migrants from other countries in the continent. In the Miami Jewish community (Miami-Dade County), the number of members of households containing a Jewish adult from Latin American countries increased from roughly 18,000 in 2004 to 24,500 in 2014 (Sheskin 2015b). In neighboring Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), the same measure increased from 5,300 in 1997 to 26,500 in 2016 (Sheskin 2017). Between 2001 and 2018, the total number of immigrants from Latin America to Israel surpassed 25,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), including many persons highly educated and highly involved in Jewish life (Bokser Liwerant et al. 2015). Outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism has appeared among real or putative descendants of *Conversos* whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century. Some of these *Converso* communities have been trying to create permanent frameworks to express their Jewish identity, in part locally, in part through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especially in smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries (Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018). Persons with such backgrounds are also migrating to Israel (Torres 2017).

Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounted for over 9% of world Jewry. The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,340,200 in 2019, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU). The EU, comprising 28 countries prior to the June 2016 secession vote of the UK (still not fully implemented in late 2019), had an estimated total of 1,078,900 Jews in 2019 (80.5% of the continent's total). The momentous political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the territorial deployment of Jewish communities in Europe. Revitalization of Jewish community life in the western countries had occurred over the past tens of years through immigration mainly from North Africa and the Middle East but also from the FSU. But more recently, economic recession and rising perceptions of antisemitism across the continent have brought about growing Jewish dissatisfaction and

emigration (DellaPergola 2017b; Staetsky 2017; Staetsky et al. 2013; European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013 and 2018). Total emigration from the EU to Israel reached a peak of 8,406 in 2015 but diminished to 5,570 in 2016, 4,268 in 2017, and 3,628 in 2018. In spite of the unifying project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted to create such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013; Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019a). The EU's initially expanding format symbolized an important historical landmark and a promising framework for the development of Jewish life. However, in recent years the EU concept and ideal finds itself under major stress, and the 2016 UK Brexit referendum is only one of its symptoms. Disagreements about migration policies facing large Muslim population increases in different European locations, reflect the unsolved dilemma of defining Europe's own cultural identity and geopolitical boundaries. The four former Soviet republics in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, excluding the three Baltic republics) have a Jewish population of 223,900 (16.7% of the continental total). The FSU is the area where, in absolute numbers, Jewish population has diminished the most since 1991 (Tolts 2008, 2014, and 2015; Konstantinov 2007). Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting emigration, an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high intermarriage rates, and low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease is being alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural, and religious activities supported by American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with 14,687 in 2015, 14,471 in 2016, 16,122 in 2017, and 18,887 in 2018 out of a total of 28,118 new immigrants (67%).

Our 2019 assessment of the total *core* Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics in Europe and Asia was 248,100, of whom 232,800 live in Europe (including 8,900 in the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 15,300 in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members created an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly twice as large as the *core* (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011, and 2015). All other European countries not part of the EU or the FSU, including Turkey, combined comprised 37,400 core Jews (3% of the European total).

Little more than 1% of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania combined. The Jewish population in **Africa** is mostly concentrated in South Africa (about 94% of the continental total). Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in **Oceania** where Australia accounts for 94% of the total.

Overall, between 2018 and 2019 Jewish population size increased primarily in Israel and to a modest extent in North America and Oceania, and decreased to varying degrees in South America, the European Union, other Western Europe, the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa.

Implications of alternative Jewish population definitions

In **Table 3** we evaluate the Jewish population's regional distribution according to several alternative definitions, as outlined in **Figure 3**. Updated and revised *core* Jewish population estimates (CJP in the table) are presented, along with the total of those who *have Jewish parents* regardless of their current identity (PJP); the *enlarged Jewish population* inclusive of non-Jewish household members (EJP); and the population eligible for the *Law of Return* (LRP). Detailed country estimates are reported in the **Appendix Table**. The main purpose of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate comparability across countries. In light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it is clear that Jewish investigators and/or community leaders in different countries sometimes follow local definitional criteria that may differ from the criteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US or Canada is evaluated quite differently in the present chapter and in other chapters (Sheskin and Dashefsky; Shahar) in this volume. In other words, criteria that may be understood or even preferred in one country may not be meaningful or acceptable in another country. But in a global study like this, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently for all countries. The prime choice unavoidably must fall on a minimum common denominator. However, by showing the implications of different definitions for Jewish population evaluation, we offer readers an additional tool to better appreciate ongoing population trends in their countries.

Starting from the core Jewish population estimate of 14,707,400 (CJP) in 2019, if we add persons who state they are partly Jewish and non-Jews who have Jewish parents, a broader global aggregate population estimate of 17,917,750 (PJP) is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, an *enlarged* estimate obtains of 20,876,400 (EJP). Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and spouse provisions of Israel's *Law of Return*, the total Jewish and non-Jewish aliyah-eligible population can be roughly estimated at 23,674,400 (LRP). The US holds a significantly larger *Jewish parents population* (PJP) living in households with Jews or other persons with immediate Jewish background than Israel—roughly 8 million compared to 6,878,950, respectively.

The results, though tentative, provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of those who have a Jewish parent (PJP) (17,917,750), regardless of their own identification, stands 3,210,350 higher than the 14,707,400 core Jewish population. The total number of household members with at least one core Jew in the household (EJP) is estimated at an additional increment of 2,756,650. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return (LRP) is roughly estimated at 23,674,400, an additional increment of 2,798,000. All in all, the difference between the Law of Return population (LRP) and the core Jewish population (CJP) is 8,967,000. Of these roughly estimated nearly 9 million partly Jewish, somewhat Jewish-connected, or otherwise included non-Jews, 73.7% live in North America, 9.3% in the EU, 7.3% in the FSU Republics in Europe and Asia, 4.8% in Israel, 3.8% in Latin America, and 1.1% in other countries.

Table 3 Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2019

Region	Core Jewish population ^a CJP	Population with Jewish parents ^b JPP	Enlarged Jewish population EJP ^c	Law of Return population ^d LRP	Difference LRP – CJP		Percent expansion LRP over CJP
					Number	Percent distribution	
World total	14,707,400	17,917,750	20,876,400	23,674,400	8,967,000	100.0	61
North America	6,092,100	8,450,200	10,550,300	12,700,400	6,608,300	73.7	108
Latin America	377,800	505,100	605,900	717,900	340,100	3.8	90
European Union ^e	1,078,900	1,336,500	1,633,500	1,910,600	831,700	9.3	77
FSU in Europe ^e	223,900	430,800	632,500	843,000	619,100	6.9	277
Rest of Europe	37,400	46,700	53,400	60,200	22,800	0.3	61
Israel ^f	6,665,600	6,878,950	7,092,300	7,092,300	426,700	4.8	6
FSU in Asia	15,300	25,700	37,100	50,500	35,200	0.4	230
Rest of Asia	18,800	23,400	27,700	31,500	12,700	0.1	68
Africa	72,000	81,700	88,900	97,100	25,100	0.3	35
Oceania	125,600	138,700	154,800	170,900	45,300	0.5	36

a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity

b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent

c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)

d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification

e The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included in the European Union

f Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

The relative impact of the various population definitions linking the *core* Jewish population (CJP) and the Law of Return population (LRP) is quite different in the three main geographical divisions considered in **Figure 4**. Since the impact of intermarriage is much lower in Israel than elsewhere, the extensions beyond the core in Israel are quite limited and primarily reflect immigration of intermarried households and, more recently, births in Israel from these households. In other communities outside the US and Israel, the graphic portrays the significant expansion of population aggregates around the CJP. One finally notes that with the emigration—mainly to Israel—of core Jews, the number of other people connected in some way to Judaism does not necessarily diminish across world Jewish communities. Indeed, their propensity to change country of residence may be lower than among core Jews, but they remain nonetheless as a more or less submerged component of the global Jewish population configuration. On the other hand, with the passing of time, as more core Jews pass because of aging, and more of those directly related non-Jews pass too for the same reason, the more distant circles may eventually lose their linkage to the core collective.

Greater detail is provided in **Figure 5** on the respective weight of the different population components within the broader Law of Return population in each of the 20 largest Jewish populations worldwide. Countries where the core Jewish population constitutes a larger share relative to the Law of Return definition include South Africa, Australia, the UK, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Mexico, and Chile. Countries where the core constitutes the lowest share of the Law of Return definition include Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Germany, the US, and the Netherlands.





Fig. 4 Core and extended Jewish populations in the United States, Israel, and other countries, thousands, 2019



Source: Appendix table

Fig. 5 World and 20 largest Diaspora Core, Jewish Parentage, Enlarged, and Law of Return Jewish populations, percentage distributions, 2019

Section 3 Patterns of Jewish Population Distribution in Major Countries

Development and the Jewish presence

Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation accompanied by an increasing concentration in a few countries, 84.1% of world Jews currently live in two countries, Israel and the US, and 96.4% are concentrated in the ten countries with the most Jews. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends.

In 2019, over 99% of world Jewry lived in the largest 25 Jewish communities, each evaluated at 10,000 or more. Excluding Israel, 98.4% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 24 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 71% in the US (**Table 4**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (Russia); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances *vis-à-vis* the Jewish presence.

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by the persistence of a higher share of Jews among the total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be directly related to the country's level of development (**Table 5**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2019, the share of Jews out of the total population was 743.0 per 1000 in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza). Israel's population high rate of Jewishness obviously reflects its special positioning in Jewish identity perceptions, but Israel also has become a developed country, and, as such, attractive to prospective migrants. In the US, the *core* Jewish population represented 17.4 per 1000 of total population; Jews comprised 3.7 per 1000 total population on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.6 per 1000 on average in the other 16 countries with 10,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority (80%) of world population.

To further illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, **Table 5** reports the latest available Human Development Index (HDI) for each country (United Nations Development Programme 2018). The HDI—a composite measure of a society's level of education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics of the members of those Jewish communities. The latest available HDI country ranks reported in the table are for 2017. Of the 25 countries listed, five are included among the top ten HDIs among 189 countries ranked (Switzerland, Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands). Another seven countries are ranked 11th to 25th (Canada, the US, the UK, Belgium, Austria, Israel, and France), six more are between 26th and 50th (Italy, Spain, Chile, Hungary, Argentina, and Russia), six are between 51st and 100th (Uruguay,

Turkey, Panama, Mexico, Brazil, and Ukraine), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (113th), pointing to lesser development in the host society. Remarkably, all of the 9 largest Jewish populations, amounting together to 95.7% of world Jewry, live in countries whose HDI ranks among the top 50.

Table 4 25 Countries with core Jewish populations of 10,000 and more, 1/1/2019

Jewish population rank	Country	Core Jewish population	% of total Jewish Population			
			In the world		In the diaspora	
			%	Cumulative%	%	Cumulative%
1	Israel ^a	6,665,600	45.3	45.3	b	b
2	United States	5,700,000	38.8	84.1	70.9	70.9
3	France	450,000	3.1	87.1	5.6	76.5
4	Canada	392,000	2.7	89.8	4.9	81.3
5	United Kingdom	292,000	2.0	91.8	3.6	85.0
6	Argentina	180,000	1.2	93.0	2.2	87.2
7	Russia	165,000	1.1	94.1	2.1	89.3
8	Germany	118,000	0.8	94.9	1.5	90.7
9	Australia	118,000	0.8	95.7	1.5	92.2
10	Brazil	92,600	0.6	96.4	1.2	93.4
11	South Africa	67,500	0.5	96.8	0.8	94.2
12	Ukraine	48,000	0.3	97.2	0.6	94.8
13	Hungary	47,300	0.3	97.5	0.6	95.4
14	Mexico	40,000	0.3	97.7	0.5	95.9
15	Netherlands	29,800	0.2	97.9	0.4	96.2
16	Belgium	29,100	0.2	98.1	0.4	96.6
17	Italy	27,400	0.2	98.3	0.3	97.0
18	Switzerland	18,500	0.1	98.5	0.2	97.2
19	Chile	18,300	0.1	98.6	0.2	97.4
20	Uruguay	16,600	0.1	98.7	0.2	97.6
21	Sweden	15,000	0.1	98.8	0.2	97.8
22	Turkey	14,800	0.1	98.9	0.2	98.0
23	Spain	11,700	0.1	99.0	0.1	98.1
24	Austria	10,000	0.1	99.0	0.1	98.3
25	Panama	10,000	0.1	99.1	0.1	98.4

a Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

b Not applicable

Table 5 25 largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 country's total population and Human Development Indices

Jewish population rank	Country	2019 Core Jewish population	2019 Total population	Jews per 1000 total population	2017 HDI rank ^a
1	Israel ^b	6,665,600	8,970,900	743.0	22
2	United States	5,700,000	328,000,000	17.4	13
3	France	450,000	65,140,000	6.9	24
4	Canada	392,000	37,200,000	10.5	12
5	United Kingdom	292,000	66,600,000	4.4	14
6	Argentina	180,000	44,500,000	4.0	47
7	Russia	165,000	147,300,000	1.1	49
8	Germany	118,000	82,800,000	1.4	5
9	Australia	118,000	24,100,000	4.9	3
	Other 100,000 & over	1,715,000	467,640,000	3.7	22
10	Brazil	92,600	209,400,000	0.4	79
11	South Africa	67,500	57,700,000	1.2	113
12	Ukraine	48,000	42,300,000	1.1	88
13	Hungary	47,300	9,800,000	4.8	45
14	Mexico	40,000	130,800,000	0.3	74
15	Netherlands	29,800	17,200,000	1.7	10
16	Belgium	29,100	11,400,000	2.6	17
17	Italy	27,400	60,600,000	0.5	28
18	Switzerland	18,500	8,500,000	2.2	2
19	Chile	18,300	18,600,000	1.0	44
20	Uruguay	16,600	3,500,000	4.7	55
21	Sweden	15,000	10,200,000	1.5	7
22	Turkey	14,800	81,300,000	0.2	64
23	Spain	11,700	46,700,000	0.3	26
24	Austria	10,000	8,800,000	1.1	20
25	Panama	10,000	4,200,000	2.4	66
	Other 10,000 & over	496,600	721,000,000	0.7	46
	Rest of the world^c	130,200	6,094,886,100	0.0	> 100

a *HDI* The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education and income (measured as US dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme (2018)

b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Total population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents and non-Jewish members of Jewish households of the West Bank

c Average HDI rank for group of countries

Figure 6 demonstrates the relationship that prevails between Jewish population size and the respective countries' human development. The horizontal axis shows the average HDI ranks of world countries regrouped by Jewish population size (as in **Table 5**). The vertical axis indicates the total Jewish population of the same groups of countries. A country's level of development stimulates conditions promoting more than proportionally the size of the local Jewish population. The statistical relationship between the Index of Human Development and the total number of Jews by type of countries is extraordinarily powerful, as indicated by an explained variance of over 85% when including Israel, and over 90% when excluding Israel. The loss of explanatory power following Israel's inclusion means that the strong Jewish presence in Israel cannot be exclusively explained by the environmental circumstances of high development, and obviously draws on deeper historical, cultural, and religious determinants. But in the rest of the world (the Diaspora)

the relationship between Human Development and Jewish presence certainly works. As a caveat, it is worth repeating that Jewish communities may display social and economic profiles significantly better than the average population of their respective countries. Nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of each individual, Jews included, everywhere. Changes in the quality of life at the country level foreshadow changes in Jewish population distribution worldwide. Interestingly, the two countries with the largest Jewish populations, the US (ranked 13th in 2017) and Israel (22th) both lost three positions in the HDI ranking versus the previous year. Such fluctuations in development ranking should be monitored carefully as they may critically affect world Jewish population distribution.

Time comparisons

The current Jewish population distribution worldwide has resulted from dramatic changes that occurred in the geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural profile of world Jewry – particularly over the years since the independence of the state of Israel. As an illustration of the intervening changes, we report the world distribution of core Jewish population by major geographical regions at three points in time: 1948, 1980, and 2019 (**Figure 7**).

Two opposing trends emerge from this temporal comparison: on the one hand, Israel's Jewish population increased from being a small entity in 1948 to being the central component of world Jewish population by 2019; on the other hand, we see the decline, if not disappearance of the major Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe, the FSU, and the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Declines of a lesser scale also appear in Latin America and Southern Africa. North America, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, maintained relatively stable Jewish population sizes, although in the latter case through a significant turnaround of periods of immigration and periods of emigration. As already noted, the tendency over time was much greater consolidation of world Jewry in the two major centers in the US (here with Canada) and Israel, versus a much more dispersed Jewish population worldwide shortly after the end of World War II.

A more detailed picture of the changes intervening between 1980 and 2019 is illustrated in **Table 6**. Here we compare the numbers and ranks for the 25 countries with a Jewish population of at least 28,000 Jews in 1980—based on revised estimates and using the list of countries extant upon the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Czechoslovakia. Striking changes occurred in the population sizes and rankings during the 39 years from 1980-2019. Quantitatively, the most remarkable was Israel's Jewish population more than doubling from 3,282,700 to 6,665,600 (103.1%). The greatest percentage growth occurred in Germany (+242.0%). Absolute population increases were recorded in Australia (+68.6%), Canada (+27.3%), and Mexico (+14.3%). The US core Jewish population remained about the same (+0.2%). The other 19 countries witnessed Jewish population reduction, with six countries losing more than 90% of their 1980 population (the five former Soviet republics of Moldova, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and Ethiopia). An entirely different ranking of major communities consequently emerged. The top five in 1980 were the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and France; in 2019 they had become Israel, US, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom.




Fig. 6 Major groups of countries by Human Development Index (HDI) and total core Jewish population, 2019




Fig. 7 Core Jewish populations by major regions, 1948, 1980, 2019, thousands

The geographical realignment of the world Jewish population reflects both their past sufferance from political discrimination and persecution, as well as socioeconomic development lags and lack of democracy in the various countries that lost Jewish population. The consequent mass migration from those countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, generated large Jewish population declines. On the other hand, countries that offered a wider range of opportunities and greater freedom witnessed steady Jewish population growth or at least stability.

Table 6 Largest core Jewish populations as of 1980, and in 2019

Country ^a	1980	Rank	2019	Rank	% change	Rank diff.
United States	5,690,000	1	5,700,000	2	0.2%	-1
Israel	3,282,700	2	6,665,600	1	103.1%	1
Russia	713,400	3	165,000	7	-76.9%	-4
Ukraine	634,400	4	48,000	12	-92.4%	-8
France	535,000	5	450,000	3	-15.9%	2
United Kingdom	390,000	6	292,000	5	-25.1%	1
Canada	308,000	7	392,000	4	27.3%	3
Argentina	242,000	8	180,000	6	-25.6%	2
Belarus	135,500	9	9,000	25	-93.4%	-16
Brazil	110,000	10	92,600	10	-15.8%	=
South Africa	108,000	11	67,500	11	-37.5%	=
Uzbekistan	100,100	12	3,000	37	-97.0%	-26
Moldova	80,200	13	1,900	44	-97.6%	-31
Australia	70,000	14	118,000	9	68.6%	5
Hungary	65,000	15	47,300	13	-27.2%	2
Azerbaijan	44,300	16	7,500	29	-83.1%	-13
Uruguay	40,000	17	16,600	17	-58.5%	=
Mexico	35,000	18	40,000	14	14.3%	4
Germany	34,500	19	118,000	8	242.0%	11
Belgium	33,000	20	29,100	15	-11.8%	5
Romania	33,000	21	9,000	26	-72.7%	-5
Italy	32,000	22	27,400	16	-14.4%	6
Iran	32,000	23	8,300	28	-74.1%	-5
Ethiopia	32,000	24	100	78	-99.7%	-54
Georgia	28,300	25	1,500	51	-94.7%	-26

a Ranked as of 1980. In bold Jewish population that increased in absolute size. The following countries had Jewish populations among the 25 largest in 2019, but not in 1980: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden, Chile, Spain, Austria, and Panama.

Dispersion and Concentration

In 2019, 98 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 7**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews, two had 50,000 to 99,999, six had 25,000 to 49,999, eight had 10,000 to 24,999, nine had 5,000 to 9,999, 25 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 39 had less than 1,000. The 73 communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for less than 1% of world Jewry.

In only four Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1000 (0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (20.0 Jews per 1000 inhabitants), the US (17.4), Canada (10.5), and France (6.9). The case of Israel is very different, with a *core* Jewish population that represents 74.3% of the total legal population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 79.1% of the total population. In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population is decreasing.

Table 7 World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion per 1,000 total population, 1/1/2019

Number of core Jews in country	Jews per 1000 total population					
	Total	Less than 1.0	1.0-4.9	5.0-9.9	10.0-19.9	20.0+
Number of countries						
Total^a	98	70	23	1	3	1
100-999	39	35	3	-	1	-
1,000-4,999	25	24	1	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	9	6	3	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	8	2	6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	6	2	4	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	2	1	1	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	7	-	5	1	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)						
Total^b	14,707,400	293,800	1,204,600	450,000	6,092,700	6,665,600
100-999	10,500	8,700	1,100	-	700	-
1,000-4,999	54,900	53,000	1,900	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	64,100	45,600	18,500	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	114,900	26,500	88,400	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	221,600	67,400	154,200	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	160,100	92,600	67,500	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	1,715,000	-	873,000	450,000	392,000	-
1,000,000 or more	12,365,600	-	-	-	5,700,000	6,665,600
Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population)						
Total^b	100.0	2.0	8.2	3.1	41.4	45.3
100-999	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	-
1,000-4,999	0.4	0.4	0.0	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	0.4	0.3	0.1	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	0.8	0.2	0.6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	1.5	0.5	1.0	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	1.1	0.6	0.5	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	11.7	-	5.9	3.1	2.7	-
1,000,000 or more	84.1	-	-	-	38.8	45.3

a Not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews.

b Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

Israel includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 24 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1000 total population: the US, Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. Eleven more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, Sweden, Austria, and Panama. Five countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.

Over the past decades, the basic typology of size-and-density of Jewish communities throughout the world did not change as much as the underlying changes witnessed by individual countries. **Table 8** shows the configuration of Jewish populations in 2019 as compared to 1984, the first year for which such tabulation is available (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1986). The 1984 data are reported here unrevised and in the original format of the countries and territories that existed then.

Table 8 World core Jewish population distribution, by number of Jews in country, 1984 and 2019

Number of Jews in country	N. of countries		Jewish population		% of world's Jews	
	1984	2019	1984	2019	1984	2019
Total^a	74	98	12,963,300	14,707,400	100.0	100.0
100-999	23	39	11,000	10,500	0.1	0.1
1,000-4,999	17	25	41,900	54,900	0.3	0.4
5,000-9,999	7	9	43,800	55,100	0.3	0.4
10,000-49,999	16	14	362,400	345,500	2.8	2.3
50,000-99,999	2	2	136,500	160,100	1.1	1.1
100,000-999,999	6	7	1,616,000	1,715,000	12.4	11.7
1,000,000-4,999,999	2	0	5,046,700	0	38.8	0.0
5,000,000 or more	1	2	5,705,000	12,365,600	43.9	84.1

a Number of countries not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews. Population and percent figures including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700.

Sources: Schmelz and DellaPergola (1986); Table 7 above.

The number of countries with at least 100 Jews indeed increased from 74 to 98, following the devolution of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the addition of several countries with very small Jewish communities that reached the 100-person threshold. The greatest increase was in the number of countries with less than 1,000 Jews, from 23 in 1984 to 39 in 2019. At the top of the distribution, two countries in 2019 had more than five million Jews, versus one only in 1984, when two countries had between one and five million Jews: Israel and the USSR. In the meantime, Israel grew and the USSR split into 15 states and lost most of its Jews through emigration.

Countries with between 100,000 and one million Jews comprised 12.5% of total Jewish population in 1984 versus 11.7% in 2019. Of the 15 republics of the FSU, only Russia had more than 100,000 in 2019 when it was joined by two new entries: Germany and Australia. Brazil and South Africa had more than 100,000 Jews in 1984, but fewer in 2019. France, Canada, the UK, and Argentina were included in the 100,000 and over category for both dates, but the gap between Canada and Argentina had more than trebled, from 65,000 to 212,000.

Communities between 10,000 and 100,000 comprised 3.9% of world Jewish population in 18 countries in 1984, versus 3.4% in 16 countries, respectively, in 2019. Among the smaller Jewish communities, those with less than 10,000 Jews comprised at both dates less than 1% of world Jewry, but in 1984 they were distributed across 47 countries and in 2019 across 73 countries. The apparent stability reflected a strong concentration of Jewish population in a few countries at the top of the distribution and a wide dispersion of very small numbers in a large number of countries at the bottom. The transition from a concentration of Jews in one dominant and two secondary centers, to a configuration based on two main centers reflected the quite revolutionary changes undertaken by world Jewry passing from the 20th to the 21st century.

Section 4 Jewish Population in Major Individual Countries

We turn now to a concise review of the information available and the criteria followed in updating the figures for the largest Jewish populations worldwide. The countries are listed in decreasing order of magnitude of the respective Jewish communities. Given the gradual and slow motion of demographic change, besides a few exceptions, we shall not repeat here the detailed descriptions of sources and patterns that appeared in previous volumes of the *American Jewish Year Book* and refer the reader to those previous volumes.

Israel

Since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Israel is the country with the largest core Jewish population worldwide. It is also the only one displaying a substantial rate of population growth—1.70% in 2018. With a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 3.17 children currently born per Jewish woman in 2018, and a relatively young age composition (27% under age 15 and only 13% age 65 and over), the Jewish population in Israel is the one worldwide displaying the highest fertility—largely above generational replacement and currently generating a share of children among the total Jewish population twice that of the elderly. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate is higher than the fertility for the total population of any other developed country and twice or more the current average of *Jewish* children among women in most Diaspora Jewish communities (sometimes called the *effective Jewish fertility rate*). This reflects not only the large family size of the more religious Jewish population component, but also a diffused and persistent desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially among the upwardly mobile (DellaPergola 2009c, 2009d, and 2015b). A moderately positive international migration balance also helps to keep Israel's Jewish population increasing. Information on religion is mandatory in official population data regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and in the permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Population and Migration Authority). Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, entering the country including immigrants, exiting the country including emigrants, and conversions). In the case of Jews and Judaism, the defining concept is a combination of religion and ethnicity according to rabbinic law (*Halakhah*). At the beginning of 2019, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 6,665,600, as against a revised total of 6,554,500 in 2017, excluding people who had been missing from the country for one year or more. A downward adjustment of -3,600 compared to the 2018 estimate reflects late entries and adjustments of demographic events, including conversions and other revisions of personal status. The revised core population combined with the addition of 426,700 "Others"—non-Jewish members of households who immigrated under the Law of Return or their Israel-born children—formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 7,092,300 in 2019, of which these "Others" constituted 6.0% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). We assume about half of the members of Jewish households who are not recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate have one Jewish parent. The *Jewish parent* population of Israel is thus estimated at 6,878,950. For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of

births over deaths. In 2018, 134,470 Jewish births and 37,744 Jewish deaths produced a net natural increase of 96,726 Jews. This represented 87% of Israel Jews' total growth in 2018. **Figure 8** demonstrates the changes in birth rates and death rates for Jews and Muslims in Israel between 1980 and 2019. The two birth rate lines in a sense mirror each other, with increases in one population matched by decreases in the other one and vice versa. A major adjustment toward lower natality occurred among Israel's Muslims since the end of the 1990s, accompanied by some increase among Jews. Besides different fertility levels, this largely reflected differences and changes in age compositions and age at marriage of the respective populations (Staetsky 2019). Death rates tended to be low and decreasing among both populations, but they were constantly lower among Muslims due to their much younger age composition. Furthermore, in 2018, the overall birthrate of Jews and Others was 20.1 per 1000 population, versus 23.3 per 1000 for all Arabs including Muslims, Christians, and Druze. These differences significantly affected the respective rates of natural increase with the consequence that in 2018 Muslim population growth continued to be significantly higher than that of Jews, and the share of Arabs among total Israelis continued to increase.




Fig. 8 Births and deaths per 1000 population among Jews and Muslims in Israel, 1980-2019

At the time of this writing, the final data on all components of population change for 2018 were not yet released. In 2017, 18,400 Jewish new immigrants and immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time) arrived in Israel, out of a total of 30,700 immigrants including immigrant citizens (meaning 12,300 were not recorded as Jewish). The net balance of Jewish migrants, minus the balance of Jewish Israelis leaving the country and returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad was 13,700. Therefore, an estimated 4,700 Jews (18,400 - 13,700) plus another 2,200 "Others" joined the pool of those who reside abroad permanently or in the long term. These data about Israel's international migration balance point to a steady if moderate level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to quite low levels

of emigration in historical perspective. In 2018, the total number of new immigrants—*'olim hadashim*, not including immigrant citizens—increased slightly to 28,118 from 26,333 the previous year. The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants (Fisher 2013, 2015 and 2019; Waxman 2013; Nissim 2018). In 2017, the net balance of conversions to and from Judaism was negative: -2,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), probably due to revisions in the personal status of some past converts, following stricter rules pursued by Israel's Central Rabbinate. The conversions balance was 500 for Israeli Muslims, and 600 for Christians. Some increase in religious intermarriage existed in Israel, but the levels of ethnoreligious interaction were overall quite low (DellaPergola 2017d).

Turning now to the territorial aggregate of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza—WBG), **Table 9** reports the numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households *and* Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, as well as foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *Law of Return* definition) in each division is also shown. At the beginning of 2019, of a total 6,665,600 *core* Jews, 6,001,700 lived within Israel's pre-1967 borders; 221,800 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 23,200 on the Golan Heights; and 418,900 lived in the West Bank. Over the years, the pace of Jewish internal migration from Israel's main portion to the West Bank was significantly correlated with levels of unemployment and emigration from Israel (DellaPergola 2019b).

In 2019 *core* Jews represented 74.6% of Israel's total *legal* population of 8,970,900, inclusive of 1,878,600 Arabs and others, but excluding 231,000 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel Statistical Monthly). In 2018 (the last year with accessible records), the latter group comprised 88,171 legal foreign workers, 18,059 undocumented foreign workers, 74,000 tourists whose visas had expired, 14,778 refugee seekers, and 37,288 illegal entrants (Israel Population and Migration Authority 2018). Israel's *Law of Return* Jewish population of 7,092,300 in 2019 represented 79.1% of the State's total legal population. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, comprised 20.9% of the total legal population. As shown in **Table 9**, the *Law of Return* Jewish population represented 78.7% of total residents within pre-1967 borders (including foreign workers and refugees), 39.6% in East Jerusalem, 47.7% in the Golan Heights, and 14.1% of the West Bank's total population. Since 2005, no Jewish population remains in Gaza.

Regarding the Palestinian population in WBG, in November 2017 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) undertook a new Census which enumerated 4,705,600 persons, of whom 1,875,300 live in Gaza and 2,830,300 in the West Bank—including 281,200 in East Jerusalem. The Census results were about 250,000 lower than the estimated projection of 4,952,168 available from by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics' web site (PCBS 2018). The PCBS Jerusalem's population estimate clearly was an undercount because of their limited access to the city (PCBS 2008, 2009a, 2009b, and 2018). This would imply an annual growth rate of 1.84% since 2007 in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and 2.84% in Gaza—as against 2.40% for Muslims in Israel

(including East Jerusalem) during the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). These growth rates were much lower than in the past and pointed to significant differentiation within the Arab/Palestine population. Recall that the total rate of growth of Israeli Jews was 1.70% in 2018 with immigration, and 1.47% without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in WBG was decreasing as well due to net emigration. According to Israel's IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria (2018), the total of Palestinians recorded in the West Bank population register approached 3 million, but this figure did not discount sufficiently for Palestinian residents permanently living abroad. Keeping in mind the data in **Figure 8**, among the Arab population both birth rates and death rates probably continued to be somewhat higher in the Palestinian Territory than in Israel, and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. There was a minor internal migration flow from Gaza to the West Bank, estimated at 2,671 persons as of mid-2019 (Hass 2019). In the process, most Christian Palestinians had left Gaza because they felt persecuted there. Our adjusted population estimates for WBG at the beginning of 2019 is 4,482,400, of whom 2,595,900 live in the West Bank and 1,886,500 in Gaza. These figures (always excluding East Jerusalem) are lower than the Palestinian census because they discount for persons, students, and others, who actually resided abroad for more than one year. Other much lower estimates of WBG population (e.g. Zimmerman et al. 2005a and 2005b, Feitelson 2013) rather than ascertained demographic criteria reflect a political stance and should be dismissed (see also Miller 2015). The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 350,600 at the beginning of 2019, and constituted 38.1% of Jerusalem's total population of 920,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Choshen et al. 2010 and 2012, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies 2015, Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2016, DellaPergola 2008b). By summing the 1,878,600 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 4,482,400 estimated Palestinians in WBG, a total of 6,361,000 Arabs/Palestinians obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, versus a total enlarged Jewish population of 7,092,300. **Table 10** reports the percentage of Jews according to the *core* and *Law of Return* definitions, out of the total population of the combined territory of Israel and Palestine. Such percent is conditional upon two factors: the definition of who is a Jew, and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment. Relative to this territorial grand total, we demonstrate the potential effect on the existence and size of a Jewish population majority when gradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab/Palestinian population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is gradual growth of the potential Jewish share of total population, along with hypothesized diminishing territorial and total population extents.

Table 9 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2019^a

Area	Core Jewish Population	Others	Core Jewish and others ^b	Arab population and others	Foreign workers and refugees ^c	Total	Percent of Jews and others ^d
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Grand total	6,665,600	426,700	7,092,300	6,361,000	231,000	13,684,300	51.8
State of Israel^e	6,665,600	426,700	7,092,300	1,878,600	231,000	9,201,900	77.1
<i>Thereof:</i>							
Pre-1967 borders	6,001,700	408,100	6,409,800	1,501,300	231,000	8,142,100	78.7
East Jerusalem ^f	221,800	8,500	230,300	350,600	-	580,900	39.6
Golan Heights	23,200	1,200	24,400	26,700	-	51,100	47.7
West Bank	418,900	8,900	427,800	^g	-	427,800	14.1^h
Palestinian Territory				4,482,400		4,482,400	-
West Bank	i	i	i	2,595,900	-	2,595,900	-
Gaza	0	0	0	1,886,500	-	1,886,500	0.0

a Rounded figures

b Enlarged Jewish population

c All foreign workers, undocumented residents and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders. Source: Israel Population and Migration Authority (2019)

d Column 3 divided by column 6

e As defined by Israel's legal system

f Estimated from Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies (2019)

g Included under Palestinian Territory

h Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction

i Included under State of Israel

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations Population Fund; and author's estimates

Table 10 Percent of core and Law of Return Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2019

Area	Percentage of Jews ^a by definition	
	Core	Law of Return
Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory	48.7	51.8
Minus foreign workers and refugees	49.5	52.7
Minus Gaza	57.6	61.3
Minus Golan Heights	57.8	61.5
Minus West Bank	74.5	79.3
Minus East Jerusalem	77.6	82.5

a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, Arabs and others of mentioned area are deducted and the percentages are recalculated accordingly

Source: Table 9

A total combined Jewish, Arab, and other population of 13,684,300, including foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, lived in Israel and the Palestinian Territory (WBG) at the beginning of 2019. The core Jewish population of 6,665,600 represented 48.7% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel. Thus, by a rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, the extant Jewish majority not only is constantly decreasing but actually does not exist any longer among the broader aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between

the Sea and the River (DellaPergola 2003a, 2003b, 2007a, and 2011a, Soffer and Bistrow 2004, Soffer 2015). If the 426,700 Others (non-Jewish members of Jewish households) are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *Law of Return* Jewish population of 7,092,300 represented 51.8% of the total population in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a tiny majority. If we subtract from the grand total, the 231,000 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations rise to, respectively, 49.5% and 52.7% of the total population legally resident in Israel and the Palestinian Territory estimated at 13,453,300 in 2019. After subtracting the population of Gaza, the percentages of Jews out of total rise to 57.6% (*core*) and 61.3% (*Law of Return*); if subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the Jewish percentages become 57.8% and 61.5%, respectively; if subtracting the Palestinian population of the West Bank, they become 74.5% and 79.3%, respectively; and if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem the percentages rise to 77.6% and 82.5%. Interestingly, the proponents of much lower Palestinian population estimates argue that the percent Jewish (*Law of Return*) out of the total population of Israel and West Bank combined is 65% (Ettinger 2019), versus our estimated 61.5%. A spirited and aggressive polemics has been going on for several years about a modest 3.5% difference. The reality is that under current demographic trends, the rate of erosion of the Jewish majority is about 0.1% per year. The same data are graphically presented in **Figure 9**.




Fig. 9 Percent Jewish out of total population of Israel and Palestine by different territorial and Jewish population definitions, 2019

The United States

In the **US**, in the absence of official census documentation, Jewish population estimates must rely on alternative sources. These are now quite abundant, though of very unequal quality (Goldstein 1981, 1989, 1992; Sheskin 2015a). To assess the current number of Jews in the US one should consider three issues: (1) The need to rely on reasoning and empirical evidence grounded in *demographic concepts and research techniques* (discussed above and elsewhere in greater detail, see DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2011a, 2012, 2014a, 2014c, 2014d, and 2014e); (2) The definitional predicament already discussed above. To perform comparisons over time constant *definition* assumptions are needed. Given ongoing acculturation and assimilation trends in America, but also new meanings attributed to Jewish identity or the rediscovery of submerged identities from the past, group definitions today often may not be the same as past ones; (3) The broader *narratives* within which one seeks to place the findings and their interpretations (Kaufman 2014). Intriguingly, competing narratives and non-comparable empirical and definitional approaches stand behind diverging US Jewish population estimates, with a high-low gap of nearly two million individuals. Opposite interpretations circulate of current and expected trends: rapid growth, stability, or slow decline. Previous to and following the 2013 Pew survey of Jewish Americans, intense debate in and outside the social scientific community entails very different implications at the cognitive level and for Jewish community service planning, matched by a lively media discussion (Heilman 2005, 2013; Pew Research Center 2013; *The Jewish Daily Forward* 2014). The unescapable underlying condition—hardly acknowledged in professional let alone publicist debate—is the end of a clear dichotomy between Jews and non-Jews in the US (DellaPergola 2015b).

The quest for US Jewish population estimates relies on three major strategies (DellaPergola 2013a). The **first** is to bridge across numerous different national Jewish population estimates available over the years by assessing intervening demographic changes: births and deaths, incoming and outgoing international migration, and identification changes such as accessions to and secessions from identifying as Jewish. In the US, several major data sources allow for a detailed reconstruction of nationwide Jewish population trends since the end of World War II to date. For all purposes, the logic of working nationally to obtain a *national* population estimate is the same logic that explains why, since 1790, a national population census (and not a compilation of local statistics) was held in the US (US Bureau of the Census). The **second** strategy pursued since the beginnings of US Jewish population studies in the early 1940s (Linfield 1942; Robison 1943), is to construct a national total from a compilation of existing local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). The **third** more recent strategy is to construct a national total through a meta-analysis of a pool of national and local surveys periodically undertaken by public and private bodies, each of which include a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Of the three alternatives, only the first was designed to determine nationwide Jewish population estimates. The second and third methodologies were not, but they do provide valuable grounds for comparative analytic work and in-depth multivariate analysis (Hartman and Sheskin 2012).

Serious attempts to monitor Jewish population size over time at the national level require a reliable baseline figure and updates based on solid empirical research. Each of the existing sources is imperfect, but they do amount to an impressive body of evidence:

from historical assessment (Rosenwaike 1980), through the US Census of Religious Bodies (Schwartz et al. 2002), the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969), the 1971 National Jewish Population Study – NJPS 1971 (Massarik 1974; Lazerwitz 1978), the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey – NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991), NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001). These various data sets fit well one with another when performing forward-backward Jewish population projections as well as checking with all available data on international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions to and from Judaism (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983 and 1988, DellaPergola et al. 1999 and 2000, DellaPergola 2005 and 2013a, Perlmann 2007). NJPS 2000-01 yielded an initial estimate of 5,200,000 after imputation of persons in homes for the elderly, prisons, military bases, and other institutional settings (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). Further cohort analysis and projections unveiled under-coverage of over 250,000 individuals born between 1950 and 1970 (Saxe et al. 2006a, 2007; Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). Evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality, accessions, and secessions provided revised estimates of 5,367,000 for 2000-01, and 5,425,000 for 2013—not including the institutionalized (DellaPergola 2013a). A rounded core Jewish population estimate could thus be placed at 5.6-5.7 million around 2010, and this indeed was the estimate suggested by a 2007 Pew survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008; Rebhun 2016). The 2015 Pew study of the US religious landscape confirmed the same orders of magnitude with a slightly higher percent of Jews among the total US adult population (1.9% versus 1.8%), well within the margins of sampling error (Pew Research Center 2015b). The 2013 Pew *A Portrait of Jewish Americans* (Pew Research Center 2013) found 4.2 million adults and 900,000 children, for a total of 5.1 million Americans with *Jewish religion* (Jews by religion or JBRs) without other religious identities. Another 600,000 persons—500,000 adults and 100,000 children—reported *no religion and Jewish* (“Jews, no religion” or JNRs) without another identity, raising the total to a 5.7 million mutually exclusive Jewish population. This 5.7 million estimate more or less corresponded to a *core* Jewish population concept relying on self-assessment and mutual exclusiveness between religious or ethno-religious populations, and as noted, was fully consistent with the whole body of research on US Jewry since 1957.

As against this quite impressive body of evidence, higher Jewish population estimates were provided by research that instead of one national comprehensive source used compilations of many different smaller databases. Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin and Dashefsky evaluate the US Jewish population at 6,968,000 (see Chapter 5 in this volume). This would be an increase of about 1,000,000 over the 1990 *American Jewish Year Book* estimate obtained with the same method. The claimed—though not demonstrated—determinants of this 17% increase include the migration of Jews from the FSU, Israel, Latin America, and other countries.

While local Jewish community studies still are the most important tool for local Jewish community planning, the methodology of summing local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves recognize (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010 and 2017; Sheskin 2008 and 2009). One should acknowledge the diversity of databases and definitions, the lack of synchronization in time, and the very uneven quality of the technical procedures followed, including sometimes embarrassing skill gaps across

different polling firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates, which as noted local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community summations may risk cumulating significant errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006; Groeneman and Smith 2009).

The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) meta-analysis of a large set of general social surveys is an innovative and ambitious undertaking in the social scientific study of American Jews called the American Jewish Population Project (AJPP) (Saxe et al. 2006b; Tighe et al. 2005, 2009a, 2009b). The Jewish population estimate suggested by SSRI for 2019, based on a synthesis of surveys of the general public conducted between 2012 and 2018, was 7,478,600, plus or minus a margin of error of over 300,000 (SSRI 2019a, Saxe 2019). This figure implies that, since 1990, American Jewry increased by nearly two million persons or about 36%, quite higher than the 32% increase for the US total population and much higher than the 5% increase for non-Hispanic whites. (The Hispanic population increased by 163% from 1990 to 2017. The African Americans population increased by 38%.) Pew (2013) reports that 93% of American Jews are non-Hispanic whites. Thus, this alleged Jewish population growth of 36% does not seem to be in accordance with extant census data and raises serious questions about the SSRI methodology. Indeed, the AJPP estimated that at least 70,000 Jewish babies were born annually in the US, and that a majority of US Jews did not adhere to any of the major Jewish religious denominations (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These figures can be plausible only if one adopts, rather than a *core* concept of individually-identified Jews, a broadly *enlarged* concept of total population with Jewish background (as already anticipated by Tobin and Groeneman 2003).

Five important caveats should be stressed concerning the SSRI Jewish population estimates (SSRI 2019b):

(a) Jews are over-represented in general sample surveys because of their higher socioeconomic status and educational attainment, and their relatively lower presence among people difficult to cover like the homeless, those without a functioning telephone, or prisoners;

(b) using a sample of US adults—like in the case of most general survey respondents—to obtain estimates for the total population ignores the comparatively lower percentage of children among Jews and thus inflates the Jewish estimate;

(c) in turn the SSRI allocation of children explicitly uses Pew 2013 estimates which include children defined as partly Jewish or of Jewish background;

(d) projecting percentages of Jews among the total population, hence population size, from the percentage of Jewish respondents out of all respondents ignores the multi-religious composition of many Jewish households and thus factors non-Jews into Jewish population estimates; and

(e) the criteria used to estimate the broader aggregate also including Jews of no religion, based on survey data on Jews by religion are problematic.

The latter point (using data on Jews by religion to estimate Jews of no religion) is important in view of attempts to estimate Jewish populations based in surveys which, as they do, include *Jewish* as one option in a question on religious identity (Magidin de Kramer et al. 2018, Hackett 2014). In the SSRI meta-analysis, Jewish population is assessed at the county level through a logistic regression model that predicts the

likelihood an adult identifies as Jewish when asked their religion. Factors involved in weighting across the sample of surveys in the model include geographic distribution, sex, age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment. The model is fit using Bayesian Multilevel estimation with post-stratification (BMP) (SSRI 2019c). In other words, Jewishness of an individual is determined by a blind statistical iteration whose margin of error can be substantial, and not through a direct investigation of the personal religious or otherwise cultural identity of the interviewees. Even if the Jews by religion estimates were accurate, the further attempt to extrapolate the "real" number of Jews from sources that only deal with religion—instead of directly ascertaining the multivariate nature of Jewish identification—are at best speculative. The SSRI estimate of 4.4 million adults *Jews by religion* in 2019 was quite similar to the 4.2 million found by the 2013 Pew survey (Pew Research Center 2013). The SSRI estimate then, while rejecting the reliability of national surveys like Pew, built its own models of the proportion of persons of Jewish origin who declare not to have a religion. The 2013 Pew survey—besides 5.1 million *Jews by religion* (4.2 million adults and 900,000 children)—indeed found 600,000 persons (500,000 adults and 100,000 children) with *no religion and Jewish*, and one million persons (600,000 adults and 400,000 children) with *no religion and partly Jewish* (DellaPergola 2015b). The total of 6.7 million designated in the Pew report as *the net Jewish population* estimate included that million. A further 2.4 million non-Jewish adults with 1.5 million children, for a total of 3.9 million, reported a *Jewish background*. Of these, about one-third had at least one Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013), thus raising the total population with at least one Jewish parent (PJP) to about 8 million (6.7 + 1.3). The about two-thirds with a Jewish background who did not have a Jewish parent, further expanded the collective to 10.6 million. An additional 1.2 million non-Jewish adults reported some *Jewish affinity*, raising the figure to 11.8 million, not including the children of the latter group. Some of these broader definitions better conform to our *Jewish parents*, *Jewish enlarged*, or *Law of Return* population definitions.

The 2013 Pew study actually confirmed some well-known demographic patterns of US Jews, namely postponed marriage, non-marriage, and small family size (Barack Fishman and Cohen 2017; Hartman 2017). Intermarriage was assessed at 58% of the latest marriage cohorts based on an *extended* Jewish population definition and showing an increase over previous cohorts. Identification with Judaism among children of intermarriages, though on the increase (Sasson et al. 2017), continued to fall below the 50% of all such children and younger adults nationally, which would be the precondition to maintain demographic stability or even determine quantitative gains from intermarriage (Barack Fishman 2004; Dashefsky with Heller 2008; Rebhun 2013; Phillips 2013 and 2018). Seven percent of the children raised in in-married households were raised as non-Jews (probably children from previous marriages) versus 67% among intermarried couples.

The current aging composition of US Jewry (also acknowledged by the SSRI study) and other evidence about age-specific birth and death rates based on standard demographic models, plausibly generates annually fewer *Jewish* births nationally (by the *core* definition) than the estimated number of Jewish deaths. The Jewish death rate in the US is one of the least investigated topics in the field of Jewish demographic research and it would be a fair research priority to try to assess it empirically.

Jewish immigration to the US nearly stopped from the FSU but continued at moderate levels from other countries in Western Europe, Latin America, and, to some extent, other countries in the Middle East and South Africa. The evidence for Israelis in the US shows a significant reduction in the influx, largely compensated by returns to Israel (Gold and Phillips 1996, Gold 2002, Cohen 2009, Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010, Rebhun 2014, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). The number of Israel residents who were allowed lawful permanent resident status in the US was 4,324 in 2015, 4,652 in 2016, and 4,227 in 2017 (US Department of Homeland Security 2017). Accounting for other Jewish migration to the US, and discounting for the about 2,500 yearly emigrants to Israel, an annual net migration into the US of 5,000 Jews (or slightly more) can be estimated. In other words, net immigration balances the losses due to the likely excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births (stressing the *core* definition), and the balance of accessions to minus secessions from Judaism. Shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society are comparatively more frequent than in other countries. Different surveys found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose membership, while evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the “religiously undefined” (“none” and not reported) tended to gain (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin et al. 2001; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008; Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Smith 2009; Pew Research Center 2015a). By the Pew 2013 survey, total secessions from Judaism were double the number of accessions; and by the 2015 Pew survey of the US religious landscape, the net balance of changes of religion resulted in a total lifetime loss of 600,000 persons for the Jewish side (Pew Research Center 2015b). Based on several comparable measures of Jewish identification, the *partly Jewish no-religion* individuals, mainly the children of intermarriages, looked in 2013 more similar to *non-Jews with Jewish background* than to Jews with no religion (*JNRs*), or to Jews by religion for that matter (DellaPergola 2015b).

Following these observations, relying on the 2013 Pew survey and its subsequent updates, stressing that the true predicament of American Jewish demography concerns population definitions, and following the assumption that Jewish identity is mutually exclusive versus other competing religious and ethnic identities, our *core* Jewish population estimate remained stable at 5,700,000 for 2019—the world's second largest. This might be a slight underestimate and national surveys that might be conducted in the near future will clarify the matter. Broader definitional criteria naturally generate higher estimates. Including the partly Jewish with no religion and the pertinent portion of non-Jews with declared Jewish background, about eight million Americans have at least one Jewish parent. The *enlarged* total population including non-Jews in Jewish households approaches ten million. The *Law of Return* population probably approaches twelve million. By each of these expanded criteria, the number of persons included is significantly larger than in Israel.

France

France has the largest Jewish community in Europe. A 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohen with Ifergan 2003). Several follow-ups (Cohen 2005, 2007, 2013b) indicated a decreasing Jewish population, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to

Canada, the US, and other countries. A survey (Ifop 2015) addressed an enlarged definition of the Jewish population in France but did not provide conclusive information about the size of the Jewish community. Instead, it offered important insights about their past and prospective migration. In retrospect, 39% reported they had relatives living in Israel compared to 31% who had relatives in another country (especially the US, Canada, and the UK). This would correspond to a migrant ratio of 56% to Israel compared to 44% to other countries. Regarding possible future migration, 13% reported they were seriously considering moving to Israel and another 30% had thought about it. The corresponding percentages for migrating to other countries were 13% and 33%, respectively. A previous survey of French Jewish adults age 18 to 40 about their expected country of residence in five years found that 33% expected to be living in France, 26% in Israel, 14% in another country, and 27% were not sure (Cohen 2013a). The 2012 European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) survey on perceptions of antisemitism in EU countries unveiled that over 40% of French Jews had considered emigrating (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013). Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually for several years, actually increased to a historical peak of 6,627 in 2015, and lowered again to 2,431 in 2018, for a total of over 48,000 between 2001 and 2018. Jewish emigration was also directed toward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of antisemitism, in part stemming from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Assuming Israel attracted half to two-thirds of the total who departed France, between 72,000 and 96,000 Jews and family members emigrated from France since 2001. Some of these returned to France in the meantime, thus reducing the impact of net migration. Currently more than half of Jews live in the Greater Paris metropolitan region (Cohen with Ifergan 2003; Ifop 2015). Jews of Sephardi ancestry, mostly first, second, or third generation immigrants from North Africa, clearly predominate numerically over those of Central-Eastern European origin who, until World War II, constituted the main component of the Jewish population. Considering these trends, our 2019 core estimate for French Jewry decreased to 450,000—the third largest Jewish population in the world.

Canada

In **Canada**, the quinquennial Census, and more recently National Household Survey (NHS) data on Jewish ethnicity (Statistics Canada 2019)—released in years ending with the digit 1 or 6—can be compared with data on religion—released every decade in years ending with the digit 1 (Statistics Canada 2003a and 2003b, Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2015, 2016 and 2017). Information on religion and ancestry was customarily collected through open-ended questions, where *Jewish* was one of the examples provided as a possible response. The 2016 NHS broke with this tradition and did not provide *Jewish* as an example. Probably as a consequence, the number reporting a Jewish ethnicity collapsed to 143,665 in 2016 from 309,650 in 2011. This makes the new data virtually unusable (see Chapter 7 in this volume). Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, can include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are *not* included in the *core* concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion who declare a Jewish ethnicity (single or part of a multiple choice) are included in the *core*. The Jewish Federations of Canada-

UIA defined this as the *Jewish Standard Definition* (Torczyner et al. 1993, Shahar 2004). The newly suggested *Revised Jewish Standard Definition* also accounts for: a) persons with no religious affiliation, but who are Israeli by ethnicity; b) persons with no religious affiliation, but with knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish as a “non-official” language; c) persons with no religious affiliation but who were born in Israel; and d) persons with no religious affiliation who lived in Israel in 2006 (Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2014, 2015 and 2016). This definition provided an estimate of 391,665 in 2011. The latter figure is not strictly comparable with the *core* Jewish population as it includes the fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, some of whom would better be included among the *Jewish parents* Jewish population. In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were Jewish by religion (Weinfeld et al. 2012). Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past decades provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. A total of 293,175 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of nearly 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 309,650 in 2011. Striking changes actually affected the distribution of Canadians and of Jews among them, by single and multiple ethnicities. The ongoing growth of a new *Canadian* ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new *American* ethnic identity in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). In 1981, 90% or 264,025 of total ethnic Jews declared Jewish as their single ethnicity, but this share decreased to 66% (245,580) in 1991, 53% (186,475) in 2001, 43% (134,045) in 2006, and 37% (115,640) in 2011. Such sharp decrease in Jewish ethnic identification can be explained by an increase in intermarriage which generates growing multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews (Goldman 2009), but also indicates that the relevance of Jewish ethnic (unlike religious) identity is rapidly diminishing, at least as a mutually exclusive category. A systematic evaluation of the Jewish ethnicity variable in the 2016 census (Smith and McLeish 2019) shows the full picture of passages from Jewish and non-Jewish ethnicity declarations, and vice versa, between the 2011 and 2016 censuses. Ethnic origins that replaced *Jewish* mostly included Eastern European countries but also a 4.7% of *Israeli*. The dropping of Jewish ethnicity increased along with increasing generational seniority and acculturation in Canada. It was proportionally more frequent among those listing no religion or religion other than Jewish. On the other hand, among those *adding* Jewish as an ethnicity between 2011 and 2016, the plurality were Christians. While the decrease in responses for *Jewish* as an ethnic origin in 2016 was likely driven by the fact that *Jewish* was no longer among the list of ethnic origin examples, response mobility involving the Jewish ethnic origin is part of a larger pattern that predates the 2016 Census (Smith and McLeish 2019). These trends are confirmed by a 2018 large independent representative survey of Canadian Jews (Brym, Neuman and Lenton 2019). As a general pattern, Canadian Jews displayed significantly higher levels of Jewish identification than Jews in the US (Pew Research Center 2013). Indicators of Jewish religious identification appeared much more resilient than indicators of Jewish ethnicity and community participation (Brym, Slavina, and Lenton 2019). Overall, between 2001 and 2011, 21,445 Jews by religion immigrated into Canada, mostly from the FSU, and were reported in Canada in the 2011 NHS. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion which was stable over the same ten years would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decrease of 6.5%) were it not for immigration. This, besides minor emigration, reflects a negative balance between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and passages of people from

self-definition as Jews by religion to self-definition of Jews with no religion. Compounding the effects of continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition because of aging and cultural assimilation, we estimate the Jewish population to have slightly increased in 2018 to 392,000 in 2019—the world’s fourth largest Jewish community.

United Kingdom

In the **United Kingdom**, the 2011 Census, including regional totals for Scotland and Northern Ireland, suggested a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 271,259 in 2011 (+1.69%) (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2002 and 2012, United Kingdom National Records of Scotland NRS 2011, Miller et al. 1996, Kosmin and Waterman 2002, Graham et al. 2007, Graham and Waterman 2005 and 2007, Voas 2007, Graham and Vulkan 2007, Graham 2013a and 2013b, Boyd and Staetsky 2013, Graham and Caputo 2015, Staetsky and Boyd 2015). The 2001 national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century and apparently somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry (Graham 2011). In 2011, the response rate significantly increased in those areas (Graham et al. 2012). Those who did not report a religion nationally rose from 23% in 2001 to 32% in 2011, but in view of the organized Jewish community’s encouragement to participate in the Census, Jewish population was probably less affected by the increase in *no religion* and *not reported*. Mainstream British Jewry is aging, but the higher participation of Haredi Jews in the Census is reflected in a rejuvenating age composition, with an absolute increase of 3% in the percentage under age 15 and a 1% decrease in the percentage age 65 and over. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns. A reversal has occurred in recent years from a long negative to a positive balance of Jewish births and deaths (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit 2005, Vulkan 2012, Casale Mashiah 2018). Intermarriage was on the rise, too, though at moderate levels compared with most other European and Western countries, from 11% of all couples in 1965-69 to 26% in 2010-13 (Graham 2016 and 2018). Synagogue membership in the UK significantly decreased over time (Casale Mashiah and Boyd 2017). In 2016, 79,597 Jewish households across the UK held synagogue membership, against 92,653 in 1995. While total Jewish households declined from 147,349 in 2001 to 141,503 in 2016, the number of synagogues actually increased from 328 in 1983 to 454 in 2016. The denominational balance also significantly shifted. Between 2010 and 2016, synagogue membership declined by 7.5% for the Central Orthodox, 4.1% for the Reform, 9.1% for the Liberal, and 21.4% for the Sephardi; membership increased by 15.5% for the Masorti, and by 18.4% for the Strictly Orthodox. Jewish education was growing, confirming the growing impact of the Haredi sector on the Jewish birth rate (Staetsky and Boyd 2016). Allowing also for some immigration, we upwardly revised our estimate the UK’s core Jewish population at 292,000 in 2019—the fifth largest Jewish community in the world.

Argentina

Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—following the bankruptcy of the country's Central Bank, dire economic conditions, and special incentives offered by Israel. Subsequently, the economic situation stabilized and emigration diminished (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). By 2014, 4,400 persons lived in Jewish households in Miami in which at least one adult was Argentinian (Sheskin 2015b). A 2004 Jewish population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005) found an *enlarged* Jewish population of 244,000 as part of the over 300,000 who were identified as in some way of Jewish origin or living with a person of Jewish origin. Of the former, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered self as totally or partly Jewish. Other research suggested significant aging of the *core* Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005) and growing interreligious couples (Erdei 2014). Argentina's Jewish population was assessed at 180,000 in 2019—the world's sixth largest Jewish community.

Russia

In the **Russian Federation**, Jewish population continued its downward course in the context of a country whose general population had been diminishing for years and only recently started to slowly recover (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015). After the compulsory item on ethnicity (*natsyonalnost*) on identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question became optional, the 2010 Russian Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another 41,000 undeclared people who likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600 in 2010 (Tolts 2011). The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our *core* Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, extrapolated from a February 1994 Russian Federation Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Goskomstat 1994; Tolts 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Comparing the totals and main geographical distributions in 2002 and 2010 (adjusted for under enumeration), the Jewish population diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration, aging, and a negative balance of births and deaths (Tolts 2018). Over 93,000 (*enlarged*) Jews migrated to Israel between 2001 and 2018. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and this basic configuration was not much altered through emigration or vital events. The striking negative balance of Jewish births and deaths, and the recent surge in Jewish emigration generated an extremely elderly age composition and continuing population decrease, only partially compensated by migration from other FSU republics and a moderate amount of returns of previous migrants to Israel (Tolts 2003, 2009, and 2015, Cohen 2009). We evaluated Russia's Jewish population at 165,000 in 2019—the world's seventh largest Jewish community.

Germany

In **Germany**, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, brought to the country large numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish household members until 2005. This caused a significant boost in the Jewish population that had previously relied on a few Shoah survivors and several thousand immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. Immigration from the FSU diminished to a few hundred annually after the German government, under pressure because of growing unemployment and a struggling welfare system, reduced the benefits to Jewish immigrants (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz et al. 2002; Erlanger 2006). In 2018, 343 new immigrants from the FSU were added to Jewish community membership (besides 251 from other countries: Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2019), versus a peak of 8,929 in 1999. The total number of *core* Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 at the beginning of 2007, diminished gradually to 96,325 in 2019.

Most of the growth was in the *Länders* (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (West Germany). Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographical absorption of immigrants, no specific area became dominant in Jewish population distribution. The main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rein-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin. The community-registered Jewish population in Berlin, despite wide reports of a huge increase, diminished from 10,009 at the beginning of 2007 to 9,255 in 2019. There is some evidence that Jews who are registered elsewhere might in reality be now living in Berlin (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012 and 2015, Glöckner 2013, Rebhun et al. 2016). At the end of 2014, the number of officially recorded Israelis in Berlin was 3,991 (plus 2,774 with dual citizenship) versus 3,065 in 2011. This does not account for Israelis and others who may have acquired German citizenship but who do not reside in Germany. Between 2000 and 2015, 33,321 Israelis were granted German citizenship, of which 31,722 kept it and 1,599 renounced it (Harpaz 2013; *Times of Israel* 2017).

German Jews are very aged. In 2018, 227 Jewish births and 1,572 Jewish deaths were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of 1,345 Jews (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2019). Especially births may suffer of underreporting because of the lack of incentives to register. German Jewry surely enjoys new opportunities for religious, social, and cultural life, but also significantly depends on welfare and elderly services (Schoeps, Jasper, and Vogt 1999). Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and the choice by some Jews, including temporary migrants, not to affiliate, we estimated Germany's *core* Jewish population at 118,000 in 2019—the world's eighth largest Jewish community.

Australia and New Zealand

Australia's 2016 Census quite surprisingly recorded 91,022 Jews, a decline of 6.5% versus 2011. The explanation is easily found in changes introduced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the Census form. The option *No religion* was moved from the bottom to the top in the list of printed options. The result was a dramatic increase by

45.5% in the number of all Australians reporting no religion. Several other religions lost respondents: Anglicans 15.7%, Eastern Orthodox 10.7%, Catholics, 2.7%, and Other Christians 4.7%. Judaism did not appear as a printed option in the questionnaire but only as a write-in option. The suggestion of the *No religion* response option as the first on the list must have affected reporting of Judaism as well. The 2011 Census had reported a Jewish population of 97,336, compared to 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2007, 2012; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2012, 2014a, 2014b). In view of the general non-response to the 2016 question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000 in 2011, a ten-year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2014a).

The Jewish population is highly concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney, which in 2016 together comprised about 85% of the total. Inter-marriage in Australia was less frequent than in most other Western large and medium-size communities, but it was on the rise and affecting the effective Jewish birth rate (Graham 2018). The community's rather old age composition reflects a fairly high death rate (Eckstein 2009; Markus et al. 2009; Markus et al. 2011; Forrest and Sheskin 2014). Yet, there possibly existed a small positive difference between an estimated 1,200 Jewish births and about 900 Jewish funerals around 2016 (Graham and Narunski 2019). Factors of Jewish population growth were continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, and moderate though rising inter-marriage rates. Based on the new *GEN17 Australian Jewish Community Survey* (Graham and Markus 2018), and a re-evaluation of the 2016 census (Graham and Narunski 2019), we upwardly corrected the previous *core* Jewish population estimate by 4,500, raising it to 118,000 in 2019—the world's ninth largest.

In **New Zealand**, likewise Australia, the 2018 census form did not list Judaism (nor other religions) as explicit options as in past censuses and left respondents the choice to write-in their preferred denominations. As a consequence, the percent of those not reporting a religion increased by 38% versus the previous census of 2013. The Jewish population apparently decreased by 23%, to 5,274. Of these, 3,348 reported Judaism (no further denomination specified), 327 Conservative Judaism, 792 Orthodox Judaism, and 807 Reform Judaism (Statistics New Zealand 2018). In consideration of the evident under-reporting of religion in the 2018 census we kept our estimate of Jews in New Zealand at 7,500.

Brazil

In **Brazil**, the 2010 Census reported a national total of 107,329 Jews, of whom 105,432 lived in urban localities and 1,987 in rural localities (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística IBGE 2010). The census classified Brazil's population by color, and among Jews, 94,575 were white, 10,429 brown, 1,690 black, 492 yellow, and 143 indigenous. By region, 79,910 lived in the Southeast including the major cities, 12,963 in the South, 4,266 in the Northeast, 2,367 in the North, and 1,394 in the Central West (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 1991 and 2000; Decol 1999 and 2009). The 2010 census found 51,050 Jews in São Paulo state—36% more than in 2000. While an upward adjustment is reasonable, a 36% increase is not unless the previous census was badly incomplete. There also was a 2.5% increase in Rio de Janeiro (24,451 in 2010) and a

decrease of 8.7% in the rest of the Southeastern and Southern states (overall 17,372 in 2010). What cannot be attributed to demography and likely reflects new emerging identifications or misclassifications is a decennial increase of over 8,000 people (+125%) in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-Western states. These growing numbers in the least developed and more peripheral regions of Brazil, but to some extent also in São Paulo, point to inclusion as Jews in the Census population of many thousands of persons who in all probability belong to Evangelical sects and Jehovah's Witnesses, besides possible cases of *Converso* Jewish ancestry. Census data for São Paulo were consistent with systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the local Jewish Federation that found 47,286 Jews (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002, Milkewitz et al. 2014). Allowing for moderate but growing emigration, our assessment of Brazil's core Jewish population stands at 92,600 in 2019—the world's tenth largest Jewish community.

South Africa

According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population of South Africa was 61,675, out of a reported total of 75,555 including nonwhites. Some of these nonwhites may identify with Jewish ancestry, but most probably pertain to messianic Christian denominations. Factoring in an evaluation of the national white non-response rate (14%) and additional factors led to a revised estimate of 72,000 (Saks 2003). After the major wave of departures just before the 1994 internal transfer of power from the apartheid regime to a democratic government, South African Jewry was relatively stable (Dubb 1994; Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006; Raijman 2016). However, due to the attrition of continuing emigration to Australia, Israel and other countries, and also because of diminishing birth rates versus relatively steady numbers of burials and cremations, the Jewish population surely declined. Jewish school enrollment data were quite stable, but they can mask growing enrollment of non-Jewish pupils. Pending more definitive evidence, we cautiously revised the estimate of South Africa's Jewish population at 67,500 in 2019—the world's eleventh largest Jewish community.

Ukraine

In **Ukraine**, the December 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews (Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). The 2010 census could not be implemented. Instability, internal cleavage, and war in Ukraine resulted in continuing Jewish emigration and population decline. Over 75,000 (enlarged) Jews migrated to Israel between 2001 and 2018. Between 1989 and 2001, the Jewish population—80% Russian speakers—diminished more sharply in the Western regions where the share of Russians was relatively lower. Patterns of decline of ethnic Russians were similar. The overwhelming concentration of Ukraine's Jews in regions with a predominantly Russian (and often pro-Russian) environment under military dangers had obviously negative consequences for the Jewish community. The 2001 census included 5,816 Jews in Crimea, subsequently annexed by Russia and where in 2014 a special census found 3,374 Jews (Rosstat 2014). Considering continuing emigration, we assess the 2019 *core* Jewish population at 48,000—the world's twelfth largest Jewish community.

Other Central and South American Countries

In **Mexico**, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2010 Census reported a Jewish population of 59,161, plus another 8,315 *Neo Israelitas* (New Jews), for a total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these, 62,913—55,138 Jews and 7,775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática 2002). Projecting the number of Jews age 5 and over to an estimate inclusive of children age 0-4, the total Jewish population in 2000 would be about 49,000. An in-depth analysis of the 1970 Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) already had unveiled a significant presence, among those defined as Jews, of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment, exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and reportedly shoeless (*descalzos*). The further inclusion of a category of *Neo Israelitas* in 2010 leaves open the question of the attribution to Judaism of a population possibly comprising followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as descendants of *Conversos*. For the Federal Capital's metropolitan area, Jewish population surveys and other research found general stability of the Jewish population at numbers similar to the Census concerning a conventional definition (Comunidad Judía de México 2015, Bokser Liwerant 2013, Comité Central Israelita de México 2006, Comité Central Israelita de México 2000, DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). Some international migration operated both ways. Our 2019 Jewish population estimate was kept at 40,000—the world's fourteenth largest Jewish community.

In **Chile**—on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2003) and an earlier Jewish population survey (Berger et al. 1995)—the relatively stable core Jewish population was assessed at 18,300 in 2019—the world's nineteenth largest.

Uruguay experienced continuing Jewish emigration (Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006; Shorer Kaplan 2016). The Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was assessed at 16,600 in 2019—the world's twentieth largest Jewish community.

Panama over the last twenty years received several thousand Jewish immigrants, mostly from other Latin American countries. Its Jewish population in 2019 was estimated at 10,000—the world's twenty-fifth largest Jewish community.

The Jewish community of **Venezuela** now estimated at 7,000, continued to shrink rapidly following political chaos and lack of security in the country.

Other European Union Countries

In **Hungary**, Jewish population trends reflect the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population has been diminishing for several years (Stark 1995, Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002, Kovács 2013a, Population Reference Bureau 2019). A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger *enlarged* Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004). In the 2011 Hungarian Census, only 10,965 reported themselves as Jewish by religion,

compared to 13,000 in 2001, clearly an underestimate but indicative of a trend (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2003 and 2013). A new survey in 2017, confirming the substantial gaps in Jewish population size according to different definitions, suggested a minimum-maximum range of 58,936-110,679 Jews for 2015 (Kovács and Barna 2018). Our *core* estimate for 2019, closer to the low of the range, was 47,300—the world’s thirteenth largest Jewish community.

In the **Netherlands**, a survey in 2009 found high levels of intermarriage, a growing percentage of elderly, and an increase in the number of Israelis (van Solinge and de Vries 2001, Kooyman and Almagor 1996, van Solinge and van Praag 2010, Tanenbaum and Kooyman 2014). Out of an *enlarged* Jewish population of 52,000, 25% had a Jewish mother and 30% had a Jewish father. Accounting for aging and assuming incoming migration tended to balance emigration, our Jewish population estimate was 29,800 for 2018, the fifteenth largest Jewish community in the world.

In **Belgium**, quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from other countries (Cohn 2003, Ben Rafael 2013). Some emigration reflected growing concerns about Islamization, terrorism, and antisemitism. The Jewish population was estimated at 29,100 in 2019, the world’s sixteenth largest Jewish community.

In **Italy**, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country’s Jewish population—decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 23,361 in 2018 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002, 2010, 2018; Lattes 2005, Campelli 2013, Campelli 2016). Our 2019 estimate of 27,400—the world’s seventeenth largest Jewish community—considers some increase of conversions to Judaism and recent emigration.

In **Sweden**, the Jewish population was estimated at 15,000 in 2019—the world’s twenty-first largest Jewish community, based on a local survey and on a total estimate of the affiliated community of about 5,600 (Dencik 2003 and 2013).

In **Spain**, the Jewish population estimate of 11,700 in 2019—the world’s twenty-third largest Jewish community—reflected some continuing immigration from Latin America but also continuing emigration. The Spanish government 2015 initiative to offer Spanish citizenship to Jews able to demonstrate ancestry from the medieval expulsion, after a slow beginning, gathered momentum, reaching 132,226 requests (Jones 2019). Most requests came from Latin American countries, 5,400 came from the US, and 4,900 from Israel. The actual number of naturalizations was expected to be much lower given the quite stringent criteria requested, such as knowledge of Spanish, of the Spanish Constitution, and of Iberian culture. The majority of these requests from Latin American countries probably concerned persons who were not themselves part of the core Jewish population or Law of Return definition but belonged to more distant Jewish identification circles.

A similar law was approved in 2015 in **Portugal** (with an estimated permanent Jewish population provisionally estimated at 600 in 2019) to atone for the expulsions from that part of the Iberian Peninsula (BBC 2015). Brexit fueled an increase in the number of applications for Portuguese citizenship.

In **Austria**, updated Jewish community records and state vital statistics (Statistik Austria 2019, Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019b) suggested an upward revision to a new

2019 10,000 estimate—the world's twenty-fourth largest Jewish community.

In **Poland** the 2011 Census found about 2,000 persons who indicated Jewish as their only ethnicity and an additional about 5,000 persons who indicated Jewish as their second ethnicity after a mostly Polish first one (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2012). Jewish community membership was reported at 1,222. We provisionally adopted an estimate of 4,500 assuming one half of those reporting multiple ethnicities would fall within the *core* Jewish population definition.

In **Ireland**, according to the 2016 census, there were 2,557 Jews, a 28.9% increase from 2011 (Ireland Central Statistics Office 2012 and 2017).

Other European Countries

In **Switzerland**, in light of Census and emigration data, the estimate was updated to 18,700 in 2018 (Statistik Schweiz 2005, 2012)—the world's eighteenth largest Jewish community.

In **Turkey**, a 2002 survey in Istanbul indicated widespread aging in a community that since has experienced growing emigration and population decline (Filiba 2003, Tuval 2004, Kubovich 2016). Most of the Jews live in Istanbul's European neighborhoods. The 2019 estimate was 14,800 Jews—the world's twenty-second largest Jewish community.

In **Gibraltar** we upwardly adjusted the estimate to 700 in 2019.

Section 5 Major Cities and Metropolitan Areas

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for Jews to live in major metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas, too, Jews have manifested unique propensities to settle or resettle in specific neighborhoods that were more compatible with their socioeconomic status, and/or more attractive to them because of the vicinity of employment or Jewish community facilities (DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015). Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions of urban areas vary by country. It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jews in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. For example, in the case of a recent Jewish population study of the service area of UJA/Federation of New York (Cohen, Ukeles, and Miller 2012), we subtracted about 100,000 individuals of the 1,538,000 that were included in the Jewish population count because they were neither born Jewish nor had converted to Judaism. We therefore do not consider them part of the core Jewish population. A similar bias affects the Jewish population estimate for the San Francisco Bay CSA (Phillips 2005). Note that elsewhere in this volume, Sheskin and Dashefsky rely mostly on the estimates resulting from definitions used by the local Jewish federations and often end up with what we define as an enlarged population with Jewish parents (PJP), although not one that includes non-Jews living in households with Jews. The urban areas reported here for the US are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), whereas in previous years we reported data for larger Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSAs).

Therefore, some of this year's estimates may look lower than in previous years. Similar changes in the definition of Metropolitan areas affected past data for Israel.

The unequivocal outcome of the overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is shown by the fact that in 2019 more than half (53.4%) of world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). These five areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York-Newark-Jersey City, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim (**Table 11**). Two-thirds (66.6%) of world Jewry lived in the five previously mentioned largest areas plus the following six: Miami/Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, Paris, and Boston-Cambridge-Newton. In 2019, the 19 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish population, each with 100,000 Jews or more, encompassed 75.8% – over three quarters – of all Jews worldwide.

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and surpassing 3.5 million Jews by the *core* definition, largely exceeded that in the New York MSA, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.1 million Jews. Of the 19 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, eleven were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, and Argentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being national or regional capitals, enjoying higher standards of living, with highly developed infrastructures for higher education and hi-tech, and widespread transnational connections. The Tel Aviv area also featured the highest percent of core Jewish among total population (91.1%), followed at a distance by Jerusalem (72.6%), Haifa (66.8%), and Beersheba (57.5%). In the diaspora, the highest percent of Jews in a metropolitan area was in New York (10.6%), followed by Miami-Fort Lauderdale (8.6%), San Francisco (5.2%), Washington (4.8%), and Philadelphia (4.6%).

Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. Especially in the US, the differences may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. The respective estimates of part-year residents were excluded from the estimates in **Table 11**. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and some may even commute weekly (Pupko 2013). The case of Israelis regularly commuting abroad for work has also become more frequent.

Table 11 Metropolitan areas (CSAs) with core Jewish populations above 100,000, 1/1/2019

Rank	Metropolitan area ^a	Country	Core Jewish population	% Jews out of total population	% of world Jewish population	
					%	Cumulative%
1	Tel Aviv ^b	Israel	3,569,500	91.1	24.3	24.3
2	New York-Newark-Jersey City	U.S.	2,107,800	10.6	14.3	38.6
3	Jerusalem ^c	Israel	932,900	72.6	6.3	44.9
4	Haifa ^d	Israel	625,600	66.8	4.3	49.2
5	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim	U.S.	617,500	4.6	4.2	53.4
6	Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach	U.S.	535,500	8.6	3.6	57.0
7	Washington-Arlington-Alexandria	U.S.	297,300	4.8	2.0	59.1
8	Chicago-Naperville-Elgin	U.S.	294,300	3.1	2.0	61.1
9	Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington	U.S.	283,500	4.6	1.9	63.0
10	Paris ^e	France	275,000	2.3	1.9	64.9
11	Boston-Cambridge-Newton	U.S.	257,500	3.6	1.8	66.6
12	San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley	U.S.	244,000	5.2	1.7	68.3
13	Be'er Sheva ^f	Israel	221,300	57.5	1.5	69.8
14	London ^g	U.K.	195,000	1.0	1.3	71.1
15	Toronto ^h	Canada	190,000	3.1	1.3	72.4
16	Buenos Aires ⁱ	Argentina	159,000	1.2	1.1	73.5
17	Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta	U.S.	119,800	2.0	0.8	74.3
18	Baltimore-Columbia-Towson	U.S.	115,800	1.9	0.8	75.1
19	San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad	U.S.	100,000	3.0	0.7	75.8

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country. The US metropolitan areas are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined by the US Office of Management and Budget. See www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/demo/metro-micro/delineationfiles.html. A table of the population of the top 20 MSAs can be found in Chapter 5 of this volume. Some of the US estimates are not core Jewish populations and are closer to enlarged Jewish populations. Israel metropolitan areas are defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, Ashdod Subdistrict, and sections of Judea and Samaria area. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikva, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZion, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000

c Includes Jerusalem District and parts of the Judea and Samaria District. Includes Bet Shemesh with over 100,000 Jewish population.

d Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District.

e Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95

f Includes Beersheba Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District.

g Greater London and contiguous postcode areas

h Census Metropolitan Area

i Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A

Section 6 Major Determinants of Demographic Change

The changes in the size and composition of Jewish populations outlined above reflect a chain of interrelated factors each of which in turn depends on a complex array of explanatory determinants. We briefly review here two of these factors – international migration and age composition – which help understanding the mechanisms behind the demographic polarization that has emerged between Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora.

International Migration

Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migration of Jews is quite imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants as such by single country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit et al. 2010). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2017; Eurostat 2015). Jewish organizations, like HIAS—formerly the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS 2013) in the US or the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on a yearly basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.

Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the FSU opened its doors to emigration at the end of 1989. Of the estimated over 1.7 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2018 including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel's share of the total increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years of 1990-1991. It then decreased to 41% in 2002-2004 and increased again in subsequent years—significantly so in 2018. The US significantly lost weight as a destination for FSU migrants since the onset of the 21st century, as was the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany since 2005. These remarkable increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU—as a whole and throughout its different regional realities—during times of rapid geopolitical change and shifts in economic opportunities, as well as real or expected disruptions in the societal environment affecting Jewish life. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic options in the main countries of destination.

Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948 and 1968, and about 60% between 1969 and 2015 (Amit and DellaPergola 2016). Clearly migration, or rather a migration balance producing a net surplus to Israel, reduces the population of the Diaspora and increases the Jewish population of Israel. **Table 12** shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2017 and 2018. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core* Jewish population, definition.

Table 12 New immigrants to Israel^a, by last country of residence, 2017-2018

Country	2017	2018	Country	2017	2018	Country	2017	2018
GRAND TOTAL^b	26,333	28,118	Germany	154	170	Kazakhstan	131	203
America - Total^b	4,225	4,146	Greece	9	6	Kyrgyzstan	21	23
North America	2,848	2,759	Hungary	52	36	Tadjikistan	7	6
Canada	280	245	Ireland	2	1	Turkmenistan	24	16
United States	2,568	2,514	Italy	115	74	Uzbekistan	208	200
Central America	135	144	Luxembourg	1	4	Other Asia	226	227
Bahamas	1	0	Malta	0	7	China	9	19
Costa Rica	16	10	Netherlands	50	62	Hong Kong	7	1
Cuba	5	2	Poland	18	24	India	56	111
Dominican Rep.	3	0	Portugal	4	7	Indonesia	0	1
El Salvador	5	5	Romania	10	22	Iraq	1	1
Guadeloupe	8	1	Slovenia	1	0	Iran	131	76
Guatemala	3	8	Slovakia	1	6	Japan	2	2
Honduras	1	5	Spain	88	63	Korea South	2	0
Jamaica	1	0	Sweden	28	20	Nepal	1	0
Mexico	76	93	United Kingdom	469	514	Philippines	5	2
Panama	16	20	FSU in Europe	15,369	18,123	Singapore	3	3
South America	1,242	1,243	Belarus	952	943	Sri Lanka	1	0
Argentina	247	283	Estonia	5	7	Taiwan	1	0
Bolivia	4	5	Latvia	49	48	Thailand	7	7
Brazil	619	586	Lithuania	25	42	Vietnam	0	4
Chile	26	34	Moldova	196	173	Africa - Total^b	432	363
Colombia	74	84	Russian Fed.	7,109	10,474	Northern Africa	143	99
Ecuador	9	13	Ukraine	7,027	6,428	Ethiopia	43	31
Paraguay	9	8	FSU unspecified	6	8	Morocco	57	52
Peru	57	47	Other West Eur.	87	89	Tunisia	43	16
Uruguay	69	54	Gibraltar	1	2	Sub-Sahara Afr.	289	264
Venezuela	128	129	Monaco	1	5	Congo	3	2
Europe - Total^b	20,197	22,041	Norway	1	3	Ghana	0	1
European Union^c	4,356	3,628	Switzerland	84	79	Mozambique	0	1
Austria	25	26	Balkans	385	201	Namibia	0	3
Belgium	119	108	Albania	5	0	Ruanda	1	0
Bulgaria	14	6	Serbia	11	12	Nigeria	1	0
Croatia	2	1	Turkey	369	189	Tanzania	1	0
Cyprus	0	5	Asia - Total^b	1,001	991	South Africa	282	256
Czech Republic	13	18	FSU in Asia	775	764	Zimbabwe	1	1
Denmark	12	9	Armenia	48	9	Oceania - Total	140	121
Finland	9	8	Azerbaijan	131	131	Australia	140	117
France	3,160	2,431	Georgia	205	176	New Zealand	0	4

a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including temporary residents, returning Israelis, and immigrant citizens

b Including country unknown

c Not including the Baltic countries

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data

In 2018, Jewish international migration slightly increased versus the previous year. In recent years, the volume of Jewish migration was far from the peaks of the past, due to the increasing concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the rapidly decreasing Jewish population in the less developed countries which also were the main areas of Jewish emigration. We already noted the clearly negative relationship that prevails between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate. At the same time perceptions and experiences of mounting antisemitism in some countries, particularly in France, stimulated Jewish emigration in more recent years. In the foreseeable future, a continuation of moderate levels of migration can be expected, provided that current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions are not seriously disrupted across the global system, especially in Europe. From this point of view, the UK withdrawal (Brexit) from the European Union might carry significant economic and demographic consequences in the longer term.

In 2018, 28,118 new immigrants arrived in Israel from 87 countries and territories, compared to 26,333 in 2017 (a 6.8% increase and the highest of the past 10 years), 25,010 in 2016, 27,850 in 2015, 24,066 in 2014, and 16,882 in 2013. In 2018, immigration to Israel increased from the European but not the Asian republics of the FSU, Latin America, and Asia, while it diminished from all areas in Europe other than the FSU, North America, Africa, and Oceania. Migration toward other countries did not necessarily follow the same patterns of change over the years. Indeed, Israeli immigration law (the Law of Return) allows for comparatively easier access and immediate citizenship to Jewish migrants and their families, but the integration difficulties experienced in Israel by some immigrants may have created a deterrent. One case in point is immigration from France which, after an all-time peak in 2015 (6,627), declined to 4,147 in 2016, 3,160 in 2017, and 2,431 in 2018. Russia was the main country of origin in 2018 (10,474 immigrants vs. 7,109 immigrants in 2017), followed by Ukraine (6,428 vs. 7,027), the US (2,514 vs. 2,568), and France. No other country had more than 1,000 migrants to Israel. Among countries with more than 100 immigrants, minuscule increases occurred from the UK, Argentina, Germany, Venezuela, and India. Declines were recorded from Belarus, Brazil, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Canada, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Georgia, Moldova, Australia, and Belgium. Azerbaijan was stable. Only 31 immigrants arrived from Ethiopia in 2018 compared to 43 in 2017. To these figures, one should add several thousand immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than many Western countries. This made Israel a reasonably attractive option for international migration.

Figure 10 demonstrates the annual changes in the number of immigrants to Israel from six of the major countries of origin: Russia, Ukraine, the US, France, the aggregate of Latin American countries, and Ethiopia. Clearly the fluctuations reflected local circumstances in each country and not one common underlying determinant, possibly related to the receiving country Israel. Occasional peaks are related in Ukraine to civil war and the armed conflict with Russia; in Latin America, the collapse of the Central Bank in Argentina in 2002; in France mounting terrorism and antisemitism; and in Ethiopia the variable policies adopted by Israel's government toward bringing more or less of the candidates for immigration who still reside in transition camps in Addis Ababa and elsewhere. The bottom panel of **Figure 10** demonstrates the frequency of migration to

Israel per 1000 Jewish population in each country of origin and each year (using a logarithmic scale). The highest frequencies initially appeared in Ethiopia, reflecting a systematic repatriation policy which has been discontinued after 2010. The significantly high frequencies in Russia and the Ukraine reflect the security conditions of border areas, but also a quite deeper socioeconomic disease. Increases in France due to security uncertainty seem to have been counteracted by difficulties experienced with immigrants' absorption in Israel. In Latin America the situation partially normalized after the above-mentioned economic bankruptcy. The US continued to feature the lowest propensity for emigration of any other country – though very slowly increasing. Emigration frequencies are clearly ordered according to the level of development of countries. However, France, though being more developed than Latin America featured higher migration frequencies, thus demonstrating the effects of a diminishing sense of security and growing disenchantment with society. While it cannot be disputed that the preference for Israel as a country of destination over competing countries is significantly affected by Jewish norms and values, *aliyah* seems nevertheless to follow the logic of global development.

On the other hand, Israel—in part because of its small market and the limits this imposes upon some employment opportunities—is today probably the main single source of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and to other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010; Rebhun et al. 2016). Levels of emigration from Israel are overall low, consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of human development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings illustrate the primacy of socioeconomic determinants related to both the basic level of development of a country and its current economic situation, along with variations in the stringency of regulations about immigrant admissions. The effects of ideological, security, and fear-related factors end up as weaker determinants of the volume and timing of Jewish immigration and emigration – namely to and from Israel.

Age Composition

The age composition of a population is a fundamental mediator between demographic processes that precede a certain point in time and the processes that unfold after that point. Age structures are sensitive to the composition of migrants which usually include some over-representation of younger adults and their children. Exceptions occur when the immigrants include a large share of elderly persons as has been the case for migration from the FSU to Germany, or even to the US and Israel over the past decades. In general, populations in the sending countries tend to become older as a consequence of migration, while populations in the receiving countries tend to become younger. But, as just noted, immigration may also cause aging of the receiving population.

The birth rate, however, is the main determinant of the age composition of a population. Large cohorts reflecting years of high birth rates, as was the case in the US during the baby-boom years (1946-1964), produce a younger population. A persistent high birth rate, as in Israel, produces an expanding population in which each cohort is followed by a slightly larger one, so creating a graphical image of a pyramid. Low birth rates, as typical of most Jewish populations outside of Israel, generate smaller cohorts which sometimes are smaller than those born several years before and in the extreme case may produce a graphic image of an upside down pyramid. In recent years some upward reversal in the Jewish birth rate occurred in the UK, Austria, and possibly

Australia. In **Figure 11**, we demonstrate four different age structures among contemporary Jewish populations, reflecting different stages of demographic transformation. All data refer to the core definition.

Israel, here portrayed in 2016 for the sake of comparisons (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics) is the only case where each age group is larger than the one immediately older. The largest age group was 0-14. Israel actually is the only country in the world with a high child dependency ratio (greater than 45%) along with a relatively high old-age dependency ratio (greater than or equal to 15%). It is included by the UN in the double dependency category (United Nations Population Division 2017). At the opposite extreme, Germany in 2018 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2018) had an extremely elderly age distribution, where the largest group is 65 and over. The US in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013), and the UK in 2011 (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2012), represent intermediate cases but with some important differences. Both the US and UK Jewish populations underwent significant aging and had relatively low birth rates during the past 50 years. In the US, the effects of the baby boom were visible, with the by far largest age group being those age 45-64 in 2013, born 1949-1968. There were significantly fewer children age 0-14 than young adults age 15-29. In the UK, aging was significant as well, but the effects of the post-World War II baby boom were significantly less and there were again more children than young adults in 2011. Such rejuvenation reflected the growing impact of Haredi Jews among the UK total Jewish population.

As a benchmark for future demographic change, these very different age structures portend very different scenarios. Those countries with large elderly cohorts will unavoidably experience some numerical decline – assuming no major future migrations. Populations that are currently younger will have more of a chance to having children and possibly increasing or keeping their size stable, as well as holding a growing share of world Jewish population.





Fig. 10 Number of immigrants to Israel from major countries of origin, and rate of immigrants per 1000 Jews 2001-2018




Fig. 11 Age structures of selected Jewish populations, 2011-2018, percentages

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Since inception, the *American Jewish Year Book* has documented the Jewish world and has given significant attention to Jewish population issues. Since 1981, responsibility for preparing annual population estimates for world Jewry was taken by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Division was founded by Roberto Bachi in 1959, was headed by Uziel O. Schmelz until 1986, by the present author until 2010, and by Uzi Rebhun since 2010. Jewish population estimates appeared in the AJYB, then under the aegis of the American Jewish Committee, until 2008. Since 2010, our world Jewish population estimates appeared in the framework of the North American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish DataBank), and since 2012 within the renewed *American Jewish Year Book*. World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009 and as of January 1, 2011 were prepared for publication but not issued. The interested reader may consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained (especially Schmelz 1981 and DellaPergola 2015a).

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Appendix

Definitions

In most Diaspora countries, the **core Jewish population (CJP)**—a concept initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews, *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps, but does not necessarily coincide, with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria (Jewish only, no religion). Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another identity, and those of Jewish origin who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted. The *core* population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources.

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings, which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities

and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

A major research issue of growing impact is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the 2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey-NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in the *core* Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. A further category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).

The 2013 Pew Research Center's *A Portrait of Jewish Americans* (Pew Research Center 2013), by introducing the previously not empirically tested concept of *partly Jewish*, helped clarify the demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and the comparison of results more ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerns the status of the *partly Jewish* as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as some analysts would have it. Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in some total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers would suggest that the *partly Jewish* stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories of *Non-Jews with Jewish background*, or *Non-Jews feeling some Jewish affinity*. Recent research experience indicates that people may shift their identities over time across the different layers of the *core* Jewish definition, and between different *core* and *non-core* statuses. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary identifying as Jewish and as something else and vice versa in response to the particular context or moment when the question about identity is being tested. At any particular moment, then, there will be a countable Jewish population, which is not necessarily the same as the previous or the following moment.

Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of ***total population with at least one Jewish parent (PJP)*** includes the *core* Jewish population plus anyone currently not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey, the total population with Jewish parents besides the *core* comprised two sub-groups: (a) persons who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish, and (b) persons who report not being Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013).

The ***enlarged Jewish population (EJP)***—a concept initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) further expands by including the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are *partly Jewish*; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish parent; and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with Jewish background,

as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most Jews who are identified in the Pew survey as *partly Jewish* or as *PJBs* who are not part of the US *core* Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of *multiple ethnicities*, naturally should be included under the *enlarged* definition. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households.

The ***Law of Return population (LRP)*** reflects Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants. The Law of Return awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return* (Gavison 2009), a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform) who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews with Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law itself does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities—but only for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the *Law of Return*. Articles 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to *all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren*, as well as to *their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses*. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so-called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998 and 2018). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand their reach strategies to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions than to the *core* definition.

Presentation and quality of data

Jewish population estimates in this chapter refer to January 1, 2019. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence some margin of inaccuracy. For example, a wealth of the data about

Israel's population becomes available annually when the *American Jewish Year Book* is already in print. Some of Israel's data here are the product of estimates based on the most recent trends, but may need adjustment when the actual data are released. Indeed, where appropriate, we revise our previous estimates in light of newly acquired information. Corrections also were applied retroactively to the 2018 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2019 estimates. Corrections of the 2019 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident core Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in the Appendix an estimate of 1) mid-year 2018 total (including both Jews and non-Jews) country population (Population Reference Bureau 2019); 2) the estimated January 1, 2019 core Jewish population (CJP); 3) the number of Jews per 1000 total population; and 4) a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The last three columns provide rough estimates of the population with Jewish parents (PJP), the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of all non-Jewish members in a Jewish household (EJP), and the Law of Return population (LRP). These figures were derived from available information and assessments on the recent extent and generational depth of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective core Jewish populations, and the data should be taken as indicative only.

Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be better to indicate a range for the number of Jews (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counting. Wherever possible, we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents. (This is similar to the part-year resident, or “snowbird” issue in estimating the US Jewish population in Sheskin and Dashefsky, in this volume.)

Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. We report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of the sources used in this study. In the **Appendix table** the main types of sources are indicated as follows:

(C) National population census. This in theory would be the best source, but undercounts and over counts do occur in several countries which need to be evaluated.

(P) National population register. Some countries, besides the periodical census, also keep a permanent population register which is constantly updated through detailed accountancy of individual demographic events.

(S) Survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities, undertaken most often by a Jewish community organization, and sometimes by a public

organization.

(J) Jewish community register kept by a central Jewish community organization.

(E) Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organization.

Our estimates reflect these sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily correspond exactly with those indicated in the given sources. When necessary, additional information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates. The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each country's Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the Appendix table, as follows:

(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country during the intervening period.

(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening period.

(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.

(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

The year in which a country's base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2018 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola et al. 2000b; and author's current updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments that occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used findings from these projections to refine the 2019 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

Appendix Table. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2019

Country	Total population ^a	Core Jewish population ^b CJP	Jews per 1000 total population	Source		Population with Jewish parent ^e PJP	Enlarged Jewish population ^f EJP	Law of Return population ^g LRP	
				Type ^c	Accuracy rating ^d				
WORLD	7,620,497,000	14,707,400	1.93			17,917,750	20,876,400	23,674,400	
AMERICA TOTAL	1,014,023,000	6,469,900	6.38			8,955,300	11,156,200	13,418,300	
Bermuda	61,000	100	1.64	C	C 2016	200	300		400
Canada	37,200,000	392,000	10.54	C	B 2018	450,000	550,000		700,000
United States	328,000,000	5,700,000	17.38	S	B 2013	8,000,000	10,000,000		12,000,000
Total North America^h	365,323,000	6,092,100	16.68			8,450,200	10,550,300	12,700,400	
Bahamas	400,000	300	0.75	C	D 1990	500	700		900
Costa Rica	5,000,000	2,500	0.50	J	C 1993	2,800	3,100		3,400
Cuba	11,100,000	500	0.05	S	C 2013	1,000	1,500		2,000
Dominican Republic	10,800,000	100	0.01	E	D 2000	200	300		400
El Salvador	6,500,000	100	0.02	E	C 1993	200	300		400
Guatemala	17,200,000	900	0.05	S	B 1999	1,200	1,500		1,800
Jamaica	2,900,000	200	0.07	J	C 2010	300	400		500
Mexico	130,800,000	40,000	0.31	C,S	B 2010	45,000	50,000		65,000
Netherlands Antilles	324,000	300	0.93	C	C 2016	500	700		900
Panama	4,200,000	10,000	2.38	S	C 2012	11,000	12,000		13,000
Puerto Rico	3,300,000	1,500	0.45	J	C 2000	2,000	2,500		3,000
Virgin Islands	105,000	400	3.81	E	D 2016	600	700		800
Other	29,371,000	200	0.01		D 2016	400	600		800
Total Central Amer., Caribbean	222,000,000	57,000	0.26			65,700	74,300	92,900	
Argentina	44,500,000	180,000	4.04	S	B 2003	260,000	310,000		360,000
Bolivia	11,300,000	500	0.04	J	C 2009	700	900		1,100
Brazil	209,400,000	92,600	0.44	C	B 2010	120,000	150,000		180,000
Chile	18,600,000	18,300	0.98	C	B 2002	21,000	25,000		30,000
Colombia	49,800,000	2,100	0.04	S	C 2010	2,800	3,500		4,500
Ecuador	17,000,000	600	0.04	J	B 2011	800	1,000		1,200
Paraguay	6,900,000	1,000	0.14	C	B 2002	1,300	1,600		1,900
Peru	32,200,000	1,900	0.06	S	C 1993	2,400	3,000		3,500
Suriname	600,000	200	0.33	J	D 2000	400	600		800
Uruguay	3,500,000	16,600	4.74	S	B 2013	20,000	24,000		28,000
Venezuela	31,800,000	7,000	0.22	S	C 2012	10,000	12,000		14,000
Total South America^h	426,700,000	320,800	0.75			439,400	531,600	625,000	
EUROPE TOTAL	827,974,000	1,340,200	1.62			1,814,000	2,319,400	2,813,800	
Austria	8,800,000	10,000	1.14	C,J	B 2018	X 14,000	17,000		20,000
Belgium	11,400,000	29,100	2.55	J	C 2018	35,000	40,000		45,000
Bulgaria	7,000,000	2,000	0.29	C,J	C 2011	4,000	6,000		8,000
Croatia	4,100,000	1,700	0.41	C,J	C 2001	2,400	3,100		3,800
Cyprus	1,200,000	100	0.08	E	D 2012	200	300		400
Czechia	10,600,000	3,900	0.37	C,J	C 2011	5,000	6,500		8,000
Denmark	5,800,000	6,400	1.10	S	C 2018	7,500	8,500		9,500
Estonia	1,300,000	1,900	1.46	C,P	A 2017	2,700	3,500		4,500
Finland	5,500,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010	1,600	1,900		2,200
France ⁱ	65,140,000	450,000	6.91	S	B 2018	550,000	650,000		750,000
Germany	82,800,000	118,000	1.43	J	B 2018	150,000	225,000		275,000

Country	Total population ^a	Core Jewish population ^b CJP	Jews per 1000 total population	Source		Population with Jewish parent ^e PJP	Enlarged Jewish population ^f EJP	Law of Return population ^g LRP	
				Type ^c	Accuracy rating ^d				
Greece	10,600,000	4,200	0.40	J	B 2000		5,200	6,000	7,000
Hungary	9,800,000	47,300	4.83	C	C 2018		75,000	100,000	130,000
Ireland	4,900,000	2,600	0.53	C	B 2016		3,600	5,000	6,500
Italy	60,600,000	27,400	0.45	S,J	B 2018		34,000	41,000	48,000
Latvia	1,900,000	4,600	2.42	C,P	A 2017		8,000	12,000	16,000
Lithuania	2,800,000	2,400	0.86	C,P	B 2011		4,700	7,500	10,500
Luxembourg	600,000	600	1.00	J	B 2000		800	1,000	1,200
Malta	500,000	100	0.20	E	D 2012		200	300	400
Netherlands	17,200,000	29,800	1.73	S	B 2018		43,000	53,000	63,000
Poland	38,400,000	4,500	0.12	C,J	C 2018		7,000	10,000	13,000
Portugal	10,300,000	600	0.06	C	C 2001		800	1,000	1,200
Romania	19,500,000	9,000	0.46	C,J	B 2002		13,000	17,000	20,000
Slovakia	5,400,000	2,600	0.48	C	C 2011		3,600	4,600	6,000
Slovenia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C	C 2003		200	300	400
Spain	46,700,000	11,700	0.25	J	C 2018		15,000	18,000	21,000
Sweden	10,200,000	15,000	1.47	S	C 2018		20,000	25,000	30,000
United Kingdom ^j	66,600,000	292,000	4.38	C,S	B 2018	X	330,000	370,000	410,000
Total European Union 28	511,740,000	1,078,900	2.11				1,336,500	1,633,500	1,910,600
Gibraltar	35,000	700	20.00	C	B 2019	X	800	900	1,000
Norway	5,300,000	1,300	0.25	P	B 2010		1,600	2,000	2,500
Switzerland	8,500,000	18,500	2.18	C	B 2012		22,000	25,000	28,000
Total other West Europeⁿ	14,434,000	20,500	1.42				24,400	27,900	31,500
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,500,000	500	0.14	C	C 2001		800	1,100	1,400
North Macedonia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C	C 1996		200	300	400
Serbia	7,000,000	1,400	0.20	C	C 2001		2,100	2,800	3,500
Turkey ^k	81,300,000	14,800	0.18	S,J	B 2016		19,000	21,000	23,000
Other	5,300,000	100	0.02		D 2016		200	300	400
Total Balkans	99,200,000	16,900	0.17				22,300	25,500	28,700
Belarus	9,500,000	9,000	0.95	C	B 2009		17,000	25,000	33,000
Moldova	3,500,000	1,900	0.54	C	B 2014		3,800	7,500	10,000
Russia ^k	147,300,000	165,000	1.12	C	C 2010	X	320,000	460,000	600,000
Ukraine	42,300,000	48,000	1.13	C	C 2001	X	90,000	140,000	200,000
Total FSU Republics	202,600,000	223,900	1.11				430,800	632,500	843,000
[Total FSU in Europe]^l	208,600,000	232,800	1.12				446,200	655,500	874,000
ASIA TOTAL	4,453,500,000	6,699,700	1.50				6,928,050	7,157,100	7,174,300
Israel ^m	8,543,109	6,246,700	731.20	C,P	A 2019	X	6,455,611	6,664,509	6,664,509
West Bank ⁿ	3,023,700	418,900	138.54	C,P	A 2019	X	423,339	427,791	427,791
Gaza ⁿ	1,886,500	0	0.00	C,P	A 2019		0	0	0
Total Israel and Palestinian Territory^o	13,453,250	6,665,600	495.46				6,878,950	7,092,300	7,092,300
[Total State of Israel]^p	8,970,900	6,665,600	743.02				6,878,950	7,092,300	7,092,300
Armenia	3,000,000	100	0.03	C	B 2011		300	500	700
Azerbaijan	9,900,000	7,500	0.76	C	B 2009		10,500	15,500	20,500
Georgia	3,900,000	1,500	0.38	C	B 2014		3,000	5,000	7,500
Kazakhstan	18,400,000	2,600	0.14	C	B 2009		4,800	6,500	9,500
Kyrgyzstan	6,100,000	400	0.07	C	B 2009		700	1,000	1,500

Country	Total population ^a	Core Jewish population ^b CJP	Jews per 1000 total population	Source		Population with Jewish parent ^e PJP	Enlarged Jewish population ^f EJP	Law of Return population ^g LRP	
				Type ^c	Accuracy rating ^d				
Turkmenistan	5,900,000	200	0.03	C	D 1995	400	600		800
Uzbekistan	32,900,000	3,000	0.09	C	D 1989	6,000	8,000		10,000
Total former USSR in Asia^h	89,200,000	15,300	0.17			25,700	37,100		50,500
China ^q	1,401,900,000	3,000	0.00	E	D 2015	3,200	3,400		3,600
India	1,371,300,000	4,800	0.00	C	C 2011	6,000	7,500		9,000
Indonesia	265,200,000	100	0.00	E	D 2016	200	300		400
Iran	81,600,000	8,300	0.10	C	B 2012	10,500	12,000		13,000
Japan	126,500,000	1,000	0.01	E	D 2015	1,200	1,400		1,600
Philippines	107,000,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000	200	300		400
Singapore	5,800,000	900	0.16	J	C 2015	1,000	1,200		1,400
South Korea	51,800,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015	200	300		400
Syria ^r	18,300,000	100	0.01	E	D 2015	200	300		400
Taiwan	23,600,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000	200	300		400
Thailand	66,200,000	200	0.00	E	D 2015	300	400		500
Other	831,646,750	100	0.00		D 2016	200	300		400
Total other Asia	4,350,846,750	18,800	0.00			23,400	27,700		31,500
AFRICA TOTAL	1,284,000,000	72,000	0.06			81,700	88,900		97,100
Egypt	97,000,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015	200	300		400
Ethiopia	107,500,000	100	0.00	S	C 2015	500	1,000		2,500
Morocco	35,200,000	2,100	0.06	J	C 2015	2,500	2,800		3,100
Tunisia	11,600,000	1,000	0.09	J	C 2015	1,200	1,400		1,600
Total Northern Africa^h	342,800,000	3,300	0.01			4,400	5,500		7,600
Botswana	2,200,000	100	0.05	E	C 1993	200	300		400
Congo D.R.	84,300,000	100	0.00	E	C 1993	200	300		400
Kenya	51,000,000	300	0.01	J	C 1990	500	700		900
Madagascar	26,300,000	100	0.00	J	D 2016	200	300		400
Namibia	2,500,000	100	0.04	C	C 1993	200	300		400
Nigeria	195,900,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000	200	300		400
South Africa	57,700,000	67,500	1.17	C,S	B 2018	X 75,000	80,000		85,000
Zimbabwe	14,000,000	200	0.01	C	B 2001	400	600		800
Other	507,300,000	200	0.00		D 2016	400	600		800
Total Sub-Saharan Africa^s	941,200,000	68,700	0.07			77,300	83,400		89,500
OCEANIA TOTAL	41,000,000	125,600	3.06			138,700	154,800		170,900
Australia	24,100,000	118,000	4.90	C	A 2016	X 130,000	145,000		160,000
New Zealand	4,900,000	7,500	1.53	C	B 2006	8,500	9,500		10,500
Other	12,000,000	100	0.01		D 2016	200	300		400

a Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2019) and United Nations Population Division (2018). Mid-year 2018 estimates

b Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity

c (C) National population census. (P) National population register. (S) Survey of Jewish population. (J) Jewish community register. (E) Estimate.

d (A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base

estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial coverage of country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends. (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. In categories A, B, and C, the year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2019 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information

e Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent

f Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)

g Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification

h Including countries and territories not listed because fewer than 100 core Jews live in each of those countries and in all of those countries combined

i Including Monaco

j Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man

k Including Asian regions

l Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU

m Including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, not including the West Bank

n Author's revised estimates of total Palestinian population on 1/1/2019: West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,595,900; Gaza: 1,886,500; Total: 4,482,400. The West Bank also includes 418,900 Jews and 8,900 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, for a total of 427,800 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 3,023,700 includes Palestinian, Jewish and other residents

o Not including foreign workers and refugees

p Israel's total permanent (de jure) population as defined by Israel's legal system, not including foreign workers and refugees

q Including Hong Kong and Macao

r Jewish population includes Lebanon

s Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa

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² The following is the full list of sources utilized in the preparation of this chapter. Some of the sources may not be listed in the text.

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